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Reflection as Commodity: A Short Ethno(historio)graphy of Victorian Mirrors

The task undertaken in this text is to show the way mirrors, as Victorian commodities, embodied the emerging nineteenth-century consumerist culture and changed the desiring subject’s self-perception. For the first time in the cultural history of the West, mirrors became cheap, spectacularized and omnipresent, lurking around every corner. As the subject encountered itself incessantly, something changed at the level of desire: the subject misunderstood its own reflected image for the truth of its inner self. By way of this short ethno(historio)graphy of the Victorian mirror reflection, the text discusses the Victorian visual culture of spectacle and desire.

Key words: Key words: mirror, commodity, consumption, desiring subject, nineteenth century.

Introduction

Victorian culture was undoubtedly a culture of mirrors. Previously a luxurious item – expensive and hard to get – mirror became one of the most cherished commodities of the nineteenth-century West. There is “an inordinate love of plate glass,” complained Charles Dickens in Gin Shops, “[…] door knocked into windows, a dozen squares of glass into one [in shops and gin palaces]” (Dickens 1852,
101). In London, transparency and reflection became prime architectural, artistic and social elements. As Isobel Armstrong shrewdly observes, Victorian “glass-world” – the fantasy of the “dreaming community” – embodied the cultural dream, or better the illusion, of a transparent, democratic society (Armstrong 2008).

There is a number of new moments in the ethnography of mirrors that separated the Victorian culture from its previous history. As commodities, mirrors became omnipresent in the second half of the nineteenth century; they grew in size and advanced in clarity, enabling a perceiving subject to grasp itself as a visual, almost clear, corporeal unity for the first time. Further, the spectacularity of mirrors wore off as the century wore on, making them natural and culturally imperceptible. Last, but not the least, in most of the nineteenth-century accounts, mirrors came not to reflect the world without but the world within the subject – its desires, fantasies and fears.

By exploiting the well-known (but often refuted and marginalized) Jacques Lacan’s idea of the mirror stage, I would like to propose a reading of the nineteenth-century glass/mirror culture from the perspective of a desiring subject. Is it possible that the above-mentioned factors, taken together, have brought a change at the level of desire?

The basic assumption of the mirror stage is that during the first formative years of life, a toddler encounters his/her reflection, be it in a mirror (or in some other reflecting surface), or as a recognition of his/her corporeal congruity in the face of the other (Lacan 2006). During this encounter the toddler (a subject-to-be) symbolically invests in his/her reflected body image, wrongly identifying it with the coherence of his/her inner self, namely with the coherence of ego. This méconnaissance is an entrance into language, into the Lacanian Symbolic, leaving the subject split between the reality of his innate inner incoherence and the fantasy of completeness promised by the mirror. From this moment on – from the moment the subject-to-be becomes a subject – a phantasm of fullness rests upon its shoulders, constantly promising semiotic totality outside of language: a Real that never comes. In Lacanian terms, the mirror reflection becomes the subject’s objet a, the phantom object that lures desire by its fundamental nonexistence and unattainability.

A universal validity of this idea is doubtful, to say at least, principally due to its strong dependence on the universality of language (in the sense of langage, a structure of signs). Raymond Tallis remarked, quite justifiably, that a literal interpretation of Lacan’s mirror-stage presupposes that blind people are incapable of forming a sense of selfhood, and are denied entrance into culture (Tallis 1988, 153). What happens with cultures without mirrors, as well as with the historical periods prior to the mirror’s emergence? Is subjectivity denied to these cultures? These as all highly sensible questions. However, if we turn the question up-side-down and instead of asking “could the mirror stage be made universal,” we ask “what kind of culture is needed for the mirror stage to be true” we shall see that this concept has an enormous value for the Victorian times. Victorian culture was the culture of mirrors. Lacan inherited his psychoanalytic vocabulary from Freud, and Freud’s imaginations was profoundly Victorian (Auerbach 1982, 26-34). The article will try to
demonstrate that Lacan’s mirror-stage is a thoroughly Victorian phenomenon, due to inescapable copiousness of reflective surface that intercepted the Victorian subjects wherever they went.

The Spectacular Modernity of the Mirror Image

What happens when the gaze penetrates its own reflection so deeply that the spot from which it reaches the upside-down world disappears? With respect to the mirror games, the first half of the nineteenth century was still young, although not entirely innocent. In the first half of the century, mirrors, abundant as they were, still inspired awe; they were still culturally perceptible, freshly taken into the world of devious commodities. They were still extraordinary, as their conspicuousness resonated with wider scopic, voyeuristic tendencies of a culture that began manifesting itself as a spectacle.

Nothing exemplifies this convergence of spectacle and mirror image better than the “mirrored curtain” of the Royal Coburg Theater. On the south bank of the river Themes, at the New Cut that connected Blackfriars and Westminster road, stood the Coburg, one of the smaller theaters of London (Kenrick 1818, 136). In its day it was famous for its name “Blood Tub,” a name earned by frequently staging violent melodramas (Moody 2000, 34). But more than anything else, the Coburg stayed remembered for the visual spectacle of the “mirrored curtain” novelty.

In December 1821, the managers of the Coburg installed in the proscenium of the stage an enormous plate-glass mirror, later to be called the “mirrored curtain.” Since it had still been impossible to produce a one-piece mirror of that size, it was comprised of sixty-three panels carefully put together and enclosed in an extravagant gilded frame. On the evening of December 26, the mirror was lowered between the stage and the audience, inspiring awe, provoking a feeling of strangeness and causing commotion. It was so big that it reflected the majority of the perceiving subjects who waved at themselves and at each other. Thirty years before Joseph Paxton’s Crystal Palace, everyone in the audience became everyone else’s reflection, surveying one another. The mirror homogenized the crowd and erased the distance between members of the audience. In a single, discontinuous stroke of the sixty-three panels of the monstrous looking-glass, the audiences could see themselves as participants in their own spectacle. Entering the world of commodities – abstracted in awe, spectacularized in a Victorian voyeuristic fantasy and alienated in the same extravaganza – this mirror embodied the scopic pleasures of the Victorian culture, reflecting, as Edward Fitzball said in 1859, “every Form and Face in the gorgeous house, from the topmost seat in the galleries, to the lowest bench in the pit” (Fitzball 1859, v). Thomas Richardson (1991) believes that the society of spectacle consolidated itself around The Great Exhibition of 1851, but we can see that some traits of this scopic cultural phenomenon had already emerged in small, dim “places of noise, dirt [...] and unbridled sexual commerce,” as Jane Moody de-
scribes Georgian theaters (Moody 2000, 3). The very act that allowed the boundary between the perceiver and the perceived to be obliterated in the Coburg mirror, allowed audiences to enter a representational loop of appearance – a visual spectacle peculiar for the West since the nineteenth century.

The responses of the spectators to the curtain were diverse. Horace Foote was carried away by the enchantment of the commodity, where “crowded audiences testified their delight at seeing themselves in this immense mirror, and for the first time ‘on the stage’” (Foote 1824, 74). Thus, as early as 1821, mirrors came to embody the awe of the Victorian voyeuristic stare, returning the gaze of the subject and catching it behind the peephole of the world. Everyone could see everyone else in a democratized illusion of scopic equality. Everyone could visually consume everyone else in the same illusion, turning their reflections into commodities. The viewers became protagonists of their own melodramas allowing the mirror – the looking-glass – to look back from the “flesh of the world” that would otherwise have stayed concealed. Imagining the novelty of the mirrored curtain, Foucault’s words ring true: “The mirror […] enables me to see myself there where I am absent,” in the blind spot of the existence (Foucault 1984, 4). The bill from the evening of the premiere summarized the new phenomenon of the mirror-commodity concisely: “the most NOVAL, SPLENDID & INTERESTING OBJECT ever displayed in a British Theatre” – the very definition of the commodity.

However, there is more to this mirror than an inversion of the perceivers-perceived relationship. This grand reflecting surface introduced a semiotic interruption in the visible public space, not only by inverting the roles in the scopic spectacle, but by perverting them, leading them astray (as in Latin pervertere: “to overthrow,” “to turn away”). In the Coburg spectacle, the epistemic lines between people and mirror-commodities were not erased or inverted, but convoluted, leading the perceiving subject through spiral loops of desire where it was never satiated and always craved for more. Another mirror narrative testifies to this distortion of meaning in the Victorian spectacle: Alice’s famous returning to the same place in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass. As she steps through the looking-glass and finds herself in the “Garden of Live Flowers,” Alice realizes that, whichever way she went, she keeps returning to the house and the mirror she came from, performing the perpetual consumption of her “mirror self” in relapses of desire.

An account of the Coburg mirror by James Robinson Planché, a bit less flattering one, clearly expresses this monstrous labyrinth of the nineteenth-century visual simulacra and consumerism:

[…] it was a large mass of plate-glass, and in those days must have cost a great deal of money. There was a considerable applause at its appearance. The moment it ceased, someone in the gallery, possessing a stentorian voice called out, “That’s all werry well! Now show us summat else!” (Planché 1872, 127)

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1 The main argument of his book is that consumerist culture preceded consumerist economy and not the other way round, and that this culture, as a culture of spectacle, consolidated only during and after the Great Exhibition of 1851.
In the world of commodities, desire always craves for more. In the field of desire, the desired object is never reached, never attained, the thirst for more of “it” is unquenchable. The Coburg mirror invoked a vortex of a broken signifying chain, broken somewhere half-way between the audience and the reflected image. In this chain, the representation did not fall back upon itself like in the “duplicated representation” of Foucault’s eighteenth century, thus cancelling the meaning as we know it (Foucault 1989, 70). In the Coburg mirror, as in the Victorian mirror language as a whole, the signifier fell not upon itself but always upon something else, introducing a différence into signification and that drove desire forward. Once again Alice comes to mind, this time talking to the Red Queen:

“I only wanted to see what the garden was like, your majesty –”
“That’s right,” said the Queen, patting her on the head, which Alice didn’t like at all, “though when you say ‘garden,’ – I’ve seen gardens, compared with which this would be a wilderness.”
Alice didn’t dare to argue the point, but went on: “– and I thought I’d try and find my way to the top of that hill –”
“When you say ‘hill,’ the queen interrupted, “I could show you hills, in comparison with which you’d call that a valley.”
“No, I shouldn’t,” said Alice, surprised into contradicting her at last: “a hill can’t be a valley, you know. That would be nonsense –”
The Red Queen shook her head. “You may call it ‘nonsense’ if you like,” she said, “but I’ve heard nonsense, compared with which that would be as sensible as a dictionary!” (Carroll 1994, 38-39)

In this scene we witness two interlocutors conversing as through a looking-glass. Whatever comes from Alice’s mouth appears to be something else for the Queen, its meaning is always postponed. This epistemic premise of the nineteenth century – the birth of a consumerist, desiring subject from the body of a differential sign – assumes that what is revealed by the mirror (however nonsensical and disturbing it may be) is the “truth” of the subject. In 1821, George McFarren sharply summarized this premise in a satirical verse on the Coburg mirror submitted to the periodical Drama:

The giant houses, t’other side the water
Who give to our humility no quarter,
Say, nought but nonsense live within our portals,
And call our heroes monsters, and not mortals;
And henceforth to astound these native elves,
Our portals must be true for you’ll behold yourself (McFarren 1821, 393).²

In this verse, we see that as long as the subject beheld itself what came as a reflected image presented itself as the truth. As the subject was entering the laby-

² My emphasis.
rinth of visual consumption, the words of Matthew Kaiser resonated true: one should know how to “survive the looking-glass” (Kaiser 2012, 54).

Horrid as this semiotic implosion (and thus desire) might have been, the perceiving subject was still both frightened and astonished by the revelation of the mirror, its spectactularity not allowing the mirror to sink completely into the third world of commodities, and to gain the introductory element: “just (a mirror).” In 1821, mirrors had still not been naturalized; the image in them still had not been appropriated fully. On the surface of the Coburg mirror, one could see the imprints of the workers, greasy smudges that still alluded to the world without, outside the reflection in the mirror and outside the semiotic implosion of *différence*: “The glass was all over fingers or other marks,” said the unimpressed Planché (Planché 1872, 127). As Kasier wittily observes, big as the Coburg mirror was, it “was not large enough to swallow the world. [...] [It] *might* have swallowed [it]; the signifier *might* have devoured the referent, existence *might* be irrevocably in play” (Kaiser 2012, 55).3 However, it had not yet. The relationship between the subject and his mirror image was not *inverted*, but *perverted*, like in the conversation of Alice and the Red Queen. Mirrors had not acquired their humility yet, and the troubling effect they had on the subject was the striking feature of that time. Once mirrors had become fully integrated into the fabric of the society – naturalized, imperceptible, and taken for granted – the mirror image either disappeared or was broken, as in so many twentieth-century narratives. This scenario slowly began unfolding in the second half of the nineteenth-century.

### The Cornucopia of Selfhood

By the end of the nineteenth century, mirror, as an artifact, had come a long way from being a rare object, used only by the nobility, highly expensive and hard both to make and acquire. In centuries prior to its commodification, the mirror was never larger than what could be cut from a glass ball, and the curvature gave it a bulging shape that could be found in Flemish paintings and German engravings of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Melchior-Bonnet 2001, 14). The reflection was dark, fragmented and literally twisted. In the late Middle Ages and throughout the Renaissance, mirrors were associated with good as well as evil, and had a strong religious significance (Schwarz 1952, 97-118). The mirror was the symbol of Truth or *Veritas*, as well as of the Deadly Sins: *Superbia* or Pride and *Luxuria* or Lust were frequently represented with a mirror in medieval miniature paintings, as well as in sculptures (Bordeau, Moissac and Arles) and stained glass windows (Notre-Dame, Auxerre and Lyons) of the great French cathedrals (Schwarz 1952, 105-106). In the Italian Renaissance the classical heritage connected mirrors with Vanity, transforming them into the “tools of Venus” – emblems of seduction and prostitution (Santore 1997). Thus, although the mirror had always been an ambiguous and contradictory symbol, its most persistent attributes were those of lies and deceit — one could not trust its reflection, nor could one identify with it.

3 My emphasis.
As long as the mirror remained rare and luxurious – existing, but somewhere else – one’s disappearing inside one’s own image, objectifying oneself, was not possible. Clear reflection and a persistent gaze were still quite far away.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the mirror was still young in pulling the subject into this space of blurred semiotic boundaries, but the more common mirrors became, the more enchanting they were. This is what Daniel Miller calls the “humility of things”: once a thing becomes common, we tend to take it for granted (Miller 1987, 85-108). Our vigilance, then, becomes low and we start referring to the thing as “just (a mirror).” But the less vigilant we are the greater the impact of the thing on our lives, and thus the stronger its influence on the construction of meaning. The thing then sinks into the third world of objects – an imperceptible, marginalized reality that strongly influences us nevertheless.

The nineteenth-century capitals, such as London and Paris, were undoubtedly cities of mirrors. Symbolic climate of the emerging consumerist attitudes towards the reflection made the mirror a perfect embodiment of these attitudes, and due to the intense innovation in the technology and production of cheap glass, London – as one of the capitals of the nineteenth century – was, by the middle of the century, completely covered in it. Everything could be made of this old but new material. “Ink stands, paper weights, knives, pen trays,” lists the *Illustrated Exhibitor and Magazine of Arts* in 1852, “lamp pedestals, candelabra, candlesticks, salt cellars, knife-rests, mustard pots, sugar basins, butter coolers, smelling-bottles, flower-vases, door-knobs, moldings, panels, chandeliers, surgeons’ speculae, railway and other reflectors” (Cassell 1852, 70-71). Every building in the center of London had ground floor covered in glass shop windows. Interiors of cafés, shopping malls and restaurants reflected consumers as they browsed the goods. In the urban shop windows, public mirrors, barber mirrors and café mirrors, one never saw one’s own image from the same angle, there was always a slightly different image reflected back to the perceiver. The copiousness and size of public reflective surfaces literally revolutionized the way a subject interacted with its own corporeal and psychic coherence.

By the middle of the century the fetishization of the mirror, and its turning into a commodity, became evident at the Great Exhibition. Tracing the steps of Marx, Agamben concluded that Marx’s visit to London in 1851, when the first Great Exhibition took place in Hyde Park, led his thinking to the analysis of commodity fetishism. “The “phantasmagoria” of which [Marks] speaks in relation to the commodity,” argues Agamben, “can be discovered in the intentions of the organizers, who chose, from among the various possibilities presented, Paxton’s project for the enormous palace constructed entirely out of glass” (Agamben 1993, 38). This exhibition used glass and reflection game to capture,

the transfiguration of commodity into an enchanted object [...] In the galleries and pavilions of its mystical Crystal Palace, [...] the commodity is displayed to be enjoyed only through the glance at the enchanted scene (Agamben 1993, 38).
Reflecting surfaces proved themselves as commodities, objects miraculously becoming alive by acquiring the bluish halo of the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park. Wherever they turned, people were haunted by their own reflections. In the streets, during meals, in city shops, transparent and reflecting surfaces surrounded the subject every step of the way. For the first time in the history of the West, the subject was not only able to encounter itself on every corner, but also to experience fully the externalization of its body. The full-length image of one’s body was a new experience. In 1889 The Turn of the Screw by Henry James, the governess experiences her full-length mirror image for the first time (James 1981, 7). In the course of the century, the Western world became a mirror; the subject was being mediated by reflective surfaces everywhere.

Alice aside (whose wanderings through the looking-glass are the greatest expression of the Victorian mirror-fantasy), nineteenth-century literature teemed with the mirror encounters, emphasizing the subject’s need to identify with and consume its own reflection while sliding down the spiral of a visual simulacrum. In A Royal Princess (1866) by Christina Rossetti, for example, mirrors obsessively reveal to the princess – dissatisfied with her golden cage – her ubiquitous reflected face which she identifies as her inner self:

All my walls are lost in mirrors, whereupon I trace
Self to right hand, self to left hand, self in every place,
Self-same solitary figure, self-same seeking face (Rossetti 1979, 149-150).

The Other Side of a Mirror (1882) by Mary Coleridge, capitalizes on this theme. As the poet sits in front of a mirror, the mirror conjures a phantomlike figure, vengeful, jealous and disturbing. This figure escapes a proper description, its meaning always somewhere else, but the poem ends in an act of appropriation nevertheless.

Shade of a shadow in the glass, O
set the crystal surface free! Pass –
as the fairer visions pass – Nor
ever more return, to be
The ghost of a distracted hour,
That heard me whisper, “I am she!” (Coleridge 1954, 88)

The sentiment that the world of the nineteenth century (the age of the world picture, the world as a stage, or a peepshow) itself became a mirror grew strong. In the 1930s, Benjamin was able to note in one of his convolutes from The Arcades Project:

Paris is a city of mirrors. The asphalt of its roadways smooth as glass, and at the entrance to all bistros glass partitions. A profusion of window panes and mirrors in cafés, so as to make the inside brighter and to give all the nooks and crannies, into which Parisian taverns separate, a pleasing amplitude. [...] [T]he man [...] sees his own physiognomy flash by. He gains his image more quickly here than elsewhere and also sees himself more quickly merged with this, his image. Even the eyes of passersby are veiled mirrors, and over that wide bed of the
Seine, over Paris, the sky is spread out like the crystal mirror hanging over the drab beds in brothels (Benjamin 2002, 537-538).

There is a myriad of things to read in this convoluto by Benjamin, but what I would like to emphasize particularly is that the subject merges with its image. It consumes the reflected image quickly, embodying the exteriorized image of the self. The hyper-abundance of, and obsession with, reflection is clear in Benjamin, even exaggerated. Every little thing – passersby, their eyes, even the sky above the river – sends the subject’s image back to it, pointing to the same circle of desire that troubled Freud in his famous passage from the “Uncanny”, where, like Alice in “The Garden of Live Flowers,” he constantly comes back to the same red-light district performing the repetition of a repressed sign (Freud 1919, 236). In the same manner, Benjamin’s gaze always comes back to him no matter where he looked, staging a trauma of lost self-coherence (the one that is experienced as a lack, as an absence of something that has never been there in the first place), a dissatisfaction of desire, a misstep – like grabbing water in a hollow cup. As Hanna Arendt (1999, 25) observes, Benjamin’s imagination was essentially superannuated, essentially Victorian, “as though he [Benjamin] had drifted out of the nineteenth century,” and his writing reflects the Victorian age haunted by its own mirror image – precisely because this image was false. Within the reflection, where the “true” coherence of the self dwells, waits the Real that always comes back to itself. It inhabits the space beyond the representational labyrinth of consumerism that the subject will never reach. Is not this convoluto by Benjamin perturbing; is it not something uncanny that comes back from beyond, or below, like from Georges Bataille’s souterrain? Does it not make us apprehensive, this reflection that comes at the same time from everywhere and nowhere? Is it so unimaginable that in an age obsessed and haunted by its reflection something changed at the level of desire?

Another convoluto by Benjamin citing S. F. Lahrs shows that the reality of 1837 was quite similar to his own experience of a reflective Paris.

Egoistic – “that is what one becomes in Paris, where you can hardly take a step without catching sight of your dearly beloved self. Mirror after mirror! In cafés and restaurants, in shops and stores, in haircutting salons and literary salons, in baths and everywhere, ‘every inch a mirror!’” (Benjamin 2002, 539)

In the above quotation, we see the subject enragèd by the encounter with itself every step of the way, its external existence loathed and despised; it is almost tired of this skirmish with mirror images. As Armstrong suggests, these abundant public reflective “surfaces, recording the random, dispersed, and evanescent images of the body in the world, gave a new publicity to the subject, who could exist outside of itself in these traces” (Armstrong 2008, 95). This external existence, and its re-appropriation, is the new Real of the Victorian consumerist subject.

In an environment in which, for the first time, the subject was able to live its own reflection, to visually experience an almost clear (a mirror is never completely clear, especially in the nineteenth century) and coherent image of the self, what happened with the perceiving subject? What did this change mean to it? The spatial democratization of reflective surfaces, the mediation of the self by mirrors
and windows, by the glass of the nineteenth century, led the subject into the representational loop of the Victorian commodities – because reflective surfaces were commodities. Through the looking-glass, the Victorian world of appearances opened and it started descending into the nothingness of its own reflection. “It blinks,” this mirror world, says Benjamin, “it is always this one – and never nothing – out of which another immediately arises” (Benjamin 2002, 542). The mirror world, the Victorian “glassworld,” slowly established a world of postponed meanings, anticipating Gilles Deleuze’s claim that the “modern world is one of simulacra” (Deleuze 1974, ix).

As we could see in literature, as well as in other accounts dealing with the mirror encounter, the Victorian subject entered the consumerist spectacle of mirrors. Of all the Victorian commodities, the mirror was the one that embodied consumerist attitudes most clearly: to appropriate oneself, to consume oneself, to turn oneself into an object by gazing into an object. Is there a stronger consumption than the consumption of the self? In a counter-movement to the externalization of its image, the subject consumed and appropriated the image perceived misunderstanding it for its own coherent inner self, for the truth of the self. “I am she”, says Mary Coleridge, and out of this mécoinnassance the split was born, a dark and horrid place impossible to signify, “a shade of a shade in the glass”.

From this anxiety of an attainable desire, the one reaching towards commodities as false objects of satisfaction, a dream arrived, fundamental to the Victorian modernity – a dream of wholeness, of an exit out of the representation and language, a dream of the other side of the mirror reflection – a dream dreaming its own awakening.

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