Exposition of Two Forms of Semantic Skepticism: Wittgenstein's Paradox of Rule Following and Kripke's Semantic Paradox

**Abstract** Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke's argument (Kripke 1982), analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who do not agree with Kripke's view have directly contrasted his understanding of Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein's own perspective (LW) in or after Philosophical Investigations (PI). However, I believe that those who have closely read both PI and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language without any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is generally accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to present one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW deviates from LW in some respects remains unavoidable.

In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the underpinnings of this impression by formulating the paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke and revealing the complicated relation between the two forms of semantic paradoxes. I will then not only propose a new interpretation of the argument about meaning contained in PI but also suggest a schema or condition for semantics that I think holds by itself, independent from exegetical matters.

**Keyword**: Semantics, Skepticism, Rule-following Consideration, Later Wittgenstein, Kripke

1. Introduction

Two lines of criticism of Kripke can be used to argue against his interpretation of LW. The first is based on PI §201. KW thinks that the skeptical paradox about meaning constitutes the central problem of PI, and he accepts this as a valid conclusion. On the other hand, in the second paragraph of §201, LW rejects the skeptical paradox as a
misunderstanding.⁴ Therefore, if KW’s semantic paradox were essentially identical to LW’s paradox of rule following, these thinkers would disagree with each other regarding the paradox.

However, notwithstanding his own insistence, KW’s semantic paradox is fundamentally different from LW’s paradox of rule following. If this view were correct, LW’s denial of the latter paradox, based on the aforementioned misunderstanding, would not entail his rejection of the former. In this case, criticism of Kripke’s interpretation based on PI §201 must be seen as missing the point. I illuminate the difference between the two paradoxes by extracting the structure of LW’s paradox of rule following in the next section.

The second line of argument for opposing KW against LW concerns KW’s skeptical solution to the skeptical paradox. As many scholars have pointed out,⁵ if the skeptical solution were inconsistent with LW’s view of meaning and if the skeptical solution were integrated into KW’s skeptical paradox as a theory of meaning, then it would follow that LW should not accept KW’s skeptical paradox as valid. Indeed, I think that the skeptical solution is invalid both as an interpretation of LW and as an independent argument that attempts to solve the skeptical paradox. I believe that KW diverges from LW most dramatically with regard to the skeptical solution. However, according to my view, KW’s skeptical paradox is separable from the skeptical solution. It seems possible to provide another skeptical solution while maintaining the skeptical paradox as a valid argument. I believe that another skeptical solution is at least compatible with LW’s view about meaning, even if LW did not propose it explicitly. In section 3, I will formulate KW’s semantic paradox and examine LW’s possible response to it. I will then show that we cannot help but confront an aporia regarding the interpretation of LW. In section 4, I will show that this aporia can be avoided by a new skeptical solution.

### 2. Formulation of Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule following

I will quote the first two paragraphs of PI §201 for the purpose of formulating Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule following (WP).

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This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was that if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases.

Wittgenstein’s paradox (WP) is presented in the first paragraph. In the second paragraph, LW describes how to dissolve it by pointing out a misunderstanding in WP, namely “we give one interpretation after another” when we follow a rule. In other words, he insists that WP arises from the thought that “every act of grasping a rule is interpretation.” Thus, if the thought that “every act of grasping a rule is interpretation” were negated, WP could be dissolved as a disguised paradox. Of course, some room exists for the interpretation of §201. However, in the context of the aforementioned points and of the descriptions in PI that precede §201, WP and the dissolution thereof can be formulated as follows:

\[ WP \]

\begin{enumerate}
  \item [Premise 1] Every act of grasping a rule is interpretation.
  \item [Premise 2] [Fact-A] Whether a rule might be expressed as a picture or an illustrated formula or sign (literal or phonetic) and whether it might occur in one’s mind or stand explicitly outside of the mind, it is always possible for us to interpret an application that differs from the one that naturally strikes us. (cf. PI §86, 139–141, 146, 185)
\end{enumerate}

Thus, an application that strikes me as natural on the occasion on which I am going to apply the rule is equally valid as an interpretation of the rule as are other applications that are logically consistent with past applications. For example, “1002, 1004, 1006, …” may initially be thought to be a correct interpretation about applying the rule “+2” after 1000. However, this is only one of many possible interpretations of this rule; other possibilities, such as “1004, 1008, 1012, …”, also exist. Even if I appeal to “a rule for interpreting a rule” to justify the former interpretation, the meta-rule itself can be interpreted in various ways. Thus, the process by which presentation of a rule opens possible interpretations of it will continue without end. Therefore, like Buridan’s ass, I cannot
help but keep confronting possible alternatives without being able to select any one.

Conclusion: A rule cannot determine any course of action.

This conclusion is said to express the paradoxical situation that arises in advance of applying a rule in that we cannot select a particular way to apply it in a new circumstance. The question of PI §198 clearly demonstrates this feature of WP: “But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.”

However, a fallacy is evident in this inference because in the daily praxis of language, “when I obey a rule, I do not choose,” “I obey the rule blindly” (PI §219), and thus a rule can determine a course of action. This outright fact contradicts the conclusion of WP. To avoid this conclusion, one of the premises must be denied. Premise 2 is the thesis that LW draws from his preceding consideration of rule following (PI §86, §139, etc.). Thus, premise 1 is supposed to be negated. It follows from it that grasping a rule is not an interpretation. “A way of grasping a rule which is not interpretation” can be said to be exhibited in our applying rules or in our reference from a meta-level perspective to “obeying the rule” or “going against it” in circumstances involving the praxis of language.

Once WP is formulated in this way, it is not indispensable to showing the essential difference between WP and Kripke’s semantic paradox (KP) to formulate KP and compare it with WP. Indeed, it can be easily shown that WP can be dissolved within the schema of KP; in other words, WP can be dissolved within the substantive efficacy of KP. Kripke evidently admits that an individual who is separated from a community and who therefore cannot be provided even with a skeptical solution can apply a rule to new examples without hesitation.

[N]o one actually hesitates when asked to produce an answer to an addition problem! Almost all of us unhesitatingly produce the answer “125” when asked for the sum of 68 and 57, without any thought to the theoretical possibility that a quus-like rule might have been appropriate.6

A circumstance in which everyone unhesitatingly applies the rule to a new example contradicts the conclusion of WP (that no one can select one among multiple alternatives when attempting to apply a rule in

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6 Kripke, ibid, 87.
a new situation). Thus, following the same inference described above, KW is also supposed to attain “a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.” One must be attentive to the fact that the individual discussed here, who is isolated from a community, remains under the influence of KP. Indeed, those individuals who are thought to be isolated from a community are not admitted even of a skeptical solution. Therefore, I can conclude that KP is fundamentally different from WP.

Of course, it does not follow from the fundamental difference between KP and WP that LW is supposed to consider KP valid while rejecting WP as a disguised paradox. It is conceivable that PI as a whole is incompatible with KP, even if LW does not directly argue KP.

3. Kripke’s semantic paradox

3-1. Formulation of KP

Let me formulate KP for the purpose of examining the relationship between LW and KP.

\[\text{[KP]}\]

Premise 1: No facts about meaning exist.

Premise 2: A semantic statement is true if and only if a fact about meaning exists.\(^7\)

Conclusion: Every sentence has no meaning.

Because KW does not formulate KP in this way, I will offer a few explanatory remarks. Needless to say, premise 1 is nothing but the conclusion that KW draws in Part II of the book. To be precise, it is expressed in this way: “There is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning plus and my meaning quus” and “there is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning a definite function ... and my meaning nothing at all.”\(^8\) Premise 2 was not referenced explicitly when KW examined the counterargument to draw premise 1. It is not until the skeptical solution is proposed that the existence of premise 2 is revealed. The conclusion is drawn based on the following inference:\(^9\)

1) For any S, p: \[\{“S” \text{ means that p}\} \text{ is false.}\]

\(^7\) According to Kripke, a picture of language based on truth conditions lies behind this conditional. cf. Kripke, \textit{ibid}, 74.

\(^8\) Kripke, \textit{ibid}, 21.

\(^9\) The inference is basically based on Boghossian (Boghossian 1989: 523).
This is the case because although a semantic statement \[ "S" \text{ means that } p \] is true iff a fact about meaning exists (premise 2), no such fact exists (premise 1). Then, the disquotational properties of the truth predicate guarantee that (1) entails the following:

2) For any S: S has no meaning.

However, because (2) is supposed to apply to any sentence, a self-refuting consequence follows: the argument that draws (2) has no meaning. No other option but to deny premise 2 exists if one is to avoid this paradoxical consequence because KW has accepted premise 1 as valid. Thus, by converting an understanding of language based on truth conditions to one based on assertibility conditions, KW makes it possible to distinguish “following a rule” from “thinking one is following a rule” by resorting to the mutual confirmation of community members. As a consequence, the condition under which semantic statements can be considered as true is barely secured under the skeptical constraint that all statements cannot be infallible.

3.2. KW’s deviance from LW

How is LW supposed to respond to KP when the latter is formulated in this way? As indicated in section 1, despite defenses of Kripke’s interpretation, I cannot help but conclude with many scholars that LW would reject such a skeptical solution as that proposed by KW. First among the most potent grounds for criticizing KW is that in PI §243, a solitary language (individual language),\(^{10}\) which stands in contrast to a private language that cannot be understood by anyone except the individual who uses it, is explicitly admitted to be possible. Second, the insistence corresponding to the communitarian theory of KW that “human agreement decides what is true and what is false” is definitely denied in PI §241. Third, the skeptical solution is thought to have its own deficiency\(^ {11}\) as an independent argument that attempts to avoid the paradoxical conclusion of KP. If the criticism of the skeptical solution were valid, we would be compelled to believe that LW advocates such a defective argument when the skeptical solution is attributed to LW.

\(^{10}\) For example, Goldfarb (Goldfarb 1985: 475) and McGinn (McGinn 1984: 79) make it clear that the solitary language that KW thinks is impossible is essentially different from the private language whose impossibility LW attempts to prove.

\(^{11}\) Blackburn (Blackburn 1984), Goldfarb (Goldfarb, \textit{ibid}), and Boghossian (Boghossian, \textit{ibid}) are examples of criticisms about the skeptical solution that are framed not in terms of the interpretation of LW but in terms of an independent argument.
criticism, which has great significance for the following argument, can be summarized as follows.

If the skeptical solution worked effectively, then each member of a community could confirm whether other members’ usage of a certain sign agreed with her own. If this were possible, then she would have to be able to compare her own present usage of a certain sign with her own past usage of it. It would then become possible for her to correct miscalculations, written mistakes, or speech errors made by her at any time in the past. That is to say, if the skeptical solution worked effectively, then it would imply that “following a rule” has already been distinguished from “thinking that one follows a rule” in a solitary setting.

Conversely, if the distinction did not come into existence within a solitary language, the skeptical solution could not work properly, because if it did not, the conception of “following a rule correctly (or incorrectly)” cannot come into existence.

3-3 Wittgenstein’s acceptance of KSC

In the absence of LW’s proposing the skeptical solution that resorts to the existence of community to negate premise 2, no other options seem to exist save negating premise 1 to avoid the self-defeating conclusion of KP. In other words, LW’s refusal to accept the skeptical solution is supposed to provide convincing grounds for his denial of premise 1.

For the purpose of providing the entire structure of KW’s argument, I formulate KP as I did in section 3-1. Although this formulation might prevent clarity in this regard, the crux of KP is, no doubt, premise 1. This is because KW believes that we cannot help but accept the skeptical conclusion with respect to meaning expressed by premise 1, whereas we can at least avoid the self-defeating conclusion of KP, although in a skeptical way. I will refer to premise 1 as “KSC” (Kripke’s skeptical conclusion) to avoid confusion with KP.

Although not attributing the skeptical solution to LW provides the grounds for believing that LW negates KSC, as I have shown, does LW really do this? Negation of KSC amounts to believing that it is possible to provide a “straight solution” to KSC. Does LW present a straight solution anywhere? I cannot reply in the affirmative. In my view, not only can a straight solution not be found anywhere in PI, but also the very

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12 For example, Wright (Wright 2001, Ch.7, 2007) provides a precise and persuasive argument for this interpretation of PI.
assumption that LW proposes such a straightforward solution is incompatible with the later views of Wittgenstein. Therefore, Kripke’s interpretation that LW accepts KSC is certainly valid, at least in that respect. Let me confirm the grounds for this conclusion.

Two candidates for the straight solution to KSC can be identified: 1) a non-intentional, reductive fact (a variety of a dispositional view) and 2) an intentional, primitive fact. Scholars who claim that LW provides either of these solutions basically identify the grounds for this claim in the fact that LW dissolves WP as a disguised paradox. As described in section 2, the fact that “we follow a rule blindly” in a normal situation based on our natural disposition (non-intentional, reductive fact) is opposed against the paradoxical conclusion of WP that “a rule could not determine any course of action.” Thus, reductio ad absurdum, the insistence that our grasping a rule is not an interpretation follows. Grasping a rule in a way that is not an interpretation seems to indicate the existence of intentional, primitive facts about a meaning that can be grasped only in a peculiar manner.

Here however, the fact that WP differs fundamentally from KP, which was pointed out in section 2, must be noted. In fact, KW begins to prove KSC under the presupposition that WP can be dissolved as a disguised paradox. The “I” who responds to the skeptical challenge is acknowledged as immediately producing the answer “125” to the question “68 + 57 = ?” based on his natural disposition. Therefore, “a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation” is exhibited in the answer “125.” Presupposing this, he who is challenged by the semantic skeptic sets out to provide a counterexample to a skeptical argument, but his attempts ends in failure.

At this point, I can provide a more definite description of the difference between WP and KSC. WP represents the paradox that arises in advance of applying the rule, namely that one cannot select any one of the logically possible alternatives. On the other hand, KSC signifies the paradox that you cannot prove afterword and retrospectively that the application of the rule applied without hesitation (68 + 57 = 125) accords with your previous intention. To be more exact, you cannot prove that only the application that you have performed accords with...
your previous intention and that it is logically impossible that any other alternative accords with your previous intention. (It is evident that KW’s argument begins under settings in which the justification for the application that has already been executed is investigated retrospectively.) Therefore, whereas WP can be dissolved only if the conditions for blind obedience to a rule are satisfied, the skeptical doubt that leads to KSC can be said to begin where WP is dissolved. Thus, I cannot help but conclude that attempts to identify the argument that enables us to dissolve WP as a disguised paradox with the rationale for negating KSC misses the point completely.

I think a still more convincing rationale for endorsing LW’s acceptance of KSC can be identified. For the sake of argument, let us assume that LW negates KSC; that is, let us assume that Wittgenstein thinks that a fact about meaning exists. Then, for example, the answer “125” that I produce at t₁ (present) to the question “68 + 57 = ?” is justified by the fact about meaning, “+,” at t₀ (past). Of all the possible alternatives, only “125” is given the status of truth. However, is it conceivable that the person who reaches such a conclusion goes on to persistently investigate the certainty of a calculation (e.g., 12 × 12 = 144) (On Certainty (OC) §43, 447, 651, 653-4)? Alternately is it conceivable that the same person states “even when the calculation is something fixed for me, this is only a decision for a practical purpose” (OC §49) about such a calculation or asks, “[w]ould the certainty really be greater for being checked twenty times?” (OC §77) (For example, with respect to the latter question, it is thought that the problem of whether the degree of certainty of a calculation depends on how many times recalculation is performed ought not be investigated philosophically when the certainty is believed to be conferred by a fact about meaning.) That is to say, the assumption that LW negates KSC renders the ardent investigation of the certainty of an elemental kind of arithmetical equation, which he undertook after PI, totally incomprehensible.¹⁵

4. An aporia of KP and another skeptical solution

Based on the grounds described above, I cannot help but agree with Kripke that LW accepts KSC. However, under these circumstances, a serious aporia about KP presumably arises. LW is not thought to accept

¹⁵ Wright (Wright 2004), who basically agrees with KW, at least in respect to LW’s acceptance of KSC, argues that LW’s consideration of certainty presupposes that LW admits the revisability or non-infallibility of mathematical propositions.
the self-refuting consequence of KP, namely, that every sentence has no meaning. To avoid this consequence, one of the two premises must be negated. Yet, neither negating premise 2 and attributing the skeptical solution to LW nor negating premise 1 and attributing the straightforward solution against KSC to LW can be consistent with LW. It thus seems to be impossible to avoid the self-refuting consequence of KP. This is an aporia for LW regarding KP.

The interpretation that LW has remained under this aporia without being aware of the predicament is possible because it is not LW who explicitly formulated KP. Therefore, this inconsistency in LW can be revealed only when the whole of LW’s arguments is seen from the perspective provided by KP. But this is the worst interpretation of the subject. Given this, how should we avoid adopting the worst interpretation?

The aporia of KP stems from the assumption that the negation of premise 2 implies the adoption of KW’s skeptical solution. However, it is possible to negate premise 2 without adopting KW’s skeptical solution. Thus, when the bi-conditional, “a semantic statement is true iff a fact about meaning exists,” and the assertibility condition, which resorts to the existence of community, are denied, what kind of condition is possible? 16

Let me clarify the conditions under which we will seek a solution of the aporia. First, we have to accept premise 1 of KP (= KSC) as valid. In short, we admit that no facts about meaning exist. Second, we are forced to negate premise 2 to avoid KP. That is to say, we admit that it is possible that semantic statements are established as true (or meaningful), even under the condition that there exist no facts about meaning. Finally, we reject Kripke’s skeptical solution, the communitarian view, as an alternative that can make semantic statements true (meaningful). Our task is to search for a way out of the aporia of KP under these three conditions.

Before beginning this task, we must take several detours to elucidate the features of semantic statements within Kripke’s argument. Indeed, the settings under which Kripke develops his argument give them a peculiar

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16 KW’s expression of a conversion of “a picture based on truth conditions to one based on assertibility conditions” is also misleading because it seems to entail abandonment of the concept of truth. Although I cannot discuss this subject here, suffice it to say that introducing two different types of concept truth, inflationary and deflationary, is supposed to settle the problem.
kind of complexity. For example, Kripke uses the following semantic statement: “Jones means addition (quaddition) by ‘+.’” According to him, because there is no fact that corresponds to the semantic statements and makes them true, they have no sense. Conversely, under the supposition that facts about meaning exist, they have sense and can turn out to be true or false. What will follow from this supposition? To clarify the comparison with the skeptical solution that we will present in a following argument, let me confirm this.

Suppose that there existed a fact about the meaning of plus among the inner (mental) or outer (physical) facts about Smith at time point $t_0$. At $t_1$, he unhesitatingly calculates “$57 + 68 = 125$” using the number 57 for the first time. The result of this calculation could be justified absolutely by the fact about meaning of plus at $t_0$. All calculating formulas that are incompatible with “$57 + 68 = 125$” such as “$57 + 68 = 5$” would be completely denied as false. In this way, the equation “$57 + 68 = 125$” that Smith produces would be infallible and absolutely certain.

If the existence of a fact about the meaning of quus was assumed, the same type of argument would hold for the equation “$57 + 68 = 5$” and calculating formulas that are incompatible with it. If Smith produced “$57 + 68 = 125$,” it would be denied as totally false by the fact of quus.

Then, if there were a condition that could render such semantic statements true (or meaningful) under the premise that no fact about meaning exists, what would it be? It is our task here to provide a convincing answer to this question. According to my view, there can be no answer to it other than the following. It is that a subject believes with some degree of justification that a new sentence, which is constructed under a new circumstance, is true and that any sentence that the constructor believes to be incompatible with it is false. For example, Smith believes that “$57 + 68 = 125$,” a statement he has constructed by using a number that is equal to or larger than 57 for the first time, is true and that any calculating formula that he believes to be incompatible with it (such as “$57 + 68 = 5$”) is false. The essence of this proposal, a new skeptical solution, consists in its individualism: that it is ultimately any individual’s

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17 cf. Kripke, ibid, 77, etc.

18 By “with justification to some degree,” I mean justification that enables us to distinguish a totally blind belief without any reason from a belief resting on some reasonable reason that the believer herself is ready to present if required. In the following argument, I will use the term “believe” or “belief” to designate one with this tacit condition.
belief in a sentence that is constructed by using signs that can make semantic statements meaningful (or true).

Although the proposal seems to offer little at present, I will elaborate on its details to provide a certain degree of justification. For the sake of clarity, I will formulate this proposal based on the example described above.

\[ \text{Cp -So} \]

“Smith means plus by ‘+’” is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 125” is true and “68 + 57 = α,” which he believes to be incompatible with “68 + 57 = 125,” is false.

\[ \text{α: any sign except ‘125’} \]

This formulation is obviously insufficient, because it is not only “68+57=125” but also other sentences including ‘+’ that Smith has used in the past that contribute to the meaning of plus. Therefore, the set of sentences that it is necessary for Smith to believe to be true must comprise the formulas of addition that are produced by adding a pair of numbers that are lower than 57 and that Smith believes to be true, such as “56 + 39 = 95,” as well as the theoretical sentences including natural numbers and “+” that Smith believes to be true, such as “x + y = y + x.” I will use the abbreviated notation “plus-T(x)” to represent such sentences. Moreover, the set of sentences that it is necessary for Smith to believe to be false must comprise every sentence that Smith believes to be incompatible with each member of plus-T(x), such as “56 + 39 = 5” and “x + y ≠ y + x.” I will represent all of them with the abbreviated notation “plus-F(x).” Then, [Cp-So] can be revised in the following way.

\[ \text{Cp-Si} \]

“Smith means plus by ‘+’” is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 125” is true, “x” is true, “68 + 57 =α,” which he believes to be incompatible with “68 + 57 = 125,” is false, and “y” is false.

\{x | x ∈ plus-T(x)\}
\{y | y ∈ plus-F(y)\}^{19}
\[ \text{α: any sign except ‘125’} \]

Then the bi-conditional for “Smith means quus by ‘+’” can be formulated in the following manner.

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^{19} Here, “x” and “y” are used as variants that represent sentential compositions.
“Smith means quus by ‘+’” is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 5” is true, “x” is true, “68 + 57 = α,” which he believes to be incompatible with “68 + 57 = 5” is false, and “y” is false.

\[ \{ x \mid x \in \text{quus-T}(x) \} \]
\[ \{ y \mid y \in \text{quus-F}(y) \} \]
\[ \alpha: \text{any sign except “5”} \]

At this point, we admit that there is no fact about meaning. Therefore, any calculation that Smith performs using “+” is not infallible. Suppose that Smith satisfies [Cp-S1]. However, at some point Smith’s belief in “68 + 57 = 125” may be converted to a belief in “68 + 57 = 5.” If he satisfies [Cq-S1] along with this belief, then he is supposed to mean not “plus” but “quus.” In this way, uncertainty persists in that Smith is not guaranteed unrevisability about which function he means by “+.” Because the existence of a fact about meaning is negated, it is impossible for us to evade such uncertainty.

However, semantic statements can be adequately meaningful even under the skeptical constraint. For example, it is actually possible for Smith to fulfill [Cp-S1]. Then, “Smith means plus by ‘+’” is attributed to him. Because he cannot satisfy [Cq-S1] at the same time, he does not mean quus by “+” at this point. The contrary case can be supposed logically. In that case, the specific semantic statement, “Smith means quus by ‘+’” will be attributed to him. What is still more important is that when he notices his own mistake, for instance, he finds not “68 + 57 = 125” but “68 + 57 = 5” to be true, satisfying not [Cp-S1] but [Cq-S1], it becomes possible for him to say “I have believed that I mean plus by ‘+’, but now realize it is a mistake. In fact, I have meant quus by ‘+’.” Here, the distinction between “to think one is obeying a rule” and “to obey a rule” (PI§202) comes into existence although in a relative sense. In this situation, it seems to Smith that his past self only thought he was following a rule (= meaning) for “+.” This is because the past Smith followed a feigned rule of “+” without knowing the correct rule (= meaning) of “+,” that is, quus. On the other hand, the present Smith can be said to follow the rule (= meaning) of “+” (quus) without any such divergence.

However, there is a bizarre character to the formulations ([Cp-S1] [Cq-S1]). If the new skeptical solution proposed here is to be individualistic in a

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20 “quus-T(x)” and “quus-F(y)” are abbreviated notations that represent sets in the assumed cases of quus that correspond to sets in the case of plus.
genuine sense, all the conditions must be formulated from Smith’s perspective. When Smith satisfies the conditions of the right side of the bi-conditional in [Cq-S1], the semantic statement “Smith means quus by ‘+’” will be attributed to him. Yet, Smith ought not attribute a semantic statement such as “I (= Smith) means quus by ‘+’” to himself. Indeed, because he believes that the correct answer achieved by following a correct rule (meaning) for “+” is (not “68 + 57 = 125” but) “68 + 57 = 5,” he ought think that he does not mean an anomalistic meaning such as quus but instead means a canonical meaning of plus even under this situation. Therefore, these conditions ([Cp-S1] [Cq-S1]) are thought to be formulated from a perspective of third person other than Smith.

If this view is valid, the skeptical solution proposed here is nothing but a communitarian variant, which is contrary to my initial intention because whether the meaning intended by any subject by any sign is canonical or anomalistic depends on the view of a third person (community) in these formulations. They are reformulated by Smith’s viewpoint to avoid this difficulty.

[CS]

“Smith means plus by ‘+’” is true iff Smith believes that “x” is true and “y” is false.

\[\{x \mid x \in P-T(x)\}\]  
\[\{y \mid y \in P-F(y)\}\]  

Here, any member of the set that is composed of both of equations of addition and sentences of the theory of natural numbers (“x + y = y + x”), which Smith believes to be true at present, is supposed to be substituted for “x.” (This extended version of plus-T(x) will be named “P-T(x)”). Any member of the set that is composed of sentences that Smith believes are incompatible with each member of the set P-T(x) and are false is substituted for “y.” (This extended version of plus-F(x) will be called “P-F(x)”). Generalizing [CS] in terms of subject, sign, and meaning, we can gain

[C*]

For any s (subject), M (meaning): “s means M by ’M’” is true iff s believes that “x” is true and “y” is false.

\[\{x \mid x \in M-T(x)\}\]  
\[\{y \mid y \in M-F(y)\}\]
Any member of a set composed of beliefs that are specified by a given subject (including Smith), a given meaning (including plus), and a given sign (including “+”) (M-T(x), M-F(y)) is substituted for “x” and “y” in [C*]. The remarkable feature of [C*] is that the disquotational relation between sign and meaning holds in the semantic statement (“s means M by ‘M’” ) in [C*]. Anomalistic kinds of semantic statements such as “Smith means quus by ‘+’” can be ruled out by this stipulation. Therefore, it can be said that a third-person perspective, one other than that of the subject(s) represented in [C*], does not tacitly creep into the formulation.

This individualistic condition for semantic statements restores the solitary language, which is fundamentally distinguished from the private language, which Kripke’s skeptical solution unjustifiably exiles from the domain of language to a reasonable status as a legitimate language. It is not the agreement with others or the community, but each individual’s usage of signs and beliefs that enables semantic statements to become true (or meaningful). According to my view, insofar as the meanings that each subject understands generally coincide, a theoretically fatal defect, such as that pointed out about Kripke’s skeptical solution, is not produced by this solution.

However, as this argument admits that no fact about meaning exists, it is possible that a crucial and fundamental disagreement, such as that between plus and quus, will arise. It is logically possible that complete anarchy arises when the meaning attributed to a sign, such as ‘E’, differs for all individuals. In such an anarchic situation, which meaning is or is judged to be true?

My reply to this question is very clear. It is this I who determines which meaning is correct or true in such anarchy. Indeed, if it were essentially different from mine, I could not help but comprehend the meaning that the other person accords a given sign as an anomalistic and deviant one.

However, which I is meant by “this I” in the previous paragraph? At this phase, the individualism of the skeptical solution advocated in this paper is forced to confront the problem of solipsism, which haunted Wittgenstein for the whole of his life. Yet, I think that solipsism does not pose a theoretical difficulty, at least against this new skeptical solution. In short, solipsism can, at most, make the solution unable to identify the condition for semantic statements in a general form. However, as this issue requires an exceedingly cautious and exact approach, I must address it in another paper.
At any rate, it seems to me that there can be no alternative but the new skeptical solution proposed above if the aporia of KP is to be avoided. Although the proposal obviously requires considerable modification and elaboration, I think that this paper elucidates one way to evade the aporia and provide a certain degree of grounding for it.

By himself, LW does not formulate KP differently from WP. Therefore, it is not the case that LW explicitly advocates this kind of skeptical solution. However, it seems to be the only interpretation that is consistent with LW and that enables him to avoid the aporia of KP.

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Bibliography

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Obrazloženje problema dve forme semantičkog skepticizma: Vitgenštajnov paradoks sleđenja pravila i Kripkeov semantički paradoks

Apstrakt

Bez obzira na uporne pokušaje odbrane Kripkeovog argumenta (Kripke 1982), čini se da su analize ovog argumenta došle do konsenzusa oko toga da se on odlučuje kobnim nedostacima kako u interpretaciji Vitgenštajna, tako i u argumentaciji povodom značenja kao nezavisnog od interpretacije. Većina filozofoa koji se ne slažu sa Kripkeovim gledištem direktno su upoređivali razlike njegovog razumevanja Vitgenštajna (KW) sa samom Vitgenštajnovom perpektivom (LW) u Filozofskim istraživanjima (PI) i nakon njih. Ipak, smatram da su oni koji su pažljivo i bez predubedanja čitali kako PI, tako i Kripkeovu knjigu Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, stekli utisak drugačiji od onog koji je opšteprihvaćen: da KW nije direktno suprotstavljen LW. I zaista, čini se da KW predstavlja jedan aspekt LW na izoštren način, mada neizbežno ostaje utisak da KW u izvesnom pogledu odstupa od LW.

U ovom članku pokušaću da razjasnim osnove ovog utiska tako što ću formulisati paradokse koje su izložili Vitgenštajn i Kripke i ukazati na složenu relaciju između ova dva oblika semantičkih paradoksa. Zatim ću predložiti ne samo novu interpretaciju argumenta o značenju koji se nalazi u PI, nego i shemu ili uslove za semantiku koja, kako smatram, jeste samosvojna, nezavisna od predmeta egzegeze.

Ključne reči: Semantika, skepticizam, problem sleđenja pravila, kasniji Vitgenštajn, Kripke.