POST-COLD WAR RUSSIAN IDENTITY

ABSTRACT

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end not only of the Cold war but also of the crucial turn in Russia’s fate. For the first time in its history Russia exists as a nation-state not as an empire. Along with the search of new identity Russians faced new challenges and threats to country’s national security and integrity (the Chechen separatist’s uprising, etc.). The transitional crisis of identity seems to be finished off at the beginning of 21st century, yet the process of acceptance of new security environment and multi-cultural realities is going on. The paper examines the process of re-formation of Russian national and ethnic identity and development national self-understanding in the post-Cold war era.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the pattern and development of the distinct national identity pattern in post-Cold War Russia. The major assumption of this article is that this new pattern was derived and in many ways brought over from the Russian past, both Soviet and Russia’s empire ones, but it became not just changed through adaptation to new post-Cold War conditions but is transforming into something really new, perhaps, radically new on certain dimensions. One should remember these words, because the transition towards democracy and free-market economy could be characterized as a set of simultaneous so-called “historical crises”, which includes the identity crises. In our view, the transition period in this country is over, and we’ll consider this point and its consequences in this paper.

It is a well-known fact that national identity comprises many dimensions (political, ethnical, linguistic, cultural, religious, etc.). The process of forging of post-Cold war Russian national identity is clearly a very complex one. National identity locates a person within a certain 'objective reality' and depends on changes of the internal political, economic, social situation, inter-ethnic relations and geopolitical environment. The Cold war that we knew so well had gone in late 1980s. What had happened in 1990s was nothing less than a “geo-strategic revolution”. Russia appeared to be a weak actor in the new world order, in “cold peace” times. Here we cannot analyze the reasons, and just mark the very fact.
One should remember that the Russians became a divided nation when over 26 millions of ethnic Russians were left out the borders of Russia and got the status of minorities in former Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR. Due to a lack of room in this paper we’ll not discuss the process of re-building of self-identification in Russia’s near abroad.

In this short paper we’ll basically deal with national political identity. In the framework of our analysis it is significant limitation because the entire pattern of post-Cold war Russian identity was forged by radical changes occurred in this country and its geopolitical environment during the transition period. The problem had taken on new dimensions in the face of the threat to Russia's integrity, internal stability and national security revealed by the open separatist rebellion in Chechnya that started in 1994 and if fact is not crashed till the time of writing (spring 2003), threats of international terrorism and radical Islamic fundamentalists, the revival of ethnic nationalism, ethnic tensions, anti-western moods and old phobias, etc. Certainly, there are many important aspects of the theme that cannot be discussed in details here due to a lack of room.

*The crystallization of the new Russian state*

The following points must be emphasized right at the beginning. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end not only of the Cold war but also of the crucial turn in Russia’s fate. What had happened was the end not just of the Soviet Union but of the Russian Empire, too. In December 1991, after the breakdown of the USSR, Russia was back to its seventeenth-century borders. For the first time in its history Russia exists not as an empire. The collapse of the Soviet Union made the Russian Federation as a truly independent country, but it could not make a Nation or the Russian nation-state. Currently we are watching the early phase of the crystallization of the new model of this great state.

However, in our view, the so-called transition period is over, at least on the major dimensions of post-communist transformations. In the beginning of the 21st century Russia has entered the second stage of reforming. The recognition of the very fact that the transitional period in this country is over in terms of basic economic and political transformations is a grave and consequential step toward proper understanding of peculiarities of the present-day situation and foreseeing the future developments.

Concerning the principal results of the first phase of post-communist reforming the following aspects must be emphasized. Most of country has changed dramatically, and there is no way back to the communist past. The program of basic and most radical economic transformations in this country is fulfilled. The new economic and political system had been established and stabilized; yet it is quasi-democracy and quasi-market as some people say. The social structure and labor relations have been dramatically changed as well. Civil society has developing dynamically, although its impact on policy is negligible.
The end of 1990s was characterized by more and more evident trend in the character of social inequality and the state of public opinion—by impoverishment of mass and intellectuals, alienation of the general public from power institutions, disappearance of really independent politicians and parties opposed to president’s power, actual destruction of multi-party system. Surely a painful irony of Russian post-Cold war history is the contradiction between the personal rating of President V. Putin, holding at a very high mark, and mass distrust of all principal political and social institutions.

While some of Russian liberal-oriented economists like to use the term ‘oligarchic capitalism’ concerning the results of Yeltsin’s stage of transformation, the democratic-oriented political scientists prefer to speak about ‘oligarchic modernization’ running in this country. The last term could be found in the recent (May 2003) report of the Center for national strategy, the Russian non-governmental think tank. Sometimes western authors called what exists in Russia “bandit or robber capitalism” (George Soros’ definition) or “a fake capitalism that presents a false front of economic reforms”. One may recall that in 1994 President Yeltsin called his country “the biggest mafia state in the world... the superpower of crime that devouring the state from top to bottom”. The situation, unfortunately, has not improved since then. One may say, “oligarchic capitalism” and “oligarchic modernization” - present-day Russia’s reality. For us, all such definitions are partly correct and inaccurate at the same time, because the truth is far more complex. However we do not foresee any radical change of state of arts in the observable future despite the declarations of the second Russia’s President Putin about the ‘withdrawal of oligarchs from political power’ and prosecutor’s attacks on some prominent figures of big business, which looks more like a personal vendetta, then a change in politics.

As to the cultural dimension of societal change, ‘cultural revolution’ always takes longer period than revolutionary changes in economics and politics. Political culture of Russia like other post-communists nations comprises newly emerged elements along with traits inherited from the past. Masses have been and still are passive and the mass consciousness is the perfect object for manipulation. But all analysts agree that the process of transformation of the value-attitudinal system of the entire nation is going on

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rapidly, because certain changes are becoming visible. The same is true for re-formation of national identity.⁴

An important element of national self-understanding is the perception of Russia in the world affairs. It should be noted that the aspiration to be integrated in the global security system, to cooperate in the global war against terror and to re-conciliate with West declared by the incumbent Russian president as a new foreign policy course is strong. Profound domestic policy’s changes had mirror a serious shift toward the US and Europe achieved in foreign policy after September 11, 2001. This new course is based on a background of increase of expenses on defensive needs and numerous actions directed on revival of Russia as the great Eurasian power, capable to unit around of itself weaker neighbors. The relations between Russia and CIS member-states is becoming another focal points in the Russian foreign and security policy, and Russia has had some success in enhancing her influence in most of the post-Soviet space.

The pattern of Russian national identity

The sociological empirical research on national identity is relevant to the question of the relations between the individual and the territorial (local and/or regional) community, the larger society, the state, the nation or the ethnic group to which a person belongs. Such an approach focuses on how people distinguish themselves from 'the others' and identify with 'those of their own'. Therefore the actually important research and politically relevant question is what kind of mentioned identities the average individual put on the first place being asked about his or her self-identification. Or, in other words, how do people rank feelings of belonging to different kinds of human communities.

Poll’s data give us a definite answer on this question in the case of post-Cold war Russia. Looking on data, one can unmistakably conclude that there are two basic distinctive types of self-identity of Russians at the individual level – political identity, i.e. Russian Federation citizenship, which comes first, civil identity or local-provincial (territorial) identity as the second option, and so on.⁵ The Russian Federation citizenship is a predominant personal identity in various surveys since the beginning of 1990s. For example, according to the findings of the representative all-Russia survey (N=1776), carried out by the Russian Independent Institute of social and national problems in March 2000 over two thirds of respondents (67%) had identified themselves first of all as citizens of the Russian Federation, 11% - as citizens of the USSR, and

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17% could not give an answer. The share of ‘citizens of the world’ and ‘Europeans’ in various samples was not significant. This is not a surprise, because most Russians never considered themselves as pure Europeans or Asians, albeit the Russian mentality is more closer to European, than Oriental or Asian ones. During centuries this country has been playing a specific role of a ‘bridge’ between the West and the Far East, between Europe and Oriental Asia, China and Japan.

The fact that for most Russians sense of shared community went first of all to country, not to region or town, whereas the majority of residents of Western Europe, for instance, Germans, view identity to a place, i.e. locality, or community of town or province, more important than to state is the main difference between the Russian pattern of identity and the Western European ones. It is seen by us to be reflective of the different emphasis of two cultures (civilizations) towards the value of identity with a larger society or state and the emphasis on loyalty to the small locality. There are some interesting parallels between the distribution of citizenry attitudes, ethnic, national and provincial self-identification in contemporary Russia and some other countries (see, for instance, the Canadian pattern), which we cannot discuss due to a lack of room.

The ‘weight of history’ is, in our view, a crucial factor that must be taken into consideration in the explanation of these findings. The past is alive and welled and living in current politics and people’s feelings in Russia as well as in Europe. The loyalty to the town or the region expressed by so many people in Europe might be interpreted in terms of historical memory, because since the seventeenth century Western Europeans' sense of shared community went, first of all, to the town, to the province and not state or nation. As a matter of fact, contemporary Europeans still unconsciously retain the memory of how their state was seen by their predecessors. During the 18th-20th centuries different European local communities and 'nations' were united into states by conquest, inter-court maneuvering, the desire of great powers, decisions by winners of the world wars and so on. And, unsurprisingly, some contemporary states are still under the pressure of separatist movements (most notably the IRA in Northern Ireland, ETA, the Basque separatist organization in Spain). In Central and Eastern Europe, the split of the Federative Republic of Czechoslovakia into two independent parts as well as the disintegration of the Yugoslavian Federation should be named as examples along this line also.

In Russia, the feeling of identity of citizenship was historically constituted in another way than in Europe, because it was the state, which gathered lands and non-Russian nations around Moscow during this country's history.


The Russian Empire as well as the former USSR was not a nation-state. National identity here historically developed first of all as the feeling of belonging to the state, at simultaneous weakness and fuzziness of an ethnic component. Such specificity of Russian identity was a consequence and simultaneously important precondition of formation of continental empire. Among other great empires, Russia was a special case. In the Russian/Soviet Empire was not carried out (behind some exceptions) strategy of national assimilation, its elite was multi-ethnic, and politics carried essentially supranational character. The post-Soviet Russian Federation is also not a state composed of one ethnicity as well, yet it is more ethnically homogenous than its predecessors. Thus, the difference between the present-day Russian pattern of identity and the Western European ones is rooted in history.

National identity is based on such fundamental features as blood (ethnicity), mother tongue, and attachment to certain elements of a specific mass public culture based on deeply rooted traditions and customs of his homeland and historical memories that distinguish one people from another and co-existed with identity of citizenship (the national political identity) at the individual level. Therefore the analysis of the problem of re-building of national self-identification on the basis of data of Russian public opinion polls leads to necessity of distinguishing the two aspects: declarative identity (how people call themselves) and ethnic and linguistic-cultural identity (how people feel themselves). This follows the fact that the answer does depend on the question, but does not mean that the evidence is arbitrary or unreliable. Leaving aside unsatisfactory question wordings, different questions measure different variables.

One year prior to disintegration of the Soviet Union, up to 80% ethnic Russian named itself first of all as ‘Soviet’ or ‘Soviet people’. For them the entire Soviet Union was the Great Motherland. They lost it in 1991. They were

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8 The Russian Federation is a real multiethnic and multicultural society. Russia’s ethnic diversity is extremely high: the State Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation registered representatives of over 100 nationalities (i.e. members of large nations, small peoples and ethnic groups). The overwhelming majority of citizens (over 88%) are native Russians. The Russian language is the official state. Almost all non-Russians use it in everyday life and in business activities, and the large share of them - named it as a second language, which they spoke fluently. In the urban areas these shares are higher. The political-geographical map of the Federation reflects the diversity of ethnic entities. There are certain territorial areas where ethnic minorities taken together form the greater part of the population, especially in rural areas. Many of the territorial units are called historically by the name of an indigenous ethnic group. During the Soviet period of history, some of these areas had the rights of autonomous republics and territories (named as raion, okrug, krai). Taken together the 31 autonomous republics and other national formations covered about one-third of the federation’s territory. Some, such as Yakutia, Karelia, Buryatia, are vast areas far from Moscow, while others, such as Tatarstan, Bashkorstan, Komi, Udmurtia and the Chuvash republics, are relatively small and close to the centre of the Federation. In 1992 all former autonomous republics ratified their declarations of ‘sovereignty’; almost all of them signed the Federal Treaty (Chechnya was the only exception).

compelled to relinquish their former identification with the entire Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Union the Soviet Russians automatically became just ‘rossiyane’, i.e. citizens of the Russian Federation (the RF). No surprise, while a smaller part of ethnic Russians have used to a recently designed word ‘rossiyane’, according to polls, most of the nation for self-identification prefer the word ‘the Russians’, mixing in mind both citizenship and ethnicity, and the elder people still often call themselves ‘Soviets’.\textsuperscript{10} Naming themselves Soviets, these people emphasized their attachment to the lost state. Surely, they were proud to belong to the world superpower.

A strong and historically embedded association between ethnicity and individual’s attachment to a certain religious denomination (Russians to Orthodoxy, Poles to Catholicism, Tatars to Islam, etc.) also coexists with national political identity. Russians by origin seem to identify considerably with Russian language, culture, history, and the Christian Orthodox faith. This association lives in the mass consciousness in the form of widespread stereotypes identifying nationality and attachment to a confession irrespective of whether a person goes to church or is a convinced atheist. We emphasized this point, because according to our and other research non-Russians and especially non-Slavs demonstrated stronger feelings of belonging to their ethnicity, religious and territorial community than ethnic Russians. Many non-Russian nationals have demonstrated a profound provincial and ethnic identity, especially in former autonomous national republics, where the identity with Russia’s citizenship does not rank on the top.

In our view, this is a result of the process of re-interpreting national identity in the autonomous republics. It was a collateral product on nationalist extremism and separatism aroused up in regional political discourse in early 1990s. At that time the heralds of sovereignty and regional self-efficiency, the local intelligentsia and political leadership, were engaged in systematic attempts to create their own national identities, destroying universal Soviet supra-ethnic identity. The re-interpretation of identity was largely based on ethnicity, religious values, national language and culture and common origin as well as local pre-colonial history with an accent on the heroic fight of their predecessors against the Russian conquest (Chechnya and Tatarstan are examples).

For ethnic Russians – the ‘core nation’ of the USSR and the RF, tolerance towards ‘others’ and internationalism were and are likely major elements of the national character. Proceeding from numerous studies, carried out by domestic and foreign scholars, we should maintain that internationalism and acceptance of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural realities continue, despite the loss of the empire, to be important features of post-Soviet Russian national identity.\textsuperscript{11}


\textsuperscript{11} This point was also emphasized in Chulos and Piirainen, 2000, op. cit.
Culturally and geographically, ethnically and historically, Russia is a unique civilization in itself. Through Russian language, different peoples communicate with each other, within Russian culture minorities’ cultures grow up. On the level of everyday life, most of citizens of the Russian Federation identify themselves with Russia first in cultural terms as an entity that unites peoples, not in terms of ethnicity and territory, and second in political terms of citizenship. Linguistic, cultural and the affective ingredients of self-identification are occupying the top place for those non-Russians who feel themselves as Russians, who consider the Russian culture and language as his/her own, who really loves Russia as motherland, and in mixed marriages. These facts indicate that blood does come first in such cases, and we agree with those scholars who said, the entire notion of ‘nationality’ in Russia’s mass consciousness is fuzzy and uncertain.12 This is a legacy of the Soviet past. And we doubt it will be eroded in the foreseeable future.

**National consolidation**

The emerged shift to national consolidation around the president on the basis of new challenges to Russia’s security and integrity, articulated national interest, and, partly, rising up nationalistic feelings and old phobias have been recorded by many Russian and western scholars. During the centuries of Russian history, the landmarks of historical turns were associated with names of national leaders coming to power. So, perhaps, a new turning point in the history of this nation has occurred at the threshold of the 21st century, when most Russians elected Vladimir Putin as their second president in the first ballot. In fact, the political rivalry has diminished after the last national (1999) and presidential (2000) elections, and, in our view, the results of coming (2003 and 2004) elections are quite predictable.

Second Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is no communist, but has brought back the kind of strong central state and his regime is shaping up by means that some domestic democrats and western journalists feared from the very beginning of his reign.13 They say, although Putin’s goals and the means he chooses are clear enough, he, unlike like predecessor, wants to construct in Russia ‘what he wants right from the start: Soviet power without Communists as the ruling party’. In our view, the main concern is as follows: authoritarianism amplifies, but the Russians do not have historically developed advanced civil society, real opposition to a regime and deep-rooted democratic traditions that may prevent this country from shift of attitudes toward genuine democracy.

There are certain grounds for such a concern. The United Russia, the political party backed by the Kremlin administration and local bureaucrats, became the presidential ‘party of power’ overwhelmingly controlling the

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12 See, for instance, the cited article of Prof. A. G. Zdravomislov.

parliament after the December 2003 national elections like the CPSU did in the Soviet time.

Critics from the pro-western democratic wings of Russia’s political spectrum worry about Putin’s symbolic reverences toward the Soviet past because the melody of the former Soviet state anthem was restored for Russia’s national hymn, Red-color flags, slightly different from the Soviet ones, returned to the army units to be used along with the new post-Soviet ones, introduced in Yeltsin’s time, the communist leaders of North Korea and China got warm receptions, and so on.

In his turn in the fall of 2000 Mr. Putin in a television address to the nation, explaining the restoration of the melody of the Soviet anthem, said his choice of symbols was meant to unite Russians by taking the best from their tumultuous history. So the Soviet anthem came back, albeit with new words written by the author of the previous Soviet anthem.14

Actually, Putin’s team is using threats to security and foreign policy issues for own domestic political aims through exploiting patriotic and nationalistic sentiments of Russians as well as the feeling of nostalgia for the former USSR might, which is still widely spread in the society and among the military. There is nothing new in such tactic; both in pre-soviet and in the soviet times conservative mass attitudes were used for consolidation the authoritarian and Great Power trends. The authorities desire to disarm the opposition, both on the left and right sides, and especially various left-wing political groupings out of the parliament.

Here we have to mention that today the adherents of ultra-nationalist views comprise the tiny minority of voters, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) fraction headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky is actually rallying around the flag in one camp with so called Statists (‘gosudarstvenniki’) only formally opposing itself to the United Russia which has the absolute majority of 301 seats in the chamber after the last elections. The main ‘democratic’ (the Yabloko party) and ‘right-wing’ (the Union of Right Forces – the URF) political formations, twins supported by oligarchs, did not overcome the 5% threshold of the parliament at the December 2003 elections.

14 One should remember that the lower house of the Russian parliament, the State Duma, backed President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to restore the anthem after its third and final reading by 381 votes to 51. The tsarist-era flag – Yeltsin’s tricolor, the state seal - two-headed eagle, and the Soviet Army’s Red banner as coat of arms were also officially adopted in the same session. The tricolour flag has been approved by 342 members of the 450-seat chamber, while 343 members backed the double-headed eagle coat of arms. Both insignia date from the tsarist era. Restoring the anthem pleased the communists, the Duma’s largest political fraction at that time. Observers said that despite their aversion to imperial panoply Putin’s laws passed easily and Russia begins 2001 with old-new symbols of statehood. Undoubtedly, it was a historical compromise.
The impact of the second Chechen war on the process of national consolidation cannot be undervalued. The 1994 –1996 campaign named by the journalist and the military as the first Chechen war ended successfully for Chechen separatists. "In 1996, Chechens got independence de-facto, but not de-jury", Vladimir Putin has recognized later, in 2000. In autumn 1999 Chechens broke the deadlock when militants had occupied a part of the autonomous republic of Dagestan. That action was an open aggression against the Russian territory under radical Islam slogans. It got a violent reaction of the Russian armed forces. In media reports the second Chechen war itself was highlighted differently versus the previous war: Russian troops were presented as liberators who came to eradicate terrorism and protect civilians, to defend Russia's national interests and integrity.

The second Chechen military campaign, or, to use the official label, - the counter-terrorist operation, was victorious for the 100,000 federal army, which brought in the operation all its might, including heavy artillery systems, tanks and aviation. Chechen troops were dissipated, and forced to shelter in mountain areas and to use the tactics of guerrilla war. The new local administration loyal to Moscow had been set up. Main military tasks of the ‘counter-terrorist operation’ are mostly accomplished, but the resistance has transformed into a form of protracted guerrilla war, the end of which depends largely on the level of popular support for insurgents inside Chechnya. Both sides are fed up with the guerrilla war. But, unfortunately, up to nowadays there is no evidence of the soon end of resistance in Chechnya.

In spring 2002 President Putin stated that the "military phase of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya may be considered closed." But the military victory in Chechnya was claimed many times before, since the last capture of Grozny, the capital of the region, in 2000. Thousands of troops are stationed in the republic, but the death toll is rising everyday. Since the second Chechen campaign started in 1999 till the end of 2003, about 5000 soldiers and officers of the federal forces were killed and wondered (it is a cumulative number of losses of the federal army, internal troops, security forces, etc.). Thousands of civilians left their homes seeking for a shelter. And nobody counted those killed on the Chechen side.

The hostage-taking drama that occurred in Moscow’s theatre centre in October 2002 had rise up anti-Chechen feelings and support of Putin’s every intention to eliminate all rebels. But public anger held a short time. As polls show, the bulk of nation is tired of war. According to the most recent survey carried out by the independent polling agency VCIOM-A, in October 2003 the number of respondents standing for continuation of combat was 21%. And 61% approved the idea of peace negotiations, although it is still unclear with whom on the Chechen side the federal authorities must negotiate (Putin’s position is “no talks with bandits’). Only minority (9% of those polled) said that after long years of fighting Russia would have to recognize independence.

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of that rebellious republic. Some adherents of this view said, it is time to realize that Chechens are non-Russians, and, perhaps, the government must agree for a radical non-military solution of the entire conflict as French did in the case of Algeria.

The complicated situation in Chechnya was an important part of political discourse during the national election campaign of 2003. Both the leaders of the Yabloko party and the Union of Right Forces considered recent local presidential elections in Chechnya as insufficient measures for a political resolution of this conflict. They argued the second war in Chechnya was launched with no idea of how to resolve the conflict politically not only military. They also said Russia would never take its due place in the international community or would it have a truly "attractive business climate" while the brutal and costly war in Chechnya goes on. But, in fact, no real alternative to the present state policy was proposed. The above mentioned failure of the ‘democratic’ and ‘right-wing’ parties at the national elections in December 2003 might be considered as the public reaction to their position concerning the Chechen issue, in part at least.

Now let us turn to direct and indirect impacts of the Chechen conflict on the process of formation of a new identity and national unity, policy-making and public opinion. The first moment, which we want to emphasize, is following. The war underlined the weakness of post-Soviet Russia’s democratic institutions. The second moment to be stressed is a visible change of attitudes toward Chechen’s problem among both the elite and the general public in the second war compared with the first one. The bulk of elite and the public at large turns to support of the governmental policy of resolving of the conflict which was not considered longer as a colonial war, but the domestic battle, where the Russians fight against separatists, mercenaries, international terrorist, not fighters for freedom. There is no doubt that the military victory in Chechnya along with declarations about the non-compromised struggle against international terrorism played the most important role in Putin’s popularity, and national consolidation as well.

The third point is a rise up of reviving patriotism and Russian ethnic nationalism, the latter especially in southern regions bordering with the rebellious republic. The forth aspect to be noticed is the entire Chechen war has clear ethnic and religious dimensions: Orthodox Russians (the federal troops) against Moslems (Chechen's guerrillas and Arab mercenaries). Today we cannot assess the real weight of the religious ingredient in that conflict. The Russian Patriarchy officially rejected the definition of the war in Chechnya as an inter-confessional conflict. Most of Muslim clerics inside the Russian Federation, except extremists, agreed with the official position of the Russian Orthodox Christian Church, at least in public. But, generally speaking, it is obvious that the Orthodox clerics heavily supported by the Putin’s administration are trying to reinvent religious elements in the development of ‘identity politics’ in post-Cold war Russia. And this is an important moment of the construction of national identity of young generations (schoolchildren).
This war has disclosed how dangerous is the rise of separatism and ethnic and religious extremism in the multi-national and multi-confessional country. The Chechen factor became one of dominants of political life. Corruption and banditry in Russia cities are strongly linked with in the Chechen war as well. Safeguarding integrity of the territory and strengthening of statehood of the Russian Federation are top priorities for President Putin compared with any foreign policy objectives. Any criticism of his Chechen policy makes Putin edgy. No doubts Mr. Putin and his entourage deadly wish to crush Chechen resistance by force.

There is a national consensus that the ongoing war against separatist fighters in Chechnya represents a key internal threat to Russian state security. The most of population and almost all political parties want to safeguard Russia’s territorial integrity with Chechnya as a part of the Federation. This means the guerilla war will burn for years ahead like in Northern Ireland.

In the light of results of the transition period and the present socio-economic and political situation in this country, it is unrealistic to expect an abrupt turn in politics as well as a sudden change in collective identification with the state. It is needless to say, that the intensity of feeling of belonging to Russia as the state (national political identity) depends upon a popular perception of post-Cold war Russia’s place in the world order, on whether the individual is proud to be the citizen of his state, etc. This is significant because it means that the process of forging of a new national identity as a political action has both immediate and long-term political consequences and depends upon the security agenda.16

The patriotic mood has grown up also from disappointment with the US politics, both in the Balkans and Iraq, because in both cases Russia’s position was not taken into account. The visible impotence of the Russian diplomacy raises questions about the country’s future, and is conducive to development of civic nationalism. Those wars have resulted in appreciable amplification of anti-American mood, and, in our view, have even revived anti-western phobias in certain segments of the population. It looks like the traditional mass reaction to perceived humiliation and Russia’s weakness after the defeat in the Cold war, backed by nostalgia for the Soviet identity.17 Perhaps, the main challenge to Kremlin’s attempts to consolidate nation comes from its inability to articulate and consistently to implement the difficult policy choices needed to pull Russia out of its present international standing.

According to the ROMIR nation-wide poll, conducted in June 2000 (N=1500), 29,5% said they are very proud to be Russians, i.e. rossiyane,

16 Various views about the link of Russia's 'post-imperial' identity and the current security situation are presented in Baranovsky V. (ed.), Russia and Europe, The emerging security agenda, Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.

citizens of the RF. The lesser level of pride was shown by 37.6% with the ambivalent answer (more proud than not proud). 20.9% of the respondents were not so proud of their citizenry, and 7.8% of the respondents answered that are not proud of it at all. Others hesitated to answer. The first figure – over two thirds of respondents - approximately matches the number of those who exposed readiness in the case of necessity to fight for Russia. Easy to see that the total percent of those who was proud (very proud + proud to some extent) with their belonging to their state (67.1%) is bigger than the sum of those who was not proud to be Russian citizen and did not give a direct answer (32.9%). But the last number is also essential.\textsuperscript{18}

In our view, national consolidation is still a goal. Despite the political stabilization obtained by efforts of Putin’s administration, the political and social consensus still is absent in this country. It is doubtless, that behind positive and negative reactions of various segments of the Russian society concerning domestic and external politics stands not only different understandings of Russia’s national interests in conditions of globalization, but also ideological orientations and values. Old stereotypes and, perhaps, prejudices and deep-rooted fears concerning threats and enemies are still very influential.

\textit{Conclusion}

Was Boris Yeltsin a great man who would go down in history as the creator of a democratic and capitalist Russia? Or he was a drunk surrounded by incompetent and corrupted people? Judging by the results of Russia’s transformation under Mr. Yeltsin’s reign and Mr. Yeltsin’s personal behavior, you can pick either version and still be right. As to his ‘identity policy’, one may surely say, in 90s Russia re-created itself through continuous political discourse about its future, by rejecting its Communist past.

Who is Mr. Putin? This question was famous in the West after the triumphal victory of ex-spy at the presidential elections in spring 2000. It is fair enough to say that Russians could not answer on that questions at that time, and, perhaps, it is not easy to give a definite answer on this question even today when Putin’s first term in office is ended. As to his ‘identity policy’, the discourse is about Russia’s present and future, by referring to its past.

National identity in present-day Russia depends upon the success of the implementation of Putin’s policies that stress on security, enhanced struggle against terrorists and extremists as well as centralization and consolidation of president’s personal power along with pragmatism in interstate relations.\textsuperscript{19} The grouping of the ruling elite around second Russia’s president and his high rating among Russian citizen leave no doubt that the current and the future

\textsuperscript{18} Another ROMIR poll’s result to be mentioned: in June 2000 the majority of respondents exposed readiness in case of necessity to fight for the country while only 19.6% gave a negative answer; and 13.7% hesitated to answer.

\textsuperscript{19} The western observer review on this process on it’s initial stage one may see in the chapter titled as “Russia: Strengthening the State” in: \textit{Strategic Security 2000/2001}. 
policies of the Russian Federation are in many respects determined by that person as well as the set of values and attitudes on which he relies while executing his presidential duties.

Contemporary Russia may be compared to de Gaulles’ France. Those who like such a comparison say, de Gaulle’s authoritarianism promoted appreciable progress of the country, and helped to rise up the level of national pride. Their opponents pointed out that at the end it had suffered a defeat. Misunderstanding of the complexity of the present situation may also lead to an equally unjustified optimism and/or pessimism about Russia’s future and its place on the international arena in the predictable future alike in gloomy forecasts that actually did not become true.

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RUSKI NACIONALNI IDENTITET POSLE HLADNOG RATA

REZIME

Autor analizira stvaranje specifičnog modela nacionalnog identiteta u Rusiji u periodu posle hladnog rata. U suštini, bavi se nacionalnim političkim identitetom. Ono predstavlja značajno ograničenje s obzirom da je celokupni model ruskog nacionalnog identiteta posle završetka hladnog rata stvoren radikalnim promenama koje su usledile u zemlji i njenom geopolitičkom okruženju u toku prelaznog perioda. Novi model je proizašao i, na više načina, prenesen iz ruske prošlosti, kako sovjetske tako i carske, ali ne samo da se izmenio prilagođavanjem na nove uslove posle hladnog rata već se pretvara u nešto što je zaista novo, možda čak i radikalno novo u nekim aspektima.

Raspad Sovjetskog Saveza je značio ne samo kraj hladnog rata već i ključni preokret u sudbini Rusije. Po prvi put u svojoj istoriji Rusija postoji kao država nacije a ne kao carstvo. Uporedo sa traganjem za novim identitetom, Rusi su suočeni sa novim izazovima i pretnjama uperenim ka nacionalnoj bezbednosti i integritetu zemlje (pobuna čeških separatista, itd.). Čini se da se prelazna kriza identiteta završila na početku 21. veka, ali proces prihvatanja novog bezbednosnog okruženja i multietničke stvarnosti i dalje traje.

Nacionalni identitet je zasnovan na suštinskim odlikama kao što su krv (etnička pripadnost), materjni jezik i privrženost određenim elementima posebne kulture masa zasnovane na duboko ukorenjenoj tradiciji i običajima otadžbine i istorijskom sećanju po kome se jedan narod razlikuje od drugog i koji je postojao zajedno sa identitetom državljanstva (nacionalni politički identitet) na nivou pojedinca. U Rusiji se identitet državljanstva istorijski stvara drugačije nego u Evropi. Za većinu Rusa je osećaj zajednice išao prvenstveno ka zemlji a ne ka oblasti ili gradu, dok većina stanovnika Zapadne Evrope, Nemci, na primer, povezuju identitet sa mestom, tj. lokalitetom, gradskom ili pokrajinskom zajednicom. Za njih je njihovo mesto važnije od države i to je osnovna razlika između ruskog modela identiteta i zapadnjevropskih. Tako je analiza problema ponovne izgradnje ličnog identiteta, urađena na osnovu podataka dobijenih ispitivanjem javnog mnijenja u Rusiji i prikazanih u ovom radu, zasnovana na praviljenju razlike između dva aspekta:

deklarativni identitet (kako ljudi sebe nazivaju) i nacionalni i jezičko-kulturni identitet (kakvima se ljudi osećaju).

Polazeći od brojnih istraživanja koja su sproveli domaći i strani naučnici, autor navodi da su internacionalizam i prihvatanje multietničkih i multikulturalnih stvarnosti, koji se nastavljaju uprkos gubitku starših država, najvažnije odlike postsovjetskog ruskog nacionalnog identiteta. Snažna i istorijski utvrđena povezanost između nacionalnosti i lokalno umjetnosti, koja se zidaju u hladnom ratu, a zatim se ukrštaju sa nacionalnim političkim identitetom. Autor naglašava ovaj elemenat jer, prema istraživanjima, narodi koji ne pripadaju ruskom narodu, a naročito ne slovenskim narodima, pokazuju jače osećanje pripadnosti svojoj etničkoj, verskoj i teritorijalnoj zajednici nego što to čine Rusi u Rusiji. Mnoge neruske nacionalnosti pokazuju izrazit pokrajinski i etnički identitet, naročito u bivšim autonomnim republikama, gde poistovjećivanje sa ruskim državljanstvom nije baš najbolje kotiran. To je rezultat procesa ponovnog tumačenja nacionalnog identiteta u autonomnim republikama. To je kolateralni proizvod nacionalističkog ekstremizma i separatizma koji se probudio u regionalnom političkom govoru početkom 90-tih godina 20. veka. Za Rusu - "osnovnu naciju" Sovjetskog Saveza i Ruske Federacije, tolerancija prema "drugima" i internacionalizu su bili i još uvek jesu glavni elementi nacionalnog karaktera.

U svakodnevnom životu većina građana Ruske Federacije se poistovećuje sa Rusijom prvo u kulturnom smislu, kao entitetom koji ujedinjuje ljude, a ne u etničkom i teritorijalnom smislu, a zatim u političkom smislu. Jezik, kulturni i sentimanalni elementi samopoistovećivanja zauzimaju najvažnije mesto kod onih pripadnika neruskih naroda koji se osećaju Rusima, koji smatraju rusku kulturu i jezik svojima, koji zajeda vole Rusiju kao majku zemlju, kao i kod onih koji žive u mešovitim brajkovima. Ove činjenice ukazuju na to da krv dolazi na prvo mesto u ovakvim slučajevima, a da je cela ideja o "nacionalnosti" u ruskoj masovnoj stisno nejasna i nesigurna.

Mnogi posmatrači su uočili pojavu prelaska na nacionalno konsolidovanje uz drugog ruskog predsednika Vladimira Putina. U stvari, političko rivalstvo se smanjilo posle opštih izbora (1999) i predsedničkih izbora (2000. godine), a rezultati nedavnih opštih izbora 2003. godine su se mogli predvideti. Putinov tim je odneo veliku pobedu 2000. i 2003. godine tako što je upotrebio pretnje uperene na bezbednost i spoljnu politiku zemlje za ostvarivanje sopstvenih ciljeva u unutrašnjoj politici i što je iskoristio patriotska i nacionalistička osećanja, kao i osećanja nostalgije prema moći bijšeg Sovjetskog Saveza koja je još uvek veoma prisutna u društvu i u vojsci. Vladimir Putin nije komunista, ali je povratio jaku centralnu državu, a njegov režim se oblikuje sredstvima kojima se desno orijentisani političari i demokrate plaše. Efekat drugog čečenskog rata na proces nacionalne konsolidacije takođe se ne može potceniti. Terorički napadi na ruske gradove su ojačali patriotizam i ruski etnički nacionalizam. Šira javnost je podržala vladinu politiku odlučnog rešavanja čečenskog sukoba upotrebom sile (pored spornih političkih aktivnosti sprovedenih u toj republici). Veći deo elite smatra da čečenski sukob nije produžen kolonijalni rat već domaća bitka u kojoj se ruski vojnici bore protiv separatista i terorista, a ne protiv boraca za slobodu, kao i protiv stranih plaćenika. Takođe treba ukazati na to da se prava težina verskih elemenata u tom sukobu koji se odužio do sada nije mogla proceniti.

Nepotrebno je reći da jačina osećanja pripadnosti Rusiji kao državi (nacionalni politički identitet) zavisi od percepcije mesta koje Rusija po okončanju hladnog rata zauzima u svetskom poretku, od toga da li je pojedinac ponosan na to što je
građanin svoje države, itd. Ovo je važno zbog toga što to znači da proces stvaranja novog nacionalnog identiteta, kao politička aktivnost, ima trenutne i dugoročne posledice. Možda glavni izazov pokušajima Kremlja da konsoliduje naciju proističe iz njegove nesposobljivosti da izrazi i dosledno primeni teške odluke spoljne politike koje su neophodne da se Rusija izvuče iz svog sadašnjeg međunarodnog položaja. Kritika spoljne politike, zajedno sa antiameričkim raspoloženjem, je proizašla iz razočaranja američkom politikom u slučaju rata u Iraku, kao što je to bio slučaj pre toga sa sukobom na Balkanu.

Rusija je ušla u drugu fazu reforme pod vodstvom Putina. Priznanje same činjenice da se u ovoj zemlji period tranzicije, osnovne ekonomске i političke transformacije, završio, težak je i značajan korak ka odgovarajućem razumevanju osobitosti sadašnje situacije i predviđanja budućih događaja. Isto važi i za reformu ruskog nacionalnog identiteta. Problem je poprimio nove dimenzije u obliku demografskih pretnji za unutrašnju stabilnost, pretnji od radikalnih islamskih fundamentalista i događaja u bliskom okruženju Rusije koji utiču na međunarodnu bezbednost, buđenje etničkog nacionalizma, latentnih i otvorenih fobija, itd.