TOWARDS NEW UNDERSTANDING OF CHANGE IN GENDER RELATIONS AT THE MICRO LEVEL: SERBIAN CASE

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ABSTRACT: Democratization of gender regimes has been taken as one of societal causes of ‘ongoing and universal’ Second Demographic Transition (SDT), [Lesthaeghe 2010]. The question whether it is present in countries of ex-socialism or not is a frequent matter of debates and ‘crisis argument’ is referred to when assessing whether it has been delayed, postponed or running in a specific manner [Höhn, et al. 2008; Sobotka, 2008; Bobić 2014]. This paper, however, argues that this mainstream theory seems inadequate when it comes to demographic and social changes of Balkan countries, Serbia in particular. Thus it should be complemented or even replaced by more suitable paradigm of semi-periphery.

After discussion of this novel approach and macro perspective, we will particularly focus onto micro level analysis, i.e. family relations through the lens of gender and individual agency [Blagojević 2009, 2013; Bobić 2014], due to their profound effects on persistent low fertility and rising childlessness. Our goal was to trace ongoing and gradual transformation from so called ‘traditional model’ to greater gender empowerment and emancipation. Decline of and resistance to the women’s ‘self-sacrificing micro-matriarchy’, observed and

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broadly investigated in state socialism [Blagojević 1994, 1997] is taking place among younger generations, middle and upper educated groups being forerunners. This shift is reflected, inter alia, in increased males’ participation in parenthood and care, though crisis of masculinity is also observed at the semi-periphery. Specific societal setting, although unfavourable when it comes to opportunities of expanding of personal and social resources (including strengthening of networks, increasing of quality of everyday life and broadening of choices), paradoxically encourages egalitarian practice in everyday life, through exchange and cooperation among men and women but as a part of ‘survival economy’. This less visible and slow ‘bottom up’ social change awaited for ever since the end of 1980s is, seemingly irreversible, yet troublesome. We deem this practice of collaboration and mutual support in privacy as highly conducive for rising egalitarianism although there are still prominent asymmetrical attitudes in public discourse related to gender roles, paid work, care and career. Theoretical and policy implications of such developments will also be discussed in the paper.

KEYWORDS: Serbia, population, semi-periphery, SDT, gender regimes

INTRODUCTION: SEMI-PERIPHERY VS. SDT

Alarming demographics of Serbia\(^2\), ever since the onset of post-socialist transformation (hereafter PST), and especially from 2000s onwards, are reflected in: stark depopulation\(^3\), rather low fertility (TFR of 1.40 in 2010), [Nikitović 2013] increase of childlessness\(^4\), rise of births out of wedlock\(^5\), ageing, with the average age of 42.2 and share of 65+ of 17.4% [RZS, 2012] with its projected rise of up to 30% by the mid 21st century, out migration of young and better educated\(^6\), etc. Childbearing is still tightly related to marital unions, and rare in cohabitations, while extramarital births are mostly widespread among single mothers and lower social strata [Penev and Stanković 2010; Tomanović et al. 2014]. Thus, low fertility in Serbia is intertwined both with a lack of flexibility of unions (de-standardization) and lack of postmodern transformation of fertility behaviour. Longitudinal studies demonstrate that major life events marking transition into adulthood of young people are still uniform, though delayed up to ages of 31–35. These are entry into the work force, marriage, conception as well as housing separation from family of origin, etc [Tomanović et al. 2012]. Having all these in mind, the question arises as to what is happening on the level of primary groups. Are there only structural hindrances in question or some other shifts have been occurring within couples and in a nuclear family? What are the political and practical implications for future social change? Finally, should acceleration be put in place, as we had

\(^2\) Without Kosovo and Metohija throughout the whole text.
\(^3\) In between censuses 1991–2002 the population decline was -78,836 persons, and in 2002–2011 even greater, -377,355 [Penev 2007; RZS 2011].
\(^4\) In the census interval 2002–2011 the share of childless women in Serbia, increased from 43.3% to 55.3 in ages 25–29 while among those aged 30–34 from 21.2 up to 30.6% [Rašević 2014].
\(^5\) In Serbia in the period 1990–2012 it has risen from 13.1% up to 24.69% [Penev and Stanković 2010; RZS 2014].
\(^6\) It is estimated as -15,000 per year [Nikitović 2013].
previously argued for marriage at the Conference organized by Matica Srpska in 2010? [Bobić 2010]

As it is well known, as to fertility trends and pronounced ageing, there is a convergence between Serbia and the developed countries. Second demographic transition (SDT) is dominating demographic thinking in the 21st century [Coleman 2005: 11]. It is claimed to be ongoing and universal in all industrialized populations of the world, with different explanations offered for developed and less developed parts. In the case of developed regions, underpinning causes are set as spreading of literacy and education, increase of income and living standards, intellectual emancipation (of women) and diffusion of post-materialist values, such as individualization and secularism, which all cause plurality of life choices and chances (‘do it yourself’ biography). Democratization of gender regimes is considered to be an important part of the “second modernization”. However, when discussing the newer demographic shifts of PST countries, so called ‘crisis argument’, referring to structural barriers, low living standards, etc, is taken as an explanatory variable for a specific trajectory of otherwise universal SDT [Stankuniene and Maslauskaite 2008].

Notwithstanding its global relevance, we deem SDT as not only Eurocentric but, even more importantly, insufficiently and inadequately contextualized for countries of PST. We will argue that it does not possess any adequate heuristic pregnancy when it comes to understanding region’s undergoing long term social change, which has been lasting long enough to be able to actually create new social structures, processes, relations, (mal)adaptations and controversial behavioural features [Blagojević-Hughson 2012, 2013]. Therefore, we resort to developing of theoretical paradigm related to societies at the semi-periphery including specific gender regimes at the semi-periphery [Blagojević 2012, 2009].

The latter is founded on Wallerstein’s world system theory (1979) referring to deep structural difference between, so called, countries of the ‘centre’ and the ‘semi-periphery’. However, we move here beyond it with new arguments and introduction of gender perspective. Societies undergoing transition are a part of the semi-periphery, ‘lagging behind’ developed or ’core’ countries, but at the same time positioned ahead of the Third world (periphery) [Blagojević-Hughson 2009, 2012, 2013].

Social transformation of Serbia, as well as of other ex-socialist countries of the Balkans, central and eastern Europe and ex-USSR, has been largely navigated from the core countries according to the formula: “democratization, privatization and market economy”. In order to bring it to reality, hard economic restructuring policies have been enacted, aiming at fast adaptation to the countries of centre and their advanced market economies (e.g. Europe and USA) [Blagojević-Hughson 2009, 2013]. Lately, we have been witnessing that such a model of social transition has been in many ways unsuccessful and has actually annulled almost all of the previously established advantages of Serbia.

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7 These concepts will be discussed in more detail in another paper of ours at the Conference, and therefore and also due to the shortage of space, here we will not elaborate on them further.
which were (as part of ex-Yugoslavia) at the forefront of countries of socialist or eastern block. These advantages included: higher GDP, better living standards of vast majority of population, higher income and salaries, and eo ipso increased personal consumption and quality of life, semi-market economy, solidly established stock exchange and cultural cooperation with the West. Ex-Yugoslavia was world famous for high quality of social and health care systems, education, housing and infrastructural development. To the contrary, transition, as the very notion says, implies very uncertain and fuzzy shift toward centre (neo-liberal capitalism in particular), tending to reach core countries, while this goal always stays out of reach for the countries at the semi-periphery. In Serbian public discourse it is said that social progress is very close by, pending, while in reality, the society and economy are actually pushed aside in long term de-development, i.e. permanent social regression – representing a mean line of social and demographic development of semi-periphery. Its main features are: population decline, enormous social devastation and overall insecurity, collapse of economic activity and employment, decrease of consumption and lifestyle of pure survival for vast majority of citizens, shrinking of social protection and social instability, lack of solidarity and cohesion, general social chaos, engrossed violence (suicides and homicides), etc. Actually, today, Serbian population is sharply divided into masses of losers (‘work society’) and narrow stratum of winners (‘money society’), the latter consisting of economic and political elites (males mostly) by whom semi-periphery has been included into the centre (transnational masculinities) [Blagojević-Hughson 2013].

In order to get a completed picture of social and demographic context of today’s Serbia, it seems necessary to introduce a concept of gender regimes at the semi-periphery [Blagojević-Hughson 2009, 2012]. It is claimed that the semi-periphery in its effort to catch up with the core, shows a tendency of extremely high consumption of female resources, in private and in public sphere [Blagojević-Hughson 2009]. Intensive and extensive exploitation of female resources is evidenced in all national representative sociological surveys of the Institute for Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy, carried out in 2000s [see: Milić et al. 2004; Milić et al. 2010; Milić and Tomanović 2009; Tomanović et al. 2012, 2014; Bobić and Sekulić 2010]. Women were first to lose job in the process of economic restructuring and privatization of state


9 Social change at the semi-periphery is either too fast or ambivalent, which is particularly strongly evident in Serbia after the political turnover in 2000. Political elites are also quite confused as to the direction of social development and unequivocal acceptance of European values, course of globalization, and/or opting for resistance in the name of tradition, turning to Russia or choosing one’s own way [Blagojević-Hjuson 2012].

10 Gender regimes are systems of power, roles, identity practices and discourses, which arrange relationships between males and females in a particular socio-historic context. In that way, gender regimes mediate in between microsphere of personal identity and everyday life and macrosphere of population, society, economy and politics. They are actually constitutive parts of these spheres. Nonetheless they deeply correspond to the given society and its characteristics, i.e. with the specific context [Blagojević 2012].
owned enterprises and/or in cases of low profits of private companies. They have been facing mobbing ever since 1990s, as well as various indecent blackmailing from employers, when applying for a post or being employees. Sociological, anthropological and interdisciplinary field researches have also widely elaborated on re-traditionalization and re-patriarchalization of everyday lives and gender regimes during the PST, retreat to the privacy, delayed transformation of family and diversification of partnerships, strengthening of kin networks and strong interdependence among household members and generations as a coping strategy [Milić et al. 2004; Tomanović et al. 2006; Milić and Tomanović eds. 2009; Milić et al. 2010; Blagojević 2006; Blagojević-Hjuson 2012, 2013]. In parallel, revitalized ideology of public patriarchy, enhanced by right wing political elites and groups, including Orthodox Church, were used to neutralize actual high level of males’ dependence on females. Therefore, this refreshed patriarchal ideology was aimed at disciplining women to peacefully accept their quite unfavourable position. By the same token, women are socialized to internalize patriarchal ideology and feel not as victims, but more, as heroines of sacrifice and accept harsh living conditions and exhaustion of their resources as ‘natural’ and ‘necessary’ [Blagojević 1997; Blagojević-Hjuson 2012; Blagojević-Hughson 2013].

DATA AND METHOD

As stated above, the results to be discussed here derive from broad empirical evidence created in between 2000 and 2014, out of six field researches, where data triangulation was strongly applied. These are: Gender Barometer Survey (GBS) in 2006 and 2012 (1,026 citizens aged 20–50 were covered by questionnaire, with 22 focus groups and 32 in depth interviews), all carried out by UN Women, office in Belgrade. Following field works’ data of the Institute for sociological research Faculty of Philosophy (ISI FF) were also discussed here: Transformation strategies of individuals and households from 2003 (N=1,636 households in Serbia), family transformation in 2008 (N=1,200 families, out of which 600 of early stage marriage, 1–5 years, and 600 ‘later stage’ of marriage, 15–20 years), attitudes toward gender equality in Serbia (N=1,950 citizens), representatives of civil organizations (N=50 NGOs) and local authorities in cities and municipalities of Serbia (N=230). Finally, qualitative research results on transformation of partnership into parenthood conducted in 2013/14, was also used (snow ball sample N=30 couples from Belgrade and 10 from Kragujevac).

Surveys from GB and ISI FF covered various aspects of everyday life, such as family interactions, labour division, career, gender relations, conflicts’ management, etc, while qualitative methods were applied to focus on some key topics, such as gender performance, turning points in biography, reorganizing of a group after childbirth, etc[11]. Theoretical reasoning and concomitantly

[11] More specifically, surveys were used to provide an overview of the state of affairs, while qualitative methods were deployed to search for ‘points’ which might be politically utilized to speed up transformation of everyday living and society as a whole, towards gender equality,
gathered empirical evidence helped us to conceive main vision for future gender equality policy strategies. That vision is defined as a new type of academic understanding and social consensus on – post-materialistic, post-conflict, post-industrial, post-neo-liberal harmonization of relations between males and females and/or genders, leading to overall social inclusion [Blagojević-Hjuson 2013].

**DISCUSSION**

Main finding from upper stated empirical evidence is that gender regime in Serbia is undergoing transformation in terms of further empowerment of family and private sphere (‘family times’), but that this does not annihilate strengthening of individualization and egalitarianism inside very primary groups. Although this sounds paradoxical, this is not surprising because long lasting devastation of public sphere has resulted in reinforcement of a private sphere. From the standpoint of public policies it is important, however, that this tendency of ‘strong familism’ is not in controversy with the increase of equality especially with younger generations, better educated and broadly adopting (post-)modern values [Bobić 2014]. This tendency of rise in egalitarianism in private and less in public domain is actually irreversible and it can not be hindered, as shown by comparisons of research results in almost 20 years of steady research.

Nevertheless, we do not want to make an overly optimistic exaggeration, but instead, we wish to highlight the macro tendency which is running through many oscillations (moving back and forth), and presupposes various types of resistances. For example, reaffirmation of patriarchal ideology which is vastly present in media and public life in Serbia should be understood as a reaction to the actual strengthening of gender symmetry at a micro level, and not necessarily as a retro trend. Although women are still highly economically dependant on men and kinship ties, the fact is that their position in decision making is advanced, compared to earlier times and working mother/housewife is a dominant norm shared by both women and men. Researchers point out on insufficiently crystallized postmodern values as a barrier to a faster modernization altogether with low living standards [Bobić 2014]. Namely, ISI FF field work, from 2008 in particular, pointed out to a value mismatch in terms of mixed pre-modern and post-modern attitudes. Liberal preferences are evident when it comes to sexual freedom for both genders, shared authority in a couple and adoption of non marital unions. Still pre-modern preferences have been reflected in idealization of ‘a complete conjugal family’, traditional femininity and masculinity. As many as 70.5% of highly positioned couples (in terms of education and revenues) opted for an intact nuclear family when a child’s well-being is at stake, and there are no great differences compared to their middle and lower status counterparts. Almost half of couples from high strata (45.5%) held conservative viewpoints on women’s self realization and as many

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*positive demographic change and overall social advancement. In that sense, researches carried out in GBS were targeted towards formulation of (gender) policies at the semi-periphery, especially towards enhancement of their meaningfulness and effectiveness [Blagojević-Hjuson 2013].*
of them considered 'male provider' model to be an optimal family strategy. However, in prioritizing care of minors as a predominantly female’s duty, they are three times less conservative (22.6%) compared to their counterparts from lower strata (65.2%). Couples from all social strata did not widely accept a model of unemployed mother, although differences among strata persist. The norm of a working mother is inherited from the previous system of state socialism. The dual income was then necessary to secure well-being of a household and was also strongly supported by socialist ideology as well as it was set in line with 'catching up' with the centre [Blagojević 2009; Bobić 2014].

Pro-familism is a central value for both males and females and Serbian families are still highly child centred [Bobić 2014; Blagojević-Hughson 2012], even with younger and better educated cohorts. Family transformation, de-standardization of unions and fertility patterns foreseen by SDT, is not widely spreading in Serbia as well as in many other Mediterranean and PST countries, except for Slovenia [Bobić 2014]. Family is praised much higher compared to job and career, while employment is mainly seen as instrumental in securing livelihood and less as a means of self actualization (job/profession). This could be explained with low career chances in general, low activity, payments and generally almost nonexistent channels of self realization, in particular of women’s human capital in paid work. Such an unfavourable setting pushes an individual into a primary group, thus enforces his/her dependency on social networks and accentuates significance of social capital. This is then an open way for global nepotism and corruption.

However, grounded theory research from 2013/14 demonstrated that young couples are quite prone to erect boundaries toward intruders, be it family of origin, relatives or friends. It clearly indicates individuals’ liberation potentials. Parents and kin are welcome to assist in realizing strategic goals, such as: entry into employment, housing, and access to key social resources, then everyday help with newborns and in housework. Still, the intimacy of young couple and their offspring is jealously preserved and kept separate (ISI FF database 2013/14). This finding brings us to tentative conclusion that once social setting becomes less frustrating/supporting (economically, socially, politically and culturally), individualization and self realization might be revealed and speeded up.

Until then, gender roles will be defined according to the possibilities offered by actual social context. Asymmetry of gender roles is particularly outlined when measuring time consuming of men and women in paid and unpaid work. Men engage more often in a paid work than women, but women actually work longer than men, spending even one hour more per day performing mainly unpaid jobs. According to GBS 2012 women spend almost one hour per day less than men in paid jobs (four hours compared to five hours for men). They spend half the time males spend in informal paid activities. Women are much more engaged in activities related to child care (two times more), in housework (4.3 times more) and in care of the elderly, sick and minors (2.7 times more). If we aggregate paid and unpaid work, women work more than men during a week (8.76 hours per working days weekly, against 7.47 hours for men) [Blagojević-Hjuson 2012].
In next two paragraphs we will dispose more details on differences in gender performance by quoting GBS and interviews with couples, transient to parenthood from 2013/14. As we shall see, both researches came up with similar results.

The greatest gender inequalities in behaviour are related to the private sphere and exploitation of women’s resources (persistence of sacrificing micro matriarchy), [Blagojević-Hughson, M. 2012]. In GBS from 2012, as many as 68% males claimed that they rarely or almost never prepared food, 65% of them rarely or never kept their flat clean, and 78% rarely or never washed clothes or ironed them. However, while in 2006 GBS, 84% females had claimed that parents should do anything for the sake of their child, in 2012 that number decreased to 66%. Decline of ‘sacrificing motherhood’ is positively related to the education. Thus, among the least educated as many as 54% women see ‘sacrifices’ as a norm in parenthood, compared to 33% women with tertiary education. Qualitative research in outskirts of Kragujevac (ISI FF 2013/14 data base) demonstrated that even a rural housewife with elementary education considers living in a house with in-laws as highly unfavourable for a young couple, although households are held separate.

Interviews carried out among 30 couples in Belgrade experiencing transition into parenthood in 2013/14 revealed many relevant, yet similar results. Firstly, according to discourse analysis, patriarchy is most often practiced among lower educated (primary school and less) couples of all age groups, while mutual collaboration of partners (gender democratization) is most frequent among those with secondary education (!), even stronger compared to those with tertiary degree. Due to lack of space we will only briefly discuss findings indicative for predominant engagement of females in couples. Activities performed by a vast majority of women in all couples are: 1. ironing of baby’s clothing (88%), performed by all women in couples from lower status (7 out of 7). Yet it is almost equally practiced by women from the highest status couples (6 wives out of 7), while women in intermediate group are less burdened (9/11); 2. the second highest ranked ‘female duty’ is (still) cooking (74.1%), where both women from higher and lower groups are almost equally and entirely engaged (7/8 with primary or less education and 6/7 with higher, while only 7 out of 12 couples with secondary education); 3. cleaning of the apartment (69.56%) with less exemplified differences among couples (5 out of 7 wives from the lowest group, 4 out of 6 from the highest and 7 out of 10 from intermediate one); 4. getting up in the night when the baby cries (69.23%), with the prevalence of those with highest education (6 out of 7) followed by lower (6 out of 8), while the least burdened are wives from the middle status (6 out

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12 Interviews were conducted among 3 social and age groups, with tendency to select 10 cases in each one, according to the methodological rule of sample saturation. Social groups were represented by education: primary, secondary and tertiary, while age groups were following: 18–29, 30–39 and 40–55. However, due to some additional interviews, we ended up with 9 couples with primary or less education, 12 with secondary and 9 with tertiary. Aggregate results discussed here are derived from those responses where both partners agreed in their transcripts, while those where there were discrepancies were extracted and should be processed as such separately. That is why the total in each social group might be lower or bigger than 10.
of 11); 5. putting the baby for a sleep (66.66%), performed by all wives from lower status (6 out of 6), somewhat less by those from upper status (5 out of 8), and least frequently in intermediate group (5 out of 10); 6. changing of diapers (65.38%), were the same tendency is evidenced (9 out of 9 in lower status, 4 out of 6 from upper and 4 out of 11 with secondary education); 7. making baby’s photo album (56%), (4 women out of 7 couples in lower status, 5 out 8 in higher and 5 out of 10 in intermediate); 8. walking baby out (53.85%), where the highest educated women are least engaged (1/7). Instead, majority of them perform it with a partner, while a male partner never does it alone (!). As to secondary school 7 out of 12 wives do it themselves (the rest do it together as a couple) while among those from lower status, women do it mostly alone (6/7); 9. baby bath (51.58%), the least frequently done alone by a wife with secondary school (3/11), then with higher education (3/7) and predominantly alone by wives from lower status (8/9); 10. going to a doctor for a check up is the activity where females from all social statuses are least engaged alone (36%). Only 2 out of 11 wives from intermediate group do it themselves, 2 out of 6 from higher couples and 5 out of 8 from lower one.

From the aforementioned results two points should be highlighted: 1. There is still a ‘core’ of house work which is taken for granted as females’, such as: cooking, cleaning, ironing as well as tasks related to care of newborns (putting a baby for a sleep, changing diapers, waking up during the night). Secondly, there are no tasks which are dominantly or only male, which has been rationalized in discourses through arguments of naturalization (close connections of a woman and a baby), pressures for men to earn money, therefore long daily absence from home. It looks that males are entering into family life more by assisting wives and less by completely overtaking tasks. Escape into privacy is a widespread coping strategy for majority of men – losers and it evolves through insertion into parenthood [Blagojević-Hughson 2013].

Discourse analysis further discloses that it is not only due to ideological reasons of a still strong patriarchy, but also due to many other, both structural and psychological factors operating, which should be taken into account. In PST males find themselves in highly contested situation. As well as females they praise family highly, but unlike them they still do not have their own place within it. In public and everyday life they are still perceived as bread winners but they are strongly restricted in its realization. Owing to similar findings of GBS we might argue that men and women act simultaneously within two differentiating models: in family (private sphere), based on solidarity and in public sphere which is founded on market model (capitalistic and individualistic), they are highly competitive.

Research results were also conducive on elaborating on a ‘masculinity crisis’ at the semi-periphery [Blagojević-Hughson 2012, 2013], implying that males pay a high cost of PST through reaffirming of patriarchy in public. Social devastation and economic decline produce surpluses of population and

13 It should be also outlined that other than mutual support and kin related solidarity, only one couple out of 30 in metropolitan area could afford paid help.
their massive exclusion from labour market, because they are redundant, aged, ill or ineffective, all from the standpoint of capital accumulation. Therefore everybody, not only women, but men too, become socially excluded. Still this is particularly troublesome for males, since the loss of profession and career, and concomitantly, demise of an existence base symbolizes ‘personal’ misfortune. This might be related to the increase of self destructive acts (suicides, alcoholism, drug abuse, depression, etc) in particular violence towards females and minors.

Transformation of privacy toward egalitarianism has been steadily revealed in empirical research, quantitative and qualitative, as discussed above. Not only is cooperation between women and men increasing in a survival economy but everyday life is highly de-ideologized. Persevering of low fertility for many generations up to date has resulted in small number of children (vast majority of interviewed couples had only 1 child) and therefore practice of gender neutral upbringing is widespread, with high investments in ‘quality of minor’ (time, money, emotions, opportunity costs, etc), in particular in education.

The transformation of privacy is, however, irreversible and takes place in three phases. It starts against the backdrop of previous weakening of male’s patriarchal authority in almost all domains of family (1). Next step (2) is women’s empowerment through the model of ‘self-sacrificing micro matriarchy’, but the latter is a transient one leading towards (3) general reinforcement of symmetry and equality. These tendencies are enhanced by processes of de-development at the semi-periphery. However, new generations of men and women definitely establish pattern of equality, grounded on cooperation and shared responsibility [Blagojević-Hjuson 2013].

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES

Under social conditions of the semi-periphery where vast majority of population becomes 'surplus' [Blagojević-Hjuson 2012, 2013] because they can not fit into the imposed patterns of neo-liberal globalization, public policies need to be targeted toward a society as a whole and not only toward particular groups (impoverished, women, children, aged, youth, etc). It looks important to accentuate lines of social cohesion instead of competing around restricted resources. As the cake is shrinking, so are the parts, and intensified competition does not produce positive effects [Blagojević-Hjuson 2012]. Inter-dependency, mutuality and assistance, exchange and support, these are the elements for creating social tissue, which is crucial for general overall survival. Therefore, shift in the mainstream paradigm from selfishness/competitiveness towards social inclusion/cohesion is needed in creating development alternatives which might expand emancipation potential for vast majority of people.

Above discussed empirical results demonstrated the urge to include men into the gender policies and not only women. Both men and women are engendered. Therefore, they both need de-gendering, stepping out of gender constructs. This is a prerequisite for realization of their individuality and wholeness, as
well as establishment of healthy relations with (other) men and (other) women. However, stronger social support, more effective public policies, legal and fiscal instruments and different institutions have to be put in force in order to enhance personal choices and promote reconciliation of work and family. That needs to be done for both genders and throughout the life course. Social intervention is particularly needed to enable young people’s faster transition into adulthood, if they are expected to take part in socio-biological reproduction, and avoid emigration, which is at the moment established as the best individual strategy to escape disastrous effects of neo-liberal type of ‘transition’.

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INTERNER SOURCES

ОРИГИНАЛНИ НАУЧНИ РАД

КА НОВОМ ТУМАЧЕЊУ ПРОМЕНА У ОДНОСИМА ПОЛОВА НА МИКРОНИВОУ: СРПСКИ ПРИМЕР

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РЕЗИМЕ: Демократизација родног поретка је узета за један од друштвених узрока „текуће и опште” Друге демографске транзиције (ДДТ) [Lesthaeghe 2010]. Питање да ли је она већ присутна у бившим социјалистичким републицима или не, тема је многих дебата а „аргумент кризе” се често користи као аргумент да ли је ова транзиција закаснела, одложена или је сукоба у одређеном смеру [Höhn et al. 2008; Sobotka 2008; Bobić 2014]. Овај рад, мишљен и савршено је о томе да се ова општеприхваћена теорија чини непримереном када се узму у обзир демографске и друштвене
промене у балканским земљама и у Србији конкретно. Стога би је требало допунити или чак заменити погоднијим примером полупериферије.

Након расправе о овом новом приступу и макро перспективи, посебно ћемо се уредисредити на ниво микро анализе, то јест на породичне односе кроз призму полова и индивидуалног деловања [Blagojević 2009, 2013; Bobić 2014] захваљујући њиховом израженом утицају на константно низак ниво фертилитета и бездетност у порасту. Наш циљ је био да пропратимо актуелну и постепену трансформацију од такозваног „традиционалног модела” до јачег оснаживања полових и еманципације. Отпор ка женском „самопожртвованом микро-матријархату” и смањивање обима истог, што је посматрано и широко истраживано у државном социјализму [Blagojević 1994, 1997], све су заступљенији у млађим генерацијама, при чему су групе са средњим и високим образовањем најбројније. Овај се преокрет огледа, inter alia, у повећаној присутности мушкарца у родитељству и бризи око деце, иако је криза мужевности такође посматрана на полупериферији. Особено друштвено окружење, мада неповољно када говоримо о прилицима за проширење личних и друштвених могућности (укључујући јачање мрежа, побољшање квалитета свакодневног живота и проширивање могућности избора), парадоксално подстиче изједнавање у свакодневном животу, кроз размену и сарадњу између мушкарца и жена као део „принципа преживљавања.” Ова мање видљива и спора друштвена промена „од дна ка врху” која је очекивана још од краја 1980-тих, наизглед тече у једном смеру али је ипак проблематична. Сматрамо овај принцип сарадње и узајамне подршке у приватности као врло подољан за све већу равноправност, иако постоје истакнуте супротстављени ставови у јавном дискурсу у вези са улогама полових, плаћеним радом, бригом и каријером. Теоретске и политичке импликације оваквог развоја догађаја такође ће бити тема овог рада.

КЉУЧНЕ РЕЧИ: Србија, популација, семипериферија, ДДТ, родни поредак