ABSTRACT: In the 'Third Sketch for a Manifesto of Affirmationist Art' ('Troisiéme esquisse d’une manifeste de l’affirmationnisme'), Badiou brings together the concepts of Universality, the Senses and Duty in Art. The author will try to reassess the concept of Duty in Badiou’s conception of Affirmationist Art, examining the problems of 1. How is an Emancipatory Art possible in the context of the anti-humanist condition? and 2. What is the ontological and epistemological status of an in-humanity as a fundamental presupposition of human emancipation in Art? It will be argued that the artistic formalization of the Subject(s) – which is ‘impersonal and singular’, as Badiou asserts – would not be possible without any human participation in the process of subjectification towards human emancipation. The author will demonstrate how it is possible to think the concept of Duty in the aesthetic realm, on the basis of Badiou’s presupposition of the Subjective Universality of Art and Župančić’s reading of Lacanian theory.

KEYWORDS: Emancipation, Art, Duty, Anti-Humanism, Subject, Badiou, Marx, Župančić

Badiou has repeatedly paid tribute to Sartre’s philosophical perspective as expressed in his thesis on radical humanism², which asserts that the Subject is always constituted in the gap between an impersonal, atheistic Nothingness and Being. The core of Sartre’s famous text ”The Transcendence of the Ego” (‘La Transcendance de l’Ego’) is that the Ego is an impersonal transcendental field which has the form neither of subjective identity, nor of synthetic personal consciousness. One of the main objections which can be raised to this proposition – and here, Badiou agrees with Deleuze – is that Sartre ‘continued to tie the impersonal field to a self-consciousness [conscience (de) soi]’.³

Man’s ‘existence’, Sartre said, ‘precedes essence’. A man is nothing else but what s/he makes of her-/himself, since a man must occupy the empty place of the dead God. There is no transcendental Will which a priori determines human nature – or, to put it differently, there is no human nature at all. To paraphrase Sartre’s words, ’man is indefinable insofar as s/he is at first nothing: s/he (the (wo)man) materializes in the world, encounters her-/himself, and only afterward defines her-/himself.’⁴ In other words, Sartre thought of man in her/his social and historic dimensions, emphasizing the necessity of thinking man in time. However, Badiou will conclude that Sartre’s philosophical proposition concerning man as project, which arises at the place of Nothingness – or, better, of the Absolute – means nothing other than the essence of man, which Badiou finds in this project itself.

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1 A shorter version of this article was introduced at the VIe Congrès Méditerranéen d’Esthétique : Faits et valeurs, Institut ACTE - UMR 8218, Ésthetica - art & philosophie, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Florence – Villa Finaly, Italy, June 24–29, 2014
4 Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2007, p 22
Despite the huge potentiality contained in Sartre’s philosophical perspective, Badiou opts for the anti-humanist concept of agency, which relies mainly upon the Lacanian proposition of the Real – or the void, which, always retroactively, tears up the imaginary and symbolic orders of the individual. More precisely, this anti-humanism derives from his ontology, which is founded on the basis of axiomatic set theory, and particularly on Cantor’s explanation of the necessity of an element (the void set) that cannot be counted as one (\textit{count-as-one}). This invention is based upon the supposition that a void set belongs to every set, which means that it also belongs to itself. In Badiou’s terms, the Event is the other name for the void that presents itself to a situation as present but not included. It is an exception to being, insofar as its multiplicity is forbidden. Finally, an Event presupposes a \textit{reflexive multiple}, or better, a multiple belonging to itself, which is counted among the number of its elements, but whose existence has been forbidden according to the axiom of foundation.\textsuperscript{5}

In his search for an anti-humanist aesthetics in the present state of affairs, Badiou proposed his most challenging thesis on the Subject of Art, which may be introduced here in the form of the four axioms:

1. Art is an impersonal production of Truth(s) that is addressed to all;

2. The Author is an ‘interchangeable animal’ that becomes the as it were ‘transi’ support for a universal address.\textsuperscript{6} An Artist is not a Subject of Art, but a vanishing cause of this address – the site or one of its sites;

3. The Subject of Art is the system of artworks that Badiou calls a \textit{configuration}. The universal Subject of Art is, Badiou claims, non-empirical and non-organic, although a human animal and its organs unify the sense-perceived.

4. A work of Art is neither an Event, nor a Truth. It is a \textit{multiple-being} – a body, as Badiou maintains, that bears the Subject of Art. An artwork is a finite objectivity in time and space, while the Truth is infinite multiplicity.

We quote the paragraph from Badiou’s \textit{Third Sketch for a Manifesto of Affirmationist Art} which appears to be the key to these axioms:

The human animal is in no way the cause of this address; it is only its site, or one of its sites. The Artist as individual is only a living being ascribed to a Subject which, since it takes the form of an Artwork, is a Subject of the sense-perceived and has need of such matter. But once the Subject-Artwork has been laid out, we can completely forget about its transitory individual support. Only the work is affirmative. The Artist is a neutral element of that affirmation.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{5} Quentin Meillassoux, ‘History and Event in Alain Badiou’, \textit{Parrhesia}, No. 12, 2011, p 2

\textsuperscript{6} ‘Nous affirmons qu’il peut arriver à cet animal, par le labeur artistique, d’être le support transi d’une adresse universelle.’ ‘Transi’ would seem to imply a reference to the Latin ‘trans-ire’, suggesting a transitory zone of transition, transit - and also, perhaps, the transience evoked in a ‘transi’ i.e. a tombstone effigy evoking mortality and decomposition. ‘Transi’ also carries the sense of a sensation of icy chill. Cf. Alain Badiou, ‘Troisième esquisse d’une manifeste de l’ affirmationnisme’, \textit{Circonstances} 2, Paris, Léo Scheer, Lignes, 2004, p 98

From the statements above, we may bring out three implicit paradoxes:

The first paradox concerns the passage between an Author-Artist who, to quote Badiou, ‘has the need of such matter’ \(^8\) (‘L’artiste comme individu n’est que matière vivante prêtée à un sujet qui, parce qu’il est, dans la forme de l’œuvre d’art, un sujet sensible, a besoin d’une telle matière.’), and the Subject-work-configuration itself, which has finally been displayed. In view of Badiou’s argument that ‘there is never anything to be gleaned from the creator’ \(^9\), how is one to understand that phrase, ‘the need of such matter’? What is the nature of the relationship between the particular human animal in its historical conjuncture and the universal Subject of Art?

The second paradox regards the thesis which states that (an) Event(s) precedes and conditions subjectivation. It seems that, for Badiou, the process of creating a new possible generic inhumanity begins with an Event(s), or with the maturation of the site of a situation where it might take place. Yet, the question is: how can we know or decide what is the right moment to be incorporated within a Subject-sequence of Art that is impersonal?

The third paradox pertains to the thinking of an Artwork as something finite in space and time, that is to say, as a product of ‘the Author and its organs which unifies the sense-perceived’, and, at the same time, as something infinite insofar as it belongs to the universal Subject of Art, which is non-empirical and non-organic.\(^10\) How to understand that an Artwork is a body of a potential Subject\(^11\), and that it somehow belongs, at least in part, to a human animal, as one among other objects?

In providing answers to these questions, we will try to defend the following theses:

1. The formalization of the Subject is not possible without some human participation in the process of subjectivation towards human emancipation, on condition that we understand the notion of human as the moment of radical pathology\(^12\), or alienation\(^13\). This proposition implies the thinking of human emancipation through Art retroactively. From this it follows that some historically and pathologically determined need of the human animal must precede an a-temporal Event – which does not mean that it causes it – in order for it to be restructured and become a new time;

2. The moment of Aesthetic Distance from the given, regardless of any form of the work itself (technical support, theme, form, etc.), is itself an Artwork that affirms both Emancipatory Act and Duty as possible aesthetic concepts.\(^14\) The Distance is that which bears the formalization of the Subject, and which makes possible thinking the avant-garde thesis of the erasure of the limits between Art and life, which is, as we maintain, the fundamental presupposition of Emancipatory Act/Art.

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\(^8\) Alain Badiou, ‘Troisième esquisse d’une manifeste de l’ affirmationnisme’, \textit{Circonstances} 2, op. cit, p 98


\(^14\) Since the concept of Duty belongs fundamentally to Kant’s vocabulary of Practical Reason.
The first assertion is based on the possibility of re-thinking human emancipation in the realm of Art in-between, or better, re-thinking the discrepancy between, on the one side, an internal limitation of the Subject itself (subjectivation in space and time as conditioned by and through the consequence of (an) Event(s), as Badiou means that term), and on the other side, the time and space of the historically determined need which precedes (an) Event(s) in the particular world. It is possible to think this proposition as, that a need of the human animal may produce and convoke particular incentives and impulses that might grow into a two-fold modality of a universalizing (not universal) Demand. In other words, we argue that it is possible to think an Emancipatory Artistic Act as an action that is done in the conjunction between actions *pflichtrichtig* (in accordance with Duty) and actions *aus Pflicht* (acting from Duty), regardless of any medium or artistic form. However, this conceptual threshold is possible only on account of Lacan’s reading of Kant, since Lacan binds together ethics and aesthetics: there is no transcendental realm which *a priori* determines human actions, since a desire is its own limit. Lacan teaches us, particularly in his later work (Seminar XX), that right (*droit*) is not Duty, inasmuch as the right is correlative to the Superego’s Will to enjoyment. The Subject’s Duty, however, empties the Will to enjoyment.\(^{15}\)

Marx was right when he insisted on the assertion that the first premise of all human history is the existence of living human individuals:

They are real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way. (…) The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered as simply being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather, it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.\(^{16}\)

The Marxist perspective provides us with the possibility of claiming that the human animal which 'has the need for such matter' (we again quote Badiou’s words), is a historically determined and limited *multiple-being* which is both produced by and itself produces its own material life. The necessity of thinking the human animal historically derives from the insight that the need, or, to put it in psychoanalytic terms, the drive, is not something original or primal – in other words, an essence of a man. Our ’self’ is not given to us in advance. The supposed nature of man in terms of an exploration of his basic drives, 'has been cross-bred and broken up many times in the course of history’\(^{17}\). It is impossible to discover the so-called 'man of primal drives’ beneath historical and modern man. People constantly create their own, self-made conditions, which, despite their ‘human origin and volatility’, possess the same conditioning power as natural things: 'Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the character of a condition of human existence. This is why men, no matter what they do, are always conditioned beings.’\(^{18}\)

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16 Karl Marx, Fridrich Engels,‘Die Ideologie überhaupt, namentlich die deutsche’, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me03/me03_009.htm 7. 6. 2014 / 16:02 PM
Let us now take a closer look at the problem of a need of the human animal. Firstly, we must detach the notion of a need from the absolute passion for the Real, which was, as Badiou states, the passion of the last Century implicated in conceiving a change as conditioned by a new Subject. This conception of the Real coincides with the insight according to which (an) Event(s) is/are always a subjective production, that, in the last analysis, has Terror as a consequence.19 Secondly, we must clarify the implication of the functions of a human drive (a need) and desire as human conditions (conditio humana) as being things which always persist in their historical conjuncture, as well as in the process of human emancipation in the realm of Art.

Our point of departure is the dual nature of need in the human animal, prior to and detached from the Event which one (human animal), as we claim, has been expecting/anticipating without initiating.

The first presupposition is that Badiou’s world(s) is/are stimulus-world(s) which is/are historically variable. From this it follows that the basic (?) needs of the human animal interact historically as socially developed and guided needs with the other social, and therefore historically varying needs. These basic (?) but historically varying needs possess the ability to be transformed, as well as to cause transformation.20 We are inclined to argue that these needs are bound up with those of what Badiou calls the marked body, 'whose fate would lie on the side of the true'21. This assertion stems from Badiou’s theory of the 'two bodies', which delineates the process of human incorporation into a Subject. The process of human incorporation into a Subject presupposes, firstly, an incorporation of the human animal and its own so-called 'natural', but in fact 'pathological' body ('my-self'), into the symptomal body, or body-place-of-the-Other; and this symptomal body, we can conclude, is a work of Art that bears the universal Subject of Art in its locality, as posited by the erasure of that body ('my-self') of the human animal in favour of the body of Emancipatory Art (the local instance of the differential point of a Truth). And secondly, this incorporation presupposes the incorporation of this local instance into the generic artistic sequence, and, finally, into the artistic configuration, which, as Badiou states, is that universal Subject of Art which is a non-empirical and non-organic transhistorical and transworldly forcing. This accounts for the assertion that there is/are still Truth(s) among languages and bodies, capable of traversing the particularity of worlds and histories. The Subject of Art is therefore rare and non-individual, and temporally finite owing to its sequential 'nature'.22

This accounts for why 'my body', as 'gathered under the trace of the vanished event'23, unfolds 'point by point organically the thought-Subject of an as yet unknown eternal Truth(s).' Or to put it in Lacan’s words, 'the Subject of the unconscious only touches the soul through the body, by introducing thought into it'.24

Nevertheless, how may one conceive this generic in-human in Art, to which the estranged human animal should 'return'? What is the ontological and epistemological status of the in-human, as a fundamental presumption of human emancipation?

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20 Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, op. cit, p 68
22 Quentin Meillassoux, ‘History and Event in Alain Badiou’, op. cit, p 5
23 Alain Badiou, ‘Lacan’, op. cit, p 479
24 Idem
Isn’t this ‘my-self’ just another name for a signifier of the ideal object of desire (a thing/das Ding), that actually does not exist in reality per se but is constitutive of it? From this follows the fundamental question which arises when thinking human emancipation through an Art at the present: How to encounter an unknown ‘one-self’ by means of incorporating that ‘one-self’ into an artistic sequence? Or, to put it in Badiou’s terms, how to become the ‘some-one’ who ‘exists without knowing it’.25

This ‘some-one’ whom one (the human animal) ‘has been looking for’, is nothing other than that which Badiou calls a site – a multiple-being which has the property of presenting itself in its own multiple-composition.26 It is an object which happens to belong to itself – or to which it happens that it belongs to itself. As we have already mentioned above, and to quote Badiou again, the artistic individual is only a human animal which through artistic labour becomes ‘an as it were “transi” support for a universal address’. However, we must underline that this human animal is never the cause of this address, but only ‘its site or one of its sites’. If we take a closer look at the notion of a site, whose ontology Badiou clarifies in his Logics of Worlds, we will be able to think it as a place of the very erasure of ‘my body’ in favour of the body-place-of-the-Other. In other words, it has to do with the very point of the in-humanity (inhuman truths) of the human – the point to which the individual (the human animal) turns back to and/or coincides with her-self (incorporation into artistic sequence) and subjectivizes. This ‘return’, however, does not imply a human nature (essence). As Badiou states with regard to a site, ‘a multiple which is an object of this world – whose elements are indexed on the transcendent of the world – is a “site“ if it happens to count itself in the referential field of its own indexing.’ [...] ‘A site is a multiple which happens to behave in the world in the same way with regard to itself as it does with regard to its elements, so that it is the ontological support of its own appearance;’ Finally, ‘the site is a being to which it happens that it exists / of itself;’27 which is perhaps to say, as if it happens to encounter its object, her unfamiliar ‘her-self’, at the same place, on the same side.

Subject formalisation is not possible without any human participation, as an historical, or, (to come closer to Badiou’s mode of expression), ‘world(s)ly’ activity, in the process of subjectivation towards human emancipation, since this action implies the retroactivity of the pursuit of the Universality of the inhuman itself. This activity of participation is not possible without inscribing the already existing pathological body into the body-place-of-the-Other. The retroactive determination of a man in the process of universal production, in other words, the determination of that which will have been inhuman, cannot refer back to any given determinations of human essence. This process itself always implies creating retroactively the conditions of its own possibility.28 Only in this way does the Subject’s transformation of one-self29 – human emancipation by means of an Art – become possible.

Now, in order to account for the place of Art and a work of Art in this process, let us return briefly to the issue of the human need. The notion of the human need implies, as we have seen, the pathological body which, since it is familiar to ‘me’, ‘puts the present in perpetual danger’30, in Badiou’s words, on account of the process of resisting the erasure of ‘my-self’. The very nature of the human need appears to be divided: firstly, we are coping with a need for self-preservation; secondly, this need is capable of

26 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds. Being and Event II, op. cit, p 109
27 Ibid, p 363
28 Frank Ruda, ‘Humanism Reconsidered or Life Living Life’, Filozofski vesnik, No. 2, 2009, p 189
29 Ibid, p 26
becoming a demand in its pure form.\textsuperscript{31} Self-preservation is what Spinoza calls 'perseverance in being', and it serves, in the right sense of the term, as a mask that conceals that the human animal is an 'animal' that 'does not function very well' or 'as expected'.\textsuperscript{32} Badiou reduces this perseverance-of-self to the pursuit of interest: 'Perseverance', he says, 'is the law that governs some-one in so far as he knows himself.'\textsuperscript{33} Contrary to this, belonging to the artistic composition of the Subject of Art implies an emancipatory break with 'my old my-self'. Human needs – or, in Kantian terminology, Triebfedern, can motivate nothing in themselves; they cannot produce anything directly. They obtain this power, as Zupančić explains, only when they happen to be incorporated into maxims. This implies fidelity to the 'remainder' – to Truth as a post-Event consequence. Only at this moment do they become drives or incentives. From this it follows that an Emancipatory Artistic Act is supernumerary to the conceptual pair legal/illegal. An Artistic Emancipatory Act demands 'not only that an action conform with Duty, but also that this conformity be the only content or motive of that action'.\textsuperscript{34}

Yet, Badiou wonders in what way this new artistic sequence (Subject of Art) is superimposed upon and intersected with the simple perseverance-of-self. It is to a certain extent Kant’s question: How can one hold an act to be necessary and free at the same time? We maintain that it is nothing other than Artistic Duty – an Aesthetic Distance which is produced in the passage between 'my-self' or 'my body' and the-body-of-the-Other. From this it follows that the experiencing of a work of Emancipatory Art does not coincide with the materiality or with the technical support from which it is made, since we always already perceive this materiality through our 'imagining eyes'. In order to subtract this materiality from the ordinary regime of exposing, one needs an Aesthetic Distance (a Duty) by incorporating 'one-self' in the Subject of Art, which could correspond to the Lacanian concept of Beauty, on the grounds of the Kantian notion of dis-interestedness. The Aesthetic Distance could be read somehow as the missed encounter between the pleasure principle and the dimension of the ethical, which for consequence has the loss of the attractive power of the pleasure object. The familiar 'my-self' of (my) need is already 'available and accessible, just no longer desirable'.\textsuperscript{35} That is to say, the human animal, or interchangeable animal which 'has a need for emancipation through an art', becomes confronted with the 'traumatic proximity of a (threatening) thing' – which is, ultimately, the human animal itself.\textsuperscript{36} This operation has for its consequence a specific way of 'responding' that is realized by introducing the Aesthetic Distance. The Artistic Duty appears as the difference in the space and time of an intersection of the imaginary and symbolic as understood by Lacan – of ego and superego. The human animal, through subjectivation and by incorporating her-/himself into an artistic sequence, obtains a distant point of view regarding the world and her-/himself (human animal) as a part of that world.\textsuperscript{37} It is accounted for by the dual 'nature' of the human need: by incorporating itself in an artistic sequence, the human need becomes a pure demand for the impossible (the desire which circles around the objet petit a – the real qua the impossible), by the process of a conjunction of 'in accord with duty' and 'acting from duty'. It is an impossibility in which, says Lacan, we recognise the topology of our desire.\textsuperscript{38}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Alenka Župančić, \textit{The Ethics of the Real. Kant and Lacan}, op. cit, p 36
\item \textsuperscript{32} Cf. Alenka Župančić, 'The Human Animal', lecture, Saas-Fee 2013 (non-published text)
\item \textsuperscript{33} Alain Badiou, \textit{Ethics}, op. cit, p 46
\item \textsuperscript{34} Alenka Župančić, \textit{The Ethics of the Real. Kant and Lacan}, op. cit, p 14
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid, p 8
\item \textsuperscript{36} Alain Badiou, \textit{The Subject of Change}, op. cit, p 113
\item \textsuperscript{37} Alenka Župančić, \textit{The Ethics of the Real}, op. cit p 154
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid, p 15
\end{itemize}
Thus, a human animal which is a thing in the process of human emancipation (subjectivation) through an Art, always returns to the 'same place' – to that of the thing (objet petit a – the object-cause of desire) which determines the relation between the individual and the other, insofar as it escapes both.

**Conclusion**

What we have attempted to show is that it is not necessary to think of the process of human emancipation in the realm of Art as a mutually exclusive conceptual pair, a dichotomy between a so-called humanism that posits a 'master of event' i.e. a Subject that affirms its own infinite power, and an anti-humanism which proposes the thinking of the Subject as a 'space of the consequences of an Event'. The first position would present humanity as a substitute for a classical transcendent God, which is in the last analysis, the objection to Sartre’s humanism, and, generally, to Marxist humanism. It relies upon the thesis that Marx subscribed to a humanism with substantialist and essentialist connotations, by virtue of human nature being something pre-given, where human emancipation appears to be a causa finalis inscribed into the substance of the human being. The humanist position inclines towards ‘the banality of the radical good’, to adapt Hannah Arendt’s famous phrase. The anti-humanist position regarding the Subject of Art, on other hand, seems rather to 'limp' behind the Event, to the extent that the human animal has been exhausted in its waiting in vain for a singular change, for an Event (of human emancipation) to come – if, indeed, it ever comes, or if we ever encounter the post-evental consequences; in so far as it (the human animal) completely depends upon the eruption of a void. In other words, we would maintain that anti-humanism emerges from humanism.

What we have just proposed is a re-reading of Badiou’s formula of the Subject of Art by introducing and defending our two main theses:

1. Firstly, the process of human emancipation in the realm of Art is not possible without any human participation in the process of subjectivation, to the extent that the very notion of the human implies the retroactivity of the process of disalienation / emancipation, which we find in Badiou’s concept of the reflexive multiple that is a site in itself – a multiple to which it happens that it is an element of itself. From this follows our argument regarding the dual ‘nature’ of the human need of the human transformation of ‘one-self’. Our assumption, therefore, does not begin with the claim that there is no essence of man which could be realized in the process of universal production. Rather, a human animal, a creator, or a recipient of Art, as one among the objects in the world, as soon as he/she enters in process of Universal Subjective production, becomes a site, a thing, a ‘vanishing cause’ of the universal address, determining her-/himself retroactively as that which s/he (the human being) will have been. We propose to call this non-substantialist and non-essentialist dehumanization, aesthetic anti-humanism.

2. Secondly, what bears the subjective artistic formalisation is not only a singular object that constitutes the appearing of a Subject, but the Aesthetic Distance itself which appears as a response to the transformation of the object of ‘my pleasure’ (my familiar my-self) into the surplus of my desire beyond the pleasure principle. This Artistic Duty operates between the vanishing self – pathological body and the body-place-of-the-Other, which is, in our opinion, nothing other than the Emancipatory work of Art itself.