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The possibilities and constraints of engaging solidarity in citizenship

Abstract  In a broader sense, this article is interested in solidarity as a politically operational concept. To be able to answer more general questions – like *What does it mean to base a political community on the principles of solidarity? Can acts of solidarity be used not only to help (support) others, but with the aim to change power relations and constitute new political orders as well?* – we must first situate solidarity in relation to some already established frameworks of thinking about the political community. It is within theories and models of citizenship that I want to situate my exploration of the political value of solidarity in this paper. Firstly, if we want to go beyond isolated gestures and actions of solidarity, to question its general capacities for political reordering, we need to firmly anchor it in broad concepts that capture the ideals and visions of political community. Without a doubt, citizenship is one such concept. Secondly, there is hardly a theory or approach to citizenship that does not presuppose some aspects of solidarity as foundational. Finally, and closely related to the previous point, citizenship and solidarity, although often conceptually intertwined, form a paradoxical duo, reflecting further potential paradoxes that may arise from endeavours to engage solidarity as a political principle. In short, citizenship is a simultaneously inclusive and exclusive notion, incorporating the idea that some sort of boundary encircles a body of citizens (most often, but not exclusively, nation-state boundaries), despite the fact that solidarity loses much of its meaning when expected to operate and be exercised within certain imposed limits.

Keywords: solidarity, citizenship, citizenship rights, equality, justice, global citizenship

New ‘solidarity talk’

Solidarity is on everyone’s lips these days. Whether the news is about collapsed national economies, natural catastrophes – which seem to be growing in number due to rapid climate change – or the emergent refugee crisis caused by wars in the Middle East, all around the world we hear pleas for solidarity with an ever-growing number of people who have lost their jobs, their homes, their savings, their safety and their loved ones. Media and social networks are flooded with stories of ‘ordinary’ citizens providing shelter and food to those in need; stories that speak as much about human compassion as they do about the failure of state and international institutions. Moreover, these acts of solidarity – depicted in such a way as to counter the effects of mainstream policies – are sometimes presented as models for the potential, and allegedly better, socio-economic arrangements.
we should be striving for, in other words, as politically instructive.¹ The topic of this article is a broad one, and hence will be touched upon fragmentally – mostly as an appeal to further rethink proposed frameworks and problems – namely, in terms of how can we think about solidarity as a politically operational concept. What does it mean to base a political community on the principles of solidarity? Can acts of solidarity be used not only to help (support) others, but with the aim to change power relations and constitute new political orders as well? In other words, can solidarity be political? If so, is it justifiable to claim solidarity for progressive, emancipatory political projects only, or can it equally be part of a conservative, right-wing agenda?

The idea of relating solidarity to political community is hardly a new one, as many political theories (most notably anarchist, communist and socialist, but others as well) rely on specific visions of solidarity as the cohesive force that turns individuals into members of society. However, there have been very few attempts, especially in more recent political and social theories, to discuss solidarity from a theoretical point of view and to provide a coherent framework that explains the role of solidarity in constituting the fibre of a political community (Hechter 1988, Bayertz 1999, Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2003, Scholz 2008). Moreover, social theory interpretations of solidarity have predominantly viewed it as a given feature of every group or as the essence of cooperative behaviour. For instance, both mechanical and organic solidarity are assumed in Durkheim’s account, emerging from the particular character of individuals and groups (Durkheim 1991). It is usually also presumed that solidarity takes place between actors who are alike, or, as in rational choice theory, who strive to achieve the same goal. In other words, these accounts do not treat solidarity as created, agitated for, and as transformative – capable of challenging and establishing political and social orders. The contexts mentioned at the beginning of this text, which have brought the topic of solidarity to the surface (again), have mostly generated writing that positions solidarity as a corrective and neglected aspect of interpersonal behaviour, now advocated as a tool for overcoming the consequences of the current capitalist and liberal-representative models of governance (Bauman 2013). In a way, they can be said to be part of a new wave of utopian thinking.

However, this emerging ‘solidarity talk’ is not without opposition. There is strong criticism – even from within the strain of thought focused on alternative ways of organizing modern communities in the face of imminent economic, geo-political and climate dangers – regarding whether ‘better’

societies can be founded on principles of solidarity. Critics say that solidarity is insufficiently political, relying primarily on instantaneous individual or group reactions and on human emotions instead of on systemic, institutional solutions; or that it is something of a companion to neoliberal policies – for, with the implosion of the welfare state and the significant depletion, or even outright abandonment, of policies designed to help the poor, immigrants, and those less-fortunate, direct solidarity among people has emerged to fill institutional gaps. This is said to be in accordance with neoliberal principles of governance, as it fits the formula, ‘do it yourself,’ and is why some have highlighted the co-optation of concepts usually thought of as radical or anti-establishment, like *active citizenship* and *direct action*, but also solidarity, into mainstream politics (Joseph 2013). My contention here is that in order to fully explore the political dimension of solidarity, we must first situate the concept in relation to some (preferably many) already established frameworks of thinking about the political community.

**Solidarity and citizenship – a paradoxical alliance**

It is within theories and models of citizenship that I want to situate my (limited) exploration of the political value of solidarity. There are a couple of reasons for this. Firstly, if we want to go beyond isolated gestures and actions of solidarity, to question its general capacities for political reordering, we need to firmly anchor it in broad concepts that capture the ideals and visions of political community. Without a doubt, citizenship is one such concept. Secondly, as I will shortly elaborate in more detail, there is hardly a theory or approach to citizenship that does not presuppose some aspects of solidarity as foundational. Finally, and closely related to the previous point, citizenship and solidarity, although often conceptually intertwined, form a paradoxical duo, reflecting further potential paradoxes that may arise from endeavours to engage solidarity as a political principle. In short, citizenship is a simultaneously inclusive and exclusive notion, incorporating the idea that some sort of boundary encircles a body of citizens (most often, but not exclusively, nation-state boundaries), despite the fact that solidarity loses much of its meaning when expected to operate and be exercised within certain imposed limits. I will return to this point briefly, too.

Citizenship is an indispensable element of every political community: encompassing dimensions of statuses, rights and identities (Joppke 2007), it serves as every polity’s “legal foundation and social glue” (Shafir 1998:

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Shaw and Štiks (2012: 317) have noticed a tendency among citizenship studies scholars to use triadic divisions when explaining constitutive elements of citizenship. Similar to Joppke’s division, authors like Wiener, Bauböck, and Bellamy have used, respectively: rights, access and belonging; membership, rights and practices; rights, belonging and participation.
It is “intimately linked to the ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand and of attachment to a particular community on the other” (Kymlicka and Norman 1995: 283). Above all, it is a relational concept with three constitutive elements: individual, community, and the relationship between them (Wiener 1999: 199). Thus, transcending issues of legal and formal statuses and rights (as well as obligations), citizenship is pertinent to wider social questions of who belongs (who ought to belong; under which rules), who is left out (and why), what types of relationships co-citizens form, what kinds of relationships exist between citizens and the state, and the nature of relations between citizens and non-citizens. These relationships are not only the result of policies and constitutional settings, but to a large extent are shaped, directed and mediated by public discourse and widely-shared narratives, in which the motif of solidarity plays an important role. The idea of solidarity with co-ethnics or with other co-nationals under the same state institutions helped underpin national citizenship in its modern inceptions (Brubaker 1992). Social citizenship (rights to education, health and social protection, etc.), implemented through an institutional distribution of national wealth, is built on ideas of egalitarianism and solidarity with less-fortunate co-citizens; multicultural citizenship, in its quest for the recognition of differences, accentuates solidarity within ethnic and religious groups; and so on.

Solidarity thus, as a discursive trope, can be found in different narratives and interpretative frameworks to purport different ideas and ideals of citizenship, as the latter remains conceptually heavily indebted to the former. However, solidarity’s role is often only presupposed, or taken for granted, and rarely thematized as a consistent feature of interpersonal relations that demands its systematic place in citizenship. The two basic models, or generative “ideals of citizenship” (Pocock 1998), namely republican and liberal – both developed in ancient times, in Greece and Rome, respectively – envisioned strong communal ties that enabled the birth of citizenship, but accentuated other features that had to do more with individuals as citizens than with the relationship between them. The republican vision of zoon politikon valued the citizen as free and agentic (a property-owning male, needless to say), “capable of ruling and being ruled,” as Aristotle famously put it. The Roman citizen gradually evolved into legalis homo, a man whose rights are acknowledged and protected. Both traditions are echoed in today’s understanding of citizens as free, right-bearing members of society and agents in their political communities, but what role has solidarity played in the evolution of these ideas?

Throughout modern history, citizenship has developed a space for struggle – for inclusion into the political community and for the protection of rights, which have gradually been seen as inseparable from the essence of what it means to be human. Equality and inclusion have thus become principles
propelling the fight to secure and expand citizenship rights. It was social contract theories that posited, albeit in different ways, that the natural state of human beings, gathered together in a community, mandated that some natural and inalienable rights be recognized. The American and the French revolutions, by way of the United States Constitution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen), transformed, even if only declaratively, all acknowledged members of the community into equal citizens. Though many remained outside this citizenry, most notably slaves and women, a new ideal of citizenship was set and a new era in the fight for citizenship rights was ready to begin. Citizenship struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries, exemplified in movements like abolitionism and the fight for universal suffrage, further accentuated the ideals of equality and solidarity. Abolitionism and the suffrage movement especially relied on principles of solidarity, as they were international movements, in which there was an even greater need for transnational ties, mutual recognition and support, and the capacity to put mass pressure on national governments.

Solidarity and citizenship grew conceptually closer as a consequence of two historical trends. On one hand, solidary networks, built across nation-states, emerged from the common fight for equal citizenship. On the other hand, those very struggles helped stabilize the notion of national citizenship, and the nation-state as its container – where solidarity was needed among citizens (of a nation) – and was often strengthened and maintained with the help of nationalist ideologies. In a way, this intra-national solidarity worked to undermine international forms of solidarity, especially when the latter threatened to work against the interests of the nation-states themselves. This is how Balibar (1988) explains the role of the rise of equal citizenship in suppressing the international workers’ movement:

“...[n]ationalism is entirely constituted in its modern form in the context of the class struggle and the ‘social question’ which it has tended to control and, if possible, to supplant. The denial of class identity and the affirmation of national identity go hand in hand... [t]he recognition of ‘universal suffrage’ is closely coupled with imperialism... The ‘dangerous classes’ have been allowed access to citizenship – let alone begun to have their workers’ rights acknowledged as one of its necessary components – only on condition that they transform themselves into constituent parts of the ‘body’ of the nation, and therefore into (real or imaginary) masters or, more exactly, foreman of imperialist domination.” (Balibar 1988: 726)

We can already see how solidarity and citizenship, and especially solidarity within citizenship, form a peculiar dynamic. However, the historical experience of two world wars, together with the turbulent inter-war period – during which unprecedented waves of migration occurred when tens of thousands were stripped of their humanity, primarily because they were
stripped of their citizenship statuses – strengthened the argument for citizenship as “the right to have rights” (Arendt 1951). Then, the post-World War II political order of the West and the triumph of the welfare state solidified the role of solidarity in consolidating citizenship. This is particularly highlighted in T. H. Marshall’s famous essay (1998) on “Citizenship and the Social Class,” where he outlined the history of citizenship in Great Britain as the history of the struggle between capitalism, which stratifies society, and citizenship rights, which aim to bring equality to all, and concluded with an optimistic look at the then-present epoch, in which social citizenship (equal access to health care, education and other social services) had allegedly transformed the whole population of post-war Britain into one class of citizens.

Solidarity in citizenship, thus, in our recent history, has mostly meant the acceptance of new social contracts by which some portion of accumulated wealth is distributed (mostly through taxation) in such a way as to accommodate the ideal of an equal citizenry. However, as we know, this social contract has been challenged for quite some time, as has the idea of a universal citizenship exemplified in Marshall’s essay. These challenges, along with attempts at reframing citizenship, which I will outline briefly below, have given new meaning to citizenship solidarity as well.

New social movements, coupled with a rise in identity politics from the 1960s onward, destabilized universal citizenship and its ideals of equal political and social rights. Culture and identities became new sites of struggle, as the claim that the so-called universal citizen actually has gender, ethnicity, and religion – namely, that s/he is not universal at all – grew stronger (Nash 2000). This questioning of formal/legal equality, said to mask unrecognized inequalities, transformed the dominant understanding of the political within citizenship, and gave rise to new calls for solidarity among minorities and repressed groups. An overall cultural turn and an increasing prominence of politics of recognition reframed the struggle for citizenship rights, most notably with advocacies for different rights for differently disadvantaged groups through new normative models such as group-differentiated citizenship and multicultural citizenship (Marion Young 1989, Kymlicka 1995). This opened up new debates on the place and role of solidarity as a cohesive force in citizenship. Whereas proponents of different variants of multicultural citizenship insist on the need for solidarity with those who feel excluded and marginalized – solidarity that presumes acceptance of special rights, exemption from certain laws, and cultural sensitivity in public domains and discourses – critics point to the ghettoization of citizens and a consequent loss of solidarity bonds with the wider citizenry (Carens 2000, Barry 2001, Phillips 1999). This shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ notions of citizenship solidarity, therefore, was a result of the shift from redistribution to recognition (Fraser 1995). Indeed, although Kymlicka
(2009), for instance, insisted that the fight for different sets of rights (social or cultural) cannot be seen as a “zero sum game”, it is hard not to notice the decoupling of cultural issues from socio-economic ones that coincides with the rise of politics of identities (Phillips 1999) and the “relative eclipse” of social politics by cultural politics (Fraser 1997: 2). Or, as Joppke put it: “With the ethnic diversification of society the basis for social rights becomes brittle while other types of rights move to the fore: rights of anti-discrimination and multicultural recognition.” (Joppke 2007: 38-39).

Besides these shifts within the paradigm of citizenship rights and entitlements, a re-conceptualization of citizenship has also occurred vis-à-vis processes of globalization. The flourishing of concepts like cosmopolitan citizenship, post-national citizenship, de-national citizenship, etc. (Bosniak 2000, Soysal 1998) indicate that modern conditions of accelerated globalization impact our way of thinking about the place and role of individual citizens in a world that is no longer dominated exclusively by nation-states, but also by global interests, international institutions and politics, and ever growing flows of people and capital. Here, I want to single out two concepts of citizenship that rely on such insights and demand the appropriate regulation of citizens’ rights and duties to accommodate emerging global conditions. Ecological citizenship stresses the need for the just distribution of ecological space and suggests new international politico-legal regulations, based on ecological footprints, where those with greater footprints would be legally accountable to those whose access to natural resources is limited or endangered. As Andrew Dobson argues (1995; 2004), we need to think of these regulations in terms of citizenship, since access to shared ecological space concerns us all as citizens and should therefore be regulated as a political issue. Even though citizens around the world participate in a single ecological community, access to and use of ecological resources is not equal, and the distribution of those resources is not just. Therefore, the regulations of ecological citizenship would impose obligations and reparation measures on those with a larger ecological impact (the subjects of this obligation-centred citizenship are primarily states).

Another example of a global citizenship model, again with a stronger focus on obligations, is the proposition of Isin and Turner (2007) for a global system of taxation on different kinds of transnational mobilities, which would create an international fund to alleviate the consequences of global catastrophes and at the same time strengthen the mutual rights and duties of all citizens in the world:

“If people started, albeit in a modest way, to pay for their rights and to contribute through taxation to the common good at a global level, human rights would become a more tangible part of everyday life. The ‘ordinary man and woman’ would feel involved in global projects to prevent famine
and drought, and they would begin acting as cosmopolitan citizens. Without a cosmopolitan taxation system, the UN will continue to be largely dependent on US funding and generosity, both of which have been declining anyway. Without these changes, human rights will be subject to the criticism that they are fake rights because they do not correspond to duties.” (ibid: 16)

This overview of various conjunctions between citizenship and solidarity treats the latter in an unusual way given that one of its most common features – namely internationalism – is not thematized. This is due to the unique role solidarity plays in strengthening the sense of membership and belonging within citizenship. Bearing that in mind, and even though solidarity figures as a necessary rhetorical tool for different variants of citizenship (national, welfare, multicultural, global, etc.), we could perhaps assert that it is in fact incommensurable with the notion of citizenship. Citizenship functions simultaneously as an inclusionary and exclusionary concept, because it “in itself embodies legalized discrimination, since it presupposes a legitimate distinction between citizens and non-citizens” (Dedić, Jalušić and Zorn 2003: 25). The exception to this is found in the last two examples above, but it must be stressed that they represent only theoretical models and that they face strong criticism – together with other models of ‘alternative’ or ‘hyphenated citizenships’ – by scholars who insist that the concept of citizenship only functions within real existing political communities and is operative only when it indicates state membership (Joppke 2007; Oommen 1997).

Can solidarity, then, play any constitutive role in building social and political relations if boundaries defining who is included are set in advance? Or could we claim that the political engagement of solidarity actually instrumentalises its powerful connotations to mask other political imperatives and motives? Here, we are dangerously approaching the problematic claim of a true nature of solidarity and we could perhaps engage in a different, non-exclusionary way. But, again, could it be for political purposes, given that political community always implies (exclusionary) boundaries? Or should we presume that citizenship can indeed be applicable to global, transnational contexts? Below, I will focus on some of the defining features of solidarity itself and will then return to the question of its relationship with citizenship.

**What kind of engagement is solidarity and can it help build political institutions?**

To be able to deal further with the questions raised above, we need to define what types of relationships could be said to take the form of solidarity. First, we must differentiate between solidarity and other forms of empathic behaviour. Discussing the differences between pity, compassion and solidarity in her book *On Revolution*, Hannah Arendt remarks:
“It is out of pity that men are ‘attracted toward les hommes faibles’, but it is out of solidarity that they establish deliberately and, as it were, dispassionately a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited… For solidarity, because it partakes of reason, and hence of generality, is able to comprehend a multitude conceptually, not only the multitude of a class or a nation or a people, but eventually all mankind… Terminologically speaking, solidarity is a principle that can inspire and guide action, compassion is one of the passions, and pity is a sentiment.” (Arendt 1990: 88-89).

It is not only the nature of affection and action that sets solidarity apart from other empathic impulses, it is also the nature of the relationships it builds. So, let us consider further how solidarity differs from charity. One of the defining traits of solidarity, I would argue, is an implicit levelling that occurs between the parties involved, and this is where the difference between charity and solidarity resides – in the principle of equality. Charity does not imply a critique of existing hierarchies; it merely ‘prescribes’ the desirable moral conduct for those on top of the social and economic ladder. Solidarity, on the other hand, emerges from situations in which people recognize each other as equal, and thus entitled to the same rights and living conditions. We act in solidarity when we want to alleviate some sort of injustice or respond to its consequences (whether man- or nature-made). Hence, the social values underlying solidarity are equality and justice, mutually intertwined, as the just order is seen, in this respect, as the order of equality.

I would also contend that solidarity is defined as an act (or a condition for acting, and for living) when we simultaneously give something and give up on something (again, a levelling occurs). To be in solidarity with thus implies the sharing of a position or experience with those who need or seek solidarity, and a partaking in their situation. This also means that acts of solidarity do not necessarily have to be acts at all (in the sense of agency). Sometimes, it is with inaction, with a refusal to act, or with self-censorship that we show our solidarity. This point is illuminated by an answer Judith Butler gave to the question ‘What does solidarity mean to you?’ in a recent interview: “Solidarity means that you stay in the group with others because you share the feeling of revolt or injustice and you want to change the world, and you stay with that group even though you may not like all the people there … it asks a lot of your time, it means spending your time with people you do not necessarily like, it asks of you to give up on the simplicity of your private life… it means to stay with the group and to stay together to attain the shared goal”. Solidarity thus imposes limits on our individual agency, and to individualism in general, stressing the higher importance of

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a group cause or principle we share with others. In other words, some sort of communalism is always implied in solidarity.

Now, returning to the question of citizenship – and keeping in mind its particular historical and political meanings, its different frameworks, and the various interpretations of the internal force of citizens' solidarity – we can ask again, within citizenship, where do potentials for engaging solidarity exist?

Since citizenship is still predominantly a state-bound concept, let me begin with this ‘traditional’ understanding of it, involving constitutional protections of statuses and rights and established norms for relations among members. State citizenship has an almost asymptotic relationship with equality, striving to attain it as a proper constitutive ideal, but constantly reproducing internal hierarchies and classes of not-so-equal citizens. Solidarity thus produces tensions with citizenship, not only regarding the exclusionary nature of the latter, but also, in a narrower sense, regarding failures to accommodate the equality of the statuses, rights and identities of all citizens. In this respect, solidarity could hardly be expected to perform as anything more than a corrective, or as a warning of the need for more inclusive communal citizenship in which identities are not entrenched but work toward stabilizing a shared political identity. Yet, a formula by which political freedoms and social equality can co-exist must still be found. The welfare state’s model of social citizenship is, in my mind (however pessimistic this may seem), the pinnacle of institutionalized solidarity within the modern nation-state – with systems of taxation that rely on inter-generational, inter-regional and social and economic solidarity. The biggest threats to this model are current austerity measures and politically-manipulated narratives of changing ethnic and ‘cultural’ balances. Here, we should consider the dangers of what Richard Sennett called “the destructive solidarity of us-against-them”: “The perverse power of solidarity, in its us-against-them form, remains alive in the civil societies of liberal democracies, as in European attitudes toward ethnic immigrants who seem to threaten social solidarity, or in American demands for a return to ‘family values’.” (Sennett 2013: 279). These threats need to be challenged and opposed from the position that social solidarity is essential for building just and equal citizenship communities. In that sense, Rorty was right to point out that “feelings of solidarity are necessarily a matter of which similarities and dissimilarities strike us as salient, and that such salience is a function of a historically contingent final vocabulary … we should create a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have and we should take into account those we instinctively think of as ‘they’ rather than ‘us’” (Rorty 1989: 192, emphasis added). However, I want to underline that solidarity, within this frame (of state-bound citizenship), inevitably remains ‘thin’ and expected to ‘work’ inside state boundaries, and is thus susceptible to a loss of its argumentative power when confronted with dangers presented as ‘external’.
International solidarity – of the kind scholars and activists predominantly have in mind when exploring and engaging the concept – expresses the ideals of equality and justice more purely, in a broader political space that transcends nation-states and encompasses the whole of humanity. Instances of international solidarity can indeed be political in that they are capable of forming institutional relationships and challenging power relations, as well as creating new ones. But this comes with significant limitations, especially related to the durability of such endeavours – which usually do not produce lasting political formations, let alone political communities – and due to the fact that they do not significantly challenge state institutions, which remain the primary locus of political power managing our statuses, mobility and fundamental rights.

Finally, models of international, global citizenship – despite the criticism they receive for overstretching the concept of citizenship – are important to bear in mind when thinking about the prospects for linking solidarity and citizenship. These models rely on a vocabulary of rights, obligations and durable institutions, and take into account the global condition of citizens' universal rights, thus embarking on an attempt to define, however loosely, the global community of citizens. Isin and Turner's thoughts on cosmopolitan citizenship, for example, resonate particularly loudly right now, as the world faces one of the biggest refugee crises in recent history. For, when we travel or move abroad, we move from one citizenship regime to another, retaining some of the entitlements from the previous regime and expecting protection from the one in which we are entering. Or at least this is what some of us expect and receive. We take these rights to mobility and protection of our interests for granted, as established freedoms won some time ago. However, at this very moment, we are witnessing constraints on the freedom of movement, the protection of human rights and the right to seek asylum. In debates about the refugee crisis in Europe, the cost of accommodating refugees is often raised, and is used by many member countries as a pretext for not dealing with the issue. And though it is clearly not the only contestable question, the recent deal between the EU and Turkey did reveal that accommodating a great influx of population comes with a price tag. If we could reach a global consensus that human destinies should never be made subject to budgetary negotiations, would it not make sense to develop an international system of taxation – of the

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4 *Citizenship regime* as defined by Shaw and Štiks (2012: 311) encompasses “the citizenship laws, regulations and administrative practices regarding the citizenship status of individuals but, in addition to that, it also refers to existing mechanisms of political participation. More precisely, a citizenship regime is based on a given country’s citizenship legislation defining the body of citizens (i.e. who is entitled to citizenship and all duties and rights attached to that status), on administrative policies in dealing with citizenship matters and the status of individuals, and, finally, on the official or non-official dynamic of political inclusion and exclusion.”
global mobility of both people and capital – that could transform the privilege enjoyed by some into an assistance fund for others? This would incorporate both elements of citizenship and solidarity; and yet, this model has its limits as well, for it does not include partaking in shared experiences and it supports equality and justice in a very restricted manner. Therefore, this is another variant of a ‘thin’ form of solidarity, devoid from direct involvement and bottom-up action.

With no current plausible linkage between ‘thick’ solidarity and citizenship, the relationship between these two mutually-related concepts remains open but is nevertheless crucial for further thinking about the politically transformative potential of solidarity. Citizenship’s essential ideal of equality must be formulated in such a way that it does not create tensions between unity and inclusion (a dilemma Sennett sees as overlapping with the disputes between the political Left and the Social Left, Sennett 2013: 39–40) – where unity justifies exclusionary measures, and inclusion (diversity) is said to weaken unity. And solidarity’s appealing force should not too readily be attributed to its presupposed universal character: solidarity is instead a process, in which joint effort and work is a necessity, that does not rely on any universal presumption but is itself “a universalizing political relation” (Featherstone 2012: 38) rooted in concepts of rights, status and a sense of shared membership, epitomized best in the notion of citizenship.

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Jelena Vasiljević
Mogućnosti i ograničenja angažovanja solidarnosti u građanstvu

Rezime
U širem smislu, ovaj rad se bavi solidarnošću kao politički operativnim pojmom. Kako bismo mogli da odgovorimo na opšta pitanja, poput: Šta znači zasnovati političku zajednicu na principima solidarnosti? Mogu li akti solidarnosti poslužiti ne samo kao pomoć (podrška) drugima, već i u cilju promene odnosa moći i konstituisanja novih političkih poređaka, isprva moramo pozicionirati solidarnost spram nekih već etabliranih okvira mišljenja o političkoj zajednici. U ovom radu razmotriću političku vrednost solidarnosti unutar različitih teorija i modela građanstva. Kao prvo, ukoliko nas zanima solidarnost izvan izolovanih gesta i akcija, te ukoliko ispitujemo opšte kapacitete ovog pojma za proizvođenje novih političkih poređaka, moramo ga usidriti u postojane, a ipak dovoljno široke konceptualne okvire koji sadrže u sebi probleme ideala i vizija političke zajednice. Bez sumnje, građanstvo je jedan takav okvir. Uz to, skoro da i nema teorije ili sistematskog pristupa građanstvu koji ne podrazumeva neke od aspekata solidarnosti kao svoje elementarne postavke. Konačno, u bliskoj vezi s prethodno rečenim, građanstvo i solidarnost, iako stoji u pojmovnoj svezi, sačinjavaju paradoksalan par iz čega se mogu proizvesti i neki budući potencijalni paradoksi s obzirom na poduhvate angažovanja solidarnosti kao političkog principa. Ukratko, građanstvo je ujedno inkluzivan i isključujući pojam, koji u sebi sadrži ideju granice koja obuhvata telo građanstva (najčešće, mada ne isključivo, granice nacije-države), dok solidarnost uglavnom gubi svoj smisao ukoliko se očekuje da bude primenjivana unutar određenih nametnutih granica.

Ključne reči: solidarnost, građanstvo, građanska prava, jednakost, pravda, globalno građanstvo