Philosophy from the Outside in: Rosenzweig’s Critical Project

Abstract: This paper examines Rosenzweig’s philosophic project in the context of his time as a critical intervention in the discussion of the place of Jewish thought in the university and in society. If Hermann Cohen represented the first generation of Jewish philosophers claiming that participation in the university is constitutive for the institution’s claim to universalism, the second generation—represented by Martin Buber—was more diffident about the university and its openness. For Buber, literary modernism offered what the university would refuse. Disappointed about the failure of the recognition of the efforts of the previous two generations, Rosenzweig represents the third generation. He turns the situation into a creative response anchoring philosophy as a project that calls for a resolute move outside the university.

Key Words: university, philosophy, new thinking, speech thinking, “we”/“you”.

Philosophy as a discipline as well as Jewish philosophers as individuals faced a particular set of challenges between 1871 and 1933. There were internal institutional pressures within the university, which during this period underwent a rapid process of growth, expansion, and disciplinary differentiation that had direct implications with regard to the repositioning of philosophy and its role within the institution. Once a leading discipline, philosophy had become during that time subject to a renegotiation of its academic and social standing. At the same time, the German university witnessed a significant increase in the enrollment of Jewish students, the maturing of that student population, and a steady increase in the production of Jewish candidates in line for teaching and research positions. Ever since Leopold Zunz’s failed attempts from 1848 onward to secure a place for Jewish history intra muros, i.e., to establish an independent field of Jewish scholarship within the German university, it had become clear that the university’s claim to universality was poised to remain fiercely selective.1 For Jewish philosophers, the signs of the time were clear. But if the university left no doubt that the glass ceiling would limit Jewish students to the academic career prospects of the rank of Privatdozenten (private lecturers, i.e., unsalaried adjuncts), the push into

---

1 See the chapter, “A House of One’s Own? University, Particularity, and the Jewish House of Learning” in Goetschel 2012 for the case of Zunz’s efforts.
academic education was too strong to be further delayed. Jewish communities would develop alternatives to the university, and opportunities in the Jewish educational system would be created that would provide Jewish academics with employment and some minimal job security as teachers, school directors, journalists, and intellectuals. The careers of Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), Martin Buber (1878–1966), and Franz Rosenzweig (1883–1929) illustrate three creative responses that have paradigmatic significance. This essay looks at Rosenzweig as, in this context, an exponent of the third generation of Jewish philosophers coming of age during the period of the Wilhelminian empire and Weimar Germany. These three philosophers are not only profoundly different in temperament, agenda, and outlook but can be seen as a group that represents the changing opportunities and prospects of three generations of German Jewish thinkers.

If Buber had sought to respond to the problem of the restricted and exclusionary stance of the German university by creating a public discourse outside and independent of the institutions, for Rosenzweig the response became a self-consciously explicit challenge. Trained as a historian by the eminent Friedrich Meinecke, who saw his brilliant student poised for a promising academic career, Rosenzweig chose to forgo the institutional route, deciding instead to work outside the university, in the Jewish community. It was during World War I, while Rosenzweig served as a soldier and was writing a number of essays that examined the larger strategic and political challenges that the German state faced, that his change of mind took its dramatic turn. Rosenzweig plunged into an almost frantic writing experience, drafting *The Star of Redemption*. The first chapters were initially jotted down on a string of field-service postcards, the only form of paper soldiers were provided in unlimited free supply. *The Star of Redemption* was early on recognized as a signal work of rethinking Jewish modernity. In the wake of Cohen’s *Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism*, *The Star of Redemption* marked the next phase in the project of German Jewish affirmation and self-positioning in philosophy. If the philosophical ambition of *The Star* remained difficult to appreciate by the wider public, the book assumed a central place in the discussion among Jewish intellectuals. But its critical significance became more palpable as *The Star* provided the philosophical framework for the Jewish House of Learning (Jüdisches Lehrhaus) that Rosenzweig was to direct in Frankfurt in the 1920s. It is through the daily practice of adult extrauniversity teaching and learning—a pro-

---

2 For Rosenzweig’s war writings, see Bojanic 2011.

cess Rosenzweig saw as intrinsically indivisible—that Rosenzweig’s vision took hold as one that pits itself in a creatively complementary manner over and against the university, which provided formal training and Bildung of sorts—while excluding the aspects most crucial to Rosenzweig and his Jewish contemporaries: the concerns of Jewish modernity. The book’s final words signaled this in programmatic if enigmatic fashion as they released the reader “Into Life.”

Indeed, the Jewish House of Learning was, according to Rosenzweig’s vision, a place where life as he reimagined it could take root and find a home and space for expression, a life that brought the advanced education of German Jews to fruition in dialogue with the project of rethinking the Jewish tradition and vice versa. Rosenzweig’s pedagogy of confronting academic thought with the everyday situation that the participants—students and teachers alike—would bring to the House of Learning created a new and open forum for the new learning Rosenzweig envisioned. This “new learning” took its lead from the “New Thinking” that Rosenzweig advocated in his companion essay to The Star of Redemption, which laid out the Star’s approach in a programmatic manner. “The New Thinking” (1925) fleshed out the philosophic significance of the new approach that informs the project of The Star of Redemption. Replacing the “thinking thinker” with the “language thinker” (Sprachdenker), Rosenzweig argues for grammatical rather than merely logical thinking, a thinking that “does not rest on loud versus quiet, but rather on needing the other and, what amounts to the same, on taking time seriously.” (Rosenzweig 2000: 109–139, 127) This dialogic move was pointedly removed from the university, whose very structure would ill accommodate this new kind of thinking:

To think here means to think for no one and to speak to no one (for which one may substitute everyone, the famous “universality,” if it sounds better to someone). But to speak means to speak to someone and to think for someone; and this Someone is always a quite definite Someone and has not only ears, like the universality, but also a mouth. (Ibid: 127)

Rosenzweig’s “experiencing philosophy” (erfahrende Philosophie) reopens the case of philosophy itself. The shift from logic to grammar attends to temporality as a central feature of Rosenzweig’s approach, and this entails profound ramifica-

4 For a discussion of Rosenzweig’s project in the context of the German philosophical landscape of his time, see Gordon 2003.


6 The English translation gives “experiential philosophy” (ibid : 117), but Rosenzweig’s point is that philosophy itself is part of the experience as well, i.e., a philosophy open to the necessary changes that the “New Thinking” calls for. Cf. Rosenzweig 1984: 144.
tions for both philosophic thought and pedagogy. As a matter of fact, “pedagogy,” the guiding of pupils, is a problematic term for a project that recognizes the adult student as an interlocutor rather than merely recipient.

This learning “in the opposite direction” that starts from the everyday life experience in order to explore Jewish tradition transforms the conventional approach to knowledge. As this new form of knowledge becomes part of lived life, it becomes dialogic in its substance. No longer detached from the subject, this new form of knowledge is eminently positional, perspectival, but also existentially constituted, i.e., grounded “in life.” Through the dialogical model of the House of Learning, Rosenzweig institutes a central insight at the heart of *The Star of Redemption*: the idea of the new thinking as a “philosophy of the standpoint” that no longer operates in an epistemological vacuum but in the context of a reality whose complexity exceeds the classic categorical grasp positions the philosopher in a radically new way.

As the epistemological subject can no longer reflect the challenges that confront the philosopher, the philosopher’s standpoint assumes constitutive significance for philosophy itself. Equally, the departure from universal ontological unity and the recognition of the tripartite nature of the universe’s elements Man, World, and God make the distinction between particular and universal obsolete. According to Rosenzweig, this distinction requires logical assumptions that, with the move to grammar and language thinking, have become problematic. Rosenzweig’s philosophical line of argument thus moves deliberately on the margins of philosophy, as the university’s institutionalized form of the discipline conceives it. While Cohen argued from within the discipline of philosophy to attend to its internal problematic and Buber sought to move outside to establish a new framework for public discourse on alternative philosophical grounds, Rosenzweig aimed at rethinking philosophy from outside in. On Rosenzweig’s account, a philosophy able to move past the impasse that defines the situation in the wake of Hegel and Nietzsche has to change the leg it stands on. Rosenzweig’s critical push is grounded in the very fact that he irreverently breaks with the tradition of thinking that he un forgivingly engages. Ironically, it is through the departure from the discipline of philosophy and by breaking it open that Rosenzweig gives his argument the philosophic stringency and force that philosophy claims but no longer commands. As Rosenzweig notes in a letter, “to philosophize is a human right, not a matter of a field of study.”

---

7 “Neues Lernen” in Rosenzweig 1984: 507.
9 Letter to Ernst Heinrich Seligsohn, 29 October 1925, ibid: 1063.
He thus feels no longer bound to commit or submit to a philosophic discourse he takes to task for its shortcomings. But at the same time, Rosenzweig rethinks the project of philosophy from the bottom up, in such a way that he recovers the liberating moment that informs philosophy but that had become buried and forgotten in the process of its institutionalization. As a consequence, Rosenzweig emerges as a philosopher of genuinely critical significance. A postmodern or, rather, postcontemporary philosopher, Rosenzweig insists in recovering a position of particularity that allows him to rethink the terms of an emancipatory vision of open thinking that the university’s claim to universality would not permit.\(^\text{10}\)

Certainly, Rosenzweig’s complex argument and the literally provocative manner in which he presents it do not come without their own problematic. But part of Rosenzweig’s genius consists precisely in articulating the issues and problems that haunt philosophy as long as it is imagined as a self-contained system. Rosenzweig’s bold step outside the disciplinary framework that defines the discourse of philosophy at the time enables him to reimagine philosophy in the context of a vision of Jewish modernity that is no longer defined in terms of the deadlock of the distinction between particularity and universality. Addressing philosophy’s own problematic, Rosenzweig pushes for its rethinking from the outside in. Against the discipline’s unquestioned protocol to approach philosophy exclusively on its own terms, as if it could be cordoned off from the theological-political implications that inform and define it in profound ways, Rosenzweig’s shift to an outside/inside position that situates him within and at the same time over and against “philosophy” makes it possible to leverage his observer position in a way that reimagines the role, place, and function of philosophy in a new way. In changing the observer position, Rosenzweig changes the frame of reference and brings philosophy’s hidden assumptions to light.\(^\text{11}\)

Nietzsche’s reminder to heed the limits of philosophy and embrace modesty as a genuinely philosophic attitude resonates along with other critical motives in Rosenzweig’s approach. In *The Star of Redemption*, philosophy thus represents only one type of moment, alongside of political, historical, and theological aspects, that drives thought. But these aspects are interconnected in dialogical fashion. Rosenzweig’s use of theology and of textual reasoning concerning various

---

\(^\text{10}\) I would like to supplement Robert Gibb’s insightful claim that Rosenzweig is no philosopher if considered in terms of the criteria of modern philosophy but certainly so if recognized as postmodern if we consider Rosenzweig under the category under which he has posthumously began to play the critical role he envisioned all along: as a postcontemporary philosopher, i.e., a philosopher whose critical impetus poses the question of temporality in new fashion rather than submitting to a predefined notion of temporality imposed by “philosophy.” Cf. Gibbs 1992: 20–21.

\(^\text{11}\) For a discussion of the critical role of the change of the observer’s position and frame of reference, see Luhmann 2002.
biblical passages operates not simply as argument that—separate from philosophy—reframes the philosophic moment by complementing it but also enriches the agenda of philosophy in critical ways. Similarly, historical and political concerns emerge as genuinely relevant for rethinking the task of philosophy in an alternative key. The particular fashion in which The Star of Redemption imports these concerns is crucial: Rosenzweig makes a point not to confuse or mix the different kinds of discourses but secures their polyphonic alterity in a pointed manner. As philosophy is no longer imagined in terms of a claim to totality, its particular accent represents a constituent but not all-determining thread in the weave of the argument. In other words, Rosenzweig takes the notion of relation philosophically to its logical conclusion, and philosophy emerges in his account as relationally reconfigured.12

The philosophic significance of The Star of Redemption consists in this move. Philosophy is no longer left on its own but emerges in its distinctive specificity with sharper precision only when considered in context of, and relation to, other forms of reasoning. In other words, as Rosenzweig reframes philosophy in a larger context, it becomes possible to revisit the terms of philosophy in a principal manner. As a consequence, his approach makes it possible to rethink philosophy in a new key. Rosenzweig’s critical role in rethinking philosophy thus consists in his breaking out of the boundaries of the discipline’s institutionalized framework. The attitude he recommends as a dialogical principle for the Jewish House of Learning to engage in dialogue is, consequently, one that also informs the particular form and content of The Star of Redemption. Just like the dialogical relationship in the way Rosenzweig conceives it as a process of mutual constitution of the interlocutors through emphatic relationship, philosophy emerges in the The Star of Redemption as new thinking enriched by language thinking and the complementation of logic with grammar.

Rosenzweig’s argument about the import of Jewish tradition in the context of modernity is thus in a remarkable way a genuinely philosophical argument. The discussion about Jewish tradition thus finds grounding in a philosophic argument that serves as more than just a departure point for buttressing Judaism’s claim to modernity. Rosenzweig’s account of Judaism serves at every point as part of the philosophic argument his approach articulates. As a consequence, as it informs the philosophical discourse as its supplement, Jewish tradition assumes a properly acknowledged place in philosophic reasoning as a legitimate force of its own.

Judaism is thus firmly grounded within a philosophical argument that in turn instantiates how they can both only be comprehended by attending the relation in

12 For one of the many examples that are woven into the argument of The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig’s reading of the Song of Songs constitutes through its reading a central axis of the particular phenomenological method the book brings into play.
which they stand. As a consequence, Rosenzweig relieves the burden of Jewish tradition from any kind of expectation philosophy might be tempted to impose. Judaism, on Rosenzweig’s account, can, just like any other phenomenon, only be meaningfully understood if the approach used to explore it is itself grounded in reflecting the relation within which it stands. This requirement forestalls any assumption of inadequacy, as it is precisely asymmetry rather than any conceived instance of equality that makes a dialogic relationship viable. In other words, exactly because, besides a certain continuity, there is also a constitutive discontinuity between philosophy and Jewish tradition does the latter assume critical significance for the former. Thus it is not without some polemical undertones that Rosenzweig’s notion of the dialogical relationship between philosophy and Judaism stands as a rebuttal of any requirement that Jewish life submit to any preconceived form of universal standards of philosophy. Instead, Rosenzweig’s argument concerning Judaism suggests that it is Judaism’s tenacious resistance to universalization that gives the Jewish tradition its philosophic edge as a bulwark against the universalizing and totalizing tendency of thought.

If the proposition that the life of Judaism rests outside of history might appear curious coming from a trained historian such as Rosenzweig, it gains critical hold if seen as being resistant to the attempt at assimilation to any concept of world history Hegel style. Reclaiming Judaism’s place outside of history serves as a reminder that the scheme of History largely written grounds in philosophical speculation whose claim might appear universal but whose perspective remains problematically restricted. The dissimulation from history serves not just as Judaism’s form of resistance, but the claim of the Jewish tradition’s extrahistorical position makes it possible to engage philosophy’s embrace of world history critically. Just as Mendelssohn’s critique of Lessing’s commitment to the notion of progress begged to differ, Rosenzweig picks up at the point where Mendelssohn had left, and he highlights that the problem is not to be outside history but History’s claim of all-inclusiveness. (Mendelssohn 1983: 95–96)

If Rosenzweig’s reinvention of the Jewish House of Learning may well have been that part of his legacy that became most successful in continuing to inspire generations of Jewish philosophers in breaking grounds for rethinking the relationship between Jewish tradition and philosophy creatively, the effects of the theory and practice of this “New Learning” reached well beyond the profound revitalization of Jewish life. Rosenzweig’s vision of the Jewish House of Learning assumed also wider importance in the larger context of rethinking the practice of learning and teaching as forms of an emancipatory and self-empowering experience in general. Yet the project of the House of Learning’s alternative approach to learning is grounded in the philosophical move “outside in” philosophy that Rosenzweig laid out in The Star of Redemption. The book’s concluding words “Into Life” signal the decisive “lifeline” that links philosophy with its praxis and vice versa. In
other words, the House of Learning, even in its most diluted variants, is built on the grounds of a strong reconceptualization of the task and function of philosophy that *The Star of Redemption* formulates.

One of the book’s most remarkable interventions that highlights the German Jewish experience—and not just with regard to the project of philosophy—represents the way in which Rosenzweig addresses the relationship between “We” and “You” as a dialectically triangulated relationship that is constituted via God. The speech act of saying “we” performs both at the same time in- and exclusion. In other words, the logic of inclusion hinges on exclusion as its constitutive correlative. As a result, the dividing line between “we” and “you” informs the very speech act of saying “we.” The “we” calls for a “you,” but “we” at the same time presupposes “you” as its other. The possibility of the “We” hinges in a peculiar way on the double meaning of it being at the same time always both in- and exclusive. “We” is thus a speech act that draws a distinction with a double edge that marks the fine line of demarcation and difference that sets off inclusion against exclusion as mutually interdependent. It is itself the marker of the divide it sets up. As such, the “we” functions like a symptom: it is the sign of the formation of a conflictual process and tension, a function of their forces rather than a self-contained entity the “we” so desires to be.

The discussion of the “We” occurs at a particular junction in the *Star*. It concludes the section “Grammar of Pathos (The Language of the Deed/Action)” that precedes the “Logic of Redemption” in book 3 of part 2, titled “Redemption or the Eternal Future of the Kingdom.” As a result, the argument about the “We/You” stands at a particular conjunction in Rosenzweig’s argument on redemption, one that cannot be separated from the way in which the “Grammar of Eros (The Language of Love)” addresses the I and You in the preceding book on revelation. For Rosenzweig, “we” is essentially a pronoun that is made possible only through its grounding in a redemptive perspective. But spoken, the word “we” lingers in a preredemptive and unredeemed space while pointing forward to redemption. Through the grammar of redemption, through an eventual form of speech act, the “we” might transcend the limits of the human conditions of in- and exclusion that make the conception of a “we” possible in the first place. But such a standpoint of redemption can only be found in God, for Rosenzweig a pointedly dynamic notion that suggests Becoming or *Werden* rather than Being or *Sein*. Such a “we” marks the vanishing point on which the possibility of redemption rests and thus can never be claimed by any single or singular voice except at the moment of redemption. The pointedly theological and theological-political conception of this “we” therefore resists appropriation by any particular historical instantiation of “we.” Its theological nature highlights the theological implications of its claims as

---

claims that are and remain theological and, on the logic of theology, thus remain forever out of reach of any grasp by mundane and secular temporality. It is thus the very category of “redemption” that shields the “we” from a social or political form of appropriation.

The limit of the “we” represents all that the “we” call “you.” But this “you,” or, rather, the pronouncing of it, Rosenzweig notes, is gruesome and harrowing: *grauenhaft*. It is the result of passing judgment the “we” cannot prevent to pass. For, as Rosenzweig states, only in this passing of judgment (*Gericht*) does the “we” gain the determinate meaning (*bestimmten Inhalt*) of a universal totality, a determinate meaning that, however, Rosenzweig stresses, is not particular and does not limit the “we’s” reach. This judgment does not exclude any particular meaning except the Nothing, so that the “we” gains whatever is not Nothing for its meaning, all that is real, all that is actual (Rosenzweig 1976: 264; Rosenzweig 1970: 237). As a consequence, Rosenzweig continues, the “we” is forced to say “you,” and the more force the “we” gains, the louder must it pronounce the “you.” While it is forced to do so, it can only do so by way of anticipation, prefiguring the kingdom to come. By doing so, Rosenzweig points out, the “we” subjects itself to the judgment of God. But for God, both the “we” and the “you” are—”they.” From the point of divine authority, the answer is no longer mere words but redemption, a process that transcends language and words and through both “we” and “you” become part of the moment of redemptive transformation. Language has reached its limits here at the “dawn of the day of the Lord.” This, at least, is the conclusion of the section “Grammar of Pathos/Language of the Deed.” Consequently, the book on redemption concludes with a discussion of “The Word of God” (“*Das Wort Gottes*,” Rosenzweig 1976: 278; Rosenzweig 1970: 250) or, more precisely, with a reading of Psalm 115, whose grammatical construction highlights the Hebrew’s linguistic stress on the “we’s” grounding in its relationship to God.

The “we” and “you” are thus in Rosenzweig’s account constituted by triangulation via the relationship of God, i.e., the vanishing point and fulcrum of redemption. While philosophy and theology are thus exposed as inseparably intertwined, the text argues through its explicit theological diction a pointedly philosophical reading.

“We,” Rosenzweig reminds the reader, is not a plural that simply derives from the third-person singular. Rather, “we” develops out of the dual that cannot be expanded but only limited. This means that the “we” is an all-inclusive pronoun of a dual construction that can only gain specificity by exclusion (Rosenzweig 1976: 264; Rosenzweig 1970: 236). The “we” of any community is therefore not primordial or primary but a derivative construct. Whereas community is built on the condition of anticipating and at the same time presuming redemption, the form of this expectation rests on a circular figure of constitution by way of performative
anticipation. Its grounds are therefore always tentative, presumptive, and problematic. Their teleological nature underlines the fact that the “we” remains a project, a work in progress. Any “you” it posits by exclusion is only a commentary about the “we” itself. Only from the perspective of a third, i.e., God, can both become a simple plural of a “they.” Otherwise “we” and “you” are mutually dependent pronouns, determined through reciprocal juxtaposition. As a result, “we” can never serve as ground for determining oneself or another (nor can a “you”). As correlative categories, they highlight the economy of redemption they cannot transcend. In other words, they are locked in the discourse they produce.

As a consequence, Rosenzweig’s phenomenology of the “we” liberates the claim of any “we” from the clutches of both a theological and philosophical hold. “We” remains immune to any such claim as an intrinsically unstable, dynamic, and open-ended unfinished project that requires the notion of redemption as one that transcends it and remains forever deferred, only realizable at the moment of redemption itself. In the final analysis, Rosenzweig reminds us, there is no “we” and “you” but simply the next, the neighbor, the one we confront: “Anyone, the Other in general—the neighbor” (Rosenzweig 1970: 252; “Irgendjemand, den andern schlechtweg, den—Nächsten” Rosenzweig 1976: 281), as the penultimate paragraph of conclusion of the book on redemption puts it. As for the I and You and their critical function of correlation, the dialogic moment is no longer locked in an impossible theological deadlock of a “we” pitched against a “you” and burdened with the expectation to present the other the “we” excludes. Rather, the “we” can now be addressed from a posttheological perspective as an always already precarious pronominal signifier whose referent remains ever negotiable, continually reconstituted by the continually new next it confronts.

Read in context, the philosophical projects of Cohen, Buber, and Rosenzweig become legibleperspicuous as interventions that address the German university politics of in- and exclusion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, not only in terms of a failure of a social and political system, but more profoundly, with regard to its theoretical significance as a failure of the master discipline that continues to drive and inform the idea of the German university ever since its inception as project of German idealism.14 It is the claims of philosophy as an institutionally entrenched discipline whose epistemic preferences have become problematic and whose flaws the philosophical approaches of Cohen, Buber, and Rosenzweig each address in their own way and according to their own specific sensibilities and concerns. Given the changing historical conditions of their situation as Jewish philosophers and intellectuals, their philosophical projects articulate a philosophic critique of the hegemonic discourse of philosophy, whose secularized claims they challenge as traces of a persistent theological hold. In different ways, their proj-

14 For this deep nexus, see Rosenzweig 1924: XIV- XV.
ects represent critical interventions in a philosophical discourse they attempt to reconstitute by rethinking philosophy’s universal claims as inseparably linked to the problem of the conflicted way in which the Jewish tradition has been (dis)figured by a cultural politics of assimilation, be it by open repression or more covertly by partial acknowledgment and “integration.” Most importantly, the critical impulse that informs their philosophic projects has become—whether by recognition or rejection—a crucial part of the legacy of German and not just Jewish philosophy.

Primljeno: 22. jun 2012.
Prihvaćeno: 30. jun 2012.

References
Glatzer, Nahum (1953), Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought, New York: Schocken.
Gordon, Peter Eli (2003), Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Vili Gočel
Filozofija izvana u: Rozcvajgov kritički projekat

Apstrakt
Ovaj rad ispituje Rozcvajgov filozofski projekat, u kontekstu njegovog vremena, kao kritičku intervenciju u diskusiji o mestu jevrejske misli na univerzitetu i u društvu. Ako Herman Koen predstavlja prvu generaciju jevrejskih filozofa tvrdeći da je sudelovanje na univerzitetu konstitutivno za zahtev institucije za univerzalizmom, druga generacija − koju je predstavljao Martin Buber − bila je mnogo sumnjičavija oko univerziteta i njegove otvorenosti. Za Bubera, književni modernizam je ponudio nešto što je univerzitet odbio. Razočaran zbog neuspeha pokušaja da se prepoznaju napori prethodne dve generacije, Rozcvajg predstavlja treću. On preokreće situaciju u kreativan odgovor usidrenoj filozofiji kao projekat koji poziva na odlučan iskorak van univerziteta.

Ključne reči univerzitet, filozofija, novo mišljenje, jezičko mišljenje, „Mi”/„Ti”.