ABSTRACT. I examine several views of belief retention in relation to the data given by David Kaplan concerning the case of Rip Van Winkle who slept for twenty years thinking that he had only slept for one day, and argue that none of these views are satisfactory, including Kaplan’s character/content framework. I then propose a view of belief retention which is in line with how the subject represents the world from her first-person cognitive perspective.

KEYWORDS: Belief Retention, Rip Van Winkle, Character, Content, Kaplan, Perry, Evans

Introduction

In a famous passage, Frege suggests a view of belief retention:

If someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the word ‘today’, he will replace this word with ‘yesterday’ (Frege 1918/1977, p. 10).

Kaplan (1989a, p. 501) has tried to apply this view within his own framework such as to adjust character as a kind of meaning of an expression, which is set by linguistic conventions. It both

(I) determines the content of the expression (what is said) in every context, and

(II) is the bearer of cognitive significance of the expression in the sense of a narrow psychological type.

Like the Fregean sense of a non-indexical expression, the character of an indexical expression such as ‘today’ both determines reference (Kaplan’s content) and exhibits it via a cognitively significant mode of presentation. But while in Frege’s theory a mode (manner) of presentation presents the same object (reference) to all mankind, character in general presents different objects (of thought) to different persons and to the same person at different times (Kaplan 1989a, p. 530). The same character accounts for the common nature that different belief states have irrespective of context, which makes it a narrow psychological
The character of ‘today’ presents the day thought about in one particular way (*the current day*) while the character of ‘yesterday’ presents the day thought about in another particular way (*the previous day*). This difference in the modes (manners) of presentation reflects a difference in the cognitive values of the two expressions wherein lies a difference in cognitive significance: ‘[T]he cognitive significance of a word or phrase [is] to be identified with its character, the way the content is presented to us’ (Kaplan 1989a, p. 531). While for Frege (1918, p. 10) the same sense as the mode of presentation of the day thought about can be expressed by means of ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ as the context changes, for Kaplan they constitute different modes (manners) of presentation of the day(s) thought about. For, unlike Frege, Kaplan held that a difference in characters entails a difference in the modes of presentation, giving rise to different actions - which led him to replace the Fregean one-level account with the two-level character/content framework. In addition to being the determinants of reference via a cognitively significant mode of presentation, Fregean senses also play the role of contents expressed and believed, while Kaplan’s characters play only the former role. The content expressed by an indexical such as ‘today’ is rather the day that it picks out in the given context while the content expressed by (an utterance of) an indexical sentence such as ‘Today is beautiful’ is a Russellian proposition that has for its constituents only the day being referred to and the property ascribed to it.

Accordingly, if someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the word ‘today’, he will replace this word with ‘yesterday’ by retaining the same content under different, suitably related, characters. The characters of ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ account for the different ways in which the given day is presented to him in accordance with the change of context. Yet Kaplan found that this account of belief retention did not work, because of the case of Rip Van Winkle, who slept for twenty years and woke up thinking he had slept for just one day (see Kaplan 1989a, pp. 537-8). Suppose, to gloss this case along the lines of Perry (1997, p. 36), that on day \(d\) before falling asleep Rip never forms any explicit belief other than ‘Today is beautiful’. When he awakes twenty years later, the belief is updated, given Rip’s view of how the context has changed, to ‘Yesterday was beautiful’. What is left of the original belief, according to the suggested account, is a belief about the day before he woke up - the day that the character of ‘yesterday’ determines (in the context of utterance) and exhibits as its mode of presentation. This Kaplan finds strange, since Rip’s assenting to ‘Yesterday was beautiful’ does not seem to deprive him of the belief he had formed about \(d\). The very fact that Rip reaches for this character shows that he is trying to update this belief, not that he has on his mind the day before he woke up, of which he has no memory.

Thinking the same Russellian content on two consecutive occasions does not guarantee that the belief with which one began will be retained. For one need not realize that the content one is thinking is the same. This makes it psychologically inert. Kaplan illustrates this by citing a case featuring personal pronouns (which also reinstates the problem of finding a standard adjustment in character in order to account for belief retention):
I first think, “His pants are on fire”. I later realize “I am he” and thus come back to think “My pants are on fire”. Still later, I decide that I was wrong in thinking “I am he” and conclude “His pants were on fire”. If in fact, I am he, have I retained my belief that my pants are on fire simply because I believe the same content, though under a different character? ... [T]his does not capture my sense of retaining a belief ... (Kaplan 1989a, p. 537, note 64).

And the same holds for Fregean thoughts. For

If one says ‘Today is beautiful’ on Tuesday and ‘Yesterday was beautiful’ on Wednesday, one expresses the same thought according to [Frege]. Yet one can clearly lose track of the days and not realize one is expressing the same thought. It seems then that thoughts are not appropriate bearers of cognitive significance (Kaplan 1989a, p. 501, n. 26).

Hence, something can be a bearer of cognitive significance just in case the subject cannot fail to re-identify it. Short of this, she will fail to retain the belief with which she began. To this I shall return below.

**Two Beliefs/Two Characters**

There still seems to be a way of granting that Rip remembers (that) d (was beautiful) without abandoning the character/content framework, leaving Kaplan’s worry about the applicability of this framework unfounded. It could be urged that when Rip awakes his original belief-state bifurcates (although he does not realize this) such that he ends up having two different beliefs that line up, respectively, with two different characters. One of these beliefs is based on his memory of d. It lines up with the character of ‘That day was beautiful’ where ‘that day’ is a memory-based demonstrative (whose character will be specified below). The other belief is not memory-based and lines up with the character ‘Yesterday was beautiful’, where ‘yesterday’ picks out the day before he woke up, call it d*. In Perry’s words, an utterance of ‘yesterday’ designates the day before the utterance automatically, no matter what the speaker intends (Perry 2001, p. 60).

This arguably explains why, in the given context, Rip is to assent to all of the following statements:

(1) Yesterday was beautiful.
(2) That day was beautiful.
(3) That day = Yesterday.

It is clear, it might be claimed, that upon waking up Rip is disposed to assent to the false (3), and given (3), the true (2) is inter-derivable with (1), which will be false if d* was not beautiful. Rip may think that (1) and (2) express the same thought-content but, if so, this is another mistake that he is making.
According to the character/content framework, the thought-contents corresponding to (1) and (3) are Russellian, and they amount, respectively, to

(1’) that $d^*$ was beautiful

and

(3’) that $d = d^*$.

By uttering and assenting to (1) and (3) Rip does arguably express and assert these two contents such that the truth or falsity of what he said turns on this. But this is not enough to endorse the suggested character/content framework. To fully endorse it, we also need to show that Rip believes these two contents, respectively, under the characters of ‘yesterday’ and ‘that day’. This requires that in addition to having a memory-based belief about $d$ with which Rip is ex hypothesi credited he also has a belief about $d^*$. Since he has not been in epistemic contact with $d^*$, such a belief cannot have its causal source in $d^*$. It rather needs to be a sourceless belief - a belief typically held about days that cannot be part of the cause of our beliefs (Perry 1997), lining up with the character of ‘yesterday’. In line with this, it may be claimed that, thanks to retaining his belief about $d$ and thinking (3’), Rip’s latter belief is about $d^*$ although he takes it to be about $d$. Alternatively, it may be claimed that in addition to having a belief about $d$, Rip has a belief about $d^*$ that is based solely on the belief with which he began plus malfunctioning updating. As a result, Rip’s updating does not amount to retaining the belief with which he began but to replacing it with a new belief about $d^*$. Claiming that updating amounts to replacing, based on malfunction, does not rule out Rip’s retaining the belief with which he began.

Either way characters are able to play the dual role of determining the content of the expression (what is said) as well as bearing the cognitive significance of the expression in the sense of a narrow psychological type.

In contrast with this, it may be that Rip is sufficiently confused that he fails to retain any beliefs about $d$ if we assume that there are conflicting reasons to say that the belief he has after waking up is about $d$ (since it is a descendant of the belief with which he began), and reasons to say that it is about $d^*$ (since it is a belief about the day before he woke up which is $d^*$). I contend, though, that after waking up Rip is neither confused in this sense

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1 To be sure, Rip has expressed and asserted (1’) and (3’) provided ‘yesterday’ in (1) and (3) is taken attributively. If we take it to be used referentially, in view of the fact that by means of it Rip intends to refer to $d$ rather than to its attributive referent $d^*$, it is $d$ rather than $d^*$ that figures in what he has expressed. This resembles the case concerning perceptual demonstratives whose referent is, in Kaplan’s view, properly determined by the speaker’s intention to refer to a perceived object (1989b, pp. 582-4) in that it is Rip’s intention to refer to $d$ rather than the character the previous day that is critical in fixing the reference of ‘yesterday’. This conforms with Recanati’s view (2010, pp. 162-3; 2012, chap. 17) that singular reference is fixed by the subject’s acquaintance relations since the reference need not satisfy the singular predicate (character). For, in the present case the day referred to, $d$ - the day that Rip’s belief is both aimed at and derived from on the basis of his former acquaintance with it - does not satisfy the singular predicate (character) the previous day.
and nor does he have a belief apiece about $d$ and $d^*$, whatever he strictly says, but just a belief about $d$ to the effect that it was beautiful. The belief he has:

(a) draws upon (his memory of) $d$, and $d$ alone, and

(b) is aimed at $d$, and $d$ alone, as its causal source, as *the same day* that his original belief was about, and has

$(2')$ that $d$ was beautiful

as its content in spite of his assenting to ‘Yesterday was beautiful’ which picks out the day through which he slept and of which he has no memory. So although Rip may have a sourceless belief about $d^*$ (for whatever reason), the relevant memory-based belief that he has after waking up is not aimed at $d^*$ but at $d$. Rip’s intention matters. Given his view of how the context has changed, Rip reaches for ‘Yesterday was beautiful’ in order to update his belief about $d$. Had he not retained this belief, he would not have been prompted to do this. This case is not relevantly different from a commonplace case of the following kind. Suppose on Tuesday a subject forms an indexical belief that she expresses by saying ‘Today is beautiful’. Then, being unaware that midnight has passed, she utters the same sentence again with the intention of re-expressing that very belief. This surely does not deprive her of continuing to believe what she believed before midnight, and *nor* does it make her think of Wednesday that it is beautiful. Although she has mis-tracked Tuesday in this way, she has kept track of it in a sense that enables her to retain the given belief: Tuesday is the sole causal source of the belief she has and she is representing it as the same day from one occasion to the next. And the same applies to Rip. The relevant belief he has after waking up has $d$ as its sole causal source and he is representing $d$ as the same as the day that his original belief was about, which accords with (a) and (b).

At this point, it may be urged that Rip nonetheless has two different beliefs, shaped respectively by the characters ‘yesterday’ and ‘that day’ (as a memory-based demonstrative) in that he is thinking of $d$ under two different characters as two different modes of presentation, without realizing that they pick out the same day. However, this move does not safeguard the character/content framework, since the character of ‘yesterday’ does not determine $d^*$ (the previous day) as its referent, as it is supposed to on the character/content framework. Furthermore, on the view that I shall propose below, Rip’s meeting (b) makes it the case that he is not thinking of $d$ here under two different modes of presentation but rather under the same one which may contain features and properties such as *being the previous day* that need not pertain to $d$.

Suppose that Rip briefly wakes up on $d^*$ and, after he finally wakes up on the following day, confuses $d^*$ with $d$ and ends up having a belief he tries to express by ‘Yesterday was beautiful’ that draws upon both $d$ and $d^*$ and hence fails to meet (a). Even so, he does not think of $d$ and $d^*$, respectively, under the characters ‘that day’ and ‘yesterday’, as required by the suggested character/content framework. For, in assenting to (3) he either has a belief that is equivocal in that two contents have been blended (see Millikan 2000, Ch. 11), or a belief that fails to refer (see Recanati 2013, p. 1851, n. 7), as the case may be.
This clearly captures Kaplan’s sense of retaining a belief. For Rip has not failed to retain the belief with which he began in the way Kaplan himself has in the foregoing ‘pants on fire’ example featuring personal pronouns.

**One Belief/One Character**

Since Rip meets (a) and (b), it may still seem possible to account for the belief about \(d\) that he has after waking up in terms of the character/content framework given that this belief seems to line up with the character of ‘That day was beautiful’, as suggested above. This is what Perry (1997) has tried to do. While agreeing with Kaplan that upon waking up Rip has retained the belief with which he began, Perry sticks to the character/content framework and suggests that Rip has retained this belief under various backup doxastic characters that are, in his view, analogous to but not derived from Kaplanian linguistic characters. The characters he suggests are ‘That day [the day I remember] is or was beautiful’ and ‘That day [the day this belief was acquired] is or was beautiful’. The bracketed material identifies the underlying cognitive role involved, based on the relation that an object can have to a given episode of thought or a particular belief. It is too strong to claim, though, that the bracketed material constitutes Rip’s way of thinking of \(d\). For the belief Rip is having throughout does not seem to involve a detailed specification of \(d\) as *the day of this thought, the day I remember or the day this belief was acquired*, and the like. The natural alternative is that the belief that Rip formed on \(d\) is a plain indexical belief to the effect that it is beautiful that he later updates on the basis of his memory, while the bracketed material serves only as a pointer to us in theorizing about Rip. But, if so, this belief is not governed by characters as it is supposed to.\(^3\)

**The (Neo-)Fregean View**

This takes us from the character/content framework to the (neo-)Fregean view according to which retaining a belief about \(d\) consists in thinking the same thought that can be expressed and updated by different indexicals as the context changes (see, e.g. Frege 1918, p. 10). But Evans, an adherent of this view, has urged that Rip has not retained the belief with which he began. In commenting on Kaplan’s remark that the Frege-inspired account of belief retention leads us to deny that Rip has retained this belief, which Kaplan finds strange, Evans says:

If so, the given characters “present” Rip with nothing. Alternatively, it may be claimed (as Lawlor (2005) does against Millikan) that given his commitment to (b) Rip makes a false identity judgement by taking the two characters to present \(d\) in two different ways. If so, the character of ‘yesterday’ presents Rip with \(d\) and not with \(d^*\) as required by the character/content framework.

\(^3\) See Bozickovic 2005 for a detailed criticism of Perry’s view of belief-retention in terms of doxastic characters. See also Bozickovic 2008 for a criticism of Perry’s (2001) account of the co-reference problem concerning informative identities in terms of reflexive contents of utterances and beliefs as second-order contents.
I see no more strangeness in the idea that a man who loses track of time cannot retain the beliefs than in the idea that a man who loses track of an object cannot retain the beliefs about it with which he began. If one has in fact lost track of time without knowing it, then one could think that one had retained one’s belief when one has not (Evans 1985, p. 311, n. 21).

Evans may be right when it comes to cases in which losing track of objects or days is the result of one’s causally interacting with two different objects or days without realizing.\(^4\) In contrast, Rip is not causally interacting with two different days, as urged above. To substantiate the claim that he has retained a belief about \(d\) to the effect that it was beautiful, consider Kaplan’s aforementioned charge that Fregean thoughts are not appropriate bearers of cognitive significance because one can lose track of the days and not realize that one is expressing the same thought. This reveals Kaplan’s contention that

\[\text{(R) One and the same bearer of cognitive significance needs to be such that a subject entertaining it on subsequent occasions cannot mistake it for two different bearers.}\]

Hence, Fregean thought can be a bearer of cognitive significance just in case the subject cannot fail to re-identify it. Short of this, she will fail to retain the belief with which she began.

I will argue that the belief Rip has about \(d\) after waking up conforms with this requirement. To block Kaplan’s charge altogether, I also need to show that a case never arises in which a subject’s losing track of the days leads her to mistake the thought she is thinking for two different ones. This will enable us to account for belief retention in terms of thinking the same Fregean thought over time.

To show that Rip meets (R), consider again two features of the belief he forms upon waking:

\[\begin{align*}
(\text{a}) & \quad \text{It draws upon (his memory of) } d \text{ and, } d \text{ alone, and} \\
(\text{b}) & \quad \text{It is aimed at } d, \text{ and } d \text{ alone, as its causal source, as the same day that his original belief was about,}
\end{align*}\]

in spite of his losing track of the days in the sense described.

The fact that Rip meets (a) and (b) makes him think the same thought that he thought before he went to sleep. By not making a division in his input information in accordance

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\(^4\) See also Campbell, 1987, p. 285. Talking of tracking perceptually given objects, in Evans’s example a particular sheep \(x\), Evans (1982, pp. 279-280) claims that the subject has a capacity to recognize \(x\), provided that (i) he is disposed to identify \(x\) as the relevant sheep upon the basis of its appearance, (ii) there is no other sheep within the area of search which he is disposed to identify as the relevant sheep upon the basis of its appearance, and (iii) \(x\) is the right sheep from which the information saturating his thought was derived. Since, in conformity with (a) and (b) above, Rip is not causally interacting with two different days and nor is he taking himself to be doing so, he meets these three requirements spelled out in terms of days rather than objects and in terms of memory rather than recognition.
with (b), he takes himself to be thinking of the same day that he thought of before he went to sleep. This makes it the case that he is thinking the same thought as before. In other words, in complying with (b) he also complies with (R). In so doing, he is not thinking second-order thoughts about his first-order beliefs, and nor is he comparing his later thought tokens with earlier ones that are no longer available to be thought about. Thinking the same thought from one occasion to the next is just a matter of Rip’s taking himself to be thinking of the same day throughout.\footnote{Meeting (a) and (b) makes the thought Rip was thinking about $d$ before he went to sleep the same as the one he was thinking after waking up although his former thought episode is perception-based, while his latter thought episode is memory-based.}

This is to say that Rip’s losing track of the days in the sense described does not deprive him of keeping track of $d$ on the basis of his memory of it. He has lost track of the days in the sense of not being able to locate $d$ in the sequence of days. But he has kept track of $d$ in the sense of not confusing it with some other day of which he has a memory. The same happens in more commonplace cases. Suppose, as before, that towards the end of $d$, as midnight approaches, a subject forms a belief about $d$ to the effect that it is (was) beautiful. Midnight passes, but she is unaware of this. She retains the belief. For in spite of losing track of $d$ by being unable to locate it in the sequence of days, she has kept track of it in the sense of meeting (a) and (b): $d$ is the sole causal source of the belief she has and she represents it as the same day from one occasion to the next. Or, suppose the subject is unsure whether midnight has passed, though indeed it has, and has no means of checking it. Once again, she will retain her belief about $d$ in spite of not being able to locate $d$ in the sequence of days.

Hence, if the subject takes herself to be thinking about the same day on two consecutive occasions, her thought will be the same throughout.\footnote{It is understood that (a) also needs to be met. Failure to meet (a) leads the subject to either have an equivocal belief or a belief that fails to refer, or else to make a false identity judgement of a kind dealt with in note 2. This should also apply to cases such as those in which, in addition to having a memory of $d$, Rip acquires information about $d^*$ from evidence or the testimony of others, such as when he assents to ‘I see the ground is wet; it must have been raining yesterday’ or ‘Jill tells me there was a fire at the mill yesterday’.} Conversely, if the subject loses track of the days in the way that Kaplan hints, she will not think the same thought as Kaplan suggests. She will rather think two different thoughts as a result of taking her two consecutive thought episodes, respectively, to concern two different days. She has failed to meet (b) even if she meets (a).

As a result, there is no room for the subject to mistake the thought she is thinking for two different thoughts.\footnote{For a more thorough discussion of these issues as well as for a somewhat different but complementary defence of the view that Rip has retained the belief with which he began, see Bozickovic 2015.} Whether the subject will entertain the same or different thoughts on two subsequent occasions is then, \textit{inter alia}, a matter of whether she is to take herself to be respectively thinking about the same or different days. This shows that we cannot talk about the sameness or difference of thoughts independently of how the subject takes the world to be, i.e. independently of the subject’s first-person cognitive perspective. The subject’s taking (correctly) her subsequent thought-episodes to draw upon the same day makes it the case that she is thinking the same thought throughout and that she is not mistaking it.
for two different ones. This is to say that complying with (b) makes her also comply with (R). And, since how she takes the world to be is explanatory of her reasoning and actions, it follows that thoughts are the bearers of cognitive significance. In the remainder of this paper I want to specify what their constituent modes of presentation amount to and how they account for belief retention.

**Modes of Presentation and Belief Retention**

‘Today is beautiful’, uttered on Tuesday, and ‘Yesterday was beautiful’, uttered on Wednesday, will convey the same cognitive value, i.e. involve the same mode of presentation of \( d \), just in case the subject represents \( d \) as the same from Tuesday through to Wednesday. This is in line with (b). Meeting (b) alongside (a) ensures that the subject thinks of \( d \) under the same mode of presentation from one occasion to the next which is in turn required for the belief with which she began to be retained (which has been claimed to be the case with Rip). In so doing she will associate with \( d \) a cluster of features and properties she takes \( d \) to possess. These may include the properties of *being the present day* or of *being the previous day*. Although they respectively amount to the characters of ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’, these properties do not shape the subject’s way of thinking of \( d \) in the way in which they are supposed to on Kaplan’s and Perry’s views which were examined above. They are just properties the subject associates with \( d \) alongside other properties and features. The case of the subject who is unsure whether midnight has passed and who refrains from accepting either ‘today’ or ‘yesterday’ in order to express her belief about \( d \) shows that such a property need not even be involved in the mode of presentation of \( d \), while Rip’s picking up ‘yesterday’ to express and update his belief about \( d \) upon waking up shows that such a property, in this case the property of *being the previous day*, can mistakenly be taken to pertain to \( d \). True, in those cases in which everything goes smoothly the character of ‘yesterday’ will typically play the key role in updating the subject’s belief about \( d \) on \( d+1 \). But as time goes by, in updating her belief the subject will need to resort to ‘that day’ in the role of a memory-based demonstrative, which does not have a fixed character such that her mode of presentation of \( d \) needs to include various supplementary features she associates with \( d \) - making it the case that all of them together shape her mode of presentation of \( d \).

That in thinking of \( d \) under the same mode of presentation the subject meets (b) ensures that (R) is met. To recall, (R) is the claim that one and the same bearer of cognitive significance needs to be such that a subject entertaining it on subsequent occasions cannot mistake it for two different bearers. As a result, it once again follows that how the subject takes the world to be matters when it comes to individuating her modes of presentation and explaining her reasoning and actions. If the subject makes a division in her input information by not realizing that ‘Today is beautiful’ uttered on Tuesday and ‘Yesterday was beautiful’ uttered on Wednesday are both about \( d \), she will think of \( d \) under two different modes of presentation.
The fact that subject will think of $d$ under the same mode of presentation as long as (a) and (b) are met ensures that the identity of a mode of presentation is not affected by whether the subject assigns new features to $d$ in the process of thinking about it over time, or withdraws those she once took it to have, or by whether these features really pertain to $d$. Similarly, a particular mode of presentation of $d$ need not involve properties that $d$ satisfies (or is believed to satisfy) uniquely. To illustrate this, consider one of Perry’s examples (1980, p. 80). Smith, whose watch is an hour fast accepts ‘Today is my husband’s birthday’. But just before eleven, she realizes she got it wrong. It is March 1 and not March 2. She glances at her watch, at eleven, and it shows midnight - she thinks to herself ‘so today is my husband’s birthday’. Smith’s respective assenting to and dissenting from two consecutive utterances of ‘Today is my husband’s birthday’ shows her as thinking of $d$ under two different modes of presentation in spite of the fact that each of these modes of presentation contains as its constituent the property of being my [Smith’s] husband’s birthday as well as that of being the present day (though not at the same time). This would be so even if these modes of presentation were, respectively, to incorporate all and only the same features and properties. This way the tricky issues do not arise, such as whether every variation in the features and properties the subject takes $d$ to possess should change the identity of the mode of presentation of $d$ or whether all those features that the subject takes $d$ to possess ought to be true of $d$ in order for her to have a mode of presentation of $d$. What matters is that the fluctuation of these features does not make the object (content) of belief unstable and shifty as long as it is individuated in terms of (a) and (b).

I want to conclude by noting that modes in presentation of the present account do not play the role that mental files are supposed to play. It is claimed that we create a mental file of every object (or day) of which we are capable of having singular thoughts. To represent an object as the same from one occasion to the next is to associate with it a single mental file that the subject can retain when she no longer perceives it. For Perry, the internal sameness of attribution required for a certain mental file to represent (in his example) a person as the same from one occasion to the next is provided by a cluster of predicates the subject has grouped together. They do not need a singular term to be knitted together. A quantifier phrase such as ‘some man’ or an ersatz name such as ‘a certain man’ serves the purpose (Perry 1980, p. 84f.; see also, 2001, p. 128f. See also Recanati 2012, 2016, for a recent discussion of mental files). While modes of presentation of the present account contain related items, they do not play the role assigned to mental files as dossiers of information stored in a single “location”, and do not face the status problem, succinctly stated by Fine:

… in virtue of what will information be stored in the same location or in a different location? After all, there is nothing intrinsic to the idea of co-location which requires that co-located items should be related in any particular way. And surely, the answer to the question is that the location will be the same when the information represents its object as the same. Thus mental files should be seen as a device for keeping track of
when objects are coordinated (represented as-the-same) and, rather than understand coordination in terms of mental files, we should understand the workings of mental files in terms of coordination (Fine 2007, p. 68).

It is in terms of such coordination, ensured by meeting (a) and (b), that the workings of a mode of presentation are to be understood, rather than the other way around. The subject’s representing d as the same makes the associated mode of presentation keep track of this in the process of her having a continuous belief about d.

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Retencija verovanja
(Apstrakt)

U ovom radu ispitujem nekoliko stanovišta u pogledu data koje pruža Dejvid Kaplan u vezi sa Rip Van Vinklom koji je spavao dvadeset godina verujući da je spavao samo jednu noć, i pokazujem da nijedno od ovih stanovišta nije zadovoljavajuće, uključujući i Kaplanov pojmovni okvir. Potom predlažem shvatanje retencije verovanja koje je u skladu s tim kako subjekt predstavlja svet iz perspektive prvog lica.

Ključne reči: retencija verovanja, Rip Van Winkle, karakter, sadržaj, Kaplan, Perry, Evans