



WHY EDUCATION POLICIES FAIL: MULTIPLE STREAMS MODEL OF POLICYMAKING

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Abstract. In this paper, the author first presents a Multiple Streams model of policymaking introduced by John Kingdon and elaborated by Robert W. Porter. The relevance and usefulness of the model are then exemplified by analyzing a reform in Argentine education. Kingdon and Porter argued that, for education policies to succeed, the following three streams of actions need to meet: problem must be clearly defined, feasible solutions offered, and political consensus obtained. In 1993, Argentina passed the Federal Law of Education in the attempt to reduce large educational inequities between the rich and the poor. The Law largely failed because (1) problems were narrowly defined only by the government, (2) solutions were one-sided, primarily focusing on the financial, and neglecting contextual and implementation problems, and (3) political will existed only at the highest level, while actual capacities of implementing units were far below those needed for the reform. Analyzing policies through the lens of the Multiple Streams model of policymaking is recommended for other policymakers.

Key words: Porter, Multiple Streams model, Argentina, Federal Law of Education, Education policy, reform.

Multiple Streams model

In traditional model of policymaking, the following temporally and functionally distinct stages are recognized (Porter, 1995): (1) identification of policy problems, (2) agenda setting (focusing governmental attention to the problem), (3) development of policy proposals, (4) adoption of policies, (5) implementation of policies, and, (6) evaluation of policies' implementation and impact. This Policy Stages model and its variants were more useful than earlier institutional approaches to policymaking in that they: (1) focused attention to the process of policymaking rather than on various institutions in charge of policymaking, (2) evaluated intended and unintended consequences of policies and treated them as starting points for future policies,

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and (3) dissected complex policymaking into discrete, manageable, rational analytical units (Porter, 1995).

However, Kingdon (1984) and Porter (1995) noted that many authors rightfully criticized this traditional model as too rational and linear, in that it did not accurately reflect actual policymaking, which is often unsystematic, disorderly, and politically charged. In real world, it is often that only one policy option is considered, that political compromise requires that policies be vaguely defined, or that politicians pick information about existing problems only to push a predetermined solution that is on their own agenda.

Following Kingdon (1984) and according to Porter (1995), needed changes in policymaking can come about when multiple sets of activities (so called “streams”) – defining the problem, suggesting solutions, and obtaining political consensus – occur simultaneously, thus opening a window of opportunity for the changes to happen. *Problems* stream denotes which social conditions are perceived by people as problems which need to be remedied by government action. Citizens, media, and interest groups often define problems and their potential causes. Frequently, it is difficult to clearly define the problem and its history because many actors lobby for their own views about them. *Solutions* stream consists of policy alternatives that are generated by mid-level government officials and administrators, policy advocates, and academics. Well crafted policy solutions entail sensitive development of sequence, content, and timing of reform, translation of policy directives into programs, generation of strategies for adoption of policy and management of the opposition, and taking advantage of supporters of the reform. *Politics* stream consists of political events that may or may not be favorable to the policy. Elections, changes in government ministers, and public protests can powerfully influence whether or not a particular problem will actually be solved. The Multiple Streams model is not linear, since three streams flow relatively independently through the policy system; ideally, a compelling problem is linked to a plausible solution that is politically feasible. In reality though, strong efforts must be devoted to making the three streams meet (through lobbying, research, communication, coalitions, interactions, bargaining, media, etc), and, further, to prolong their simultaneous flow.

Multiple Streams model is useful because it argues that numerous real-life contextual factors – political events, bureaucratic procedures, interest groups, etc. – largely shape the future of a public policy. It forces all interested and involved actors to recognize realities of policymaking and pragmatically act to see policies come to life. Also, like the traditional Policy Stages model, it allows for policies to be dissected and analyzed in

broad, generalized terms (problems, solutions, and politics). Such analysis can be very educational and highly valuable to other policymakers who are faced with social problems that need to be fixed in a given political milieu.

To exemplify the usefulness of the Multiple Streams model, an educational reform in Argentina will be analyzed. First, a short section below will highlight the successes and pitfalls of the Argentine Federal Law of Education. Then, the subsequent sections will show that lack of convergence of problems, solutions and politics streams contributed to failure of Argentina's attempt to address its educational ills.

Background: Argentine Federal Law of Education

In 2001, Argentina had the sixteenth largest economy in the world (Dupre, 2001), the largest middle class in South America, and per capita income of \$8,970/person (World Bank, 2000). However, Argentina also had one of the most unequal income disparities and inequalities between its rich and poor inhabitants, with education being among the hardest hit (Watkins, 1999; World Bank, 2000).

In 1993, Argentina passed the Federal Law of Education whose primary goal was to equalize the opportunity of quality schooling among its population, i.e. to compensate for the education disadvantages faced by Argentina's poorest children. The national Ministry of Education developed a Social Education Plan (Plan Social Educativo, or PSE), which aimed to provide special pedagogical instruction to the poorest children, support teacher development, finance repairing and building of schools, and establish scholarships to help students from the disadvantaged families stay in secondary school.

In 1998, the PSE impacted 21,542 or 47.6% of schools and nearly 3 million or 34.5% of students mostly attending primarily pre-school and primary school. The initial results showed that PSE was strongly pro-poor: 60% of PSE beneficiaries came from the poorest quintile of population, while 80% accounted for two poorest quintiles (World Bank, 2000). In addition, the results obtained after five years were quite tangible: almost 2,000 schools were built, and 13,000,000 textbooks and 5,600 computers delivered (Reimers, 2000). More importantly, the repetition rate in primary school declined, and the primary students' academic achievement improved. Furthermore, the most positive results were found in those provinces with the largest number of homes where basic needs were unmet (Reimers, 2000).

However, the Social Education Plan neglected the needs of the poor at the secondary educational level. Enrollment rates in secondary school

between 1992 and 1997 have actually decreased from 70% to 62% for the poorest 10% of students, and from 75% to 69% for the second poorest segment (World Bank, 2000). Only 24% of those between 18 and 24 years of age among the poor had secondary education (World Bank, 2000). In 1974, 30% of university students were coming from the lower 50% of the population, while in 1998 that number was only 11% (Rozada & Menendez, 2000). At the same time, the bar to the minimum educational level required by many employers had been raised: the completion of secondary education had become a minimum requirement to enter formal employment because of new productive processes and the growing competition in the labor market (World Bank, 1998). Those who did not satisfy the requirement were mostly doomed to low-paid menial labor (World Bank, 2000).

In addition, the Social Education Plan mostly focused on providing the children in primary school with the appropriate “infrastructure” – textbooks and classrooms. These provisions had effects (as they improved student achievement and lowered the drop-out rates of poor children), but only to a certain level. The Social Education Plan was a compensatory policy that could not remedy all it had set out to do, since its major tool – financial help to the poor schools – was limited in the amount, but also in the extent to which it could solve the problems not necessarily dependent on money (such as teacher distribution rules or inefficient teacher training, as will be seen later).

Problems stream

As previously said, for a social condition to be a problem, people must perceive it is such, and also see it as the condition amenable to a government action (Porter, 1995). In Argentina, prior to the passing of the Federal Law, everyone seemed to think that education was in serious crisis – the government, the parents, the students, the teachers. During five military periods between 1930 and 1983, Argentine education suffered immensely: universities were infiltrated by secret police, university autonomy ended, students persecuted, teachers fired and professors disappeared (Rock, 1993). Teacher salaries were low and quality of teaching diluted (Leonard, 1999). First democratic government of Raul Alfonsín did not produce desired changes in Argentine education. During this period, a National Pedagogical Congress (government’s attempt to gather public opinion and consensus on what educational policies should be in democratic Argentina) failed because it lasted too long and lost its political momentum. Educational budget got burdened by the policy of free tuition at the university level. Finally, the ministers of Argentina’s 23 provinces fought to establish and protect their

federalist rights from the real or imagined control from the national government (Hanson, 1996). Although everyone seemed impatient to see Argentine education move forward, if asked by what they meant that the “education was in crisis” – every mentioned group would have come up with quite different definition of what the real problem was for them.

The teachers – major implementers of many educational reforms – saw as the main problems to be addressed by the reform bad working conditions for the teachers and disregard for the teaching profession.

First, teachers were often paid less than bus drivers and many held another job to complement a salary earned during a 4-5 hr long school day (Dupre, 2001). Teacher wages in 1990 were a half of those in 1960 and a third of those in 1965 in real dollars (Parrado, 1998). There was extreme disparity among teachers’ salaries in the nation, both for the carrying out of equivalent tasks and for the level of qualifications (Randall & Anderson, 1999).

Second, the teachers were also unhappy with the level of respect given to them by two democratic governments. They were disappointed that during the ten years of Alfonsín and Menem governments, the administrations not only failed to involve them in the decision-making process, but also purposefully rejected to hear teachers’ voices. The teacher unions were not permitted to participate in Alfonsín’s Pedagogical Congress, nor were teachers heard by the Menem government unless they staged protests. The teachers saw the government as detached from and uninterested in educational practice and thus unable to truly identify the real problems in education.

Government’s position in the problems stream is more complicated. By passing the Federal Law of Education, government of Carlos Saul Menem wanted to establish itself as different from the previous – democratic, but less efficient – Alfonsín government. Menem’s government also saw the initiation of educational reform as a natural continuation of its efforts to revitalize Argentina. After all, the hallmark of the Menem government was reforms – reforms in finances, trade, and privatization. This interpretation fits well with Porter’s observation that the developments in the political sphere – such as a change of government – can be powerful factors in agenda setting.

On the other hand, the Menem administration came to define the major problems in education as those of inefficiency, inequity, low quality, and bureaucracy because these problems necessitated a certain type of solution that would also help solve the larger problem the government was facing. Many of the reforms undertaken by the Menem government were initiated and/or supported by the international banks and donors. Many of the loans Argentina received to recover its economy carried with them conditionalities

of reduced governmental spending (especially in social sector), fiscal responsibility and management reorganization. As a means of reducing the burden of a large social sector to satisfy the World Bank and the IMF, the government initiated the 1992 and 1993 reforms, decentralizing education and shifting the financial and organizational burden onto the provinces. To fit this type of solution, it was only natural for the federal government that the major problems in Argentine education be identified as large bureaucracy and inefficiency. This exemplifies the dynamics of the Porter's model of three streams: the solution to one problem can conveniently be extended to serve as the solution of the other, and the problem does not necessarily need to precede the solution.

According to Porter, the more links that could be built between the problem and solution the better. However, the existence of two drastically different visions of major problems in Argentine education implied that different actors concerned with the same issue would necessarily hold different views on what solutions should be. This state of the affairs at the outset lowered the chances of successful reform.

Solutions stream

The solution to the "crisis in Argentine education" turned out to be a solution only to problems defined by the government. As mentioned earlier, the teacher unions opposed the Federal Law; they not only thought that teacher salaries were low, but they also expected that shifting of financial and organizational burden onto the provinces would further worsen teachers' working conditions and lower their salaries. Government was pushing for its solution, as more obligations for the provinces meant less spending from the national budget. International donors – having a vested interest that Argentina pay its debts and reduce its deficit on time – financed educational projects that supported government's vision. CTERA, Argentina's largest teacher union, especially resented the World Bank for supporting and pushing for reduced role of national government in education, as the union believed that Argentine civil society was weak to begin with and that, having already been hard hit by the privatization impacts, could not handle more financial burden (Puiggros, 1996).

The distrust of foreign "intrusions" into national matters is not unique to Argentina. According to Porter, and based on other examples in education policy making, the public and organizations are more receptive to the internal rather than to imported, external ideas; if a new idea comes from the outside, it needs to have a legitimate sponsor on the inside to be accepted. In

case of Argentina, the public and Argentine teachers did not see the government as the legitimate sponsor of foreign ideas but as an ally of foreign interests (Puiggros, 1996). Even when the adopted foreign policy is theoretically sound, it is its outcomes in real life (or even the circumstances that surround it) that will determine people's disposition toward that policy. For example, even if reducing government's spending on social services might benefit everyone in the country in the long run (the budget cuts should result in greater ability of government to pay off its debt, which should in turn lead to increased fiscal flexibility later), the idea of reduced spending will be anathemized in a situation where the rich profit from the recession, while the poor become poorer. The general public cannot help but feel cheated in such situation, and will inevitably resent otherwise sound elements of the policy.

The fact that crafting of the reform proceeded without seriously addressing many key issues advocated by the teachers proved to be a large obstacle during the implementation of the reform. In addition, government failed to anticipate several other educational issues that would detract from Federal Law's attempts to equalize education between the rich and the poor. As previously said, well planned policy solutions will address not only the content of the policy, but consider all contextual factors that may aid or harm the policy. Specifically, the Federal Law partly failed because it did not tackle the problems connected with initial and in-service teacher preparation, teacher distribution rules, student selection practices, budgetary issues, and tax policies.

First, initial and in-service teacher training failed to prepare teachers for the increased demands on teaching put forth by the Federal Law – namely to improve pedagogical methods used in classrooms and foster educational development in students of various socioeconomic backgrounds. The diversity of teacher training institutions and lack of coordination of states' educational laws has led to the diversity in training, which has in turn led to uneven preparation of teachers (Randall & Anderson, 1999). There is enormous gap between initial teacher training and current methodological developments: teachers are not trained to work in teams or address the needs of students from different social groups, they are not taught how to behave in a creative manner, and teacher training schools do not contribute to participation or flexibility (Randall & Anderson, 1999). On-the-job professional support for the teachers is almost non-existent: information or feedback on the performance of their students is not readily available, there is no tradition of offering or receiving advice and suggestions about teaching either from colleagues or the parents, and evaluation of teachers is rather

bureaucratic and disconnected from performance (Alvarez & Majmudar, 2001).

Second, there is a great disparity between the Argentine provinces in the norms regulating teacher hiring, evaluation, supervision and promotion, each according to their laws (Alvarez & Majmudar, 2001). The teachers with higher number of points (earned through their degrees, courses attended and length of service) have the right to choose where they want to teach in the district (Fiszbein, 1999). The point system generates a pattern whereby the youngest and most inexperienced teachers get the “worst” schools, schools in poor, rural and marginal urban areas, where there is the greatest need for the good teachers (Fiszbein, 1999; Liang, 1999). Even though the incentive system of rewarding work in “difficult” areas is in place in many provinces, teachers who work in rural or other “difficult” areas are paid 10-30% less than their urban counterparts (Liang, 1999). So many justifications for which the bonuses can be paid exist that the reward distribution in reality depends on the will of the officials formulating the salary policies; this, in turn, can cause the salary disparities across geographical area due to the over-time accumulative effect (Liang, 1999). Low initial abilities of the teachers and fewer chances of in-service training in schools for poor children just perpetuate the vicious circle of poverty (Randall & Anderson, 1999; Alvarez & Majmudar, 2001).

Third, the rooted practice of many school authorities can also sabotage any meaningful reform of equalizing educational opportunity for the poor. Children enrolled in the public system attend the school within their district (radio escolar). The existence of several schools within that district has over the years resulted in a complex and mostly informal system of distribution of those children into better schools or worse schools. School authorities retain significant discretion in selection of students, which is far from transparent, and personal contacts can play a big role in enrollment of children in schools with good reputation completely outside of their district (Fiszbein, 1999). The authorities can reduce the number of the entry slots for their school as a means of denying the poor the entrance to their school. There is a historical pattern of giving entry slots of good schools to the children of the influential even if they are from different radio escolar (Fiszbein, 1999). The schools can also “get rid” of the problem students by giving referrals to other schools; there is some evidence that students from low-income families tend to be over-represented among the “transferred” (Fiszbein, 1999). Often times, students self-select themselves into certain schools, based on the presence of the “non-discriminatory” school director or friends from the same socioeconomic background (Fiszbein, 1999).

Fourth, no thoughtful attention was given to the budgetary problems. Only after the street demonstrations of 1992 did the government include the fiscal stipulation in the Federal Law. However, the law did not specify where the funds would come from, how they would be spent or what the projected costs for reforms were (Hanson, 1996). In addition, the national government devised no enforcement tools that would secure that the funds distributed to the provinces from regular, federal budget for education be spent on policies the national government thought were compatible with national vision of improving quality in education; instead, the provinces continued to devise their own budgets for education according to their own laws.

Fifth, government failed to see that Argentine tax policies also contributed to the economic and educational disparities between the rich and the poor, which undermined the attempts of the Federal Law to better educational opportunities for the poor. The public spending on education is not progressive, as the distribution of public secondary, and especially tertiary education is pro-middle class and antipoor (World Bank, 2000). The return for the primary education is only 3%, for secondary education a low of 10% and for tertiary a very high of 29% (i.e., by finishing primary education, one can expect to profit only 3% of the investment in that level of education, while by finishing university the profit is almost 30% of the investment). This presents a large incentive to finish the university; however, only middle and upper class profit from the free higher education, as the poor – considering their high drop-out and low graduation rates - mostly obtain only primary school diploma (World Bank, 2000).

Lack of serious considerations of these aspects of the national education reform seemed to be the hallmark of the policy formulation and decision-making of the Argentine government. All the unresolved issues surfaced during the implementation process, and prevented the reform from helping the poor, only proving that the reform that starts out flawed and inadequate has a small chance of success.

Politics stream

As can be seen from previous discussion, the political will for the reform existed at the highest level. This should have been a fortunate circumstance for Argentina, as frequently the attempts at reforms fail because they don't make a priority on government's agenda table. However, the reform cannot happen if other political realities, such as the capacity of administration to successfully carry out tasks, or the will of provincial bureaucrats who implement the policy are lacking.

One of the impediments to political feasibility of the 1993 reform was the inefficient and large national Ministry of Education. Educational centralism developed a large bureaucracy that perpetuated itself and that it was hard to change (Randall & Anderson, 1999). The attempts of reforming the Ministry were also presenting a barrier to the reform in education. The president, unhappy about the state of education, would appoint the new minister, who would usually be not the most effective professional for the job, but a politically suitable person; he would also bring with him a whole new team of inexperienced senior officials into the Ministry; when the institutional change did not happen quickly, the president would be pressured to replace the minister; the arrival of the new minister would be characterized by the same political and impatient decision making (Hanson, 1999). The country saw five educational ministers from 1989 to 1993 (Hanson, 1999). The lower rank officials of the ministry, who have more stable jobs, have a tendency to hold power within their work domain, which can frequently be a barrier to introduction of new programs (Hanson, 1999). Thus, the lack of long term and effective education planning on behalf of the national Ministry further constrained the development of a unified vision for Argentine education.

Similar to the Ministry of Education, the whole country was characterized by the lack of continuity in political leadership and participatory democracy. There was no tradition of participation in education system and there was lack of persons trained to participate (Randall & Anderson, 1999). The historical interventions of national governments into the provincial matters disabled the provinces from developing their own capacity of dealing with the problems in education. Even today, the national government wants to delegate its previous obligations in education to the provinces on the one hand, while on the other still helps them out financially; while this may be appropriate for such a sudden and large move of responsibilities, the government does little to invest in long-term capacity building of the provinces that would enable them to handle educational challenges on their own (and with potentially greater impact than the national government, as they are more familiar with the issues in their own states). To make matters worse, it is usually the poorest provinces that are proportionally helped the most (again, in this situation it would be merciless to leave them with no support); this prevents them more than the richer provinces from developing the appropriate infrastructure, laws and professional support, only perpetuating the vicious cycle of dependence on national government and increasing the educational gap between the rich and poor provinces.

The previous point is supported by the research of Diane Rhoten who found that the poorest province of the three she examined, Jujuy, accepted the reform in theory, but did not and could not try to implement it, while the richer provinces had more means and capacity to implement the required changes. Paradoxically, Jujuy, the most incapable of carrying out the burden of the changes, was the most compliant of the three provinces in accepting the reform (Rhoten, 2000). This further testifies to the different conditions and mentalities existing in different provinces, as well as to the inability of some provinces to even articulate and define its problems, let alone act on them. The major recommendation of the research was for the national policy to pay attention to local realities (i.e. interpretations and actions of local governments and populations of the national policy) in order to be successful; if the national government uniformly doled out the same responsibilities to the very different provinces, and did not seriously consider genuine specificities of each in formulating the national policy, than the policy would meet various success. The policy itself might not be bad, but could be blind to the need to initiate the inevitably different implementation processes. Evaluation needs to be done of how provinces view the process of decentralization and assuming of responsibilities of providing secondary education so that the feedback can improve national policy and make it more flexible and in touch with reality, thus making it more successful (Rhoten, 2000; Rozada & Menedez, 2003).

Unfortunately for Argentina, its Federal Law of Education was also eroded due to outside economic events. This exemplifies Porter's observation that politics stream flows independently of the other two and that sudden developments in the political arena can be powerful forces in the policy arena. Due to economic crises of 1995 and 1998, the economic gap between the rich and the poor in Argentina increased and diminished the ability of the poor to participate in secondary education. From 1994 to 1998 urban poverty increased from 22% to 29%; with the rural poor, the poverty level is probably around 34% (World Bank, 2000). The share of income received by the lowest 20% decreased from 4.55% in 1994 to 3.80% in 1998, while the richest 20% increased their income from 51.40% to 54.25% in the same time period. The unemployment rates for the poor had been climbing and had passed 20% (World Bank, 2000). Not only did the poor parents have harder time paying for transportation and educational expenses, but they also could not financially endure the economic recession without the help of their older children, who stayed at home to perform household chores or work at menial and poorly paid jobs. For the poor children, economic difficulties were a major reason for dropping out (World Bank, 2000).

Based on the observations above, it seems that the existing political milieu and administrative setup did not offer a fertile ground for the educational reform to take up. While political will existed on the highest governmental level, in reality the policy was not feasible. The lack of political determination at the lower bureaucratic levels, lack of appropriate capacity of the national and state governments, historically present administrative and professional gap between the poorer and richer provinces, and failure of the educational reform to address these issues, as well as economic crises of 1995 and 1998 all weakened the political impetus necessary for the successful change (World Bank, 2000).

Summary

Overall, it seemed that for Argentina, only partial coupling of two Porter's streams existed – the problem was recognized, and political will existed on the highest level, but the plausible policy was missing. The problems stream was not coherent, as many undercurrents pulled in their own direction, since various stakeholders had their own definitions of the problem. The politics stream looked much more like a dribble than a torrent, since the policy was not truly politically feasible due to the incoherent division of power between and lack of administrative and professional capacities of the provincial and national governments. And, finally, the solutions stream was running its own course, quite out of touch with barriers on the ground, and thus unable to make the connection with the other two.

For the successful reform to have a chance at life, the problems must be first thoroughly examined. Each of the major stakeholder groups should identify its most pressing problems with the educational system. The final, smaller list of the specific problems that the reform would try to target should be made in such a way that each group has at least its most crucial grievance included in the governmental agenda. It should be clear to all that only compromise can lead to fulfillment of every group's requests, as no side completely controls the situation and single-handedly determines the outcome of the reform. In case of Argentina, the federal government was to blame for failing to understand this.

Once the problems are clearly defined and prioritized, the solutions should be comprised accordingly: the biggest complaint of each major stakeholder group should be addressed even if it means that achievement of every group's overall goals is somewhat delayed. Only by having a vested interest in the reform, every entity will try its best to see it succeed. Again, in Argentina, the federal government wanted to see all of its problems gone

without realizing that their solution held no incentive for other groups to want to implement the reform.

It should be noted that agreements on problems and solutions need to be pursued with full force and in relatively short period of time. This is not to say that the identification of the problems and solutions should be superficial; an appropriate task force in charge of the reform and comprised of several experts representing each stakeholder group should intensely work together, research possible options, and investigate potential obstacles. If the obstacles are too great to be overcome, they need to become part of the problem and be accordingly addressed. For example, in Argentina's case, administrative inaptitude and non-binding sharing of responsibilities between the national government and provinces were large obstacles to implementation of the main aim of the reform – equalization of the opportunity for the poor. Those obstacles needed to be resolved so that the reform could proceed; by clarifying the obligations of each governmental office and making their actions binding and accountable, the government could have cleared the way for the meaningful reform to occur.

The failure of the problems, solutions and politics streams to meet provided little hope for the success of the educational reform. The Federal Law of Education seems to have been doomed from the outset: it was rushed and ill-defined, it neglected many issues important for its implementation, and it failed to galvanize support needed for its realization. Other policy-makers should learn from the Argentine example: for policy to succeed, thoughtful consideration of problems, solutions and politics streams needs to be undertaken; obstacles on all levels recognized and addressed, and implementation carried out with full force.

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ЗБОГ ЧЕГА ОБРАЗОВНЕ РЕФОРМЕ ПРОПАДАЈУ:
МОДЕЛ ВИШЕСТРУКИХ ТОКОВА
Анстракт

У овом раду аутор представља модел вишеструких токова који је осмислио Џон Кингдон, а разрадио Роберт Портер. Релевантност и корист овог модела за анализирање образовних реформи су приказани на примеру реформе аргентинског образовања. Кингдон и Портер су аргументовали да је за успех образовних реформи потребно да се три следећа тока акције сретну: проблеми у образовању морају да буде јасно дефинисани, одговарајућа решења понуђена и политички консензус постигнут. Године 1993. Аргентина је донела Федерални закон о образовању покушавајући да смањи велике образовне разлике између богатих и сиромашних. Ова реформа је углавном пропала због следећег: (1) проблеми су били уско дефинисани и то само од стране владе, (2) решења су била једнострана и претежно фокусирана на финансијски аспект реформе, занемару-

јући контекстуалне проблеме и проблеме имплементације и (3) политичка воља је постојала само на највишем нивоу, док су стварни капацитети актера у имплементацији реформе били веома слаби. Анализирање образовних реформи кроз модел вишеструких токова се препоручује другим доносиоцима одлука у образовању.

Кључне речи: модел вишеструких токова, Аргентина, Федерални закон о образовању, образовна политика, реформа.

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ПРИЧИНЫ НЕУДАЧ РЕФОРМ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ:
МОДЕЛЬ МНОГОКРАТНЫХ ТЕЧЕНИЙ

Резюме

В предлагаемой работе автор презентует модель многосторонних течений, осмысленную Джоном Кингдоном и разработанную Робертом Портером. Значимость и полезность данной модели для проведения анализа реформ образования показаны на примере реформы аргентинской системы образования. Кингдон и Портер обосновали положение о том, что для удачного проведения реформ образования необходимо обеспечить пересечение трех течений деятельности: проблемы в образовании должны быть четко определены, затем, необходимо предложить и соответствующие решения, а также добиться политического консенсуса. В 1993 году Аргентиной был принят Федеральный закон об образовании с целью преодоления крупного разрыва между состоятельными и малоимущими слоями населения. Реформа, однако, в основном не удалась, вследствие следующих причин: (1) проблемы были определены предельно узко, причем только со стороны Правительства; (2) решения отличались односторонностью, фокусируясь главным образом на финансовом аспекте реформы и отодвигая на второй план контекстуальные проблемы и проблемы внедрения, и (3) политическая воля существовала лишь на высшем уровне, тогда как реальные capacities участников во внедрении реформы были предельно слабыми. Проведение анализа реформ образования по модели многосторонних течений рекомендуется и другим факторам принятия решений в образовании.

Ключевые слова: модель многосторонних течений, Аргентина, Федеральный закон об образовании, образовательная политика, реформа.