Vojin Rakić

RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON AS THE KEY FOR A COMPREHENSION OF KANT’S COSMOPOLITANISM

APSTRAKT: U ovom članku zastupaču tezu kako bi Kantov kosmopolitizam trebalo tumačiti kao teoriju u čijoj je osnovi ideja svetske države kao krajnji istorijski cilj čoveštva. Evidencija za ovaku tezu može se naći u Kantovoj Religiji u granicama pukog uma, i to prevashodno na osnovu interpretacije koncepta „etičke zajednice“. Jedna faza u napretku ljudskog roda ka svetskoj državi jeste federacija država koju Kant zastupa u spisu Ka večnom miru. Pre nego što objasnim ovu osnovnu tezu svoga članka, daću prikaz savremenih tumačenja Kantovog kosmopolitizma. Osnovna podela u ovim tumačenjima jeste podela koja se zasniva na razlici između paradigme o „demokratskom miru“ i paradigme o „kosmopolitskoj demokratiji“. Izneću tvrdnju da se zastupnici obej paradigmi pozivaju na sopstvene kantovske osnove, ali uglavnom propuštaju da posvete odgovarajuću pažnju Religiji u granicama pukog uma. Ovaj propust naročito je štetan za argumentaciju pristalica paradigme o kosmopolitskoj demokratiji.

KLJUČNE REČI: liberalni internacionalizam, demokratski mir, kosmopolitska demokratija, Kant, etička zajednica, svetska država.

I. Kant, Democratic Peace and Cosmopolitan Democracy

Contemporary liberal internationalist scholarship can be subdivided into four main variants: liberal institutionalism, structural liberalism, liberal reformism and liberal cosmopolitanism (McGrew 2002: 274). Liberal institutionalists maintain that international cooperation or governance bloom even in the absence of a hegemonic power imposing order on states. International cooperation is therefore not a product of hegemony (or of an altruistic motivation on the part of states), but rather a rational response to conflict between states among which there is a consid-

1 Since a comprehensive review of all the variants of liberal internationalist thinking is not a purpose of this article, I will refrain from potentially contestable references to particular authors who advocate specific stances that fall outside the article’s scope. Let it also be noted that McGrew’s taxonomy is not the only one, but I employ it here since I believe it is both accurate and helpful. For another classification (with different terminological references), useful might be Marchetti (2008).
erable degree of interdependence. Hence, it is conflict that drives international cooperation (Ibid., 274). Structural liberalism holds that hegemony matters and that international institutions have prospered in the postwar era, precisely because they constrain state power. It relies on a historical institutionalist approach (rather than on the rational choice approach that inspires liberal institutionalism) and contends that institutions are structures that evolve with the passing of time, shaping and constraining state behavior, and that continue to persist even when the original reasons for their establishment have expired (Ibid., 275). Liberal reformism is concerned with elucidating the primary defects of global governance that is based on the dominance of the most powerful states, and with finding a more effective and legitimate alternative to it. Democratic reform is a propitious option. It is considered to provide slightly more representative, transparent and accountable international institutions. Such institutions tend to evolve with the widening participation of states in key global forums. Moreover, transnational civil society also contributes to the aspired democratic reform (Ibid., 278).

Liberal cosmopolitanism is most relevant for our purposes, because two essential interpretations of Kant’s stance on international relations fall within the scope of liberal cosmopolitanism. It is a normative theory of global justice that contends that choices about what policies we should prefer, or what institutions we should establish, are to be based on the impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected. Moreover, much of normative liberal cosmopolitan scholarship has Kantian underpinnings. It imparts a radical critique of the present world order and the political status quo, as long as they perpetuate global injustices (Ibid., 280). One set of liberal cosmopolitan interpretations of Kant’s understanding of international relations advances the “democratic peace (DP) thesis”, accepting the option of justice and peace based on relations among democratic states, while rejecting the idea of a world state. The other set of interpretations, the “cosmopolitan democracy (CD) thesis” accords primacy to global distributive justice, advocating the idea that justice is to be achieved in an inter-state community resembling a universal state.

Proponents of DP are committed to the idea of popular sovereignty based on the view that the citizenries of territorially fixed units are adequate and sufficient mechanisms of international democratic reform2. This standpoint became the dominant view on the subject in the 1990s, since the realist paradigm had been weakened in the years after the Cold War. The DP thesis focuses on Kant’s dismissal of a world state in sections of Toward Perpetual Peace (hereafter TPP). Kant raised his concerns there regarding the potential for uninhibited despotism in a world re-

---

2 For a related formulation of the “democratic peace thesis” and a useful review of corresponding literature, see Franceschet (2000: 280-88).
public, and voiced his preference for a lawful federation under commonly accepted international right.

Some advocates of this position, such as Fernando Teson, put forward that the first definitive article of *TPP*, the one that stipulates that the civil constitution of every state ought to be republican, can supply a transition from Kant’s moral philosophy to his political theory – because every state within the federation is required to be representative and to respect human rights without the presence of an overarching global authority (Teson, 1998: 105). Moreover, Teson believes that Kant was the first philosopher to establish the link between domestic freedom and the foundations of international law: ”Not only did he [Kant] have the vision to predict modern international organization for the maintenance of peace; he also explained, for the first time, the connection between domestic freedom and the foundations of international law. In essence, he foresaw the human rights revolution of the twentieth century” (Teson 1992: 56).4

A variant of DP establishes a connection between the features that are intrinsic to liberal states and peaceful relations among them (Doyle 1983, Russett 1993, Owen 1996). Doyle’s 1983 article is a seminal piece in which the author provides cogent evidence for two findings. The first is that in the previous 150+ years the number of liberal states is on the increase. The second is that in the same period such states apparently have not waged wars against each other. For his second finding, Doyle provides an explanation, deriving his argumentation from *TPP*.3

Russett (1993) considers that democratic peace is the product of shared norms and institutions that seriously constrain the ability of one modern democracy to fight another. He discounts alternative explanations for democratic peace, such as the view that it is the product of simple geographical distance among democratic states or of international institutions. Russett emphasizes, however, that democratic peace may be violated in the period after the Cold War by a number of nascent democracies, where democracy can be tied to intolerant nationalism.

John Owen (1996) argues that there is a causal mechanism that prevents democracies to go to war against each other. This mechanism is normative in nature and consists of the “liberal ideas undergirding liberal democracies” (Ibid., 152). The liberal commitment to individual freedoms leads to the development of foreign policy ideologies and governmental institutions that work together to produce democratic peace (Ibid., 153).

---

3 This did not prevent other scholars to focus their attention on the perceived contradiction between Kant’s respectful attitude toward state sovereignty and his desires for cosmopolitan reform (Franceschet, 2002).

4 Possibly the most robust formulation in favor of the thesis that democracies do not fight each other is provided by Jack S. Levy, who calls this discovery “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations” (Levy 1989).
Russett and Oneal (2001) claim that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in IGOs produce peace in a mutually reinforcing relationship. These basically Kantian variables strengthen one another in a “virtuous cycle”. The whole process, however, is the result of states making strategic choices. They can choose to reverse the virtuous cycles and engage in vicious cycles of warfare. Either one is an equilibrium. In light of the fact that Russett and Oneal consider strategic choices that are made by states to be responsible for peace or war, it is warranted to associate them with the DP paradigm.

On the other hand, Doyle’s finding has also been challenged by a number of authors. Their arguments include the following:

1. Serious crises between democratic states did not result in wars, but did in “near misses” (Layne 1996);
2. DP proponents selectively adopt definitions of key variables so that data analysis yields the results they seek (Spiro 1996);
3. The evidence that DP advocates stipulate is so sparse that statistical evidence cannot confirm their hypothesis (Spiro 1996)\(^5\).

Critiques of DP can also be found in Gowa (1999) and Snyder (2000). Joanne Gowa attempts to demonstrate that DP advocates typically examine the 1815-1980 period as a whole. In doing so, they conflate two quite different historical periods: the pre-World War I and post-World War II years. Examining these periods separately, Gowa illustrates that a democratic peace prevailed only during the latter period. DP is thus just as exceptional as the Cold War that gave rise to it. Moreover, Gowa predicts that a democratic peace will not survive the end of the Cold War (Gowa 1999). Jack Snyder disputes that democracy is necessarily an important conflict resolution tool. In countries that are making a transition to democracy, electoral competition can lead to extremist appeals and ultimately violence. In fact, nationalism and ethnic tension can be exacerbated by democracy (Snyder 2000).

The CD position also claims to have a Kantian heritage. It advocates that Kant envisaged a world republic and that he was looking after a community of individuals independent from states. During the 1990s and 2000s, the CD paradigm presents an alternative to the DP thesis.

In a recent formulation, Jeffrey Abramson asserts unambiguously that Kant was a proponent of world government (Abramson, 2009: 65, 73). But CD has earlier origins (e.g., Bull 1977, Wight 1987). Hedley Bull notes the following: “[Kantian] imperatives enjoin not coexistence and cooperation among states but rather the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a cosmopolitan society” (Bull, 1977: 25). According to Bull, however, the sole force that can bring

---

5 The first two arguments are critically assessed in Owen (1996), while Russett (1996) makes an attempt to disprove the third.
warring states together is the force of one will over all others, which makes the idea of a world union unattractive. Wight even came up with the realist interpretation that Kant’s preference for a world state originated from his alleged inclinations toward the idea of world conquest (Wight, 1987: 226).

CD theorists disagree with DP exponents that the state is the sole basis of individual autonomy. They replace the DP paradigm of territorially-based sovereignty with the idea of multiple, overlapping, state-transcending forms of democratic governance. David Held is possibly the principal proponent of this thesis. In Held (1995) it is argued that the ascent of modern democracy was deeply entangled with the development of the nation-state. The world economy, however, with its global corporations, interest groups, and other transnational and supranational trends, has grown beyond the control of individual nation-states. Decisions made by some political communities impinge on other political communities, with no obvious democratic recourse when rights and interests are under threat. Held’s solution is to establish a “cosmopolitan democracy” that can democratically control these new forces. Its role would resemble the role strong welfare states had in the control of national capitalist economies in the 1930s.

In a more recent piece, Held elaborates on what is required for a “cosmopolitan polity” to complement administrative, legislative and executive capacity at the local and national levels with similar capacities at regional and global levels. That is the creation of regional parliaments and governance structures (e.g., in Latin America and Africa), as well as the strengthening of similar bodies where they already exist (EU), a reform of the General Assembly of the UN, the opening of functional governmental organizations (WTO, IMF, World Bank etc.) to public examination and agenda setting, general referenda concerning the implementation of core cosmopolitan concerns and the development of a cosmopolitan law-enforcement and coercive capability (Held 2003: 176-79).

Archibugi (1998) advances the thesis that the current age is the right time for a cosmopolitan democracy. To be able to claim outright victory, democracy must also assert itself nowadays in international relations. It is thus necessary to design an international democratic system. That is the ambition of the cosmopolitan model.

What is needed now is the participation of new political subjects: world citizens, provided with adequate institutional channels (Archibugi 1998: 223).

In a recent formulation of CD, Marchetti (2008) develops a “cosmo-federalist position” that is grounded in an ethical theory of choice-based consequentialism and a political theory of cosmopolitanism (Ibid., 36). His commitment to the idea of a world state is perhaps best exemplified by the opening sentences of the book: “Either democracy is global or it is not democracy…. Any political system that applies allegedly democratic principles within a limited scope is either hypocrisy or an il-

Zolo (1997) criticizes the CD thesis and rejects attempts to eliminate international conflict through the use of mechanisms of centralization. Instead of that, he seeks to develop a conception of international relations which takes account of their pluralistic, dynamic and conflictual nature. This conception abandons the paradigm of hierarchical centralization (which dominates the UN Charter) in favor of a logic of “weak interventionism” and “weak pacifism”. Zolo believes that this logic relies on self-organization, co-ordination and negotiation.

A Marxist critique of CD can be found in Görg and Hirsch (1998). According to the authors, the conceptions surrounding the development of international democracy must necessarily reach an impasse if they fail to take into account the transformation of the “capitalist mode of production”. Such a transformation is also necessary at the international level. The various possibilities for democracy will only be realized when both the capitalist mode of production and the capitalist way of life (including its morality) have been fundamentally altered (Ibid., 612).

It is possible to advocate that, apart from DP and CD, there is also a third set of interpretations of Kant’s cosmopolitanism and its ramifications for the current age, one that is in its key aspects a response to the critiques that were raised against CD. In that sense it is a sort of its refinement. This viewpoint accepts the idea of a future world republic7, although it emphasizes that such a republic was not Kant’s immediate choice. Kant, namely, had considerable reservations concerning the instantaneous establishment of a global state – something that is clearly reflected in his dismissal of a world republic in sections of TPP on grounds of its potential for unrestrained despotism. These interpretations lay down that Kant advocated a federation for practical and political reasons, but also believed that something more than a federation was required to achieve the ultimate purpose of history, i.e. the cosmopolitan ideal. Hence, Kant saw a global federation as a stage on history’s path toward a world republic (Cavallar 1999). Some Kant scholars have come up with the understanding that Kantian ideal theory requires individuals to live under common civil laws of a cosmopolitan republic and that the idea of a federation was merely Kant’s second best choice (Laberge, 1998). If “second best choice” is to be interpreted as a stage on history’s path toward the ideal of a global state, this construal is also in line with the third set of interpretations of Kant’s cosmopolitanism.

Unlike CD, the third set of interpretations does not suppose that Kant favored a world republic as an immediate political goal, but rather that he believed in the progress of humankind towards a global state. Such a state would be some kind of history’s long-term destination. One of the strengths of this interpretation is that it can accommodate Kant’s conviction that any progress toward a future global order

---

7 See the argumentation in Matthias Lutz-Bachman (1997: 59–77).
would have to be voluntary and that a willingness to accept such an order needs to be preceded by humanity’s augmented ethical maturity.

II. Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason – A Clarification of Kant’s Stance on International Relations

Let us now turn to Kant himself. Which writings are the ones that can give us relevant insights into his views on international relations? The work Kant students refer most frequently to is Toward Perpetual Peace and the sections on public right of The Metaphysics of Morals. In the following I will focus, however, on Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (hereafter Religion), because it contains a number of essential hints for Kant’s understanding of international relations – hints that, as I argue, have not received the necessary attention in scholarly literature on the subject.

In interpreting Religion, let me begin with highlighting something that is significant for an understanding of Kant’s conception of the relations among states. It is also important for comprehending the role “perpetual peace” plays in his approach to international relations. For Kant, namely, the aim of perpetual peace cannot be achieved by political means alone. In his own words:

“Such is therefore the work of the good principle – unnoticed to human eye yet constantly advancing – in erecting a power and a kingdom for itself within the human race, in the form of a community according to the laws of virtue that proclaims the victory over evil and, under its dominion, assures the world of an eternal peace.” (Ak. 6: 124).

What can be concluded from this? Evidently that the success of the peace project sketched in TPP must depend on something other than politics. That something is for Kant “the work of the good principle”, i.e. the moral progress of the human being. But moral progress has a point of convergence with political progress. This point of convergence is fully outlined in Religion, and that is one of the primary reasons why we ought to give Religion serious consideration.

But where do moral and political progress converge? In the previous citation it has been pointed out that Kant talks about “the good principle” working “within the human race” in the direction of the creation of “a community according to the laws of virtue”. This statement should not be understood independently from Kant’s per-

---

8 In this citation, and in all references to Kant’s works that follow, I will refer to the editions of the Prussian Academy, marking them by “Ak.”. The English translation of Religion I use is the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1996).

9 Here I partially follow the argument in Williams (1983). Williams perceives Religion, possibly overemphasizing its role, as “perhaps the most committed of Kant’s works” (Ibid., 261).
ception of Christianity as a religion that sends us a moral message that calls for the unity of humanity – a unity that will in the final instance apparently result in the formation of a world state. That indicates why issues pertaining to international relations occupy such a salient place in Religion. Kant asserts there that the ultimate aim of human progress is that “the human being ought to leave the ethical state of nature in order to become a member of an ethical commonwealth” (Ak. 6: 96; emphasis added). This commonwealth Kant envisions as “an association of human beings merely under the laws of virtue” (Ak. 6: 94).

The idea of an ethical commonwealth is anticipated already in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In both works Kant writes about the *summum bonum*, or of the highest good, and defends the position that this can be attained in a perfect community only. In *The Critique of Practical Reason* he refers to the achievement of the “highest good in the world” as to the “necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law” (Ak. 5: 122). In the *Groundwork*, Kant describes the perfect community by using the term “Kingdom of ends” (Ak. 4: 433, and elsewhere).

Let us for a moment call to mind something that is essential for Kant and central to the concepts that are addressed here: the idea of the free person. Only a person with a free will is capable of acting morally, because he *wills* to act morally. Hence, the achievement of the highest good and the Kingdom of ends is only possible by free individuals.

In political commonwealths all citizens are in an ethical state of nature (Ak. 6:95). That is not the case in an ethical commonwealth, in which they are “united under laws without being coerced, i.e. under laws of virtue alone” (Ak. 6: 95). The concept of the ethical commonwealth, moreover, extends to humanity in general (Ak. 6: 96). Kant:

“Hence, a multitude of human beings united in that purpose [of a political community] cannot yet be called the ethical community as such but only a particular society that strives after the consensus of all human beings (indeed, of all finite rational beings) in order to establish an absolute ethical whole of which each partial society is only a representation or schema” (Ak. 6:96).

His association of the ethical commonwealth with a world state Kant makes clear by calling the ethical commonwealth “a universal *republic* based on the laws of virtue” (Ak. 6: 98; my emphasis). Moreover, such a commonwealth is something humans ought to aspire, but that can only be achieved with the help of Divine intervention (Ak. 6: 99). Kant: “Hence an ethical community is conceivable only as a people under divine commands, i.e. as a *people of God*, and indeed *in accordance with the laws of virtue*” (Ak. 6: 99). In other words, no matter how unachievable the ethical commonwealth might appear to us, Providence will give us the help we
need – but not if we remain indolent. On the contrary, we ought to direct our efforts toward our moral improvement and the creation of an ethical commonwealth.\(^\text{10}\)

The ultimate purpose of politics is the goal of an ethical community in which individuals are guided by “(the duties of) virtue”. This means that Kant is entirely clear about the need for the subjection of the political sphere to ethical principles. The highest political good and the highest moral good, however, can only be achieved simultaneously. And that can occur exclusively in a world community, a community of human beings, in a world state – not in a federation of states. That might strike us as contradictory, having in mind that \(\text{TPP}\) can be interpreted as Kant’s advocacy of a global federation of states. Kant: “The idea of the right of nations presupposes the separation of many neighbouring states independent of one another; and though such a condition is of itself a condition of war (unless a federative union of them prevents the outbreak of hostilities), this is nevertheless better, in accordance with the idea of reason, than the fusion of them by one power overgrowing the rest and passing into a universal monarchy…” (Ak. 8: 367). Or: “…a federative condition of states having as its only purpose the avoidance of war is the sole rightful condition compatible with the freedom of states” (Ak. 8: 385).\(^\text{11}\)

How to explain this discrepancy in Kant’s thoughts? It might be argued that the ethical commonwealth Kant envisions as the Church: “An ethical community under divine moral legislation is a church which, inasmuch as it is not the object of a possible experience, is called the church invisible…” (Ak. 6: 101). But at a variety of other places in the Religion, Kant makes clear that the ethical commonwealth is more than one particular church (in fact, it is a “republic”, as I have noted above). What is more, the invisible church, the universal republic or world republic, “the good principle” working within the human race toward “a community according to the laws of virtue”, the sumnum bonum, the perfect community, the Kingdom of ends, the ethical commonwealth – all these terms refer to Kant’s view of the point of convergence of moral and political progress of the human. This point is thus also one at which the Church and the political community converge. Consequently, the ethical commonwealth is to be associated with both the Church and the world state.

Elsewhere in Religion, Kant writes that the “the will of the world ruler…..invisibly binds all together, under a common government, in a state inadequately represented and prepared for in the past through the visible church” (Ak. 6: 122). The “church invisible”, on the other hand, is the true representative of the morally

---

\(^\text{10}\) For Kant’s own formulation, see Ak. 6:100-6:101.

\(^\text{11}\) It deserves to be mentioned here that, similar to the differing readings of Kant’s stance on a universal state, interpretations of his understanding of perpetual peace are also a matter of debate. For an interesting statement of the conception that Kant denied the possibility of permanent peace in \(\text{TPP}\), citing his assertion that perpetual peace is “an idea incapable of realization”, see Babic (2004).
progressed human, subject to a *common* government in a *common* state. Accordingly, this “church invisible” and the world state are the indispensable embodiments of a future humanity – a community of human beings who are united in an ethical commonwealth.

Kant’s apparent incoherence in advocating in *TPP* a federation of states, instead of a world state, might indicate that his aims there were quite different from those in *Religion*. In *Religion* he endeavoured to give an account of the final condition which humanity ought to attain (and is gradually attaining). In *TPP* he was concerned with the intermediate phase, the stage humanity ought to aspire in the more immediate future. At that stage, a world state is still not possible – because of the imperfections of humanity. After humans have made sufficient moral progress, a universal state and Church will become possible. Before that, a federation of states will have to do.

In interpreting Kant’s view on international relations, one therefore needs to have a clear picture of the stage of the future Kant is referring to: the far future (i.e., the approximation of the final stage of human development) or the more immediate future. *Religion* deals more with the former, *TPP* with the latter. There are at least two crucial reasons why it is justified to believe that Kant cared more about the former. First, in *Religion* he made a systematic attempt to position his thoughts from that work in the framework of his entire system of practical philosophy. For instance, the ethical commonwealth from *Religion* is an extension of the Kingdom of ends from the *Groundwork*. It is also an extension of the “highest good in the world as a necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law”, Kant refers to in *The Critique of Practical Philosophy*. Second, in 1794 Kant was coerced by the Prussian state to pledge “not to discuss publicly on any form of religion, whether natural or revealed, either in lectures or in writings” (see Wood 1996: xi-xxiv). Hence, in the period when Kant published *TPP* (1995) and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) his freedom of expression was limited. That affected the possibility for him to elaborate on the role of Providence (and God) in the development of a future global order. When he published *Religion* in 1793, Kant was not subjected to any similar ban. Accordingly, his thoughts from *Religion* about the future world society, including the role Providence plays in its establishment, might deserve a greater deal of attention than his reflections on this and related subjects that are expressed in *TPP* (and the sections on public right in *The Metaphysics of Morals*)!

There is one other problem Kant has exposed himself to in *TPP*: the “status quo bias”. Although this bias is usually not associated with Kant, I believe he has fallen victim to it at the time while the ban on his freedom of expression was in place. Since in that period Kant could not have expressed his thoughts on matters that might have an underpinning in religion, his key conceptions about the ethical commonwealth, the one true Church and one world state, he could possibly not
have developed further in *TPP*. It left him with the possibility to discuss international relations in an aborted form, and Kant opted for the least painful solution – to discuss his concepts on relations among states from the point of view of the present state of affairs and the relatively near future. That skewed his thoughts in *TPP* toward the status quo in international relations.

But is the attainment of something that goes far beyond the status quo realistic? Although Kant believed that humans do not have the capacities to achieve the ethical commonwealth and a universal state on their own, he thought that the help of Providence will finally result in the development of a community of humanity and a world state, while a global federation of states would be used merely as a transitional construction. In that regard, it deserves emphasis that it appears quite incongruous to envision an ethical commonwealth as the *sumnum bonum*, and at the same time to consider this highest good to be achievable only in a federation of states. Such a federation of states can only be necessary as an intermediate stage of development of international relations. Its rationale would be based in the need of humans to preserve a connection to their ethnic or political communities and not to be robbed of their cultural identity and specificity. But why the need for such ties in a community of humanity, in an ethical commonwealth of the highest good? Can we imagine the highest good and a community of humanity as a condition in which humans are divided along ethnic and political lines? Such a division is conceivable only at some halfway stage on the path to a global state. That is the stage Kant elaborated on in *TPP*. But the only logical consequence of Kant’s concepts elaborated on in *Religion* is one global state. That state is an embodiment of the ethical community, as well as the worldly side of the church invisible, whereas the federation of states from *TPP* is an intermediate political composition.

*  

It can be concluded that advocates of both DP and CD generally fail to take into account *Religion* as an essential peace of reading on the subject they are concerned with. Furthermore, the proponents of the third set of interpretations of Kant’s cosmopolitanism in our typology (i.e, the advocates of a refined form of CD) appear to have come closest to his own understanding of the federation as a transitional stage on the historical path of humanity toward a world state. However, they generally also seem oblivious to the fact that key arguments for their position are to be found in *Religion*, specifically in Kant’s conception of the ethical commonwealth. There Kant makes clear that this commonwealth is a future community of morally perfected humans that is marked by justice and peace, as well as “a world state based on the laws of virtue”. Such a state is the final destination and
purpose of our moral and political development. We have to guide ourselves towards this purpose, we can count on Providence in our endeavours, while we have to direct our short-term strategy to the establishment of a federation of states as its precursor. This fits CD, in particular “refined CD”.

Vojin Rakić
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd

References


Kant, I (1903) *Grundlage der Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals)*. Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ak. 4).

Kant, I (1907) *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason)*. Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ak. 6: 3-202).

Kant, I (1907) *Metaphysik der Sitten (Metaphysics of Morals)*. Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ak. 6: 205-493).

Kant, I (1907) *Konflikt der Fakultäten (Conflict of the Faculties)*. Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ak. 7).

Kant, I (1908) *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason)*. Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ak. 5).

Kant, I (1912) *Zum ewigen Frieden (Toward Perpetual Peace)*. Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ak. 8).


Long, D (1995b) „Conclusion: Inter-War Idealism, Liberal Internationalism, and Contem-
porary International Theory“. In: Long D. and Wilson P (eds) Thinkers of the Twenty
Lutz-Bachmann M (1997) “Kant’s Ideal of Peace and the Philosophical
Conceptions of a World Republic”. In: Bohman J and Lutz-Bachmann M (eds) Perpetual
ledge.
McGrew, A (2002) “Liberal Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism”. In: 
Held D and McGrew A (eds) Governing globalization: power, authority and global
Owen, JM (1996) “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace”. In: Brown ME, Lynn-
Press
SM and Miller SE (eds) Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press.
Russett, B and O'Neal John (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, interdependence, and
international organizations. New York: W. W. Norton.
York: W. W. Norton
Press.
International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
the Works of Immanuel Kant – Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Press.
Vojin Rakić

*Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* as the Key for a Comprehension of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism

(Summary)

This article advances the thesis that Kant’s cosmopolitanism is to be interpreted as a view that contains at its core the idea of a world state as the final destination of humanity’s historical progress. Evidence for this is to be found in Kant’s *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, in particular on the basis of an interpretation of the notion of the “ethical commonwealth”. A phase in this progress of humanity toward a world state is a federation of states that Kant advances in *Toward Perpetual Peace*. Before elucidating this core idea of my article, a review of contemporary interpretations of Kant’s cosmopolitanism will be offered. The primary division of these interpretations will be based on the distinction between the “democratic peace paradigm” and the “cosmopolitan democracy paradigm”. It will be asserted that the proponents of both paradigms generally claim to have Kantian underpinnings, but by and large suffer from a failure to devote the necessary attention to *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. This failure is above all detrimental to the argumentation of the proponents of the cosmopolitan democracy paradigm.

**KEY WORDS:** liberal internationalism, democratic peace, cosmopolitan democracy, Kant, ethical commonwealth, world state