Intentionality and Objectification

Husserl and Simmel on the Cognitive and Social Conditions of Experience

Abstract  Husserl’s transcendental turn can be best regarded as a turn in his phenomenological models of intentionality. While in the Logical Investigations, he maintains a conception according to which intentionality is a structure of cognitive directedness in which objectification plays a formative role, in his later works the intentional relation is considered as a structure of consciousness founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority. This paper argues that if Husserl had extended the scope of his early phenomenological research to the problems of object formation in the domain of historical and cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), the radical subjectively oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. We also argue that in Simmel’s theory of historical cognition and culture one can detect the elements of a theory of intentionality that can account for what is missing in Husserl, namely the attention devoted to the specific constitution of social and cultural objects. It is precisely the objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization deployed in social and cultural values, and in historical time that constitutes the specificity of these objects which also conditions subjective experiencing, rather than remains dependent on it.

Keywords: Husserl, Simmel, Intentionality, Objectification, History, Cultural Objects

Intentionality as a structure of objectification

Although it was Franz Brentano who rediscovered the idea of intentionality for 20th century philosophy, it is nevertheless correct to say that it was Edmund Husserl who first tailored this idea to be the subject of a systematic philosophical elaboration. In fact, among all of the members of the Brentano School, Husserl seems to be the only one who, in discussing intentionality, could have reiterated Leibniz’s words: „It is the greatest remedy for the mind if a few thoughts can be found from which infinite others arise in order“ (Leibniz 1973: 1).

We know that Husserl first laid down the phenomenological principles of intentionality in his Logical Investigations in 1900–1901. But we also know that he designed this work, in terms of its problems and composition,
to be as much a philosophical overture as an attempt seeking an ultimate epistemological foundation. The presence of these somewhat disparate aspirations in the *Logical Investigations* results in that in the phenomenological elaboration of the problems of ideality, meaning, perception and knowledge, Husserl does not attempt to provide a unified system of philosophical responses. The relatively diffuse arrangement of the principal ideas in the *Logical Investigations* also reflects the fact that the presentation of the phenomenological problem of intentionality is far from being definitive. Indeed, in dealing with intentionality, Husserl does not seek to provide an unambiguous answer to the question of the ontological status of the intentional object, nor to the problem of the subjectivity of the intentional consciousness. One could even say that in the *Logical Investigations* the idea of intentionality maintains its philosophically optional status. This is because in this work Husserl suggests that before one can even attempt to provide philosophical definitions of „objectivity“ and „subjectivity“, one must acknowledge that the principal problem of the intentional relationship between the consciousness and its object arises in the determination of the essential interrelatedness of the two.

Husserl resorts to this strategy when he takes up the task of elaborating the problem of intentionality at the beginning of the *Fifth Logical Investigation*. Here, he offers the three concepts of consciousness – „stream of consciousness“, „inner awareness“, and „intentional experiences“ (Husserl 2001: 81). The privilege accorded to the third concept serves to provide the necessary gnoseological neutrality for the phenomenological analysis of intentionality. Accordingly, Husserl considers intentionality as a cognitive relationship in which a lived experience „refers to“ or „aims at“ an object as its correlate. What is more, he claims that in this relationship neither the experience nor the object can be defined independently of one another; they are both elements of a cognitive unity in which what is lived in experience can only be defined in terms of the object of that experience. One can also note that this definition rules out the notion of „subjective interiority“ as a vital component in the explication of consciousness. In fact, defining consciousness as intentional experience means explaining it by means of objective elements that do not belong to the immanent sphere of that consciousness.

From this point, the analysis of intentionality in the *Logical Investigations* takes an investigative turn. Husserl starts by critically analyzing one of Brentano’s claims that „each intentional experience is either a presentation or based upon underlying presentations“ (Husserl 2001: 129). This approach
entails the phenomenological elucidation of the notions of „presentation“ and „representation.“ In the context of the *Fifth Logical Investigation*, Husserl’s increasingly detailed analyses of these notions serve to foreground his conviction that intentionality can only be understood as the cognitive relatedness of the consciousness to its object where the object is so to speak „representatively present“. In other words, the object, in being apprehended as intentional content, forces its own intentional properties upon the acts, depending on its objective representational qualities that can be formal or material, ideal or empirical, simple or complex, etc.

Husserl capitalizes fully on these results when he raises the problem of „knowing“ and „knowledge“ in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. According to him, knowing means the „fulfilment“ of a significative, meaning oriented intentional act with a corresponding act of perception. At the same time, that fulfilment is defined by Husserl as an act of „identifying synthesis“ through which the meaning of an object becomes intentionally corroborated by the intuitive presentation of that same object. Accordingly, fulfilment can provide knowledge insofar as it allows for the „recognition“ and „classification“ of the object (Husserl 2001: 201–202) while representing it in its „objective identity“ (Husserl 2001: 207).

This demonstration of the essential components of the theory of intentionality in the context of the *Logical Investigations* can permit us to conclude that intentionality is principally conceived by Husserl not so much as an *a priori* or overall form of objective constitution effectuated by a constitutive conscience, but rather as a structure of cognitive directedness in the configuration of which the modes of subjective representations and the characters of objects play an equally formative role. On this basis, Husserl can evenly consider the intentionality of consciousness as the basic structure of knowledge in general, insofar as this latter is produced as an act of identification that is based on the epistemic unity of significative and intuitive intentional acts representing the internal qualities of objects. Thus, even though consciousness is considered by Husserl as sphere of lived experience, in his early writings the structure of objectification remains the horizon within which the phenomenological problem of intentionality is essentially exposed and elaborated.

**Intentionality as a structure of pure consciousness**

In order to highlight the contrast between Husserl’s early conception of intentionality and his later ideas, one does not necessarily need to turn to the *Ideas*, the *Cartesian Meditations* or some other *chef d’oeuvre* of his
transcendental phenomenology. To clarify this issue, it seems more salient to turn to Husserlian texts that point toward the transcendental turn but still draw upon the problems and terminology of the *Logical Investigations*. This is the case with Husserl’s lecture course given in 1906–07 entitled *Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge*. The importance of this text lies in the fact that when Husserl re-establishes phenomenological research in light of the horizons opened up by the *Logical Investigations*, he locates the key problems of intentionality in the context of a new conception of consciousness.

Just as in the *Fifth Logical Investigation*, in the lecture course of 1906-07 Husserl begins his phenomenological analysis of intentionality by distinguishing between three concepts of consciousness. But, in sharp contrast to his earlier work, he presents these concepts with a clearly hierarchical model in mind. Husserl defines the first concept of consciousness as that of „mere experiences“ in which „the datum has not yet become objective“ (Husserl 2008: 243). This definition brings into play the immanent temporal structure of the flow of the data of consciousness – what Husserl calls „pre-phenomenal being.“ He also describes this sphere as an „absolute“ and „not objectified“ dimension of experience, one which can be made thematic only in reflection, but in itself pertains to a „being that is, but is not perceived“ (Husserl 2008: 243). The second concept of consciousness is based on the first and refers to the experiences that have the distinctive quality of „being-conscious-of-an-objectivity“ (Husserl 2008: 245). Consequently, this concept covers all of the aspects of the intentional consciousness in the proper sense. Finally, the third concept of consciousness is based on the second insofar as it labels consciousness as „position-taking toward an objectivity“ such as judgments, evaluations, etc.

Certainly, it is not difficult to notice the fundamental differences separating the Husserlian idea of consciousness exposed in the lecture course of 1906/07 from that of the *Logical Investigations*. The fact that Husserl rules out the entire apparatus of „representation“ from the list of the basic determinations of intentional consciousness – the notion of „representation“ is being related only to the third concept of consciousness (Husserl 2008: 246–247) – is perhaps the less radical consequence. Husserl makes the most radical step in arguing that the structure of intentionality is founded on a sphere of experiencing that in itself has no objectifying character. In describing this fundamental cognitive sphere as an „absolute“ and „pre-phenomenal being“, Husserl conceives of it in terms
of internal time consciousness. And because, in this conception, intentionality is reduced to being a distinctive characteristic of certain experiences that presuppose the internal consciousness as fundamental, he can now claim, „all objectification is realized in time-consciousness“ (Husserl 2008: 262).

Indeed, this new conception of consciousness is defined by the configuration of time-consciousness, experiencing, and intentionality, and clearly outlines the basic phenomenological constitution, as well as some of the fundamental aspects of what Husserl refers later to as „transcendental subjectivity.“ This concept of consciousness can no longer be simply described as a unity of cognitive relations with an independent objective reference for correlate. Rather, Husserl is more and more convinced that the intentionality of consciousness should be founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority that possesses the laws of its essential constitution in its own temporal effectuations. Accordingly, while consciousness remains the centre of all intentional relationships, objectification and the production of knowledge become dependent on a structure of experiencing that, in its basic form, has nothing to do with objectivity and its epistemic standards.

This explains why after its transcendental turn, around the 1910s, Husserlian phenomenology tends more and more to turn towards the inherently subjective elements in the structure of intentional constitution, i.e. on what is immanent, temporal, genetic and passive within consciousness. Subjectivity becomes a transcendently qualified instance for Husserl insofar as it is claimed to be generating all kinds of intentional relations as being exclusively grounded in the sphere of the immanent phenomenal performances of conscious life.¹ And even if it is misleading to affirm that in his transcendental approach Husserl dismisses the intentional analysis of the objective order, it is certainly true that objects are usually interpreted as correlates in a process of intentional constitution of which the immanent effectuation lacks any reference to modes of objectifications. One could also note that Husserl extensive analyses dedicated to the problem of the constitution of the „world“ or „life-world“ do not really change this scenery. The phenomenology of life-word is principally about the foundation of objectivity, and not so much about its proper functioning in human life. Also, it is within context in mind that Husserl offers his views on the phenomenological constitution of intersubjectivity which is supposed to condition any objective world-formation.

¹ For a detailed analysis of this doctrinal configuration in Husserl, see Takács 2014.
**Intentionality and objectification in history: an unexploited possibility**

Before turning to Husserl’s views on intersubjectivity and sociality, I would like to put forward the following argument: if Husserl could achieve such a radical transformation in his idea of intentionality – i.e. understanding it primarily as a basic structure of subjectivity and intersubjectivity instead of that of objectification – it is because in his early phenomenological approach one of his principal intentions was to elaborate a theory of knowledge and experience, paying special attention to the gnoseological problems. These problems were primarily related to elucidations of questions of meaning formation, perception and justification associated with logical, mathematical idealities. In other words, in his early period, Husserl was mainly preoccupied with the problem of the „role of the subjectivity“ in the natural sciences (Husserl 2008: 116). However, one could argue that if Husserl had extended the scope of his phenomenological research to the problems of knowledge and experience in the domain of historical and cultural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), the radical (inter)subjectivity oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. In effect, Husserl very seldom seems to seriously account for the fact that the nature of the objects and the types of knowledge in the domain of historical and cultural sciences might be drastically different from those in the natural sciences – an argument made by Dilthey, Simmel, and certain neo-Kantian philosophers of the epoch.

Georg Simmel’s work *The Problems of Philosophy of History*, published in its final form in 1907, points to some of the essential features of the problems that might have been decisive for Husserl had he raised in a phenomenologically sophisticated way the issues of *Geisteswissenschaften*. Although in many aspects Simmel’s approach remains more faithful to the Kantian perspective than to the phenomenological approach, his analyses focus on the „internal conditions of the historical inquiry,“ providing a set of epistemological claims and perspectives that can be rightly measured by the standards of Husserlian phenomenology. In any case, the basic question of the Simmel’s work points clearly in a phenomenological direction: „how can the theoretical construction called history be generated from the matter of the immediately lived experience?“ (Simmel 1907: vii).

Simmel’s basic answer to this question can also be considered as phenomenological in its orientation. He claims that history is only possible as a unity of experience and knowledge (Oakes 1980: 6). But, when he adds
that there is no simple mediation between lived experience and historical constructs, it is not just because his notion of *a priori* undoubtedly stands closer to the Kantian than to the Husserlian sense of this concept. In fact, his approach can be rightly characterized as "phenomenological" insofar as the focus is placed clearly on the conditions of historical knowledge as seen through the lens of the descriptive analysis of the structure of historical cognition.\(^2\) Simmel conceives of this cognition as a form of understanding, the aim of which is to seize upon human thoughts, perceptions, and actions distant in time. According to him, historical cognition faces the task of "sensing something that is genuinely not sensed" (Simmel 1907: 32) and is necessarily played out in an interpersonal relationship. However, in explaining the possibility of this mediating relationship between different consciousnesses across time, Simmel is not satisfied to simply point out the essentially similar cognitive structures that are supposedly assigned to these consciousnesses. Rather, he takes it a step further by emphasizing that "the essential identity of two subjects does not abolish the necessity of a having a mediation between the two in the various form of exteriorization, transposition and symbolization" (Simmel 1907: 31). It is precisely this type of objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization unfolding in historical time that constitutes the specificity of the domain of history as science, which is at the same time the product and the source of the cognitive processes proper to historical understanding.

Although Simmel does not rely explicitly on a concept of intentionality in his analyses, his theory of historical knowledge and experience can nevertheless help us to reassess some aspects of the Husserlian position. For in setting the phenomena of knowledge and experience on the horizon of historical development and its temporal and intersubjective conditions, Simmel’s analyses tend to revitalize the problem of cognitive representation as being regulated by objective components inherent in the process of cognition itself. According to Simmel’s basic claim, historical understanding is carried out in the form of a projective representation that aims at endowing human experiences and actions that are distant in time with objective significance and value. But he also claims that the experiences and actions situated in the past possess such objectivity insofar as they become objects of mental acts produced in historical cognition. In other words, representation is a sign for objectification, but this latter is precisely what makes history something more than a set of external conditions

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\(^2\) See Owsley & Backhaus 2003.
influencing human life. Hence, just as in Husserl’s early work, for Simmel, “representation” determines a subject–object relationship in which the objective side modulates and regulates what is to be represented and known while remaining inherent in the subjective process of cognition. As has been noted, here, Simmel is not far from advocating for certain concept of intentionality (Oakes 1980: 28, 49, and 56).

**Intentionality, intersubjectivity and the social dimension in Husserl**

There could hardly be more serious misunderstanding than to consider transcendental phenomenology as a philosophy that neglects the question of the *alter ego* and its related topics. In fact, from intersubjective to interpersonal relations, from community formation to aspects of sociality and history, Husserl’s phenomenology offers a wide range of considerations taking into account the fact that consciousness is by no means an abstract or isolated entity. Husserl’s phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity has two main tendencies in order to provide a conceptual frame within which the problem of human coexistence, community formation and history can be situated as well as elaborated. Drawing upon some of the key analysis of the second volume of his *Ideas Pertaining to Pure Phenomenology*, one could be justified to speak of a „naturalist“ and a „spiritual“ orientation of the intersubjective analysis in Husserl. In fact, these two analytical tendencies are clearly present in his works from his texts of the 1910s to the latest writings.

For Husserl the constitution of the body and its experimental environment are crucial for the understanding the basic lines along which the problem of the constitution of the nature can be unfolded. The second volume of the *Ideas* talks in this sense the „material“ and the „animalistic“ dimension of nature (Husserl 1989: 30–32). The nature defined in this way as the fundament of the formation of any intersubjective relation. However, Husserl’s main aim here is not simply to try to integrate the problems of nature into the frame of a transcendental anthropology. Although the human body remains the phenomenological focal point within the analysis of the constitution of nature and that of intersubjectivity, it cannot be considered as the ultimate layer of natural constitution, not even that of intentionality. According to some later texts, Husserl considers the ultimate layer of the constitution of nature the „instinctive structure“ of all

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3 Needless to say, these phenomenological designations have nothing to do with the traditional conceptions of naturalism and spiritualism.
living being (Husserl 1981: 335). According to him, the instinct (Trieb, Instinkt) is a fundamental form of „not-objectivating intentionality“ (Husserl 1981: 336) insofar as it is designed to be not an object focused relation of sensory experience, but a pure bodily tendency within the living. Thus, from a phenomenological point of view the instinct integrates human beings into the animal nature. However for Husserl it also designates the first and most fundamental form of human community formation defined as „instinctive community“ (Triebgemeinschaft). It is this form of community that is supposed to provide the basic monadological and teleological structure of intersubjectivity in Husserl.4

In most of Husserl’s work unfolding the spiritual aspects of intersubjectivity means first and foremost to relate it to the elucidation of the problem of the intentional constitution of the world. This is also the context within which the problem of „lifeworld“ (Lebenswelt) is usually explicated. The main question here for Husserl is to understand how the achievements of the sciences and that of the cultural reality of humanity can be generated out of a common world-horizon constituted by human experiences. In this sense, one can speak at least three levels in Husserl where the phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity becomes one with that of the world-constitution: 1) the level of the subsistence of a common validity of horizon of intentional sensory and cognitive word-experiences belonging to different consciousnesses; 2) the level on which this horizon can serve as a fundament for basic collective experiences manifested in various form of empathy-relations; 3) the level which Husserl considers as a process of an universal rational development of human reason as it manifests itself through the history of science and culture which governed by the „idea of universal teleology of reason“ (see Husserl, In effect, these levels delineate the experimental, monadological and teleological grounds based on which the transcendental phenomenological elucidation of the constitution of the world as intersubjective performance is supposed to be carried out.

As early as from the 1910s, Husserl constantly elaborates and revisits the question of sociality and social constitution in his various unpublished research manuscripts. One of the particularities of these analyses is however the fact that Husserl tends to separate the question of sociality from the question of intentionality and treats it as a problem of constitution of higher order. This means that for Husserl the problem of society and

4 On the relationship between instinct and intersubjectivity in Husserl, see Nam-In-Lee 1993.
social constitution is somewhat deduced from his phenomenological approaches of intersubjectivity. For him the social sphere consists in its basic structure of acts of co-willing and co-acting based on common structures of experimental and communicative activity (Husserl 1973: 165–170). However, the governing principles of these common performances are also founded, on the one hand, on the sphere of natural-bodily constitution, and on the other hand, on the process of „spiritualisation“ driven by the teleological development of validities of human cultural cooperation. In brief, society for Husserl is a result of intersubjective constitutions where these constitutions in themselves are not socially constituted instances.\(^5\) In other words, although socially embedded, natural and spiritual intentionality and its founding subjective components tend to preserve its constitutive autarchy with regard to the very effects that might emanate from the social world.

**Objectification as a primary field of intentionality in Simmel**

Without doubt, contrasting Simmel’s and Husserl’s theories of representation can do more than simply call attention to the relevance and merits of Husserl’s early object centred concept of intentionality as developed in the *Logical Investigations*. As Simmel’s example shows, this contrast can also provide insight into the functioning of intentionality in spheres other than those which Husserl tends classify to under the label of transcendental constitution, be it related to the consciousness or the world. In other words, investigating the role of cognitive subject–object relationship in the formation of historical reality, cultural values, social representations, and symbolic forms can not only reveal the specific nature of cognition and objectivity at stake here. It also points to a dimension within which the process of intentional objectification tends to leave radically behind the order of consciousness. In Simmel, the analysis of cognition usually makes an appeal for an analysis of its socio-objective conditions.

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5 One could argue that this Husserlian vision of the double intersubjective foundation of social relations is inherited to a large extent in post-Husserlian phenomenology. In most cases, in later phenomenological thinkers society is considered as a phenomenological residuum which is to be explained, rather than explored, by going back to the original „natural“ dimension of community formation (sensibility, body, flesh, etc.) and/or to certain original „spiritual“ modes of coexistence (co-understanding, co-affection, sense of community, ethics, etc.). In other words, social relations are supposed to be explained by having recourse to intersubjective formations or original forms of collective experiences which in turn, in their own constitution, are not considered to be the part of the social fabric.
In sum, his example can demonstrate that once history and the order of cultural or symbolic configurations become the targets of a phenomenologically fashioned investigation, the intentional objects and their corresponding forms of cognitions cannot be fully accounted for from a perspective based on first-person or intersubjective experience.

Far from reducing philosophical issues into sociological ones, this simply means that one could rely on Simmel’s approach in claiming that there is a fundamental sphere of objects of which the intentional setting reabsorbs subjectivity, rather than provides an evidence of an original subjective constitution. No one can experience nation, state, property, money, law, social class, democracy, or even history, as such. Rather, it seems that these „cultural objectivities, or „spiritual objects“ of higher order, possess a capacity to involve and generate personal or collective experiences insofar as one acknowledges their validity and recognizes oneself as being their subject of reference. The referential character of these objects therefore can be said to be intentional, but in reverse; these objects can direct, orient and modulate human experience, creating instances of „consciousness of“, whereas their genesis and functioning cannot be simply explained by reference to merely subjective or intersubjective experiences. Instead, they presuppose a social constitution mediated by objective components (values, norms, institutions, etc.) and displayed in history. In this sense, they indicate the structural and genetic functioning of an objectivating intentionality that lacks direct subjective foundation. However this intentionality remains connected to (inter)subjectivity in the sense that it is capable of involving or even producing subjective experiences of „seeing as,“ „apprehending as,“ and „understanding as.“

It must be noted that in his late text entitled „The Origin of Geometry,“ published in 1936 as an appendix to the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl takes up the task of accounting for the intersubjective and historical constitution of object of higher order. He affirms that his „considerations will necessarily lead to the deepest problems of sense, problems of science and of the history of science in general, and indeed in the end to problems of the universal history in general“ (Husserl 1970: 353). With this argument however, he raises only the question of the intersubjective formation and historicity of ideal objects (ideale Gegenständlichkeit), in particular that of geometry. But no matter how strongly he emphasizes the role of some social conditions such as language and human communication in the formation of these idealities, Husserl remains entirely faithful to his basic phenomenological
insight according to which the production of an ideal object can only take place in an original subjective experience of „self-evidence,“ or through its act of reawakening that is valid for all knowing subjects (Husserl 1970: 59–60). However, in the case of ideal objects that belong to the sphere of society, culture, or even the historical sciences, this mode of explication seems to fall short. Not only might one find it difficult to subscribe to the concept of historical a priori required by Husserl for all genuine historical explications, but it seems even more doubtful to have recourse to an original sphere of experience that plays the role of a primarily instituting function in the formation of historical-cultural forms and objectivities.

In his famous essay „On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture,“ published in 1911 in the revue Logos, Simmel draws a different picture and conclusion on these developments. Although he does not deny the fundamental role that subjective life plays in the constitution of cultural forms (works of art, religions, sciences, technologies, laws, and other social institutions, etc.), he seeks to acknowledge the fully objective character of the functioning of these forms with regard to personal and interpersonal experiences. According to him, the creation and experience of cultural or historical forms presuppose the correlation of the productive activity of the subject and the objective spiritual product. However, in this correlation, the cultural level can acquire an objective independence that in turn determines, rather than depends on, the experimental ground of human subjectivity. As he points out, „subjective life [...] can become truly cultivated only through forms which have become completely alien and crystallized into a self-sufficient independence“ (Simmel 1968: 30). Or in other terms, „creative life constantly produces something which is not life itself, something on which it somehow peters out, something which raises its own opposing legal claim. It cannot express itself except in forms that are, and signify, something for themselves independently of life“ (Simmel 1997: 103).

With this context in mind, one can also notice that once confronted with the problems of the constitution of historical and cultural objects, the concept of intentionality should be fully reinscribed into the sphere of the social. In fact, one of the results of Simmel’s analysis of culture consists in highlighting the fact that in this sphere the levels of „we“ experience or intersubjectivity can hardly provide means by which the constitution of cultural objects could be rightly accounted for. Instead, it is precisely the social and historical disposition of these objects which provides the very field in connection with the phenomenon of „self-sufficient independence“
and its relation to subjective experience are supposed to be analyzed. This further means to take into account specific social practices (work, consummation, collective actions), specific social structures (language, social institutions, symbolic order, power), and specific social dynamisms (distribution of knowledge, information, collective memory, history) as being the concrete forms in which the independence of cultural forms manifests itself.\(^6\) This independence however is not ontological, but intentional in its character. In other words, everything points to the fact that, in this domain, the objectivating intentionality of spiritual and cultural objects contribute constitutively to the formation of subjects and their sphere of experience. One can wonder as to what extent the subjectivity can remain intact in the face of this reversed intentionality through which the social constitution of objects fashions the spheres of experience and conditions the structures of life.

Literature


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\(^6\) For an example of such an analysis, see Simmel 1978.

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**Adam Takač**

*Intencionalnost i objektifikacija – Huserl i Zimel o kognitivnim i društvenim uslovima iskustva*

**Apstrakt**

Huserlov transcendentalni preokret se može smatrati preokretom u pogledu njegovih modela intencionalnosti. Dok je u Logičkim istraživanjima Huserl imao koncept prema kojem je intencionalnost struktura kognitivne usmerenosti u kojoj objektifikacija igra formativnu ulogu, u njegovim kasnijim radovima se intencionalni odnos pojavljuje kao struktura svesti koja se bazi na čistoj subjektivnoj interiornosti. Ovaj rad argumentuje da ukoliko bi Huserl proširio obim svojih ranih fenomenoloških istraživanja na probleme formiranja objekta u domenu istorijskih i humanističkih nauka (Geisteswissenschaften), onda se radikalno subjektivistički usmerena transformacija njegove teorije intencionalnosti ne bi dogodila toliko lako, odnosno možda bi bila nemoguća. Takode ćemo da argumentujemo da u Zimelovoj teoriji istorijske spoznaje i kulture možemo da pronademo elemente teorije intencionalnosti koja nedostaje kod Huserla, naime, pažnju koja je posvećena specifičnoj konstituciji društvenih i kulturnih objekata. Upravo objektivno posredovanje kroz ekteriorizaciju i simbolizaciju, razvijen u društvenim i kulturnim vrednostima odnosno u istorijskom vremenu, konstituiše specifičnost tih objekata koji mnogo manje zavise od subjektivnog iskustva, nego što čine uslov istog.

**Ključne reči:** Huserl, Zimel, intencionalnost, objektifikacija, istorija, objekti kulture