SERBIA: A PART OF BOTH THE EAST AND THE WEST?

Srbija: i na Istoku i na Zapadu?

APSTRAKT Tekst se sastoji iz dva dela. U prvom se razmatraju osnovni istorijski preduslovi formiranja savremenih kulturnih obrazaca najvećeg dela stanovništva Srbije i njihov odnos prema onim kulturnim obrascima koji se danas pojavljuju u razvijenom delu sveta, a koji se nazivaju modernim. Ispitivanje pokazuje da je istorijska samo/proizvodnja kulturnih obrazaca ovde obeležena protivrečnostima, upravo kada je reč o susretu na relacijama Istok:Zapad, tradicionalno:savremeno. Osnovni je nalaz istraživanja da se, zbog takvog razvoja (karakterističnog za granična područja, kojima Srbija pripada sve do kraja proteklog veka), na ovim prostorima ne može praviti razlika između dva kulturna jezgra (Zapadne i Istočne kulture), čiji su nosioci dve – nejednako velike – odvojene i međusobno suprotstavljene grupacije (tradicionalni slojevi i modernizacijski akteri), nego da navedeni rascepi karakterišu sve empirijske aktere, čije je delovanje iznutra obeleženo ovim protivrečnostima. U drugom delu rada izložiće se nalazi empirijskih istraživanja koja su izvedena u zajedničkim komparativnim okvirima projekta: “The Socio-Economic Culture of Eastern Europe in the Enlarged Union: an Asset or a Liability?”

KLJUČNE REČI kulturni obrasci, modernizacija, tradicionalizam, Zapadna kultura, kultura Istoka, Srbija

ABSTRACT The text comprises of two parts. The first is dealing with the basic historical preconditions for the formation of modern cultural patterns common to the largest part of the Serbian population and their relation towards those cultural patterns which appear today in the developed part of the world and are referred to as modern. The research shows that the historical auto/production of cultural patterns is marked by contradictions in Serbia, especially in considering the encounter between the East and the West, traditional and modern. The main finding of this research is that, due to this kind of development (characteristic of a border areas of which Serbia was a part until the end of the previous century) it is, in these parts, impossible to make the usual distinction between the two cultural cores (those of the Western and Eastern cultures), supported by two – unevenly sized – separate and mutually confronted groupings (the traditional strata and modernization actors) and that the above-mentioned splits characterize all the empirical actors whose effects are marked by these controversies on the inside. The second part of the paper sums up
the findings of the empirical research carried out within the joint comparative frameworks of the project: “The Socio-Economic Culture of Eastern Europe in the Enlarged Union: an Asset or a Liability?”

KEY WORDS cultural patterns, modernization, traditionalism, Western culture, Eastern culture, Serbia

Introduction – Serbia between the East and the West

This text is composed of two parts. The first deals, in the briefest terms, with the main historical preconditions for the formation of the modern cultural patterns prevailing among the Serbian population and their relation towards those cultural patterns which appear today in the developed part of the world and are referred to as either modern or Western.\(^1\) Having in mind that the way of life and its meaning-value interpretation (as the notion of culture is, in brief, understood here) are, essentially, historically conditioned, the proposed historical excursion cannot be avoided, if one wishes to truly understand the actual encounters of the autochthonous and Western culture on the Serbian territory (which is the basic topic of this research\(^2\)). Our research shall reveal that the historical auto/production of cultural patterns in Serbia has been marked by contradictions, especially in considering the encounter between the East and the West, traditional and modern, progressive and regressive, etc. The main finding of this research is that, due to this kind of development (characteristic of a border areas of which Serbia was a part until the end of the previous century) it is, in these parts, impossible to make the usual distinction between two cultural cores (those of the Western and Eastern cultures, e.g., or the “Two Serbias” as significatively suggested by the title of an influential collection of works with an anti-nationalist charge published in the early 1990s), supported by two – unevenly sized – separate and mutually confronted groupings (the traditional strata and modernization actors) and that the above-mentioned splits characterize all empirical actors whose effects are marked by these

1 The ideological origins of equalizing the Western with modern and developed, as representing “positively” valued social-economic, political and cultural patterns, opposed to “negatively” defined Eastern (simultaneously traditional and backward) patterns, have been addressed by a large body of literature. For a well-laid out criticism of shaping the “modernization theory” see e.g. Sztompka, 1994.

2 In this and the following articles the results of the project “The Socio-Economic Culture of Eastern Europe in the Enlarged Union: an Asset or a Liability?” are analyzed. The project is financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria, and coordinated by the Institute for Human Studies, Vienna. Janos Matyas Kovacs was at the head of the whole project (in which authors from nine countries – Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Serbia – were involved), while Mladen Lazic was in charge of the Serbian team. The research took part during the 2003.
controversies on the inside. And also that there is no a priori overlapping of the above mentioned characteristics (traditional-modern direction, backward-progressive direction), but that each of them carries an ambivalent potential of both. The second part of the paper sums up the findings of the empirical research carried out (for the most part) within the joint comparative frameworks of this project.  

I. A Society on the Border

1. Serbia – a country on the East side of the border

In the late 1980s and especially during the 1990s in Serbia, a debate concerning the historical and especially cultural foundation of the nation and the nation state was started. Naturally, the motive was twofold. The breakdown of socialism imposed the transformation of the society according to the market and democratic model which \textit{eo ipso} meant an orientation towards the European West. Within this framework the public sphere soon reached a – tacit! – consensus that Serbia is an »European country«, which meant that the firm European orientation of the nation must be built in the historical, economic, political and, certainly, in the cultural sphere also. True, and this debate had already been marked by a paradoxical positioning of participants, who managed to arrive at a common denominator from opposed starting points. While those who insisted on the inevitability of as complete and as fast as possible adoption of all Western standards (institutional, value, moral, etc.) saw the main obstacle in the weak Western foundations of the Serbian culture, their opponents who started from an irreducible specificity, and even uniqueness of the Serbian national culture, at the same time invoked the European heritage of the Serbian nation (of Byzantine origin and therefore, according to this interpretation, even older – and “more European”! – than the Western-European variant), established a way back in the Middle Ages.

On the other hand, the civil wars on the territory of the former Yugoslav federation, accompanied by Serbia's progressively increasing confrontation with the policy of Western countries, added to the strengthening of the isolationist orientation in public life. That orientation was gradually formulated as the legitimacy basis of Milošević's regime and in a time of war, as it generally happens, ensured the homogenisation of the nation – in support to the ruling circles! – which presented the external environment as hostile. Under such circumstances the previously mentioned debate was particularly radicalised. Different positions gave dramatically opposed interpretations in value terms, presenting one as patriotic compared with the

\footnote{This time not all the texts written by the Serbian part of the project will be published.}
other considered traitorous (according to the usual interpretation of one side), i.e. as anachronistic and modern (according to the interpretation of the other, defined in mildest terms). It is quite clear that under such circumstances appropriate frameworks did not exist for a rational debate on a topic of doubtlessly lasting importance.

Namely, the search for identity is characteristic of Serbia from the very inception of its modern nation state, in the early 19th century. In the period from mid-15th century (when the Serbian feudal state definitely came under the Ottoman rule) through the 18th century, that identity was seemingly fixed in clear opposition to an ethnically, politically, economically and – above all religiously – opposed grouping. Just like other Balkan peoples under the Ottomans, Serbs had to rely on culture as the primary means of sustaining this identity. Naturally, during the long history of “coexistence” of the two societies, their cultural confrontation (and partly also “proto-national”!) – due to the Islamized part of the autochthonous population), became gradually relativized: shared elements of the way of life, orientation frameworks, values and the like, of the reduced Christian (Orthodox) society and the totality of the Ottoman society inevitably became increasingly apparent.

This historical period of coexistence of cultures (simultaneously confronted and increasingly mutually pervasive from the very beginning) is made all the more complex by the fact that the Serbian cultural opposition to the “oriental” totalised (economic, political, cultural, social) domination did not feed only on the past (sustained by word of mouth and a weak organization of the church ensured autonomy by the millet principle). Namely, while settling in border territories

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4 For some elementary historical data on this topic see V. Vuletić’s text in this collection.
5 Cf. a thorough historical research into the importance of the enemy in the strengthening of – the British – national identity in: Cooley, 1992.
6 They were deprived of political rights and had only meagre economic resources. The Church, despite having an autonomy, was remarkably institutionally underdeveloped, with an incomplete organization, a clergy who hardly differed from the rest of the population in their life style and education, a completely local orientation, etc. – and, moreover, all these characteristics prevailed long into the second half of the 19th century! Cf. Radić, 2003.
7 Here I take culture in the wide meaning of the concept, as a way of life of a specific nation, as well as symbolical universe. – Cf. Golubović, 1994. For the purposes of this paper, the author’s understanding of the cultural pattern shall be used, defined as a “meaningful framework of orientation and integration of a community, encompassing, in the first place, the value systems used by individuals and social groups to arrive at an understanding of themselves and the world they live in, as well as a model for action in order to attain the chosen objective...” – cf. Golubović, ibid, 35.
8 Here, naturally, “Orient” must be understood quite conditionally, since its Islamic “branch” has from its very beginnings, been powerfully intertwined with the West: from the Judaist-Christian sources of the Muslim religion, through the Arabic philosophical-scientific mainstays in the classical European heritage, to the – late 19th century – military-political, administrative and other Western sources of the Young Turk movement. For the lasting historical crisscrossing of the Islamic-“oriental” and Western cultures see e.g. J.M. Roberts, 1997. A Turkish historian commenting on the
adjoining the catholic Christian countries throughout their “Balkan history” (from the times of Christianisation) the Serbs developed a similar ambivalent relation towards that side as well. By contrast to Islamic religion, (Western) Christianity presented itself as a close ally. This alliance by far exceeded the cultural sphere: Austrian eastwards campaigns always reckoned with the important support of Serbian insurrection, while their withdrawals westward invariably included the columns of Serbian refugees, who, fearing the Turkish revenge, fled to settle in territories under the Austrian political (as well as economic and cultural) control. In these parts, however, religious kinship was soon transformed into confrontation (spurred by the proselyte efforts of the Catholic church), which inevitably made this population look for support among their brethren in the south, in the single cultural heritage (as well as in the East, in the newly-enthroned centre of orthodoxy - Russia).

This double (in both cases imposed) acceptance and rejection was compounded by a paradoxical fact. The part of the Serbian ethnical body positioned within a gradually progressing bourgeois society had its mainstay in the south, in an area which had for a long time already been marked by historically regressive trends. Under such circumstances the identity building inevitably relied primarily on mythic elements. One of such elements is the projection into time distance (where the miserable economic, political and cultural situation of the Serbian nation was “overcome” with a belief in a mythic power banked in all these fields, as confirmed by the medieval realm: and also in the increasingly successful military political resistance to the Turkish rule during the 19th century; nota bene: this myth of successful military-political resistance started to turn westward in the 20th century, feeding on the allegedly crucial importance of the Serbs for the failed German-Austrian push due east in both world wars). The second element is the

“western” strivings of the Ottoman says: “From that moment (end of the 16th century – M.L.) the Ottoman history is the history of efforts of a Middle East state to adjust to the economic, political and cultural challenge of Europe” - Inalzık, 2003, 6. As for Said’s – cf. Said, 2000 – and post-Saidean criticism of orientalism, and “critique of criticism” - primarily its own partialities, the reader need not be burdened with relevant references here.

At that, one must constantly bear in mind that the developed “North” in South-Eastern Europe continuously appears as a historically “belated” semi-periphery of the West. This may be illustrated by a quote from Schorske: “On March 12, 1848, the students of the (Vienna – M.L.) University met and formulated for Austria the first comprehensive set of demands for a society linking law not only with administrative order but also with political and cultural freedom: popular representation, academic freedom, freedom of the press etc.” - Schorske, 1998. Entire half a century afterwards, Adolf Loos felt it sufficiently warranted to give the journal he had started (Das Andere) a sub-title: A Paper for the Introduction of Western Culture into Austria”, quoted from Schorske, 167. Therefore, we are talking about a backward province of a country itself significantly behind the world-historical centre in development terms.
projection into space distance and a far away, but powerful ally, predestined to be the saviour by “blood” and religious kinship.\textsuperscript{10}

Indeed, the background of the Serbian national identity formation must explicitly include this particular element, orientation towards Russia. Namely, it is only natural that the Serbs, in whose midst the principle of non-assimilation had already been historically established as one of the dominant cultural patterns, and who were located in border territories of two mutually opposed and moreover most powerful states/societies/cultures, based their relation towards the Other on the idea of (double) rejection.\textsuperscript{11} However, since their own identity basis was supported by a weak base in terms of institutional and other “hard” (economic-political) grounds, it is quite clear why they had to look for additional external assistance to sustain their own (specific) cultural patterns. And since their national identity relied on the religious (Orthodox) factor, and the material and spiritual centre of Orthodoxy moved to Russia, it was inevitable that Russia should appear as the key point of reliance for national survival (naturally, this “choice” was also facilitated by the ethnic – Slavic – kinship of the population). But, while the two “antagonized” cultures maintained a constant (menacing, violent etc.) presence, the Russian mainstay acted at a distance and was much more “imagined” than real. Precisely that remote action may be taken as the key to understand why the principle of “rejection” has never been established in more extensive proportions with respect to Russia, although the imagined protectress often provided specific-historical reasons for that effect (for instance, from the peace Treaty of San Stefano when it demonstrated its readiness to openly act to the detriment of Serbian interests in order to obtain a firmer – Bulgarian – foothold for its own push to South West, to the NATO bombing in 1999).

Thus the process of historical emancipation of the Serbian nation unfolded through contradictory developments wherein political constitution took place in economically and civilizationally more backward regions, which – by “liberating” culturally and economically more developed parts of the nation – imposed themselves as lasting leaders. Naturally, in order to understand the historical formation of features basically characterizing the cultural patterns, a whole series of political-economic factors has to be highlighted. Thus, the specific political organization of the Ottoman Empire (combined with economic conditions for the reproduction of the society, shortly to be addressed) essentially influenced the attitude of the population towards the state, as well as any – externally imposed –

\textsuperscript{10} For the importance of diverse “traditional” spiritual elements – myths, legends, religion, etc. – for the growing of an ethnic community into a modern nation see Smith, 1986; and for “modern” elements – press, role of intellectuals, mass mobilization, etc. – cf. Anderson, 1983.

\textsuperscript{11} Therborn, invoking F. Barth, recalls: “Ethnic studies should focus on the ‘boundary that defines the group’” – Therborn, 1995, p.229.
system of power, and also towards the principles of an organized action. According to the typical patterns of oriental action (cf. Wittfogel, 1988), the Ottoman rule was simultaneously absolute and of weak local presence, leaving a high degree of autonomy to the lower organizational units (cf. e.g. Inaldžik, 2003), and even to the local village communities. Thus the population developed an ambivalent relation of an almost unconditional acceptance of the central authority of power (once again territorially distant and with mythic characteristics!), with a concurrent resistance to the system of rule represented by its local (foreign, enemy) officials, only to, once again, unconditionally accept the principle of patriarchal seniority (an element of the “domestic” system of rule) at the lowest level of the village community.

In other words, the Ottoman rule atomised its subjects, which facilitated the rule as a system of submission, but also created resistance towards it as a system of political organization, i.e. state. Resistance to the state was doubtlessly particularly intensified in a situation where, in the first place, that state appeared as “foreign”, occupying. Second, this resistance kept growing as the gradual disintegration of central control (gaining momentum with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire from the end of the 16th century) left the population defenceless before the (ever more brutal) arbitrariness of local potentates. Then (since there is no room here for a more extensive elaboration, the most important factors will only be mentioned!) the “deflection” of the population from the state (to repeat: one that was gradually shaped as resistance to any system of organized rule) becomes all the stronger to the extent that the functioning of its regular administrative and judicial apparatuses at the local level grows weaker, leaving it up to the self-will of individuals – representatives of the foreign colonial power, or the traditional norm, to pass judgement in the village community which has been granted internal self-administration.

In the absence of systematic legal regulations and controlled bureaucracy to oversee their enforcement, the backward economy of the Balkans could not join the gradual rise characterizing the European West as of the 17th century, and even less the (industrial) revolution of the 19th century. Practically the entire Serbian economic activity developed in agriculture and the life of its population in rural parts. The initial Serbian bourgeoisie which organized the movement for state independence (“the Serbian uprisings” in 1804 and 1815) lived in the villages and traded in agricultural products (especially cattle; cf. Ekmečić, 1989). Complete legal insecurity permitted accumulation of only (easily) movable property (cattle) and money. The absence of any significant buildings in Serbia until the last third of the 19th century is not only the consequence of the country’s overall poverty, or even the insufficient accumulation of the wealthiest individuals (it is only individuals, since at that time more stable social strata have not yet been formed), but also of the overall legal and physical insecurity, entailing excessive risk for major investments into real estate (including factory buildings, machinery, etc.). Thus orientation to
consumption rather than accumulation was not, in this case, due to the non-existence of the protestant ethics, but to the lasting first-hand experience of the futility of postponing the satisfaction of one's needs, bearing in mind the absence of any protection of private property, and even life itself.

2. Serbia – difficulties of crossing over to the Western side of the border

Serbian liberation from the Ottoman was brought about by the combined effect of the dissatisfaction felt by the emerging (village, commercial-agricultural) bourgeoisie with the conditions for capital accumulation and the existential threat to the peasantry posed by the increasingly plunderous nature of the local Turkish heads, as well as the growing state-creating national romanticism in Europe of the late 18th and the early 19th century. However, the protracted (almost three quarters of a century) – and therefore also highly gradual – process of the country's liberation had important consequences for the character of the Serbian society (economy, politics, culture). The old patterns of action (government, social organizations, thinking, etc.) were not only reflected through tradition (habits etc.), but were also constantly reproduced. Economic and human resources (physical and spiritual) of the elites, as well as of the population, were predominantly channelled towards the political processes of state independence, and the expansion of the country's borders. Economic, cultural and social developments were attached only secondary importance and their progress was therefore dramatically slowed down. 12

Disharmony between political dynamics and developments in other social spheres (which was already clearly revealed at the time of adoption of a relatively modern in European terms, liberal “Sretenje” Constitution of 1835, in a situation in which the group that could support such principles of social regulation was extremely marginal) left a long-term mark on the more recent Serbian history.

Serbia awaited the 20th century as a remarkably economically backward, poor, agrarian country to go through the wars (Balkan and the World War I) which brought her large territorial-political expansion with disastrous human losses and huge material destruction. Once again in this period, the mainstream of social energy

12 The precedence of political over economic objectives among the elite members, on the one hand, and the link between these objectives and the acceptance or refusal of the European orientation, on the other, along with the established hierarchy of values among the population, are clearly visible in the history of the Serbian parliamentary life in the last quarter of the 19th century. The emphasis on the political objectives of liberating parts of the country and the populist ideology of the Radical Party which stressed the primacy of autochthonous tradition and is suspicious of the West, had a remarkable advantage over the primarily economic and pro-Western orientation of the Liberals. This order was essentially sustained all the way to the World War II and had the majority support of both the political and intellectual elites, and the largest part of the electorate. – Cf. Perović, ed. 2003, especially papers contributed by L. Perović and O. Milosavljević.
was channelled towards the first objective, consolidation of the newly-created political entity, with attempts to integrate its multinational composition with the dynastic-political domination of the ruling Serbian elite, while economic and social development remained of a secondary importance. We shall not dwell on this period at this point, and the only thing required is to sum up in briefest terms the main characteristics of the national cultural patterns the country had at the time of establishment of the communist social order after the World War II.

Namely, after Yugoslavia had been created, it appeared that the country was looking at a relaxation of (at least external) political tensions. Serbia's national objective was essentially attained by gathering the prevailing part of the ethnical body within the state borders. On the other hand, it seemed that Serbia finally stopped being the border belt between the East and the West and that gradual abandonment of the double rejection pattern (“neither the East nor the West”) could be expected. Namely, the cessation of the “Eastern danger” could also be interpreted as an opportunity to finally constitute value patterns according to western models, in the newly created environment (Yugoslavia as an European country with a pluralist political system and an economy institutionally oriented towards the market principles). True, it was immediately revealed that, in view of the national objectives of other South Slavic groups, external peace would be replaced by internal strains. The requirement for greater participation in power of primarily the Croatian political elite was immediately transferred into the sphere of a more general ethnic conflict, where the old division was largely revived, in somewhat changed categories (Orthodoxy vs. Catholicism; the Turkish/Byzantine East vs. the West). Thus it happened that, for one more time, the material and spiritual energy of the elite and the population converged on political issues, while at the same time the country was overcoming the economic and overall social backwardness at an extremely slow pace.\footnote{The list of literature from the period between the two world wars addressing the interpretation of the Serbian-Croatian conflict as one of “the East and the West”, of “civilization”, “cultural” opposites, etc. would be a very long one; I shall here, by way of illustration, mention only a treatise *Pogled s Kalemegdana (A View from Kalemegdan)*, which at the end of the 20th century, in a new ethnic conflict, became one of the most strongly present in the Serbian public; cf. Velmar-Janković, 1938, 1992.}

Although the modernization process in the »European« matrix doubtlessly developed (cf. Marković, 1992), Serbia was, in the late 1930s, still a remarkably rural country with the overwhelming majority of agricultural population, underdeveloped industry and traffic, low level of literacy (especially among women), a sparse cultural elite, etc. This, furthermore, means that the market could regulate but a minor part of the national economy (as the major part consisted of subsistence farming), that democratic culture in politics was distinctly subjected to patriarchal-authoritarian patterns, that the state apparatuses functioned primarily in
the patrimonial matrix (personalization of relations, corruption, non-professionalism, etc.), that the public sphere was limited to the narrow strata of citizenry (while the suffrage was general, which is directly conducive to the “spoiling the prospects for democracy” - cf. Huntington, 1984) etc. In a word, until recently the primarily spiritual ambivalence of the Serbian ethnical body (naturally, concentrated and awakened primarily within a very narrow circle of educated individuals), in this period poured out, first into an institutional reality (democratic and market “vessels” where pre-democratic and pre-market contents are mixed; so that the failures resulting from the contents are simply interpreted as “deficiencies” or assigned to the generally inappropriate form), to gradually spread to ever wider social strata. The traditional society, faced with increasingly stronger real penetration of the West, which along with the improvement of the conditions of life, also carried a threat of, or an actual ruin for quite a few (we should bear in mind that this is the period marked by the collapse of the world economy of 1930s, with grave consequences for Serbia), looked for a refuge in the imaginary values of the East (called Orthodox, in a Byzantine/Greek-Russian combination, but oriental by its real characteristics; the “defence of society” from the civilization assault of the “prosperous market economy” cf. Polanyi's classical study – Polanyi, 2003).

3. Serbia – Back to the East?

This twenty-year process ends in the new huge destruction of the World War II and the establishment of the communist order in Serbia (Yugoslavia). This period is again marked by substantial ambivalences, and I shall mention but a few, mindful of the main line threading through this paper. First of all, it has often been said that communism in the former Yugoslavia became firmly embedded precisely due to the traditional Serbian reliance on Russia. Naturally, as already said, it was reliance on Orthodoxy in Russia, which was exposed to destructive effects of precisely the communist regime, from the very moment of its constitution. Therefore, it is not odd that the peasants offered a widespread resistance to the communist partisan movement in Serbia during the largest part of the World War II (based on both the above-mentioned cultural and, primarily, on the economic factor – the fear of small farmers that their land will be taken away). However, although the most numerous proponents of introducing the communist regime in the country were Serbs, in this case they were from “across the river” (prečani), from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (whose mass attraction to the partisan movement was, at least in the initial years – 1941 and 1942, much more attributable to its anti-nationalist than class ideology). On the other hand, although forcibly imposed (as demonstrated by another mass resistance of peasants in Serbia, this time to the creation of collectivised agriculture in 1949-1952), communism was, a few years after, embraced with increasing intensity, to all appearances due to the traditional
orientation towards Russia. But, its acceptance was probably due to a more important reason – the changed social position of a large mass of the population who found this regime remarkably modernizing.

But before we briefly address this topic, we should point out the following. If in the previous centuries-long period, Russian orthodoxy represented the key identification basis for the wide strata of the population in Serbia (in parallel with ethnic closeness), then once the communist order was for other reasons also accepted by the masses, the acceptance “package” included an antireligious ideology, giving the identification basis with the (new!) communist Russia (or USSR) a new cultural basis. Resolute rejection of religion on a wide basis in the New Yugoslavia was substantially more widespread among the former Orthodox (Serbian and Montenegrin) believers then, e.g., in Catholic parts of the country (as revealed by numerous sociological research works – cf. Djordjević, 1984). Russia was, thus, now a model precisely because it opposed religion, because it was resolutely anti-Orthodox.

Another source of wide identification were the (alleged) astonishing achievements of modernization in the USSR, as well as the (real) improvement of the conditions of life for the population in Yugoslavia (especially the poor strata), accomplished on the basis of the type of social organization taken over from Russia. Indeed, in terms of the GDP growth rates, the pace of industrialization, deagrarianisation, urbanization, coverage of the educational network, etc. Yugoslavia had no equal in the world in 1950s. But this new basis of orientation towards the East had a large overhang. Precisely at that time, due to the dramatic conflict of the Yugoslav communist leadership with Stalin, anti-Stalinist propaganda (which despite the efforts of party ideologists could not avoid at least latent anti-Russian connotations) was developed to paroxysm in Yugoslavia. Not only that: the sheer survival of the country, and therefore also of the regime, demanded a new material point of reliance, which – in view of the Soviet withheld economic assistance and military threats – could only be found in the West. The communist Yugoslavia thus became a major beneficiary of material assistance from the West (which, according to subsequent analyses of economists, perhaps decisively influenced precisely those economic successes assigned to the new type of social organization – cf. e.g. Madžar, 1990). Then, since even at the time of mitigating the conflict with the Soviets from mid-1950s “keeping the distance” towards them was only possible with the support of the “other side”, the stabilization of firm economic ties was practically inevitably accompanied by a more general opening to the West and increasingly intensive cultural communication with the West. The general motif: “We are different from both the East and the West” became a kind of an identification sign of the country, and self-understanding of people in Yugoslavia, and perhaps in the first place in Serbia (in the Western regions of the country the
first part of this statement was a priori assumed from earlier times, while the other elicited reservations).

It is important to understand the following. The society in Yugoslavia (Serbia) in the 1950-1990 period was not split between the East and the West only in the ideological sphere (the criticism of Stalinism based on a Stalinist value matrices; the rejection of the “formal” Western democracy and the declarative acceptance of the “substantive” socialist democracy; the egalitarian ideology and the spread presence of consumer society elements, etc.). The same rift existed in the organizational and institutional bases of the system. The command (centrally planned) economy which essentially characterized the Yugoslav system, was not only called “market socialism” but it actually had important – true subordinated – elements of enterprise autonomy, only in the period after the year 1965, as well as less important but nevertheless present elements of employee participation in decision making (“self-management”). Significant openness in the economy, culture and traffic (with almost a million inhabitants who during 1970s found themselves in the markets, as well as in the social – political and cultural environment of the Western countries in the capacity of “guest workers”) implanted Western values into the prevailing socialist matrix.14 The whole situation was apparently efficiently summed up in the country's foreign policy creed: “non-alignment” - which was supposed to mean “neither the East nor the West” (but was in reality a compound: both the East and the West).

However, there was yet another dimension of the Yugoslav socialist order which was (in its ambivalence) important for the understanding of the relation between the East and the West, the traditional and modern in these parts. That is the pronounced homology of the real-communist and deeply rooted traditionalist patterns (on that see Lazić, 1994), which, incidentally, largely facilitated the stabilization of the new order in a relatively short time. The traditional collectivistic orientation found its correlate in both stressing the priority of the class and in the open ideological depreciation of individualism as a “bourgeois” principle. The unconditional patriarchal acceptance of authority represented the basis for the adoption of a strictly hierarchically organized nomenclature, with the unquestionable role of the leader, experienced as the “father of the nation”. At the same time, the village-tribal deposits of democracy fuelled hostility towards the excessively pronounced (manifest) distinction of superiors above their subordinates, especially those who indirectly represented hierarchy (in other words, the more distant, higher one's position in the hierarchy is, the less problematic his position appears; still, the

14 It was precisely in culture – understandably in view of the deterministic “distance” from the political-economic foundation of the system – that the West was the most present, externally as well as internally. Yugoslavia was a country where modern painting, literature, film, theatre, and even philosophy and social theory clearly developed autonomously ever since 1960s!
only unquestionably accepted authority is the leader on the very top of the pyramid. The patriarchal protection of the community members formed a matrix which comfortably accommodated the communist ideal of equality, with the social functions of the state by far exceeding its economic possibilities. Closing from and suspicion of the environment, important elements of rural consciousness, continued in the state with the position of a besieged camp – with the eternal enemy in the West and a no less dangerous opponent in the East. One's own position was, at that, experienced as superior: the supremacy over the West was based on the achieved “historically more perfect” type of society (socialism as a “higher stage” of historical development), and over the East, on the growing presence of the western elements (standard of living of the population, country's openness, modernity in culture, etc.).

4. Serbia – Back to the West?

The described matrix was clearly controversial on the inside and its homogeneity was, increasingly forcefully, undermined by the continuing human, economic and cultural exchange with the developed countries. When already in the late 1960s the very system was brought into question in somewhat wider circles – with the mass student demonstrations in Belgrade, as well as the expansion of “rock culture” - taken over from the West practically without limitation – in larger urban centres of the country, it was quite clear that a young generation of an educated, urban, well-informed, individualized, middle-class – in brief “modernized” - population has come of age and is moving away from the “organic unity” of the patriarchal-communist collectivity. Naturally, this growing core fermented in a still substantially predominant – but nevertheless increasingly retreating – traditionalist environment. This fermentation gained momentum after the death of the “popular leader” Josip Broz (Tito), during the 1980s, so that despite the attempts of the communist nomenclature to reinforce external repressive measures, the Yugoslav system internally started to obtain noticeable characteristics of a pluralist society (civil society development, open denial of basic legitimacy principles, overt para-political self-organization, etc.).

Under such circumstances traditionalist collectivism found a new strongpoint in the newly discovered (truly never deeply buried and a few times renewed – even during the communist regime) nationalist ideology. We cannot elaborate on that extensively in this paper (cf. Lazić, 1994, 2003), but it is necessary to briefly spell out the main consequences produced in the 1988-2000 period by the regime of

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15 This state’s legitimacy of its own superiority was often substantiated by exaggerated stories of the incredible value of Yugoslav passports on the black market; ostensibly, since it ensured free passage on both sides of the “iron curtain” a stolen document could be sold for a large sum of money.
Slobodan Milošević for the cultural sphere analysed in this study. Firstly, in widest terms, that is a period of an unusually strong turn backwards, towards the previously mentioned traditionalist patterns. Nationalism, as the main legitimacy mainstay of the regime, became the dominant value orientation which has organized all other values among the majority of the population. Bearing in mind that this value is itself based on a series of principles with a traditionalist origin (collectivism - anti-individualism, cult of the leader, authoritarianism, closeness-rejection of the other/hostility towards the other, etc.), the speed of its spread among the population is hardly surprising.\(^{16}\)

Naturally, the gaps between traditional and modernizing patterns are in this period widening not only in the cultural sphere but also in all other sub-systems of the society. In politics, controversies are manifested in the strengthening of the authoritarian form of rule of S. Milošević (which quite a few people, clearly erroneously, but not without a reason!, called totalitarian) and the concurrent continuance of the pluralist political system (which was in no case formal, as proven by the fact that the regime was definitively removed on the basis of the results of the parliamentary elections). In the economy, an accelerated dismantling of the command system was taking place with simultaneous unbridled flourishing of the private sector (true mostly within the grey and even black economy, primarily due to the international sanctions). However, the privatisation of the state/social enterprises was continuously put off, and the state control over the economy was used for mass transfer of resources from the public sector into the private property of the persons who were until recently members of the nomenclature and their war-political allies (empirical research of the new economic elite established “conversion” of political into economic capital of huge proportions - cf. Lazić, ed. 1995). The international isolation of the country on a dramatic scale (trade sanctions, limited travels and,}

\(^{16}\) Naturally, among specific categories of the population, receptive to such values. Although research work registered a substantial growth of nationalism among all population strata, its foundation was not equally fertile in all cases. Thus the younger, urban, more educated, middle-class population throughout this period manifested continuing resistance to the Milošević regime, as well as increasing opposition to the nationalist ideology. Certainly, these two things cannot be equalized since nationalism is not a mere product of the regime, of a monocausal origin. Still, “modernity” (of western provenance) as “vaccine” against both regressive cultural developments is clearly demonstrated in the social characteristics of the above-mentioned population. See, e.g. the social and social-psychological characteristics of participants in large anti-government protests in Belgrade in 1996/7, in Lazic, ed. 2000). Another important indicator of the internal division between traditionalistically and modernistically oriented parts of the population, and their social and psychological characteristics, is the many times repeated observation that among the tens of thousands of emigrants from Serbia in this period, young and better educated people definitely predominate. Finally, the cultural split and search of modernistically oriented individuals for their own mainstays is also evidenced by the tendency – mostly of the younger! – researchers to examine Western influences on Serbia/Belgrade during the past century. – Cf. the above-mentioned works of P. Marković and R. Vučetić-Radinović, as well as L. Perović's collection.
finally, war operations) was accompanied by the intensive contacts of international institutions with all the fairly organized anti-regime initiatives (whether of oppositional parties or of the civil society), and their participation in generous financing. In addition, as already mentioned, tens of thousands of primarily younger people left the country going Westward, without a clear idea whether they were temporarily pushed out of a war and economic misfortune, political repression and cultural downfall, or pulled by the offer of a new lasting safe haven in the affluent societies.

When, finally, towards the end of the year 2000, first by the vote and then by the defence of vote in the streets, the regime was removed, and Serbia once again found itself in a paradoxical position. The social forces – both among the members of the political, economic and cultural elites and within wider, especially middle urban strata – which carried out the political about-turn were ready for a fast integration into the European mainstream. This readiness was the most distinct precisely on the cultural plane, since this part of the population believed that it practically did not – except forcibly and for a short time – leave this mainstream (let us recall the beginning of this text: no one in the country denied its essential belonging to Europe). However, it soon turned out that economic and political, organisational and institutional obstacles for the country’s integration into Europe are such (moreover on both sides of the boundary!) that the speed of integration would not be measured in days and months but in years. The lack of speed made the objective obstacles clearly visible, somewhat undercutting the energy of unreserved advocates of integration and incited the doubts of those strata which were the unavoidable victims of the capitalist transformation of Serbia (manual workers, the unemployed, pensioners, peasants, the poor, etc.), making them an easier prey to the populist organizations (certain political parties, part of the church, nationally oriented parts of the civil society). Thus a border between the West and the East once again emerged inside Serbia, splitting the country not only in terms of geographic landmarks (North : South) or stratification-demographic divisions (middle strata : lower strata, civil : rural, educated : uneducated, young : old, richer : poorer, etc.) but also cutting across these entities, and even the largest number of individuals, whichever of the above-mentioned groupings they belonged to. This double face of the modern Serbia, which is the lasting characteristic of its identity shall now be briefly presented with the results of our research.

II. Encounters and Conflicts

The empirical basis of this study was obtained in the summer of 2003, at a time when some of the European and global institutions (The Council of Europe or The Interpol, e.g.) started to (re)admit Serbia, when the enforcement of the new
Privatisation Act on a wider scale was only beginning, and a whole series of laws, as well as other institutional arrangements necessary for the regular functioning of a modern market economy, was not adopted yet (e.g. VAT, real estate cadastre and the like). Under such circumstances this study – as a part of a wider regional comparative research – had to incorporate several specific elements. In the first place, due to the complete novelty of the process of the country’s political re/integration into Europe, the part of the research related to the members of the state apparatus concerned with these integrations had to be reduced: quite simply, the constitution of such apparatuses was not completed near enough. Furthermore, although foreign trade registered a powerful upswing after the lifting of the sanctions, the operations of foreign firms in the country were (and still are!) of a low scale. Due to the undeveloped institutional framework, major foreign direct investments were still forthcoming, and that part of the research concerning individuals who maintained any systematic cultural contact with the Western business world was also limited to a more selective sample. This initial state of re/integration into Europe was the most vividly illustrated by a case study in agriculture, since the planned effort encountered an insurmountable obstacle: administrative procedures for registration of firms with foreign capital – such as the one selected for the study – were so disarranged that the firm failed to register, and therefore also start working, until the end of the research (and the whole plan for research work had to be changed). Finally, due to the fact that for fifteen or so years, Serbia was not only cut off from the world – sometimes more and sometimes less – but also that both in and out of it an unusually high number of prejudices about its “Asiatic” political-cultural origins was accumulated (Serbia is no exception in these parts; for the tradition of “orientalistic” logic in Western attitudes towards the Balkans as a whole see Todorova, 1999), we thought it necessary to add a chapter which concisely clarifies the modernizing processes in the 20th century (the chapter by K. Turza has been published as an article in Sociologija no. 2/2003). This, in our view, provided a more complete picture, which could point the reader to the various possibilities and limitations for Serbia to join the line of European institutions, actions and values.

Let us now turn to the findings of our empirical research, starting with an overview of the text by V. Vuletić. Namely, according to the insights of the respondents and the interpretation thereof, the real world reveals the controversies – between the East and the West, traditional and modern, collective and individual, pre-market and market, etc. – discussed in our previous general historical research. The Serbian actors in economic and political relations towards the West at the same time point to the country’s material, institutional and cultural backwardness, its “concurrence” with the developed world (in terms of knowledge, abilities and practical action), difference (with respect to a series of historically shaped specifics) and progressiveness (naturally, not always where the respondents find it, but
sometimes also where they see inferiority!). First of all, quite understandably in view of the status of the respondents (direct participation in relations with developed countries), the wish to integrate the country into Europe is a generally accepted stance. The problems they see on that road may be classified in the following manner: material problems (overall poverty of the country, inferior equipment of institutions and enterprises in terms of elementary means for their work, drastic shortage of modern, especially electronic equipment); institutional problems (undeveloped institutions – democratic-political, and market); problems in the cultural sphere (traditionalist values and patterns; pre-market and non-market orientations, different priorities in life); mutual prejudices (“orientalistic”- patronizing attitude of Westerners towards the Serbs; ambivalent feeling of inferiority/superiority – in “essential” things – of Serbs towards the Westerners).

The fact that material conditions provide the basis for any communication in the modern world (including political cooperation and market operations) need not be mentioned here. From that point of view, the drastic straggling of Serbia – or better to say the speedy increase of this leg during the years of war and isolation in 1990s – represents one of the key obstacles for the country's relations with the developed world. It is an obstacle of an objective nature (lack of communications infrastructure, e.g. precludes a substantial number of direct investments, for instance in tourism), but also subjective (poverty a priori produces the impression of “second-ratedness” as many respondents have pointed out speaking about the expectations of foreigners and even about the resulting “proportionately” - lower – quality of businessmen or experts they send to Serbia).

Institutional obstacles for cooperation are perhaps expressed even more. By way of example we could mention the absence of the bulk of legal regulations necessary for developing both democratic political relations and a market economy (precisely the underdeveloped market institutions present the most important problem in relations with the West, at least in the view of the part of respondents who operate in the economy).

Speaking of cultural differences, the respondents most often warn of what is well known in theory with respect to differentiating the “traditional” and “modern” culture. Thus the respondents caution against the attempt to personalize business relations, absence of specialization and long-term planning, a relaxed attitude towards procedures, hierarchy, time and even money, lack of interest (failure to understand the need) for permanent personal advancement (characteristic of the “domestic” population); i.e. specialization, standardization and optimisation, as well as emphasis on expert knowledge and procedures (characteristic of the Westerners).

In reality, however, this listing already hints of strong prejudices the respondents and their western partners have while establishing mutual relations. However, before saying anything about these prejudices, it should be pointed out
that the essential common characteristic of all respondents is found in their statements that there are no major (cultural) surprises in their contacts with the West, simply because all of them have already acquired some experience in such contacts (longer or shorter, direct or partly mediated), in view of the long period of Serbia's openness in previous times. In that sense, difficulties in cultural communication they mention are typical stereotypes, which they attribute to others (majority) in the autochthonous population, rather than themselves! Thus they in a manner present themselves as the (cultured) Westerners who, too, experience problems in contacts with the majority of Serbs due to their proclivity to indiscipline, improvisation, irresponsibility, etc. That is, let me repeat, the basic ambivalence characteristic of people on the border of two cultures who have adopted (not necessarily in equal measure) cultural patterns of both and therefore may adjust to one or the other, depending on the prevailing circumstances (while they always remain partly adjusted to both).

These insights lead us to the following conclusion, in the attempt to systematize the obtained research (empirical, as well as historical) results. People's actions are necessarily determined, on the one hand, by the norms which derive from fundamental relations in the social systems (referred to here as the social context for short) and, on the other, value patterns which are the product of a twofold influence – of historical factors and the given system of relations. In the social-historical circumstances (at the time of post-socialist transformation) Serbia found itself in during the last decade of the 20th century, two social contexts were simultaneously effective. On one side, there was the powerful presence of distributive social norms (produced, as already indicated, by the command (centrally planned) socialist economy, but structurally homologous also to the pre-market agrarian self-sufficient economy, characteristic of a country in the pre-capitalist period); and on the other, the effects of norms derived from the market type of economic operations (arriving not only from the outside, from the capitalist surroundings, but to a certain degree also present in the specific Yugoslav “market” socialism).

In the sphere of values collectivistic patterns are present (re-created by combining the traditionalist, patriarchal and socialist egalitarian heritage), as well as the individualist patterns which are the product of multiple crosspollination: (quasi) modernization from the period of the previous order (especially urbanization and spread of the educational system), openness of the country towards the West and actual effects of the environment. It is understandable that in the crossing of these two pairs (we are, naturally, talking about an “ideal-typical” structure) - of the given “social context” with appropriate normative systems and value patterns – only two combinations are mutually compatible, while the other two bring about a powerful conflict (cf. Chart 1).
According to the above-mentioned inference, compatibility of the normative system and value patterns exists only in combinations 1 and 4 (socialist and capitalist types). The remaining two combinations reveal a contrariety which could be called normative-value dissonance. It appears when the environment faces an active individual with requirements which are disharmonious or conflicting with the value patterns this individual has adopted. In cases of clear predominance of one type of norms, this dissonance may be resolved (to put it in simplified terms) in two ways. An individual who seeks to be successful in the given environment shall attempt to adjust his actions to the systemic requirements (norms) which will, in time, lead to changes in his value patterns, their adjustment with the normative system. By contrast, the actions of that individual who retains the old value patterns shall be ineffective in the given environment (entrepreneurial failure, lack of advancement in career, loss of job, etc.). Thus in the case of most respondents-economic actors, interviewed in Vuletić's survey, it turns out that they have adopted individualist patterns, but notice the existence of a powerfully manifested dissonance in the environment, in the form of non-observance of the hierarchy, formal procedures for operation, deadlines, etc.

The difficulties appearing in Serbia are, however, the consequence of the fact that the factors leading to normative-value dissonance are still very firm, both owing to the delayed transformation and the processes of long historical duration (as already shown). Many enterprises in Serbia with a large number of employees are still in a form of collective ownership (state or social) and the privatisation process develops at a relatively slow pace, because the society is, after a decade of wars, economic and political crises, too exhausted to sustain more rapid change (which would be conducive to a further increase in unemployment, differentiation of earnings and other well-known consequences of economic restructuring). In these enterprises elements of distributive economy are retained (large transfers from the state budget), creating the illusion not only among the employees of these enterprises but also among others, that it would be possible to preserve the old normative system for a longer term, and consequently enables the retaining of the old value patterns.

In other words, it turns out that in view of the specific (“borderland”) history, Serbia has its own internal roots of the assumed cultural conflict between the

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external ("Western") and internal patterns (traditional, "East", etc.). These can act in two mutually opposed directions. On the one hand, an express normative-value dissonance may represent an additional obstacle to change, in the sense that the old value patterns may be sustained longer and may lead to the types of actions which are actively opposed to the introduction of new relations (numerous strikes in Serbia demanding e.g. discontinuance of privatisation, establishment of the origin of capital involved in the privatisation and the deposing of managers appointed by the owner, are indicative precisely of these value patterns). But, the opposite is also true and the existence of other (individualistic) value patterns may mean that when changes are introduced resolutely, i.e. when a normative system is changed at an accelerated pace, adjustment to the system is facilitated precisely by this value dualism (as was the case with hundreds of thousands of Serbian workers in Western countries ever since 1970s).

The survey carried out among economic experts by S. Vujović ("We and Others...") shows, even more strongly than the one involving political and economic actors, that members of this specific group actually experience themselves as part of the "West" rather than their own culture. They too, in a similar way as the previously mentioned respondents, manifest incompatibility of autochthonous cultural patterns with the requirements of modern (expert) communication (absence of specialized knowledge, insufficient responsibility with respect to one’s obligations and procedures, improvisation instead of organized action, etc.) But they also critically assess the activity of Western actors in our parts (using their own cultural matrix) and thus – in addition to expert approach – find individuals of a "missionary" orientation, who start from ideological prejudices on the absolute superiority of their own patterns, which have to be imposed on the “backward” environment (the third type in this classification are, also critically defined “specialty-idiots”, too narrowly specialized Western actors who cannot act efficiently in complex and unforeseen situations). Thus exposure to the "duality" of value patterns in these parts allowed a highly differentiated, twofold critical judgement: towards one’s own environment (where, true, modern elements are not explicitly marked, so that – along with criticism of mutual prejudices – there is the repetition of the stereotype about “us” as those who in the expert field can offer only applied knowledge, while the possibility for more general insights is a priori left to those from economically and scientifically developed environments) but also towards the Western cultural patterns.

As for the individuals from Serbia who speak from a Western point of view, extremely interesting is the survey of V. Vučinić, about “our” people who have spent an important part of their lives in the West ("How Serbian Repatriates from the West Experience..."). First of all, here again we note the presence of the largest part of topics encountered by other researchers. On the systemic level respondents stress underdevelopment of the basic market mechanisms, and in that relation also
the absence of the market patterns of action (first of all, once again, the different understanding of time in the “autochthonous” culture – adherence to deadlines, non-completion of work, casual attitude towards working hours, short-term orientation – all the things belonging to the so-called traditional type of personality – cf. Inkeles and Smith, 1974). However, the new element in this text is the division into two types of actions depending on the ownership type of the firm: the respondents emphasize that the non-market form of operation prevails in enterprises and institutions in state ownership, while in the privately-owned companies patterns can be found identical to those in the Western world! Secondly, another novelty is that elements of the cultural pattern the Westerners should take over from “us” include some of the values referred to as deficiencies in the previous cases! These have to do with avoiding an excessively formalist approach to people and work (less rigid hierarchical principle, higher flexibility towards the rules, more “relaxed” attainment of objectives, etc.). Therefore, this clearly points out to the limits of reducing rational action to bureaucratically narrowly understood procedures, which represents not only a reductionist principle applied to human personality, but may also be counterproductive in view of the attainment of (in this case business) objectives. Thus we here see some productiveness of the “border” position and the resulting value mixture, not only in terms of prospects to perceive more clearly the limitations of each of the patterns individually, but also in the possibility to “synthesize” different patterns, by overcoming the recognized one-sidedness, from their specific frameworks (such as, e.g. when procedures become absolutely more important than the attainment of objectives).

The previous research also opens the possibility for conditional classification of typical attitudes of employers, as well as the employed in Serbia, towards the cultural patterns reproduced within the frameworks of the market economy (in the West):

a. The “Repatriated” individuals (studied by V. Vučinić) have generally completely accepted these patterns – due to the early and lasting acculturation – and therefore themselves seek to impose them on others (through efforts to establish a new value as well as a normative system). Their cultural conflict therefore primarily appears in relation to “autochthonous” values. These individuals could tentatively be called members of the group which actively introduces the Western (market) cultural patterns.17

b. The second category comprises individuals who were, relatively strongly, exposed to both types of value patterns (either due to intensive contacts with the West, or the kind of influence deriving from the duality of the “context” - the

17 We saw that in Serbia, due to just as early or lasting acculturation to “autochthonous” cultural patterns (collectivist values and distributive norms), these people may retain a critical attitude towards the Western (market) patterns.
coexistence of the distributive and quasi/market normative systems in the Serbian society). They form a group (numerous, by contrast from the previous one), which is, subject to the change of the “context” (the dominant normative system), capable of proportionate acceptance of the required forms of (market) actions, and hinge on them its value patterns which are consistent with such actions (change due to normative-value dissonance). Members of this group could be called *transmitters of the Western (market) cultural patterns*.

c. The third group, also exposed to the effects of the two value systems, remains primarily within a non-market, re/distributive type of relations, and therefore also the normative system (state enterprises, enterprises still financed by the state, etc.), or is clearly the victim of transition to market conditions (the unemployed, employees in unsuccessful enterprises, operating without or with insufficient state support, etc.). This group (currently very numerous in Serbia) displays substantial attachment to collectivist value patterns. However, in the event that the “context” (and the relevant normative system) is changed in the way which enables the satisfaction of their basic interests, members of this group could relatively easily also accept market (Western) patterns. Members of this group could be called the potential recipients of market (Western) cultural patterns.

d. Finally, there is a group which has adopted collectivist value patterns and, in any case, offers resistance to market (Western) values, and therefore also to the establishment of the new type of social relations, economic activity, democratisation of society and so on. Members of this group could be called the *opponents of market (Western) cultural patterns* (which implies opposition to the capitalist type of social relations, market normative system and individualist value patterns). Although the numerical size of this group, too, substantially depends on the given social circumstances (its actual social position, linked with the prevailing normative system), its sustaining is also influenced by other “contextualizing” factors, such as the level of education, age and place of residence (these are primarily less educated, older categories of people who live inland, in the villages and smaller towns). One may easily conclude that these are the factors which have even before (in the socialist society) reduced exposure to (quasi)modernizing influences of the system, as well as the external action of the Western cultural values.

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Prevela na engleski

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