Bojan Vranić

Democratic Values, Emotions and Emotivism

Abstract The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson's ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in moral and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum's concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and political disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents' emotional judgments.

Keywords: democracy, emotivism, emotional judgments, moral disagreement

Introduction

After losing the 2013 elections in Australia, former labor prime minister Julia Gillard published an article in The Guardian, in which she analyzed the election defeat.¹ There is an intriguing message in the heart of this text: when a politician loses political power, it feels like an emotional upheaval of her or his world (Gillard, Internet). In the aftermath of the defeat, Gillard (Internet) remembers that she had “waves of sensations” that manifested themselves “like a pain that hits you like a fist, pain so strong you feel it in your guts, your nerve endings.” The situation was similar in the labor election camp where one could talk only about “the guilt” (Gillard, Internet) and that she felt that her colleagues shared this upheaval feeling with her. Gillard concludes the text with a notion of hope that from collective “grieving” there should spring a new “purpose” of the labor party: “To protect those who need us to shield them. To empower through opportunity. To decide what future we want for all our nation’s children and then build it” (Gillard, Internet).

¹ The paper is a part of research project no. 179076, funded by Ministry of education, science and technological development – Republic of Serbia.

Bojan Vranić: Assistant Professor, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Sciences; bojan.vranic@fpn.bg.ac.rs
How should a political philosopher understand Gillard’s message and its normative content? To answer this, a political philosopher should take into consideration at least two additional questions: (1) Why does Gillard describe the feeling of the loss of power as emotional upheaval and (2) what specific emotions form a cluster of that upheaval? If one looks at the mainstream theories of contemporary political philosophy, it is particularly worrying how empty the basket of analytical tools that can be used for understanding emotionally upheaval situations in political life is. Even if one manages to acquire such a tool, it is usually used for describing the behavior triggered by emotions. As Robert Solomon (1976: 129) argued, emotions (or passions) in social thought are usually taken for an irrational part of human nature which leads to suffering and inactivity.

However, it is encouraging that in the last several decades, philosophers (Solomon 1976; Nussbaum 2004; Gilbert 2014; Freeden 2014) started to question this dominant paradigm about emotions. The hypothesis that appears in various forms in their works can be summarized in the following question: do our emotions have a structure of a judgment? If we return for a moment to Gillard’s quest for a new purpose for the Australian labor party, that quest might have emerged from her emotional state, but it cannot be inferred from this state that such a quest is irrational. To set new political ends when a politician loses an election is a rational move. In Gillard’s case, that move was derived from an emotional judgment, the one that she describes as collective grieving.

Mainstream political philosophers often ignore the emotional state of political actors and deduce rational behavior from impartial principles that are, per definitionem, deprived of subjectivity. One of the best critiques of the current state in political philosophy comes from ethics:

“In ethics, for example, moral knowledge has become equated with the elaboration of highly formalized and stylized decision procedures, with extremely general ‘first principles,’ and with manipulating the logical implications of hypothetical cases whose occurrence in daily life is either impossible or improbable. The result is the production of a kind of knowledge that has no valence, that does not speak to human needs, fears, and aspirations, and thus cannot attract the assent of the biographical self, but only a kind of purely logical assent. The further result may be, as Annette Baier claims, that the morality endorsed by many moral theorists ‘is seriously endorsed only in their studies, not in the moral education they give their children, nor in their reflective attitude to their own past moral education, nor even in their attitude to how they teach their own courses in moral philosophy’” (Calhoun 2004: 112).

In this paper, I want to explore the relationship between emotions and democratic values. Democracy is a suitable subject for this kind of exploration
because it is a political arena where participants are in permanent contest over the meaning of values. I argue that political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate the normative paradigms of political life. Consequently, values as a traditional means of evaluating political systems (primarily in political science but also in political philosophy) are reducible to emotional judgments. By explicating this reduction, I hope to shed new light on the role of emotion in political philosophy.

In the first part of the paper I will briefly analyze contemporary context and explain the lack of usage of the concept of emotions in political philosophy. I turn then to the first major attempt to solve this problem found in Stevenson’s ethical conception of emotivism. In the second part of the paper I analyze the thesis of Robert Solomon who argues that emotions are purely subjective emotional judgments and Martha Nussbaum’s account that emotional judgments are closely related to the values of a society. I conclude the paper with a description of the nature of the relation between emotional judgments and values.

**Political philosophy, impartiality and emotivism**

The conflict between political philosophers who find that passions are an indiscernible part of politics and those who want to liberate political concepts from irrationalities reached its peak in the mid XX century. The critics of classical ethical and political thought of that period strongly argued against the normative dimension of moral judgments: in the best case scenario, the strength of moral judgments is in their emotional appeal.

This conflict turned into warfare between moral cognitivists and anti-cognitivist (Stojanovic 1968). Albeit cognitivist ethics won in this conflict, there were severe casualties, especially in the field of political philosophy. This is why the passion is dispelled from contemporary political philosophy, establishing the monopoly of the *ratio* that is supported by a new political science paradigm taken from economics. In a recently published text, Jon Elster (2004: 160) argues that the problem of passions and emotions lies in the probability calculus of political actions or inactions, i.e. that emotions need to be calculated two times in the account: firstly, as a variable that is dependent on an actor’s motives and secondly as an ex-ante variable. Put differently, to take emotions into account in political behavior is to disregard the principle of elegance of a theory, i.e. the requirement that theses of a scientific theory should remain simple.

This account portrays well the dominant attitude toward emotions in political science. The problem with this kind of attitude is taking for granted that political behavior is causal. When Julian Gillard (Internet) lost her power as Australia’s prime minister, she asked the following question: “Are election
victories the only measure of political success? (...) But surely our national story is written in more than statistics of election night. Our national story is shaped by what endures from the government as well as what is rejected.”

What follows from Gillard’s assumption is that the measurability of political success is rational and economical, but the means that political agents use to evaluate political acts are inferred from cultural context. Therefore, one’s view of political success consists of rational and emotional components.

A good way to start a quest to find an analytical means of evaluation in political context is by exploring the ethical doctrine of emotivism. Although it is considered to be vastly misunderstood and anachronistic today (Satris 1982: 128), Charles Stevenson’s work *Ethics and Language* is a treasure house of analytical tools for analyzing non-rational moral judgments. My reason for opting for Stevenson’s work is twofold. Firstly, Stevenson’s analysis is a good example of how logical analysis can be applied to emotions and therefore has an introductory function to the argument for emotion as types of judgments. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1967: 671) described Stevenson’s theory as the one that “combines emotive and cognitive meanings of all sorts and fuses subjectivism with most types of objectivist naturalism.” Secondly, Stevenson takes a specific moral situation as his subject-matter, the one that implies an existence of moral disagreement between agents. This type of situation is especially important for democracy, because democracy represents a social context where moral disagreements are recognized as a “natural state.”

Stevenson’s main argument is that moral judgments consist of a recommendation for accepting a behavior $P$. This recommendation “involves something more than a disinterested description, or a cold debate about whether it is already approved, or when it is spontaneously going to be” (Stevenson 1958: 13). The structure of moral judgment has a rational basis (“disinterested description” and a “cold debate”) which Stevenson (1958, 3) terms as *attitudes* and defines them as beliefs (that are necessarily connected with objects in the world) which form relations that are verifiable or falsifiable. Attitudes provide information about expected behavior and serve as truth function to moral judgment, since there cannot be an agreement or disagreement on a non-belief (Stevenson 1958: 12). Therefore, this verifiable/falsifiable part of a moral judgment is a weak support for moral thinking and it cannot be considered as a sound ground for ethics.

This is why Stevenson claims that moral judgments need to involve something more that would have the function of a supporting beam for moral behavior. This kind of support Stevenson terms as *emotive meaning*. This

---

2 The nature of the concept of emotive meaning is such that it is not reducible to rational part of a judgment. Emotive and rational part of a moral judgment support
DEMOCRACY AND ETHICAL VALUES

concept is key to understanding why emotivism was the most popular ethical doctrine in the mid XX century but, more importantly, why it eventually failed. Stevenson (1958: 33) defines this concept in the following manner: “The emotive meaning of a word is the power that the word acquires, on account of its history in emotional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as distinct from describing or designating them.” I will analyze two parts of the definition which are important for my argument, i.e. accumulation of power and the use of that power.

I will start with the latter. Stevenson makes a distinction between emotions and emotive meaning. Emotion is a subjective and internalized state, which is reflected in certain behavior when one is in a certain context (Stevenson 1958: 39). The use of emotions in this manner is something that the subject learns from his or her environment. Stated in this way, Stevenson’s theory is significantly distinctive from the James-Lange theory of emotion, because it puts emphasis on a socially dependent meaning of emotions. As Errol Bedford (1964: 83) argues, the consequence of this “social context” dependency is that “statements about emotions cannot be said to describe behavior; they interpret it.” That is to say that emotive meaning has a different logic than that which one uses when evaluating attitudes.

I will explicate this view with an example. Suppose that Schrödinger used my cat, Steven, for his experiment. The outcome of the experiment as well as the paradox that sprang from it are well known. However, for me, as the emotionally involved party in this experiment, the question has a different emphasis and priority than solving the paradox of quantum mechanics: Is it justifiable to use Steven the cat for this kind of experiment? Put differently, I am using a different kind of logic while evaluating the justifiability of the experiment and its results. This becomes clear when reflecting the seemingly (or partly) paradoxical moment when Steven the cat was alive and dead at the same time. If I were to use rational means to explicate this situation, the fact that Steven is my cat would not change the outcome of the experiment: it is still a paradox. With emotive meaning, the logic of the evaluation changes: my emotion is a cluster\(^3\) of joy and sorrow, and behavioral reaction is crying over Steven the cat’s fate to be the guinea pig for an experiment that involves radioactive substances. Is this an emotional paradox? The answer is certainly negative. Everyone knows at least one situation where they were at the same time sad and happy (weddings, divorces, job changing etc.). Emotional meaning is socially dependent and therefore has a crucial role in moral disagreement.

---

3 This cluster is probably consisted of several more emotions (excitement, horror, resistance, etc.), but they do not make a difference to the argument.
Following this example, it becomes clear that crying (or lack of it) is a learned reaction to maltreatment of a living creature (this is even more emphasized when there is an emotional relationship with that creature, i.e. when the cat is your pet). Although it seems *prima facie* that it is sufficient to assert “x cries; x is witnessing a maltreatment of his pet” to infer “x is sad”, it is still not a necessary conclusion. In a given social context, where the experiment is inconclusive whether the cat is alive or dead at a certain moment, the emotional meaning of crying can also be a joyous reaction. Also, if one uses the descriptive method in order to conclusively infer the emotive meaning of crying, that wouldn’t be of great help. Stevenson (1958: 249) argues that the function of description is only to determine whether a behavior is rational or irrational: if the attitudes of a moral agent contain some epistemic fallacies, then it is a case of irrational behavior (e.g. I believe that Steven the cat is in the box, when in fact the box is empty). Irrational behavior is therefore a question for epistemology and not ethics. This is connected with the fact that moral disagreements can endure even after all epistemic difficulties were removed (e.g. I can keep worrying that next time, Steven the cat will indeed die in Schrödinger’s box).

This example demonstrates that Stevenson’s notion of “use of power” of a moral word has the function of solving disagreements by changing the logic of a situation, from a rational to an emotional one. Emotive meaning is socially and culturally dependent. Still, it remains to be explored what does it mean that a word has a *power* which charges it with emotional meaning. This can be best explicated by evoking Stevenson’s argument (1958: 60) that the meaning of a moral attitude remains solid even after the meaning of object that is connected to that attitude had changed. Therefore, the use of concept of power in Stevenson’s account fits the notion of disposition.

The concept of power comprehended as a disposition is not new in ethics. In *De Anima*, Aristotle (2008: 116, 433a-15) found that emotions (i.e. passions or desires) are a significant part of human behavior. However, he explicitly used the term disposition when defining the relation between passions/desires and the object of passion in book seven of *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle (1980: 37, 1105b-1) argued that this relation is a constant that follows one’s behavior when he or she is near the desired object, i.e.

---

4 Stevenson only briefly mentions that emotive meaning is learned through socialization. He argues that moral judgments are formed through a specific type of practice that extends to a lifetime and is also depended from situations in which these judgments are stated (Stevenson 1958: 91–92). Only several decades later, the thesis of emotional socialization took its form. For TenHouten (2006: 191), emotional socialization is a way for people to emotionally season through lifetime, developing more or less sensitivity towards other people’s attitudes. This led some authors (Baron-Koen 2013) to connect certain forms of emotional behavior, such as empathy, to the nature of evil.
in a condition to feel something about that object. Prior to explicating the nature of the relationship between disposition and the concept of power, it is important to analyze the question whether desire itself is a disposition (not only the relation between desire and the desired object)?

The answer to this question is negative. To state my argument, I will modify Aristotle’s example from De Anima of a physician and his motivation to treat a patient. Aristotle (2008: 116, 433a-5) claimed that physician does not treat a patient due to the fact that he is skilled in the art of medicine. Formal knowledge of the art is a necessary condition for him to be in a social context of practicing medicine, but it is not sufficient. Both necessary and sufficient conditions are met only when the patient is actually in front of the physician, i.e. when they are socially interacting. The years of training in the art of medicine take the form of the desire to help and cure the patient. As Hannah Arendt (1978: 58) argued, in Aristotelian ethic it is necessary for the reason to include some kind of “calculation” in order to actualize the desire. Arendt (1978: 58) found that this type of calculus ethics (exemplified in the notion of phronesis) is deduced from the meaning of the concept of “oregō” which “indicates the stretching out of one’s hand to reach for something nearby”, and which Aristotle used as a synonym for a desire (orexis). In the example with the physician, his knowledge does not have the power to heal a patient; this power derives from the physician acting. This example shows that acting and disposition are synonyms, and disposition and desire are not.

Aristotelian doctrine is very much present in Stevenson’s theory of emotivism. The result of Stevenson’s analysis (1958: 73) is an argument for a distinction between belief (knowledge, practices) and dispositions. The purpose of belief is in applying descriptive meanings of words used in a moral judging, while the purpose of dispositions is in evoking learned emotional meanings. For Stevenson (1958: 44), there is no equivalence between emotions and dispositions; emotions are reduced to behavioral reactions that are more or less morally appropriate in certain social contexts. The moral judgments, however, are independent from and irreducible to emotions. This antireductionism and an escape from naïve subjectivism was the reason for the popularity of Stevenson’s theory in the mid XX century. The greatest debates about emotivism were concentrated on the relationship between emotion and emotive meaning. The latter does not need to be followed by any kind of emotion. The function of emotive meaning is to evaluate whether an act and situation are congruent from society’s point of view. If not, there need to be changes, whether in an agent’s behavior or of social norms. In this sense, emotive meaning is both evaluative and normative. The twofold function of emotive meaning further dispels subjectivism but, at the same time, because of the premise of its social dependency,
emotivism dismisses universal moral principles and reduces them to socialization of cultural norms. Emotivism is not subjectivism but it has nevertheless been followed by psychological determinism.

This was the main reason why emotivism eventually declined. I will analyze this problem in detail and try to determine how emotivism can be modified to avoid the problem of psychological determinism. The overlap of emotive meaning and acting would be a simple process if it weren’t for what Stevenson (1958: 90) designates as a consequence of the ambiguity of natural language. To avoid this kind of ambiguity, Stevenson designs a procedure for the formalization of ethical meanings that consists of a series of definitions that sharpen the meaning of the word and which he terms “the first pattern analysis” (1958: 89). The distinction between formal definitions and everyday usage of the word is purely analytical: the meaning is determined by language practices which assert what is good and just and what is corrupted and evil. The first pattern analysis serves to indicate the historical meaning and changes of the moral word and to isolate the emotional surplus of that word.

This is a useful tool for explicating the social context and emotional history that is prior to interaction between moral agents. The result of the first pattern analysis is twofold: the description of the correct application of disposition within a context and a judgment that consists of assertions “I approve” or “I disapprove”, which has a special behavioral function to arouse the emotive interest of the hearer (Stevenson 1958: 93). If this interest is not evoked, then one of two cases is true: either the word of which I approve/disapprove lost its emotional appeal or it has no meaning (the object to which it refers no longer exists or the hearer has lost any recollection of it).

The arousal of emotive interests is not necessarily related to both cognitive and affective elements. It is sufficient that only one of them is affected, in order to start the communication between moral agents. Castañeda (1967: 673) argues that this is one of the constitutive elements of the Stevenson’s theory and terms it the ethical-core thesis:

“The characteristically ethical meaning of an expression, to be called its ethical core, consists of both the expression’s emotive meaning and the expression’s cognitive meaning consisting of its denoting some natural property or other. The statemental components F1, . . ., F, may vanish; in such a case the ethical meaning of the word in question conforms to the
first pattern of analysis. The autobiographical component may vanish; in such a case the ethical meaning of the expression in question conforms to the second pattern of analysis” (Castañeda 1967: 673).

Castañeda’s formalization of the thesis demonstrates well that the function of the first pattern analysis is the removal of ambiguities that the use of a word can lead to, especially when not all of the natural features of the object that the word connotes are known. The removal of ambiguities is not a morally contested process, because it is done by purely formal rules of analysis. What if, however, the “autobiographical components” of an agent’s attitude are not communicable? If that is the case, then the analysis of the whole assertion is required in order to find the emotional meaning of the attitude (Castañeda 1967: 673). In this part of the analysis, the focus moves from the historical meanings to persuasions. Put differently, when the ambiguities are removed, and moral disagreement still persists, the only thing that agents can do is to try to persuade each other that the moral conception that they are respectively opting for is the best one. This is the part of Stevenson’s second pattern of analysis.

Stevenson (1957: 139) argues that persuasion is the ground of deliberation when all rational means for resolving the disagreement are exhausted. Persuasion is not irrational, but a non-rational way to settle a moral disagreement. Stevenson (1957: 221) infers that in a moral situation which cannot be solved via rational means, one can only apply the lexicographic sorting principle on the meaning of moral terms and then evaluate them on a ranking scale. This scale is not objective but subjective and for this reason, moral terms remain emotionally charged. Evaluation groups moral terms by their “family resemblances” (Stevenson 1957: 221) and ranks them by the strength of their emotional appeal.

If one is willing to sacrifice the universality of moral principles, and reduce them to social interactions between moral agents and their power to persuade one another, Stevenson’s theory is an adequate basis for the analysis of moral thinking. When moral agents have accurate descriptions of the moral terms that they are using, the moral disagreement is to be settled by the agent’s readiness to get emotionally evolved in the matter. This would be rational behavior, if Stevenson’s first pattern analysis should achieve its purpose. Stevenson’s behavioral definition of emotion is too narrow. The problem can be summarized in the following question: if the emotion is reduced only to perceivable behavior, and it is not connected to the reflection of moral words and concepts, how is the evaluation in the second pattern of analysis possible? In order to see “family resemblances”, one needs to know the criteria for family grouping, i.e. to be able to conceptualize emotions, not just show them. The criteria are blocked by psychological determinism which is generated by behavioral reduction. Finally,
DEMOCRATIC VALUES, EMOTIONS AND EMOTIVISM

Bojan Vranić

To state that emotional meaning is the criteria for evaluation would be a vicious circle, because the disagreement started because of the emotional meaning of the attitude.

I will try to remove the problem of psychological determinism from the first pattern analysis by redefining the role of emotions in moral disagreement. I will argue that emotions have an active role in structuring values that form the agent's moral thinking.

**Evaluative function of emotional judgments**

In the previous several decades, philosophers and moral philosophers have been exploring the possibility of emotions having a regulative function in the life of an individual. The pioneering work in this field was Robert Solomon's book *The Passions* (1976). Solomon's work is also the first major break from the traditionally negative relation of philosophy to emotions, as well as from once very influential behavioral theory.

Solomon explicated his stand on emotivism only recently and argued that the main problem with this ethical doctrine is the removal of rationality from emotive judgment (2007: 205). However, this was already implied in *The Passions*, where he stated that agents should strive to comprehend the logic of emotions:

“But it is also true that most emotions are shared in common by all people, whatever their differences in languages, customs, religion, etc. The logic of the emotions is in no case simply ‘the one’s own’; in every case the logic of emotions, once its parameters are known, is a public affair... Logic dictates the course that emotions will take, and that is where we expect them to go. Similarly, we criticize our own emotions, in reflections or retrospect, for their foolishness and stupidity, for their lack of justification and unreasonableness, and such criticism make sense only on the basis of an objective logical structure which we expect our emotions to follow” (Solomon 1976: 257).

Solomon’s view is different from Stevenson’s emotivism in at least two ways: (1) the emotions are not learned behavioral reactions – they are autonomous in their own logic; (2) the rational and emotional are different ways of thinking, both derived from the same objective basis.

To justify its cause, Solomon (1976, 180) introduced the concept of intention into his account: “To say that emotions are intentional is to say that they essentially have logical connections with the objects of our world... Emotions are not ‘mental states’... An emotion is a structure linking ourselves and the objects of our world which provide the structures of our world.” By introducing intentionality into an account about emotions, Solomon puts more emphasis on reflections. Emotions are not just a means of
communication; they have an autonomous role in converging a subject’s world view with an objective one: “An emotion is a basic judgment about our Selves and our place in our world, the projection of the values and ideas, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and through which we experience our lives” (Solomon 1976: 187).

Solomon’s subjectivism dispels the difference between emotions and emotional meaning and converges them into emotional judgments. For an agent, emotions have both structural and semantic roles by giving sense and meaning to the objects in the world. However, Solomon modified his original account to remove surplus intellectualism from emotions (Solomon 2007: 204). Solomon later argued that emotional judgments are inherently connected with acting about and not conceptualizing the world. To make this clear, Solomon (2007: 206) gave a useful example: Imagine that you are strolling down the street. Every step of the way you are making judgment about your direction (e.g. should you continue walking or stop by the window). Do you think about the judgment? No. If you, however, trip and fall, and when it comes to a disturbance in the structure of the walking-plan that you made, then you will stop, think and evaluate what had happened. Put differently, in situations of some sort of crisis, the emotional evaluation process increases, while in “normal” condition, thinking and evaluating our actions are in a “sleep mode.”

Solomon’s account is very useful for analyzing emotional judgments in this kind of context and it can serve as a good basis for dispelling the problems of emotivism. When the theory of emotional judgments is applied to Stevenson’s first pattern analysis, it broadens the role of emotions. Historical recollections are an important part of an emotional judgment but sill just a part. For Solomon (2007: 257), emotional judgments create a network between internal moral world of agents and the world around them. The concept of network also changes Stevenson’s idea on the use of power (disposition). The power of moral agents is a result of their ability to conceptualize a network between their emotions and the social world through acting.

The concept of emotional judgments is the first step in correcting emotivism. Is it now possible to argue for universality and normativity of moral judgments in the context of moral disagreement? Solomon (2007: 206) stated that emotions would be unintelligible if it were not for universal moral judgments that are irreducible to persuasions. However, due to the subjectivism of Solomon’s account, universal moral judgments are still just a 6 Empirical research in issues of nationalism and national identity (Pantic 1995, Kecamanovic 1999), verify this thesis. Societies that are in a deep social crisis are often followed by value regression which manifests itself twofold: internally, through subjective disorientation as a consequence of demise of values, and externally as an absence of emotions that are important for maintaining a group cohesion.
psychological support for emotional judgments. Therefore, this universality is more like a communicability, i.e. it has the function of making the agent’s emotional judgments communicable. If the theory can somehow justify that these moral judgments are not just communicable but universal, then emotions (transitively) would be equivalent to values. The structural consequence of this equivalence would be the inter-reducibility of emotions and values in moral theories.

I find that Martha Nussbaum’s account offers justification for the idea that emotions and values are equivalent. Nussbaum (2004: 190) argues that emotions are not reducible to emotional judgments; they are a part of each other identity. This conclusion is inferred from four premises (Nussbaum 2004: 187–189): (1) the domain of an emotion has at least one object (the concept of “aboutness”); (2) the relation between emotion and object is intentional and it is linguistically expressed by propositional attitudes; (3) the emotions contain beliefs and perceptions about objects; (4) emotions bind objects and values together where emotional judgment has the role of the mediator.

Premises (3) and (4) are inferred from (1) and (2). The difference between these “groups of premises” is analytical, but very important. The first group of premises (1–2) are connected with authentic interpretation of objects by an agent. From the definition of intentionality, it follows that emotions have a crucial role in selecting objects that are important for an agent. Similar to Solomon’s account, Nussbaum seems to argue that emotions have both structural and semantic roles. The difference is that Nussbaum deprives emotions of the feature of world-structuring and limits them to object-selecting (via intentionality). This unties the normative function of emotions from psychological grounds. The second group of premises (3–4) are means of agents’ communication that are dependent on beliefs built within the first two premises. Nussbaum (2004: 189) argues that beliefs “are essential to the identity of the emotion” because they constitute the axis of disagreement between agents as well as the way to settle them.

If premise (3) identifies the disagreement, premise (4) identifies that the nature of disagreement lies in values. It should be stressed that inter-reducibility of emotions and values cannot be inferred solely from connection between objects and values. What can be inferred is that value disagreement was triggered by emotions. There are two processes that need to be taken into account when explicating value disagreement. Firstly, emotions make intrinsic values of an object communicable by relating them to social values. This feature of the premise (4) is derived from premise (2). Secondly, during that process, emotions necessarily select some intrinsic values and rank them on the basis of the agent’s value system which does not need to be congruent with social values. This is derived from premise (1). This sheds
light on a consequence that was not *prima facie* clear. Due to their evaluative function, emotions have the power to make some objects more valuable than others by making them “ultimately finer and more discriminating than that made explicit in our earlier evaluative judgments” (Helm 2007: 228).

Nussbaum (2004: 193) argues that in a social context where some sort of disagreement persists, the emotions are preceded by a more or less intensive upheaval of the agent’s system of beliefs. This is connected to those emotional judgments that emotionally (re)select objects. The key change that Nussbaum brings to the discussion about emotional judgments is that this connection is *not a necessary one*. Nussbaum (2004: 194) finds that it is the natural language that is deceiving agents into believing that the connection is a necessary one since it is represented as a causal relation. It is plausible to imagine a context where a change is caused by disappearance of an object, that an agent had a strong emotional reaction to it, but that his or her belief system stays sound. To test the authenticity of emotions and the system of beliefs connected to them, Nussbaum (2004: 193) introduced the concept of upheaval: only when the emotion is strongly related to an upheaval, it is justified to argue that the agent is in a process of reevaluating his or her system of beliefs and harmonizing or conflicting it with a new social value system.

The concept of upheaval is connected with emotions, but disagreement and its settling is a subject-matter of emotional judgment. This follows from premise (3), i.e. that the disagreement is always about agents’ beliefs. Emotional judgments have a *normative addition* which is not case with emotions. Albeit emotional judgments are a vital part of the identity of emotions, their form (propositional attitudes) limits the possibility that all features that are connected with the former are true for the latter, *salva veritate*. What is blocking the reduction is the agent’s need for a continuity of emotional relations in order to sanitize damage from the emotional upheaval. This implies that in some cases, beliefs are founded solely on the collective memory of an object that no longer exists (e.g. the

---

7 Stevenson asserts a similar conclusion, stating that descriptive and emotional meaning are in “constant interplay” (1957: 72). He points to the case of the feelings of most Americans toward the democratic political system as an example (1957: 73). According to Stevenson, Americans have a recollection of what democracy is and that they maintain this set of attitudes via the laudatory meaning of democratic values. What is important is that this recollection is not necessarily in congruence with the factual state of American democracy, which can bring change to the laudatory meaning of democracy or the democratic system itself.

8 Example: The nostalgia for social benefits of the communist state is a common emotion in post-communist societies (Kecmanovic 2008: 76), and yet, as empirical evidence shows (Diamond 1999: 178–183) it does not necessarily relate negative values with democratic system.
founding myths of a nation). But the converse can also be the case: one can have strong emotions about an object whose existence is an offence to all that society stands for, and still the normative order of the society can remain relatively solid (e.g. the case of representative democracy that respects the rights of minorities to an authentic value system). For this reason, the emotions and emotive judgments in Nussbaum’s account are important for each other’s identity, but this is not a logical type of identity. Reduction is false if all elements cannot be reduced to the same basis. In the case of emotions and emotional judgments, reducibility is impossible due to a strong network that exists between the latter and the normative order of the society. The existence of this network allows me to conclude that emotional judgments and values are inter-reducible. Emotional judgments are knotted into the normative order of the society once the agents settle at least one of disagreements. Emotional judgments, therefore, have normative features.

Concluding remarks: democratic values are emotional judgments

My analysis has shown that the plausible version of emotivism is the one consisting of the first pattern analysis that describes both the form and the meaning of moral terms in use, and the second part of the analysis that maps the network of emotional judgments that are to be used in the settling of moral disagreements. This modified emotivism does not damage Stevenson’s basic idea that emotions are at the core of moral disagreements. The advantage of the modified emotivism is that it determines the relations between emotions and values and finds that their overlapping point is emotive judgments, i.e. value inferences derived from propositional moral attitudes.

Is this modified emotivism verifiable? In order to answer the question, I need the context where disagreeing is a natural state for actors. As stated previously, this context is to be found in democracy.

It is a truism that political decisions in democracies are reached by a consensus among all participating parties. What is contestable is the nature of this consensus, i.e. whether it is rational. One of the key points of emotivism is that purely rational conceptions of resolving moral disagreement are essentially incompatible with the ways that actors actually behave, which is both rational and emotional. To put this differently, political decisions in democratic processes is value-oriented and, due to the emotional nature of values, partial.

The term “partiality” should be used somewhat cautiously because, in this case, its purpose is merely technical. Partiality here emphasizes the fact
that agents choose to use one cluster of values in democratic debates over
an other, and that nature of this choice is often not rational. In his most
recent book, Michael Freeden (2015: 87) argues that emotions play a vital
role in agents’ ranking of the objects that they value the most and adjust
them to the existing order of the social values. When partiality is compre-
hended as ranking, it becomes clear that this term is closely related to the
concept of the freedom of choice as an inherently democratic value. In the
context of democratic decision making, ranking is a purely political act.
Therefore, it is true per definitionem that the emotional judgments that one
uses to rank political objects are a political act as well.

This enables me to conclude that values (at least political ones) are reduc-
tible to emotional judgments. That is to say that a political philosopher, when
justifying political principles and decisions, needs to take into account both
rational and emotional elements of actual (i.e. socially and culturally de-
pendent) behavior. As Margaret Gilbert (2014: 23–24) stressed, in order
for an emotion to be a collective one, i.e. to be found as valuable by most,
there must be a joint commitment of population P to be a body of emotion
E; and for this commitment to be true, there must be sufficient reason for
that. Since sufficient reasons for E are synonymous to justification for ac-
cepting E as a collective emotion, joint commitments can be defined as a
“network of emotional judgments that forms the consensus.”

Every political act, if it is to be morally justified and legitimately recognized
as intrinsically democratic one, it must be supported by an emotional judg-
ment. Since emotional judgments are to be accepted as collective emotions
only when they contain sufficient reasons for those emotions, it follows
that emotional judgments and values are inter-reducible.

References
Aristotel (1980), Nikomahova etika. Beograd: BIGZ.
Hopkins University Press.
University Press.

Bojan Vranić
Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam

Sažetak

Cilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa Stivensona kao prvi celovit pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbauma, kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokrati-jama rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera.

Ključne reči: demokratija, emotivizam, emocionalni sudovi, moralni sporovi.