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Social Pathologies, False Developments and the Heteronomy of the Social: Social Theory and the Negative Side of Recognition

Abstract  The aim of this paper is to explore a tension between two concepts designed to expose social discomforts in Axel Honneth's mature work, namely social pathologies and anomie. Particular emphasis will be given to how they contribute or obstruct Honneth's apprehension of social tensions. In the first session of this exposition I will show that Honneth's interpretation of social pathologies is based on a conception of society as an organic whole (I). While this interpretation represents a slight change regarding Honneth's understanding of social pathologies in Das Recht der Freiheit, it does not change the fact that in his work subsequent to that book the concept of false developments has not been properly theorized. Accordingly, social discomforts related to deviations from expected patterns of a normative reconstruction remain largely ignored. This calls for a perspective more fully able to grasp the heteronomy of social life (II). As a result, in Honneth's mature work there seems to be a tension between the aims of a normative reconstruction and those of social critique, mainly due to an inability of the author to combine both elements of his social theory. In its final section (III), the paper will address that tension in order to critically contribute to Honneth's attempt to link normative reconstruction, social analysis and criticism.

Keywords: Social pathologies; anomie (false developments); normative reconstruction; social criticism; social conflicts.

Introduction

In the theory of justice exposed in Das Recht der Freiheit, Axel Honneth (2011) distinguishes two forms of social discomfort: Social pathologies and anomie (or, as he alternatively puts it, false developments). Presented in that book as false understandings of the intersubjective conditions for the realization of social freedom, social pathologies are later related to a different conception of society Honneth exposed afterwards, namely that societies should be understood in analogy to organic bodies, so that social pathologies are illnesses of society (Honneth 2014). In any case, those social pathologies are described as having their cause within the norms of social interaction; furthermore, they

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cause the subjects to act upon a falsely justified comprehension of the ideals and norms to be collectively achieved in a given society. Hence, it is necessary for Honneth to make clear what are those collectively shared, underlying goals, which according to his method possess normative value. This method is the normative reconstruction of modernity’s norms and ideals, among which the principle of social freedom enjoys the highest rank. Generally speaking, Honneth’s reconstruction of modernity’s values and ideals follows the path opened by Hegel and complemented by Durkheim and Dewey, and is named by him a functional normative perspective, according to which social differentiations fulfill the normative function of enabling the institutionalization of ever new forms of individual self-realization, hence allowing society to be reproduced through the gaining of legitimacy before its members.

The second form of social discomfort, tough, has ever since not received much attention from Honneth. This could be partly explained because he describes anomie as having their causes somewhere else, that is, outside of that organic conception of a good functioning society, the development of which is the part of his work that has been given the bulk of attention as much by him as by other commentators. Furthermore, in a more recent work (2015), Honneth appears to endorse explanations of social discomfort solely as social pathologies. However, in another paper (Honneth 2013), he does seem to affirm that false developments rather lie in a zone of barbarized social conflict. As a result, the analysis of that discomforts that have not to do with the internal logic of the system of reciprocal recognition that lies a the basis of social freedom, that is, the analysis of the false developments either finds no room within the architecture of Honneth’s theory or is relegated to a subaltern position.

Nevertheless, some authors have pointed the need of a more refined understanding of the negative side of recognition (Martineau, Meer and Thompson 2012). Some highlighted how different forms of misrecognition may be encountered in social reality and thus plea for a typological study of those (Klikauer 2016), some showed how the reinforcement of recognitional ties in situations of social disintegration can lead to the ambiguous effect of establishing forms of group-based animosity (Kaletta 2008), and some showed how specific forms of discomfort are also expressions of a discontent towards the general forms of political and social organization of the modern era (Smith and Deranty 2012). All of these investigations have in common that they are not particularly related to forms of social discomfort whose cause could be allocated within a misunderstanding of the ethical norms that govern social interaction; they all rather reveal the existence of claims that at some level try to justify alternative norms or values for the social organization. Yet, the key point here is not what specifically unites them all, but to show that in many situations experiences of misrecognition, disrespect
or derecognition are the result of practices, which are intended and justified by those involved in their performance. Accordingly, these claims for the reorganization of society imply a critique of normative legitimation and hence challenge the very chosen criteria for a normative reconstruction (Claassen 2014).

This last challenge represents, so the argument in this paper, an attempt to bring back in the game those social and political claims that have been dismissed by Honneth’s method. On the one hand, this paper defends the idea that this task could be better accomplished through a model of social analysis of the phenomenology of recognition, as exemplary developed by Cillian McBride (2013). Particularly, such a model would permit us conceptualize collective claims as a dispute among different and sometimes concurrent worldviews over normative hegemony and legitimation within society. Applying this approach to the highlighted necessity to refine the research on the negative side of recognition, it should be possible to contribute to the investigation about the causes of the lack of recognition (Ikäheimo 2015). Finally, such a theoretical model would enable a better understanding of those social discomforts called by Honneth false developments.

In its conclusion, this paper will argue, against Honneth’s emphasis on internal discomforts, that either the organic conception intentionally refrains from apprehending the complexities of social conflict or it tries to subsume anomie within the concept of social pathologies, hence making the distinction between both unnecessary. Throughout this paper the idea will be advanced that Honneth tends to second option; yet, a more promising strategy for social philosophy would be to develop a social theoretical approach to the moral grammar of social conflicts and to the phenomenology of recognition. Accordingly, Honneth’s limitation regarding the analysis of social conflict could be overcome through a distinction between the heteronomous moment of social life, considered to be a moment in which claims for normative authority are raised, and the moment of institutional social freedom, considered to be a moment in which moral progress can be a posteriori normatively.

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2 It should be understood here that some social groups support and work for the implementation and institutionalization of specific social practices and routines that lead to relations of subordination or derecognition, even if they claim to be interested in establishing relations of recognition. In this sense, such practices are the result of an intentional design by groups able to exercise social power. Yet, some of these practices are openly particularistic, which demands from the groups involved that they justify their belief that particular practices are a better worldview among concurrent others. Of course, not every particularism is a question of social power (think of supporters of a football club), as well as not every form of hierarchisation results in particularistic forms of derecognition (think of ideological, patriarchal recognition of women’s beauty, shyness and fondness of housework). Nevertheless, some particular forms of misrecognition only can be exercised if social power comes to play.
reconstructed. In advancing this critique, the paper will defend the idea that Honneth’s option for following a philosophical tradition of normative functionalism that goes back to Durkheim, Parsons and Hegel makes him indebted to what some critics have called normative history (Freyenhagen 2015). If, however, social theory should retrieve a theory of heteronomous conflict as an alternative to the Honnethian model of cooperative normativity, it should approach the idea of heteronomy as a feature of social reality, and indeed as a feature that predates the choices met by the methodological procedure of normative reconstruction. This will lead to the somewhat complicated, yet promising social theoretical claim that Honneth’s conception of the objective reality of social freedom is rather a normatively organized form of a much vaster, heteronomous, social reality, within which collective claims struggle for legitimacy.

Social pathologies and the society as an organism

According to Honneth’s exposition in *Das Recht der Freiheit*, social pathologies cause effects on a level of social reproduction other than that of the establishment of chances for equal participation on cooperative processes (2011: 157). Since he considers that the effects of social pathologies occur on a higher, reflexive level, it is fair to say, first of all, that Honneth conceives modern societies as being normatively ordained in two levels which are equally important for their reproduction. The first one is the level of institutionalized mutual cooperation for a society’s material reproduction, a level in which implicit norms and ideals take factual shape; the second one is the level of the comprehension about the normative character of the reproduction of social life, a level in which those norms and ideals which will be put forward in the first level are reflexively legitimated. It is precisely because of this dual picture of society, that Honneth’s approach to social discomfort includes, beyond forms of traditionally conceived social injustice, the notion of social pathologies as reflexive misunderstandings about the conditions of social freedom – but it also implies that such conditions for the realization of any collective principle undergo a permanent process of legitimization by the members of society.

Consequently, the normatively more complete form of freedom, social freedom, does not refrain from a dimension of reflexivity that would be expected to correspond to the merely partial form of reflexive freedom, on the contrary: a reflexive understanding of the underlying collectively legitimated ideals and goals is actually a trait of social freedom, for only through the possession of that understanding about the shared construction of social reality can the individuals fully grasp the objective character of the later (Honneth 2011: 81). In this sense, the misunderstandings identified by Honneth
as social pathologies relate to the underlying shared goals of society, that is, the norms established in order to find legitimated forms for the reproduction of collective life.

This conception of social pathologies, which was suggested to Honneth by Christopher Zurn (2011), takes such discomforts as an analogous to the Marxian concept ideology in the sense that they can produce false beliefs through a disconnect between the first-order contents of social life and the individual’s actual comprehension about them. So, they are to be understood as possessing the structure of “second-order disorders” (Zurn 2011: 345). In as far as social pathologies are related to that level of reflexivity, if the equation is reversed, one arrives at the picture of a society in which the expected normative developments would lead its member to have a comprehension about what exactly is at stake in social life, namely shared ideals and joint pursuit of goals. That is, one of the features of a conception of society centred around the notion of social freedom is that the individuals must have some sort of comprehensive capacity about the society they live in.

At this moment it is necessary to ask what is it exactly, that individuals must comprehend about society. Particularly, what is it that they must comprehend in regard to social freedom, so that normative developments can occur, or normative expectations can be fulfilled. Honneth’s answer to this question is given in the form of a method of normative reconstruction. Through an prospective investigation of the underlying normative ideals and values that are collectively shared by the members of society at every level of social development, he intents to find and expose the grounds through which modern societies are legitimated by its members and consequently reproduced over time. Reversely, these collectively legitimated ideals and values are used as the criteria by which a philosophical perspective can measure present society’s achievements in reproducing and legitimating itself. However, a further premise of Honneth’s method consists in selecting out of the variety of existing practices and routines only those that are indispensable to social reproduction. The key here is to show that those indispensable routines and practices are the embodiment of underlying principles which achieve legitimacy at the eyes of the members of society exactly because they are taken by the later to be fair, hence justifiable (Honneth 2011: 23; 26). Interestingly enough, this selection of material implies that some of the attitudes found within social reality are considered to be in accordance to the underlying criteria of normativity, while others are not. While this means that progress can only occur when some normatively justifiable values are met that surpass the forms of freedom existing until that given moment, it also means that the moment in which the political and social disputes over the norms occur are left out of analysis. Thus, the criteria of progress are measured by their ability to find legitimacy whereas legitimacy can only be normative if
it means progress, or put otherwise: legitimated values and ideals are normative and their realization means normative progress.

Progress, then, occurs when new norms and values are legitimated and promote wider chances for the individual self-realization of individuals within society, so that the main reason for new norms to be legitimated is, according to this conception, their capacity for being more inclusive. For this reason, Honneth affirms that a normative reconstruction that claims some sort of moral progress within modern societies must also show that every level of newly established principles are normatively superior to the old ones (Honneth 2011: 120). First of all, this move makes the construction of ideal norms unnecessary, for the norms and ideals are the result of what one could call momentary social contracts and in this sense, they are historically shaped to be as good as the concerned can expect them to be at that given situation; but it also reveals how the procedure of normative reconstruction implies a degree of teleology, although this teleological background is accessed rather from an *a posteriori* perspective (Honneth 2011: 111-2). More important now, is to understand that moral progress happens through functional differentiations, that is through the transformation of the social institutions in order to fulfil the task of granting legitimacy even anew. Accordingly, what is there to be understood by the subjects about society’s reflexive level is the functional role those collectively legitimated arrangements must fulfil. As a result, Honneth arrives at an idea he applies initially to the analysis of economic markets, but that can be expanded to the whole of his social theory, namely, the idea of normative functionalism. According to it, in order to live up to the ethical promise of mutual recognition contained in the division of social labor, markets must be able to reflect moral rules of reciprociry, which means that even economic action in the capitalist market is coordinated through the ethical point of view of social cooperation and not only from an economic one (Honneth 2011: 333). A generalization of this

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3 In this sense, Honneth distinguishes two set of problems related to the premises of the capitalist market, the Adam Smith problem and the Karl Marx problem. The first one, which also concerned Emile Durkheim, is presented as tension within Smith’s thought in *The wealth of the nations* and in *The theory of moral sentiments* according to which the idea of individual profit maximization could only be properly understood if the subjects possessed the image of other individuals as trustful counterparts to her actions. The second problem is presented as the idea that in any case capitalist markets cannot live to the promise of free exchange because there is no escape from the fundamental relation of exploitation. As Honneth puts it, both perspectives cast shadows over the legitimacy of the market order; however, the second complex – if the economic market is a sphere of unavoidable constraint – is logically posterior to the first one – if the economic market indeed fulfils its institutional promises (cf. Honneth 2011: 326-331). Furthermore, Marx and Durkheim share the impression that social contracts are not free, but for Durkheim the conditions that make contracts unequal, and consequently not free, are to
principle would mean that in order to live up to the promise of accomplish moral progress through the widening of chances for individual self-realization, social institutions must be able to institutionalize functional differentiations that could later prove to be normatively better than the previous ones from the viewpoint of social freedom. As opposed to pathological practices characterized as “unlearning” or “deficits of rationality” (Honneth 2011: 157) in order to fulfil the expectations normatively reconstructed, subjects must comprehend functional differentiations if they are to fully grasp the reflexive structure of social freedom, but they also must be able to legitimate only those differentiations that generate more freedom, if they are to contribute to moral progress.

The level of reflexivity in which social pathologies eventually develop is, thus, the level in which collective arrangements are met and legitimated in order to society to permit a wider range of moral forms of self-realization to occur. Social pathologies, for their turn, are distorted understandings about those values and their function.

Yet, the very idea of social pathologies is not undisputed. Arto Laitinen, for instance, is not completely sure that there is no difference between reflexive social pathologies and a further differentiated form of social pathology. Accordingly, he refers to social pathologies as a third-order disorder (2015: 45). His criticism of Zurn (and Honneth) refers to whether the idea of a disconnect is enough to explain all aspects of discomfort that occur within the reflexive structure of modern societies. Laitinen begins by approaching this reflexive structure and presenting it as possessing four aspects, or orders, which could be roughly summarized as: the first order, that of objective reality; the second one, that of consciousness; the third one, that of the self-conscious reflection about the first two; and a fourth order, that of the institutionalized comprehension about the contents of the other three, that is, the ethical life. Laitinen’s question is whether one should limit the occurrence of disconnects to the passage from the second to the third aspects or if there is rather different forms of disconnect at different aspects – thus making true of his Anna Karenina principle, at least at its negative side (Laitinen 2015: 51).4

Nonetheless, Honneth would rather plead for a different solution. Instead of acknowledging this multilayered structure that could locate disconnects

4 Laitinen refers to Tolstoi’s idea that every suffering is a particular form of suffering, whereas all forms of happiness are alike (Laitinen,2015: 45). Its negative side, that is, that every suffering has its own specific character, is proven true if Laitinen is able to show that at every level of disconnect a specific form of discomfort can emerge that not necessarily fits into the scheme of reflexive disconnects.
in any of those societal orders, he seems to move in the direction of an unifying idea of society as an organic whole, inside of which pathologies are unexpected developments. To make sure, his account of the society as an organism is to be understood as a tool that allows social pathologies to be understood rather as a collective experience than as individual ones. Correspondingly, in as much as social pathologies affect society as a whole, one must admit that as many social pathologies can exist as different levels of importance for the reproduction of society exist. For Honneth, they are three: The relation of humans to the external nature, the formation of a socially internal nature (of humans) and the regulation of interpersonal relations. This does not means that he could accept the truthfulness of (the negative side of) Laitinen’s Karenina principle, but that although they find specific forms relating to each of the spheres in which they emerge, the structure of social pathologies is always the same: the failure in accomplishing the tasks associated with the vital functions within each of those three levels (Honneth 2014: 58). His solution would rather run like that: behind closed doors, every unhappy family is unhappy in their own particular ways; in public they are unhappy in the same way!

This solution, however, is only related to social pathologies and not to the second kind of social discomfort mentioned by Honneth, namely the false developments.

**False developments and the heteronomy of the social**

Had Laitinen managed to make true of the negative side of the Anna Karenina principle, what could be said about the attempt to make true of its positive side, the idea that all happiness look the same? This also proves to be an important task, once one acknowledges the importance of Rutger Claassen’s (2013; 2014) objection to Honneth’s normative reconstruction. According to Claassen, in his reconstruction of the normative values that are embedded in the sphere of capitalist markets, Honneth implicitly relies on a constructivist point of view, albeit unacknowledged. Claassen begins his argument by questioning to what extent the project of normative reconstruction implies acceptance of the implicit principles collectively legitimated by the members of society as that momentary social contract; furthermore, he asks if it is at all possible to reconcile subjects with different moral conceptions around this shared norms (Claassen 2014: 70). Subsequently, he claims that it remains unclear why Honneth ascribes to certain social movements, namely the ones who defend a cooperative market economy, the capacity to raise normative claims that are valid while other claims, for example the neoliberal Tea Party in USA or radical socialism, do not enjoy this status (Claassen 2014: 74). His central point is that in modern, pluralistic societies, virtually
every propositional claim is at least indirectly based on a philosophical basis, which is called upon when it comes the moment to justify those claims. Dismissing those grounds for justification as distortions or deviations would mean that one endorses some set of norms without discussing its advantages over others, and therefore raises the suspicion that the project of a normative reconstruction includes a hidden constructivist theory. Why, after all, should other social claims not be taken into account, even when they raise views about the functioning of the market that are antagonistic to the regulative one, although they still see the market as an arena of cooperation that represents the citizens’ aspirations, asks Claassen (2014: 75)? In general, therefore, his argument demands that in following a normative reconstruction, one would have to choose between two options: either to assume some constructivist theory that has to be justified \textit{a posteriori} (which is, according to Claasen, what Honneth should do and to a certain extent does); or try to explain how one among a variety of normative claims achieved an hegemonic position within the public sphere – or, at least, how one or some claims achieved legitimacy. This second path seems as important as the first because of the hidden premise that alternative claims could, on good grounds, be seem as normatively legitimated. If, on the one hand this is a criticism of the very method of normative reconstruction, on the other hand it seems to correct the later overemphasis on \textit{a posteriori} legitimacy through an emphasis in the claims that are raised amidst social conflicts.

The proof of the pudding would be, of course, exactly to show if those alternative claims for the organization of society would be in the position to bring about forms of societal reproduction that could be legitimated. What is needed here is to prove that instead of considering them distorted perceptions about social justice, those alternative claims are at the service of alternative notions of justice\textsuperscript{6}, even tough incomplete, that also represent popular claims. Honneth’s own attempt to redress the socialist project as a normative ideal akin to his own notion of social freedom gives a first indication that it may be possible to speak of alternative organization forms as possessing also a normative potential. Of course, Honneth’s view of socialism is of a very different nature from the one Claassen has in mind when he

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\textsuperscript{5} As a brief remark, it is important to note that Claassen assumes that competition is also a form of cooperation.

\textsuperscript{6} From a rather empirical discussion about the idea of a multiplicity of justice conceptions, see Rosenfield \textit{et al.} (2015). The authors try to show, through sociological analysis of biographical interviews with cultural agents, how these people perceive their contributions to society in different manners and, from that point of departure, formulate different conceptions of justice. Interestingly enough, the presented conceptions of justice have nothing to do with self-realization; they are rather related to form the concerned think society should be fairly organized.
gives his example, so it would be necessary to investigate in how far neoliberal or socialist views could pass the proof of legitimation.

Honneth, notwithstanding, has given a different response to that objection. His position is that the signs of History show undoubtedly how the normative content of modernity has progressed towards the present situation; he thus refrains from admitting that alternative claims are also not obviously wrong, as pointed by Claassen. Moreover, he affirms that the reconstructive methodology shows how the emergence of each given modern sphere of justice is accompanied by justificatory claims that make reference to the internal principle they embody (Honneth 2013: 39). Nevertheless, this response does not show why exactly these signs are the ones which reveal normativity or moral progress. It rather shows that the method of normative reconstruction is able to grasp the dynamics of change within society, as it refers to the signs of legitimacy of what I have called a momentary social contract. Such an answer is not dissimilar to the way Honneth has recently responded to Jacques Rancière’s objection to his theory of recognition. According to Rancière (2016: 93) the main problem with Honneth’s approach is the stance of identification that lies at the very ground of the concept of recognition; thanks to it, radical political change, or the reconstruction of implicit equality, cannot be devised, for it lies beyond the given terms of social agreement. Honneth replies that indeed such radical change can occur, as in the bourgeois revolution, and this should be called an external struggle for recognition, that is, one situation in which the involved cannot find the adequate means to express their dissatisfaction (Honneth 2016: 105). The most frequent struggle, however, is what he calls an internal struggle for recognition, that is, that sort of small struggle aimed at reframe and reinterpret everyday experiences of injustice and subversion (Honneth 2016: 106). As in his response to Claassen, it seems here that Honneth is interested in assessing the progressive character of the results of social struggle, and therefore he would rather refrain from engaging with social struggle itself.

But a more complex answer can be devised in another train of though adopted by Honneth, which would recall Critical Theory’s commitment to the Hegelian philosophy and merge it in the newly espoused notion of society as an organic body. In the tradition of Critical Theory, Reason is a tool out of the heteronomy of the social (Honneth 2011: 89). Particularly in Honneth’s attempt to actualize Hegel’s philosophy of right, Reason is potentially embodied in the ethical form of collective life. His response to why should some features of historical progress be understood as normative, thus, recalls their functional importance within the development of ethical life. Distortions or deviations are always distortions of and from the expected norms of ethical life. This candidate explanation would mean that, watched from a reconstructive
perspective, the signs of History show not only moral progress, but also that this progress meant the realization of the claims that could be collected at the moment of their emergence; furthermore, these claims may have proved to more inclusive claims than the then existing ones and this is why they won the public competition for legitimacy. In this sense, ethical life is not a mere embodiment of moral claims, but a way out of heteronomy that has proven, at the eyes of the concerned, to be a fair solution to the problems they faced.

Although factically acceptable, this too is not a proper methodological answer to the challenge of explaining, on the one hand, how one normative vision becomes hegemonic, and, on the other hand, how does this hegemonic view relates to other potentially normative claims. In general, even this complex answer still does not touch the affirmation that there are internal developments possible, which would be as easily legitimated among the concerned individuals as any other. The collection of evidence, as has already been shown, is itself guided by this *a posteriori* approach, which tends to dismiss concurrent claims. Consequently, fractures within the spheres to be reconstructed tend to be ignored and concurrent claims rather silenced by this approach. Much more interesting than dismissing then would be an attempt to understand if they could embody some normative form of societal reproduction. Here one would have to note that this line of thought leads to the assumption that the *social* in social freedom is a step out of heteronomy, so that there is a distinction between practical life and social life, where the former pre-dates the later. A set of questions would then arrive, which would revolve around the phenomenological experiences that pre-date social life (in Honneth’s sense) and determine which aspects of heteronomous social relations will gain entrance to the ethical relations as normatively legitimated.

If this is the case, the causes for social conflict over the normative authority for different moral claims must be sought somewhere out of the system of reciprocal recognition that underlies ethical life in modern societies. That is exactly where Honneth suggests that the causes for the anomie be looked for (2011: 231), for contrary to both moments of his understanding about social pathologies, the false developments have to do with the specific spheres in which they occur. But then it would also mean that the emergence of social conflicts is the heteronomous moment in which normative values are still to be defined.

First of all, the idea that at the still heteronomous moment of collective life (as opposed to the moment of social life) there are already normative claims that struggle for legitimacy makes it impossible to prove true the positive side of Laitinen’s Anna Karenina principle: One has to conclude that, because of the impossibility to rule out that different claims have also normative potential, there could also be different claims for what is fair or, put
otherwise, which principles should be referred to in order to organize social life. This implies, moreover, that the organization of collective relations of mutual recognition could also be challenged or redressed – and, naturally, this would affect the way the negative side of recognition should be theorized, for different forms of misrecognition or non-recognition would also have to be evaluated in light of the respective underlying philosophical basis of those possible rearrangements.

This is all the more important because it could be a step forward in conceptualizing the causes for the lack of recognition. As Heikki Ikäheimo has tried to show, there are at least three main candidates to be the causes for the lack of recognition: capacities, costs and understanding (Ikäheimo 2015). The absence of capacities can cause the lack of recognition in that there could be necessary skills for the giving and receiving of recognition that are missing; excessively high cost for the individual who intends to give recognition can also prevent her or him to perform it; finally, excessively high cognitive requirements about the giving of recognition can also prevent individuals from giving it. Whereas the evaluation of the lack of capacities to perform recognitional acts seems to Ikäheimo to be rather a problem of empirical oriented disciplines (2015: 33), he assumes that at least the other two candidate causes could be accessed from a philosophical viewpoint. From this point on, Ikäheimo considers that recognition is to be understood as something desirable and good for the involved only within the Hegelian scheme of concrete freedom. This approach to freedom requires from the individuals way more intellectual ability than the mere negative freedom, in the first place, because it demands from them that they understand that determination of one’s own self-interest depends on some concrete Other. Furthermore, if concrete freedom and its implied dependence on the presence of the concrete Other is experienced – or at least fathomed – by the individuals as being against her or his self-interests, it is possible that she or he concludes that the cost of recognizing the Other’s authority are too high to be met (Ikäheimo, 2015: 33-34). These distinction seems to roughly correspond to the distinction between social pathologies and false developments: The lack of understanding could be associated with the incapacity to comprehend in how far one’s own existence and ability to self-determination is embedded in the presence of concrete others; for its part, the assumption that recognizing the external authority of those others may be dangerous to one’s own self-determination shows that individuals may respond to concrete situations through the mobilization of their own expectations about their freedom, that is, their normative expectations. Accordingly, one could conclude with Ikäheimo that, although theoretical understanding is essential to establishment of institutional contexts of mutual recognition, the most essential issue for a practical understanding of the causes for the lack of recognition is
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the way particular conceptions of freedom guide factual thinking about the
goodness and badness of institutional designs and social practices (Ikäheimo
2015: 38), that is, how they relate to idea of social freedom.

If this is correct and the causes for the lack of recognition on the side of
false developments could be looked for in the different conceptions of free-
dom, it would not seem wrong to consider that underlying some practices of
misrecognition that the Honnethian organicist perspective would consider
pathological, one can also find attempts of normative justification that relate
to the notion of recognition. This is why it is necessary to advance the idea
that, among the cluster of phenomena that have been summed up under the
notion that individual’s moral conceptions may impede then to participate
in recognition relations due to their costs, some distinctions must also be
met. For that there is more to the negative side of recognition than social
pathologies has already become clear; likewise, it has also become clear that
the denial of recognition may have a moral-philosophical background. Fur-
ther investigation should eventually reveal that practices of denial of recog-
nition also occur in different forms.

For instance, Thomas Klikauer (2016) developed a typology of forms of neg-
ative recognition that goes beyond misrecognition and non-recognition.
According to him, at least four asymmetrical relations could be identified
(mostly within work relations, but potentially also in other spheres). Mis-
recognition is taken to be the non-intentional result of a failure to perceive
structural asymmetries shaping relations of recognition; non-recognition,
which can occur either as a sanctioned form of unequal treatment or as in-
formal acts performed in public, is the deliberately and purposely differen-
tiation in treatment engineered by those on higher positions; derecognition,
the third type, is the process by means of which one individual or group
withdraws previous attributed recognition from some group or individual;
finally, pathological mass-recognition is a form of exaggerated identifica-
tion between masses and one figure in a prominent, mostly political posi-
tion. Now, what is interesting about Klikauer’s rather confused typology7,

7 I say it is a rather confusing typology because Klikauer seems to bring together effects
(Misrecognition as failure), causes (overly identification and engineering of hierarchies)
and processes (non-recognizing) and present them all as negative forms of recognition.
Furthermore, even tough he speaks about formally sanctioned and informal non-recog-
nition, Klikauer fails to understand that many practices of informal non-recognition
could be better classified under a proper concept of derecognition. In order to do that it
would be necessary to consider that derecognition is more than a mere process that can
result either in misrecognition or non-recognition (Klikauer, 2016: 43). Derecognition,
from this perspective, should be treated as an action’s guiding principle that embodies a
series of moral conceptions of the involved about how they should relate to those who,
in relation to the ones prone to derecognize, occupy socially in inferior or external
is that it presents an internal differentiation between non-recognition and derecognition that seems to empirically support the view that behind practices of denial of recognition there are purposes and intentions by the part of those in better position to exert social power; moreover, Klikauer shows, through examples taken from work relations, how the planned avoidance of recognition is engineered in order to established hierarchies, which are deeply interwoven in new forms of managerialism, but that are still dependent on recognitional relations (2016: 43).

The centrality of the problem of hierarchy for theories of recognition is also emphasized by Cillian McBride, who thinks that the fundamental conflict over the achievement of respect and esteem should be understood in terms of a competition rather than in terms of a complementarity between aspects of recognition. By choosing the later, so McBride, one tends to ignore the fact that, as a normative phenomenon, recognition refers to the forms by which people evaluate each other (McBride 2013: 67). In as far as this evaluation occurs amidst a struggle for the normative authority individuals have over their own self-interpretations and the expectations of others towards them (McBride 2013: 6; 136), the establishment of normatively justified hierarchies serves a double purpose: On the one hand it reinforces the feeling of belonging of individuals towards the groups they recognize as their own; on the other hand, however, once a group achieves authority over a public narrative about its social position, that is, once a group succeeds in establishing social hierarchy, it finds itself in the position of determining how other relate to itself and to others. A particular effect of such competition over esteem has been explored by Barbara Kaletta. According to her, there are situations in which some groups or individuals experience a deficit in the position they occupy towards other groups, that is, a deficit in positional recognition caused by the concurrence they face within society for the acknowledgement of their particular achievements, their worldviews, or even their value as members of the community; in these situations, says Kaletta, groups or individuals that feel themselves threatened tend to develop responses vary between symbolic demarcations towards different Others and open violence (2008: 43). This whole complex of responses, which Kaletta analyses through the concept of group-based animosity (2008: 39), related in an ambiguous manner to the idea of recognition, for such groups that espouse that animosity aim at reinforcing their internal cohesion and solidarity through defending it from an imagined external thread. More important, those responses also show that subordinated groups develop responses to the failure of the positions. In this sense, some of the practices that Klikauer sees as accounting for informal non-recognition, as the rendering of some people invisible or the establishment of symbolic forms of demarcation could be understood as practices of derecognition that have intended institutional effects.
institutionalization of the ideal of equal respect, and that in these responses they replace the ideal that everyone is an equal member of the moral community with a rival, hierarchical view of the world (McBride, 2013: 67).

Again, we arrive at the notion that different conceptions of recognition, much like different notions of freedom, help organize worldviews that struggle for normative authority. Throughout this paper the social visions espoused by the representatives of such struggles, when they imply in the institutionalization of notions of freedom that differ from social freedom, have been shown to be purposely pursued ideals and goals. Accordingly, they should not be understood simply as embodiments of deviant or distorted understandings of the normative values of modernity, particularly of social freedom. If, on the contrary, they are taken to be part of an heteronomous societal reality that pre-dates the establishment of the functional differentiations, which will later crystallize in the progression of ethical life, one could associate those different conceptions with the struggles for the establishment of alternative norms for the organization of society. In this sense, what Honneth has been calling false developments would rather be associated with this moment of heteronomy. The question would then be, if one could actually speak of false developments, and if the answer is positive, how to relate then to that moment of heteronomy of the social life.

To speak of a moment of heteronomy within a Hegelian inspired theory of recognition seems plausible, on the one hand, because one of the methodological premises of a normative reconstruction is to select social practices and routines (Honneth, 2011: 26), thus leaving the door open to note that a much varied array of social practices occur around those selected. On the other hand, Honneth himself has attempted to present a sociologically inspired diagnose of the current state of the struggle for recognition, in which he arrived at the picture of a conflict devoid from moral foundations (Honneth 2013: 38). However, he seems to have chosen a different path for the development of his social theory. In conceptualizing society as a body prone to fall ill, the main cause of discomfort is the inability to reach the adequate adjustment between functional differentiations and the existing arrangements. The most important consequence of such an option would be, therefore, that all of the social discomforts would have to be understood in relation to malaises they would cause for the good functioning social organism. This is way, in public, every suffering is alike. Here, the concepts of deviance and distortion would gain upper hand, since they are the measure bar with which non-conform practices can be accessed and consequently the analysis – let alone the very concept – of struggle loses importance.

8 Interestingly enough, in the article dealing with the organic analogy Honneth mentions false organizations as social pathologies (2014: 57).
Therefore, apparently there are two ways Honneth could properly deal with the notion of false developments: he could either abandon it altogether, for it does not refer to more than practices that can more or less easily be rectified and do not relate properly to the features of institutionalized social freedom; or it could be subsumed to social pathologies, since, if the distinction between heteronomy and social freedom is discharged, each and every alternative moral conception could simply be taken to be a misunderstanding of the implicit value of freedom.

Nevertheless, none of those alternatives seem seductive enough either for the project of sociologically explaining the causes for the lack of recognition or for the project of better understanding those false developments themselves. As a conclusion I will try to summarize what could be gained by adopting that distinction between heteronomy and social freedom and accepting that the heteronomous moment should be taken to be a constitutive part of social analysis.

**Part III – Heteronomy and claims for justification**

If Honneth’s account of normative functionalism is indeed not suited to understand the diversity of claims for justice, it is because it cannot justify why some world views are normatively valid and others are not. Normative functionalism is rather a tool that enables an understanding of History from an *a posteriori* point of view (and note that this is not a God’s eye point of view), since by reconstructing the historical development of human societies by ordering the functional differentiations that made society come to where it is, it becomes clear which ones were the demands that once institutionalized generated moral progress. It is exactly thanks to this method of writing justice backwards that Honneth can properly speak of what Amy Allen called “progress in History” (2016: 13): being able to present the historical course of social life as a series of differentiations that fulfilled normative functions, it becomes clear that History progress in the direction of a higher moralization, or better, of a complexification of morality, one that enables even more people to achieve self-realization. Key here is that the functions can be reconstructed as leading to an actual state of affairs, and indeed, a state of affairs that can be deemed normative because it was possible to show that it embodied some very specific values, namely those of freedom as reciprocal recognition.

Although many regressive moments also occurred during the progression of History, compared to functional differentiations that enabled wider perspectives for the individual self-realization, they appear unambiguously as regressive moments. Yet, this is not the case for those claims whose wrongness cannot be asserted beyond any ambiguity. These alternative claims, now
putting it on the vocabulary of the Hegelian influenced Critical Theory, are part of the heteronomy of the social world. In this sense, the procedure of a normative reconstruction also shows how the members of society were able to organize their shared goals and collective ideals around the principles, which could most probably take them out of the heteronomy of the social world and institutionalize ethical forms of life. This is what I called momentary social contracts. But social research, and sociology in particular, care exactly about the social, political and economical elements that influenced such arrangements. Its interest could be achieved rather through a cartography of the social (Voirol 2012: 98). For with the application of the normative reconstruction also these not obviously wrong claims end up silenced, since they are thrown away as not belonging to the normative canon of functional differentiations. Among those claims, however, alternative conceptions of freedom and about the social order would also be found that could help understand practices that result in the denial of recognition to some members of society, particularly because subjects evaluate in how far they would be ready to cooperate with each other and recognize the value and authority of concrete Others. A suggestion not to let those claims out of sight for the theory of recognition would be to understand these claims sociologically, as demands for normative legitimation that precede the institutionalization of social norms and values. If this is correct, Claassen objection, namely that there are some political claims about the organization of social life that are nor obviously wrong, would have to be addressed as if those claims were located at these level of heteronomous political struggle over legitimacy. If this is correct, not only we would be able to provide a deeper analysis of the struggles over normative legitimacy that constitute modern societies; we would also be able to understand how normative claims and alternative conceptions of freedom guide the social and political actions of individuals and groups; finally, we would be in the position to investigate how a specific form of social discomfort emerge, namely that one which results of the costs for recognizing being too high. It seems that all of that justifies that the idea of false developments be rather further developed than abandoned or subsumed to that of social pathologies.

References

Luiz Gustavo da Kunja de Souza
Socijalne patologije, pogrešni pravci razvoja i heteronomija društvenog: društvena teorija i negativna strana priznanja
Apstrakt
Cilj ovog rada je da se istraži određena napetost između dvije koncepcije koje služe za analizu društvenih napetosti u zrelim radovima Aksela Honeta, naime društvenih patologija i anomije. Naročita pažnja je posvećena pitanju kako ove koncepcije pospešuju odnosno ograničavaju Honetovo razumevanje društvenih napetosti. U prvom delu rada pokazujem da Honetova interpretacija socijalnih patologija počiva na koncepciji društva kao organske celine (I). Iako ova interpretacija predstavlja određenu promenu u Honetovom shvatanju socijalnih patologija u odnosu na Pravo slobode, to ne utiče na činjenicu da u radovima koji nastaju nakon ove knjige koncepcija pogrešnih pravaca društvenog razvoja nije adekvatno teorizovana. Shodno tome, društveni problemi koji se sastoje u oštećenjima u odnosu na očekivane obrasci normativne rekonstrukcije ostaju neprimećeni. Ova činjenica upućuje na neophodnost perspektive koja bi mogla

Ključne reči: socijalne patologije, anomija (pogrešni pravci razvoja), normativna rekonstrukcija, društvena kritika, društveni sukobi