REASON WITHOUT FEELINGS? EMOTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

ABSTRACT
The paper critically analyzes the interplay between reason and emotions in the history of Western philosophy, as an inadequately ambivalent interrelationship of contrast, control and conflict. After the analysis of the philosophies of emotions and passion amongst the most important philosophers and philosophical works of classical antiquity and the Middle Ages, the paper presents ideas on this interrelationship within the framework of modern philosophy, or during the so-called Age of Reason. Finally, the paper analyzes the character of emotions in the contemporary philosophy, while examining possibilities for the history of (philosophy of) emotions and feelings, but also the possibilities for overcoming the undue opposition of reason and emotions, which was present in the dominant Western philosophical tradition.

In many respects, the relationship between emotions and reason in the Western thought has been a relationship filled with ambivalence, dichotomization, contrast, or even an open conflict. Already in the popular imagination there is a Manichaean attitude on the sharp contrast between a “reason” and a “heart,” which is also a reflection of a long, unbroken and relatively ruinous tradition in the history of Western philosophy. Ancient Greeks spoke of emotions as of pathema (πάθημα), which was a rather narrow term that referred to passion, suffering, and psychological events which overwhelmed an individual. In French and English language of modern philosophy, emotions were also interpreted as passion, what additionally

These are the feelings of my depression and indolence; and indeed I must admit that Philosophy does not help me to resist them.

[Hume 1740/2009: 421]
implied their moodiness, incapacity, impulsiveness, and passivity (Frijda 2008). The wider term of “emotions” in French in the 16th century (émouvoir) originated in the Latin word for “movement” or “migration” (ex + movere, “move to the outside”), implying that they mentally triggered people. However, although the term “emotions” is of more neutral nature, it retains the connotation of a person torn between the sensible and the sensual, where the emotions are interpreted as a kind of threat to rational cognition.

Namely, passions are different from (rational) actions in the sense that an individual feels actions or inclinations toward emotions in a passive, uncontrolled and overwhelming way, instead of actively creating them on one’s own initiative (Frijda 2008: 68). Ideas of individual passivity or a kind of “possession” refer to the idea that particular feelings and behavioural tendencies are aggressively, reluctantly, and disastrously imposed on the current behaviour and rational thinking. In this regard, the scientific study of emotions, which seemed to be encouraging after the pioneering work of Darwin (Darwin 1872/1989), James (James 1884, 1890), and Freud (Freud 1900/1955), was stopped by the advancement of behaviourism in the 1920s, as well as cognitivism in the 1950s. Both perspectives viewed emotions as irrational, or at least inaccessible to a rigorous scientific analysis (TenHouten 2007). This is another expression of the long-lasting philosophical heritage of studying the reason without emotions, or the “sense without the sensibilities”, which is the topic of this paper.

On the other hand, emotions were motives of various texts, myths and narratives since the very beginnings of civilization and the development of writing (Oatley 2004). In the Epic of Gilgamesh, we read about the negative emotions of the goddess Inane (due to Gilgamesh’s refusal of sexual intercourse with her). In the texts from the period of the Egyptian Middle Kingdom there were songs about negative emotions of sorrow and loneliness, in Hebrew (Old Testament) myths, God felt satisfied after the Creation because of it (and Adam and Eve felt shame because they were naked), and the first verse of The Iliad testified about Achilles’ feelings of anger and fury, which was why it could be said that “rage” was the first word in the Western literature (Engelen 2009: 395). In other words, emotions were, and still are, typical and fascinating motives of human culture and society, but also a sort of puzzles or mysterious paradoxes with which the Western philosophy was coping in its characteristic ambivalent manner. In this regard, it is not surprising that majority of the greatest and most influential Western philosophers indeed have formulated clear and recognizable theories of emotions.

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1 The term “emotions” appeared in the Oxford Dictionary of the English Language only in 1580, after terms such as “self” and “consciousness” lost their negative connotation, and after the situation where individual experience became worth of attention (Franks 2001). The practice of grouping different emotional experiences into the framework of a unique and distinct psychic phenomenon is a relatively recent phenomenon, while rage, love, sorrow and similar phenomena usually were not conceptualized within the broader category of “emotions” until then. Also, it could be said that the subjective experience became a more relevant phenomenon, as the attributed identities in the Middle Ages gave way to the acquired identities in the modern era (Franks 2001: 4478).
Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

Even the Presocratic philosophers, like Heraclitus and Empedocles, conceptualized emotions as phenomena that distracted attention from intellect and reason, with the focus on the most appropriate ways of controlling emotions (Mandler 2001: 4438). This tradition was continued in Plato’s works, with a bit more sophisticated analysis of the characteristics of human emotionality. It could be also said that Plato’s theory about three parts of the soul in The Republic (Plato 2004) was the first detailed systematization of emotional phenomena in the history of the Western philosophy (Knuuttila 2004: 5). According to Plato, the human soul is divided into three parts: rational, spiritual and appetitive, whereby (only) the rational part is capable for love towards knowledge and wisdom. The appetitive part is guided by direct sensual pleasures and avoidance of suffering, while the intermediate spiritual part is the part in which emotions are found (see Plato 2004: 280–285). The rational part is symbolically presented as a human, the appetitive part is presented as a multi-legged beast, while the ‘emotional’ part is presented as a lion.\(^2\) The basic model of emotional dynamics in Plato is in the rational control of negative emotions, that is, in empowering positive emotions and virtues by using the rational part of the soul. In his critique of art forms such as painting, drama and particular forms of music, Plato primarily implies their (devastating) influence on human emotions (Lyons 1999: 23). In other words, a kind of a struggle between reason and passion for the “dominance” actually takes place in an immaterial arena of the human soul.

In Phaedrus, Plato offers additional sophisticated theories of emotions which are specifically devoted to Eros and love, including a homoerotic love (Plato 2002; see also Plato 1993). In this dialogue, Eros (as a special form of “madness”) is attributed to the irrational part of the soul, but it is also conceptualized as the feeling of a person who recalls the forms of beautiful, being stimulated with the passionate love between two people with a “philosophical” soul (Knuuttila 2004: 15). In Philebus, he analyzes both bodily pleasures and pain, stating that these feelings could be characterized as processes of (dis)integration of the harmonic state of a living organism (Plato 1975). Finally, in The Laws, Plato separates emotions which could have some positive effects if they are mediated by education: pleasure, fear, shame, love, hatred and others (Plato 1988: 25–30).

When it comes to Aristotle, he preferred the term pathos for emotions, which also implied emotions as passive states. These were the reactions of the embodied (“political”) animals to the outside world, which made them reminiscent of perceptions, thus creating an integral part of human experience. In this regard, Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Aristotle 2007) was the first detailed and systematic analysis of a

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\(^2\) Plato treated these parts of the soul as if they were mutually separated, though allowing interactions between them. The rational part of the soul was also characterized by certain emotions, such as love for wisdom, as well as the shame and fear of bad reputation, and similar. Although Plato remained very critical about bodily pleasures and passions, it was interesting that he highly appreciated the “erotic” appetites, which he viewed as a reaction of the entire soul, including its rational, intellectual part. In other words, he argued that the intellectual element was not sufficient for a comprehensive and full understanding of the truth and the attainment of wisdom, implicating that this requires an indispensable emotional involvement of the individual (Plato 1993).
series of individual emotions in Greek philosophy (Knuuttila 2004: 27), as well as one of the first systematic discussions on human psychology. In that sense, a detailed philosophical discussion about the nature of emotions actually began with Aristotle, and not with Plato (Lyons 1999: 22).

Writing about what constituted a high-quality public discourse, Aristotle differentiated and contrasted the ethos (or a projection of the speaker as a moral person), the logos (inductive and deductive logical argumentation), and the pathos, evoking emotions in persons from the audience (Aristotle 2007: 112–113). With regard to the search for the truth in public debates, this argument acted like the Platonic tripartite logic about the soul, but Aristotle gave a much more important role to emotions than Plato. Concrete emotions by Aristotle were the following: anger, calmness, friendship, fear and self-confidence, shame and impudence, kindness, envy, compassion, indignation, and others (see Aristotle 2007: 116–147). For example, Aristotle in his unusually detailed discussion on anger emphasized that emotions had a biological component (physical feeling of pain), a complex cognitive component (for example, a perception of an undeserved insult), and a specific intention (e.g. a desire for revenge), which resulted in culturally-standardized behaviour (Aristotle 2007: 117–118). He clearly distinguished the physiological dimension of emotional experience, as well as the individual (cognitive) and social (cultural) component of that experience (Barbalet 2007: 1374). Accordingly, he approached emotions in an unusually comprehensive way, where his analysis of anger or fury incorporated a distinctive cognitive content, a certain social context, behavioural tendencies, and recognition of physiological excitement (Solomon 2008: 5).

Aristotle would also argue that human actions were induced by habit, as well as by rational and irrational desires, and not that they were products of natural necessity, coincidence or constraint (Knuuttila 2004: 28). However, “rationally” in his conceptualization denoted both practical goals and morally correct actions, and not merely Platonic rationality. For these reasons, emotions had a prominent place in Nicomachean Ethics, where perception was of a key importance for feelings of pleasure (Aristotle 2011). Unlike his teacher, Aristotle was not a dualist, and he offered a much richer insight into emotions, including the analysis of their use in politics (Lyons 1999: 23).

In the ethical sense, the emotions for Aristotle were neither virtues nor flaws, but were the facts important for a morally correct life. Since he considered emotional experience as a phenomenon of an extreme importance in human life, every description of life filled with virtues had to refer to emotions as well. For these reasons, emotions for him were not actually something that should be opposed or subjected to the rational control, but only directed in the right direction, in the right (either moderate or optimal) scope, and under appropriate circumstances. A virtuous human life involved the development of human rational capacities, as

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3 It is interesting to find Aristotle’s claim that the object of anger as an emotion is an individual own self, while the emotion of hate refers to objects such as thieves or traitors. The social or cultural dimension is important to Aristotle only because the social situation is the one that causes emotions, while the biological and psychological element of the emotional experience is “only” a structure that provides the basis for this experience (for the detailed scheme of Aristotle’s theory of anger see Power and Dalgleish 2008: 36).
well as the right feelings and emotional involvement in different forms of social life (see Aristotle 2011: 10–18).

Thus, Aristotle took certain elements of his analysis from Plato, but their general attitudes about emotions were quite different. Since Plato postulated three different abilities of the mind (thinking, spirit, and passion), he interpreted emotions as something that was separate from the mental capacities of a human being. Aristotle rejected such conceptualization, combining all the capacities (as well as the consequences and influences) of the mind in his practical philosophy. For him, it was impossible to separate the mind from the body and vice versa, which was of particular importance for the consideration of emotions (Mandler 2001: 4438). Such a biological context allowed the analysis of emotions as natural phenomena (see Griffiths 2004; Barrett 2006; Izzard 2007), along with the stimulating incorporation of the cognitive element of emotional experience in that analysis. Finally, the different conceptualizations of emotions (as well as the interrelations of emotions and culture) in Plato and Aristotle could be seen as models for all subsequent claims of these phenomena in the Western thought (Barbalet 2007).

A completely different, but equally influential, conceptualization of emotions was offered by the Stoics. While Aristotle considered that emotions were the key to keeping a good life, Stoics analyzed them as conceptual mistakes that lead to suffering and distress, making people unhappy and frustrated (Solomon 2008: 5). They insisted only on cognitively and morally problematic contents of emotional experience, advocating their reduction or elimination both from the public and private life. Accordingly, while Plato and Aristotle saw emotions as the inevitable elements of the soul or the human experience, the soul for Stoics was purely rational and bodily in their nature (Knuuttila 2004: 47). In this way, Stoics such as Seneca or Chrysippus developed a strictly cognitive theory of emotions two millennia ago, stating that emotions were simply (distorted) judgments or (wrong) conclusions about the world and one’s own place in it (Solomon 2008: 5). For Stoics, an emotional release was a kind of “a cure for the soul,” in discussions about emotions that resembled modern self-help manuals (see Oatley 2004: 39–43). In addition to the philosophical analysis of emotions, Stoics also offered a kind of a “therapy” (for mental disorders) by analogy with medical therapy.

In other words, emotions had a marginal or even a negative role in the Stoic perception of a human experience, and the practical philosophy as well. Happiness or eudaimonia could be achieved only by perfecting the intrinsically rational nature of an individual, while emotions or “passions” were unreasonable or excessive reactions to preferred or unwanted things such as wealth, illness, etc. Therefore, for example, Cicero called for a state of apathy (apatheia) or tranquillity (tranquillitas) as the absence of passion or emotions (see Cicero 2002). It could be also said that

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4 According to Stoics, the soul was a physical substance that was completely mixed with the body, which controlled the body like the central nervous system. They clearly distinguished pleasure and pain (relating to the Present), and appetite and fear (relating to the Future), while other emotions were subtypes of these primary types (Knuuttila 2004: 51). This systematization was very influential in Hellenistic philosophy, and the negative implications of the emotional experience were present in the terms used for emotions: emotions were “instincts”, “passions” or “sufferings.” All these meanings implied passivity that could have devastating effects on the human well-being.
the Stoics did not condemn the emotions as such, but they observed emotionality and emotional persons with a certain dose of suspicion (Lyons 1999: 24). For them, there was nothing intrinsically immoral in the emotional experience. Emotional evaluations were based only on the false images of themselves and inappropriate conceptions of reality (Knuuttila 2004: 56).

Epicureans also represented similar attitudes about emotions as Stoics, although they belonged to a rival Hellenic philosophical school. As it is well known, the basic dynamics for Epicureans during the life of human beings was reduced to the search for pleasure and avoidance of pain, which made it necessary for a truly rightful life to be released from the tyranny of emotions (Oatley 2004: 44). In that sense, the basic task of the moral development of an individual was to distract attention from ephemeral desires, like money or fame, and consequently to distract attention from emotions such as greed, envy, lust, or anger. The state of this static, peaceful satisfaction arising from the absence of both physical and mental pain was called ataraxia (*ataraxia*).

When it comes to the Medieval (Christian) philosophy, Augustine observed emotions in a similar way as his ancient predecessors, which dramatically influenced many later philosophers and theologians. Interestingly, he preferred the term passion (*passio*), as the Latin version of the Greek *pathē*, using it without the excessive negative connotations. His discussion on emotions in *The City of God* was actually a part of a longer discussion on demons, where he presented a detailed overview of ancient ideas about the emotional experience from a theological angle (Augustine 2009: 250–270).

Augustine testifies that (pagan) demons feel emotions like anger, sadness, or joy, just like humans, arguing that it is exactly why it is meaningless to worship them like a Christian God (Augustine 2009: 251). In a Platonic way, he emphasizes emotions as an “inferior” part of a human nature, stating that wise, rational people avoid strong emotional experiences. He particularly exposes the Stoic theory of emotions as unnecessary and dangerous mental unrest (Augustine 2009: 252–254). On the other hand, Augustine distinguishes those passions that characterize the souls of Christians, not leading them towards sin, but towards virtue, such as compassion for others and obedience to God.⁵

Some other early Christian fathers were heavily influenced by the Stoics and the Stoic ideas, transforming emotions as obstacles to reason and rightful life into the conceptualization of sin (Oatley 2004: 50). For example, the Alexandrian theologian

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⁵ Augustine also exposed the inspiring systematization of emotions in the form of four versions of “love”: lust, joy, fear (love that rejects what it opposes), and sorrow (love that feels the rejection) (Augustine 2009: 404). For him, an appropriate love was also a virtue, one of the three basic theological virtues, along with hope and faith. A variant of love that was of the highest value was the *caritas*, a desire to unite with God. It could be said that Augustine was attracted to Stoic conceptualizations of emotions, as well as to their ideas on *apatheia*, but he was probably aware that such a feeling was practically impossible. Neither Adam nor Eve, after their creation, or before the original sin, were free from their emotions, including the love and respect for God (but also a desire for “the forbidden fruit”), and many Christian saints also had emotions. For him, even the citizens of the “City of God” were filled with certain “passions”, but these were reasonably “regulated” passions according to God’s will, (Augustine 2009: 409–411).
and ascetic Origen, from the third century, wrote about the necessity to numb one’s passions and to reduce evil thoughts in function of giving oneself to God, therefore acquiring God’s grace (Knuuttila 2004: 121). Origen’s examples of this reduction were most often related to the renunciation of sensual desires, as well as of anger, fear, pleasure, appetite, and the like. It is interesting that Origen was not interested in emotions as such, but called for a specific and radicalized version of the Stoic apatheia, as an inevitable element for perfecting the soul and approaching to God.

Similarly, the Christian monk Evagrius, a theologian and ascetic from the 4th century highlighted eight “dreadful thoughts” as different forms of temptation, which included voracity, greed, laziness, regret, lust, anger, vanity, and pride (Oatley 2004: 50). Two centuries later, this “list” was modified in the famous doctrine of “Seven Deadly Sins”, which were also emotions or had emotional quality. Evagrius commendably wrote about the Stoic doctrine of apatheia, stating that a person bound with passion could not see the spiritual power of a prayer and a peaceful attitude before God.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that subsequently there was a chronic absence of Aristotelian or Stoic theory of emotions from the (dominant) philosophy of emotions until the period of contemporary philosophy and psychology (Lyons 1999). This occurred primarily due to the influence of (Neo)Platonism, the Christian “Platonization” of Aristotle, and the marginalization of Stoicism, due to the favouring of (idealist) philosophies which conceptualized a mind as a spirit, i.e. a soul (Lyons 1999: 26). In the Middle Ages there were also some detailed, (quasi)medical studies on the effects of certain parts of the body (bile, spleen, blood, etc.) on the emotions and behaviour or temperament. However, the emotions were primarily associated with desires and instincts, which were then typically perceived as sin (Solomon 2008: 6).

A developed theology of emotions under clear Aristotle’s influence could be found only with St. Thomas Aquinas, whose discussion on emotions from the second book of Summa Theologica (see Aquinas 2003) was the most comprehensive discussion on emotions in the Middle Ages. Thomas integrated many allegations on emotions that existed in Aristotle, Stoics and Augustine, but he also significantly improved the understanding of this concept. He analyzed “passions” or “passions of the soul” (passiones animae) as emotions felt both by animals and humans. However, the discussion on emotions as “passions” repeatedly implied their passive nature, with dramatic intensity (Kagan 2007: 12). For Thomas, emotions were phenomena related to sensuous objects or objects of imagination, which were important to our own or others’ well-being (Cates 2009: 9). Accordingly, they were internal movements caused by the human knowledge, but also phenomena with a clear appetitive and motivational dimension.

Thomas also emphasized that within the emotional impulse there was a certain non-cognitive impulse of attracting/rejecting the object, along with the accompanying physiological dimension, as well as the propensity for action (Power and Dalglish 2008: 39). Like Augustine, he argued that God and angels did not possess passions, and that their actions were guided by purely rational will or intention. In non-human animals, passions were most often awakened by instincts or experience (for example, the danger from the wolf for sheep and the resulting fear), while the humans might subject them to the rational evaluation. For Thomas, emotions by themselves (as the movement of irrational appetites) did not possess either moral
good or evil, but these dimensions depended on reason (Aquinas 2003: 143). However, he, like Aristotle, was preoccupied with the consequences of the misbalance between socially and politically dangerous emotions of excessive anger, lust, greed, and so on (which were difficult to suppress, and which had a devastating effect on life in the community), and benevolent emotional states (which empowered virtues and preserved social harmony) (Kagan 2007: 12). On the other hand, the explicit “ politicization” of emotion came only in the Renaissance, i.e. in Machiavelli’s (realistic) political philosophy (Machiavelli 1532/1998).

**Emotions and the Age of Reason**

Modern philosophy, led by the rationalism of René Descartes, additionally deepened a gap between emotions and reason, which were present in various formats since antiquity. In *Passions of the Soul*, Descartes was dealing with emotions in details and very influentially, while he argued that the discussion on emotions in the ancient philosophy was in many respects wrong. Hence, he argued that he wrote

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6 Thomas also conceptualized the taxonomy of eleven basic types of emotions or passions, based on Aristotle’s classification of physical movement (for a detailed scheme of Thomas’s description of the emotion of fear see Power and Dalgleish 2008: 39). The variables of good and evil, along with three different types of movements, generated six “lustful” passions: love and hatred, lust and aversion, joy and pain. Then, as “impetuous” passions related to the direction and the object of movement, he distinguished hope and despair, i.e. fear and courage (Knuuttila 2004: 242–246). For him, the last, eleventh emotion (which did not have a pair, and which only referred to the current situation) was anger, and he was critical of Augustine’s taxonomy of love-based emotions. Nevertheless, he distinguished two types of love as well: a friendship love and a lustful love, defining general love as a good will directed towards something (Aquinas 2003: 144). He also argued that affection aroused both in the friendship love and in the lustful love, which was why he attached the cognitive nature to these emotions. The consequences of love were the external unity (when two people were in company with one another), and the internal unity, through the feeling of affection (Aquinas 2003: 147).

7 In the Renaissance philosophy, along with the restoration of Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas on emotions (for example, by Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola), Machiavelli’s contributions were especially distinguished. His decisive anti-idealistic or realistic political theory was extremely closely related to the emotions, i.e. to the emotional experience of rulers and their citizens. In that context, he dealt extensively with fear, greed, love, compassion and other similar emotions in an unequivocally political context. According to Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, people could be divided into different geographical groups according to their emotional characters and, consequently, the patterns of behavior which motivated these emotions (Machiavelli 1532/1998: 5–48). Since he considered the actions as the outcomes of emotions, Machiavelli’s venture was clearly focused on teaching political leaders how to manipulate the emotions of citizens in order to maintain the public order (and/or their own authority). One of these techniques was in the projection of the ruler as a person with praiseworthy emotional and character traits (which could be completely different from real or subjective feelings) (Machiavelli 1532/1998: 61–65, 87–91). Another technique, by which Machiavelli became known, was provoking fear among citizens, i.e. the claim that it was better for the ruler if the citizens fear him than love him, since fear was considered to be a powerful motivator (Machiavelli 1532/1998: 65–68). Finally, he claimed that it was necessary for the ruler to avoid the emotions of contempt and hatred among citizens (Machiavelli 1532/1998: 71–82).
about emotions in a way that no one wrote about them earlier (Descartes 1649/1989: 18–19). He exposed the unambiguous and harsh dualism between the spirit and the body, whereby he associated “warmth and movement” with the (mechanical) body, and the thought with the spirit, which was the basis of his earlier and more famous works (see Descartes 1641/1996: 16–23, 50–62). For him, the immortal soul contained everything that was important to humans, although it could be also said that Descartes’ theory was at the same time the first attempt at (re)conceptualization of studying emotions into an unambiguously scientific venture (Lyons 1999: 28).

After a detailed description of the functions belonging exclusively to the body, Descartes emphasized that the functions of the spirit could be reduced to thought that had two aspects: actions of the spirit (will) and passion or emotions (Descartes 1649/1989: 28). For him, emotions were primarily the functions of a spirit, which were not actions but perceptions. When the human spirit perceived something that did not exist, “like a vicious palate or chimera”, and also when it referred to one’s own nature (i.e. towards “the movement of the spirit”), it resulted in passions (Descartes 1649/1989: 29). In that sense, passions were caused, sustained, and empowered by the movement of the spirit by analogy with Harvey’s mechanistic principle of the movement of blood in the organism. This “physiology” of emotions was of a great importance, because the causes, consequences, functions and the regulations of passion depended on it.8

Accordingly, it was not necessary to erase or suppress emotions. They were the source of satisfaction in this life, as they were intrinsically good in nature, with particular exceptions. However, Descartes was repeatedly warning that emotions or passions could get into the conflict with rational evaluations of the external world. In this regard, it was essential for a person to change his/her evaluation of feeling the emotions in order to approach the world more rationally and, consequently, generate new and more appropriate habits. In a way that did not differ in its consequences from the attitudes of Stoics or Epicureans, Descartes saw this procedure as a kind of the “cure for the soul”, i.e. as a prerequisite for maintaining the mental health.

Subjecting emotions to the rational control is a therapeutic tool through which the spirit enhances its own imagination, and emotions are transformed from pure bodily reactions into a key element of wisdom (Solomon 2008: 6). Like Plato and Aristotle at the time, Descartes’ ideas were extremely influential for the latter philosophy, as well as for reflecting emotions in the sciences in the following centuries.9 It could also be said that Descartes has been a symbol or an “emblem” of a series

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8 According to Descartes, every individual emotion is characterized by certain body changes (such as color, body temperature, facial expression, movement of the extremities, etc.), which could be associated then with the movement of the spirit. The key consequence of emotions is to prepare the spirit to wish things, then preparing the body for the wishes. According to these ideas, the spirit then initiates the “small gland in the middle of the brain” (epiphysis), as the “seat of the soul”. He distinguished six “primitive” emotions: wonder or complicity (which he considered the first and foremost), love and hatred, desire (lust), happiness and sorrow. He viewed all the other “infinitely numerous” emotions as combinations of these six basic emotions (see Descartes 1649/1989: 50–101).

9 For the stimulating and critical synthesis of Descartes’s philosophy of emotions, as well as the continuation of Cartesian tradition in reflection on emotions, see also Kenny 1963/2003: 2–10.
of ideas about a body and a spirit, or a brain and a mind, which are still present and very influential in various ways in the sciences and humanities of the West (Damasio 1994).10

Spinoza continued the rationalist tradition in the conceptualization of emotions, with significant sophistication. Almost half of his *Ethics* (volumes III and IV) consisted of the discussions on the affects (*affectus*), which demonstrated the central role of emotions in Spinoza’s philosophical system (Spinoza 1677/1992). For him, emotions were “the feelings of the body through which the power of physical activity is increased or decreased, helping or stopping it, along with ideas about these affects” (Spinoza 1677/1992: 103). His ultimate contribution was in the explanation of a freedom or “blessing”, defined as knowledge, as well as the “intellectual love” toward God (Spinoza 1677/1992: 201). With this in mind, it could be said that Spinoza rebelled against the prior philosophical orthodoxy when it came to emotions, as his views on the human nature were specifically opposed to Descartes’ views (Lyons 1999: 29).

According to Spinoza, the mind was constituted on the basis of the ideas of the body, i.e. a person became aware of his body based on the changes or activities in it (Spinoza 1677/1992: 107). In other words, feelings or emotions actually constituted the human mind. Spinoza did not conceptualize only passive feelings or the Cartesian passions (derived from inadequate ideas), but also active emotions such as affect, for which he claimed that the emotions grew from the appropriate ideas. Nevertheless, even in Spinoza there was an obvious cognitive element, where in the case of emotions, he particularly emphasized phenomena which were of the utmost importance for the mind, i.e. the instinct to defend or survive. For these reasons, the desire was central for understanding of the affects, or the very essence of the nature of emotions (Spinoza 1677/1992: 137). Finally, Spinoza, like Stoics, perceived the emotions as a form of thinking, which often led to misunderstanding of the world, making a person unhappy and frustrated. However, he did not advocate the renunciation of emotions, but reaching of bliss through active emotions mediated by reason (Solomon 2008: 7).

Accordingly, reason remains a great topic of Spinoza’s philosophy of emotions, but he no longer opposes emotions, nor sees the control of emotions as a moral imperative. The use of reason is the way of increasing the human power, or increasing a physical activity (Spinoza 1677/1992: 111). Reason provides the ability to understand good and bad feelings, and therefore a reasonable man always acts

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10 Damasio calls Descartes’s dualism, in the form of a sharp contrast between the “thinking” and the “non-thinking” parts of the human, “the mistake” that burdens studying of both the mind and the brain, as well as the emotions. It is wrong to distinguish the body as visible and mechanical, and the mind as an invisible and spiritual element of the human experience (Damasio 1994: 249–250). This narrative refers to the suggestion that the logical reasoning and moral reasoning *can* exist separately from the body, and therefore they can be separate from the human emotions. It is interesting that Damasio calls for the return to Aristotle, who has conceptualized both the mind and the emotions as an element of body experience, while claiming “how much Aristotle would be annoyed with Descartes only if he knew” (Damasio 1994: 251). For Damasio, the Cartesian idea of the “untamed mind”, or the Cartesian “metaphor of the mind as software”, dangerously (re)shaped biology, psychology, medicine, as well as social and humanistic sciences.
right, honestly and honourably. Emotions manifest a human psychic stability or instability, and a rational knowledge about our emotions can contribute to a kind of reconciliation with one’s own complex psychic structure and organization (Lyons 1999: 30). Probably the most significant Spinoza’s moving away from Descartes is in the assertion that it is impossible for a person to gain control over his/her emotions, because it is metaphysically impossible for the human mind to be autonomous in the way that it has been claimed by Descartes (Spinoza 1677/1992: 104).

When it comes to the conceptualization of emotions in modern philosophy, a distinguished position was taken by Thomas Hobbes, who discussed the emotional experience in works such as Elements of Law (Hobbes 1640/2013) or Leviathan (Hobbes 1651/1998). Hobbes’ idea was distinctive due to his unambiguous materialism: instead of the previous “metaphysical” ideas of emotions as movements of the spirit, he identified emotions (which were again re-defined as passions) exclusively with material, internal movement in the body. It was interesting that Hobbes, like Aristotle and Machiavelli at their time, testified about the stimulation of emotions in listeners during the public speeches by officials, which function was persuasion or propaganda (Hobbes 1640/2013: 68). The function of speech, according to Hobbes’ opinion, was the communication of passions, i.e. he claimed that the language often signaled particular emotions (Hobbes 1651/1998: 21). He also postulated the universal nature of human emotions, along with differentiating objects of these emotions among different individuals (Hobbes 1651/1998: 8). For these reasons, he argued that every individual naturally started from his/her own tendencies embodied in passions, as the actual balance between good and evil. In this way, he greatly opposed both Aristotle’s and Descartes’ ideas of passions.11

In the context of Leviathan and emotions, it is important to emphasize the most famous idea of Hobbes’ political philosophy, according to which the crude laws of nature were opposed to the human natural passions and desires. Namely, the natural state (the universal conflict) was opposed to the natural emotions (a desire for survival, safety, and happiness), which resulted in the creation of power and social order. In this sense, particularly important for political and social theory were natural emotions such as fear of death (or of wounding and pain), as well as passions that aroused an individual’s tendency to peace and well-being (Hobbes 1651/1998: 66). According to Hobbes, both emotions and reason suggested the transformation of the natural state of “the war of all against all” into the state of existence of

11 Hobbes expounded and described in details a series of emotions as results of satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the indicators of honor (or dishonor), such as: glory (distinguishing a desire for glory, false fame, and glory filled with vanity), humility, shame, courage, anger, vengeance, hope, trust, compassion, indignation, laughter, salvation, lust, love, admiration, etc. (Hobbes 1640/2013: 36–48). In Leviathan, Hobs identified six “simple” passions: appetite, desire, love, aversion, hatred, joy and sorrow, describing appetite and aversion as the basic instincts (with the addition of contempt as the instinct in between them), which produced many variations of the emotional experience (Hobbes 1651/1998: 36). Among them there were the following: self-confidence (a continuous hope), a natural lust (love for people who were satisfied with senses), ambition (a desire for power), etc. It is interesting that the emotion of “a fear of invisible power” as the power that was “invented by publicly allowed stories” for him was simply “a religion” (while the fear of power produced by “unallowed” stories was “a superstition”) (see Hobbes 1651/1998: 37–42).
the sovereign power and authority. Thus, Hobbes’ political theory implicitly implied an assertion about the emotional causes or the emotional basis of the social order, which was subsequently explicated in sociology of emotions (much) later (see Massey 2002).

David Hume was extensively dealing with emotions, including the first and the second book of his famous *A Treatise on Human Nature* (Hume 1740/2009), a part of the “Dissertation on Passions” in the study named *Four Dissertations* (Hume 1757: 119–181), as well as in the numerous essays (see Hume 1742/1889). According to Solomon, most philosophers “then, and to this day” rather read the first and third chapters of the *Treatise*, which were dedicated to knowledge and ethics, thereby ignoring the central place of emotions in Hume’s philosophy (Solomon 2008: 7). Emotions for him were the affective perceptions in the close analogy with movement, and he divided them into calm and violent (“passions”) (Hume 1740/2009: 430–431). For him, passions were lower-order perceptions, while “calmer” feelings reflected in a higher level of reflexivity, among which there was the taste. In other words, according to Hume, there were impressions (feelings) and ideas (thinking), where the impressions were very lively and rich, and the ideas were comparatively weak, indistinct, and obscured (Hume 1740/2009: 429).

Hume particularly dealt with emotions of pride and humility, love and hatred, as well as with direct passions related to the will. Pride and humility (modesty) for him were simple and uniform impressions caused by the same object, which was the self, conceptualized as the succession of close ideas and impressions preserved in the memory and consciousness (Hume 1740/2009: 432–433). Emotions such as pride and humility were caused by the image which the individual had about himself/herself, based on the perceptions of self and the outside world, in an interesting interrelation of the subject and the object. Hume thus exhibited an unusually modern and (proto)interactionist theory of the emotional experience (see, for example, Shott 1979), and the similar dynamics was in action with emotions such as love and hatred. A feeling of empathy took a special place in the Hume’s system as a causal mechanism by which individuals began to feel the emotions of others (e.g. sadness or happiness), based on their real or false expression of emotions (Hume 1740/2009: 490). These ideas remind of certain contemporary ideas of the interactionist-oriented sociology of emotions about the central place of empathy in the social life (Clark 1997).

Hume’s prominent place in the history of philosophy about emotions was contained in the unambiguous claim that “the reason is, and can only be a slave of passions, and can never pretend to do anything else than listening to them and obeying them” (Hume 1740 / 2009: 636). It was an iconoclastic statement for the previous tradition in the history of philosophy (Solomon 2008: 3). In this way, Hume placed

12 In an inspirational essay on tastes and passions, Hume wrote about the importance of sophistication and cultivation of passion in order to achieve higher or better taste, including the taste in relation to art and science (Hume 1742/1889: 91–94). Delicacy of the taste was significant for him in the context of love and friendship, i.e. it was important for an appropriate choice of life partners. Concerning the superstitions and the enthusiasm followed by religious beliefs, he wrote in the context of emotions such as hope and pride, but also cruelty, violence and ignorance, which represented an enormous social danger and a threat to civil liberties (Hume 1742/1889: 144–150).
almost entire human motivation in the domain of emotions, observing emotions as a basic instinct for action, and as a fact with the “original existence” in a human experience. His affinity for emotions and the emotional experience, in fact, mostly aroused from the sceptical attitude toward the abilities and capacities of reason. That was why he also wrote in a particularly inspired way about his own scepticism, and the need for continuous checking of each of his own conclusions, attitudes and opinions, which (in him) produced the feelings of anxiety, loneliness, and melancholy (see e.g. Hume 1740/2009: 345–346, 411–427).

For Hume, emotions could be opposed to reason only if they were followed by certain judgments or attitudes. However, even in the “unreasonable” emotions, it was not the emotion that was unreasonable, but the individual’s judgments about it. In that sense, “it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger” (Hume 1740/2009: 637). For these reasons, he questioned the inferior position of “passions” in the previous philosophy, while developing an extremely stimulating theory and dealing with (scientific) problems, which would be explicitly formulated only much later (Solomon 2008: 7).

On the other hand, Immanuel Kant continued the tradition of a kind of animosity toward human emotions, describing the dangers of affects and passions, and (again) advocating the Stoic apathy and self-control. For example, in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, he emphasized that if reason did not overpower feelings and passions, they would start to control an individual (Kant 1797/1991: 208). Apathy and self-control were also crucial both for the expression and protection of the inner freedom, which was under a continuous threat by affects and passions. Hence, Kant viewed affects (*Affekte*) as abrupt emotions that were temporarily imposed on the rational thinking and self-control (e.g. anger), and passions (*Leidenschaften*) as permanent tendencies which represented a continuous challenge or temptation (e.g. hatred) (Kant 1797/1991: 208).

Kant emphasized the importance of rationally rooted feelings through which individuals could feel satisfaction or dissatisfaction on the basis of pure consideration of the morality of their own actions. Therefore, in order for a rational being to work in accordance with certain moral imperatives, reason must have the capacity to generate a sense of satisfaction by fulfilling certain moral duties (Kant 1797/1991: 48). In this regard, he explicitly distinguished and described the moral feelings, conscience, love for the neighbour, and respect for others (Kant 1797/1991: 200–204). This did not mean that Kant had a unique model of emotions, but the emotions for him were primarily a *continuum*, ranging from emotions that could not be controlled (like rage) to those that could be cultivated and controlled in a rational manner (Borges 2004). He therefore advocated self-control or an active resistance to the affects, arguing that the only actions of moral value were those performed on the basis of a sense of duty. Therefore, the sense of respect for moral law was the only ethically relevant for emotions (also see Oakley 1990).

In his philosophy, Kant critically responded exactly to Hume’s scepticism, formulating an uncompromising defence of reason, which, unfortunately, further strengthened an inappropriate distinction between reason and emotions. However, Kant had much more respect for emotions than his philosophical predecessors, including the importance he attached to common (intersubjective) feelings in aesthetics (Solomon 2008: 8). For him, every choice came out of the representation of a
possible action based on a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, which implied that he considered emotions as important motivators for action (Kant 1797/1991: 201). He argued that people were not passive in terms of their own emotions, but that emotions responded to human rational tendencies, i.e. they were the product of our choices (Kant 1797/1991: 203).

Finally, some liberal and conservative social philosophies and proto-sociologies of emotions referred to human sensitivity, as, for example, in the case of Adam Smith and Edmund Burke. In the *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith dealt with emotions in details, as well as with the importance of emotions in moral, social, and political life (Smith 1759/2007). For him, emotions were not the “shameful” part of the human psyche, but the very basis of human social existence and morality (Solomon 2008: 8). The basic concept of Smith’s philosophy was exactly affection or sentiment, which he conceptualized as an individual’s common feeling of sympathy towards feelings or passions of another person (Smith 1759/2007: 2–3).

On the other hand, Burke was a conservative social theorist, remembered primarily by his sharp criticism of the French Revolution (Burke 1790/1951). Also, along with the opposition to the revolution (and the Frenchmen), based on his political ideology and personal prejudices, Burke opposed the Enlightenment concept of establishing the social order on the principles of Reason as the only source of truth and authority. He also considered that society was not suitable for rapid construction or reconstruction, and favoured the gradual and slow implementation of proven or traditional methods in establishing a safe, secure and stable social order. In his conservative opposition to worshiping Reason among the leading figures of the French Revolution, Burke emphasized the validity of the *emotional* basis of social solidarity (Kemper 2000: 773). In his opinion, long-term or traditional ways of acting induced emotional reactions, which then prevented violent, rapid and destructive social changes. A similar conservative and antidemocratic sentiment was expressed by Gustave Le Bon. However, in his classic *Psychology of a Crowd* (Le Bon 1895/2002), he opposed the character of modern social movements and new social classes precisely on the basis of their emotions or affections. For him, a contemporary society was distinguished by the pathological manifestation of emotions with destructive consequences for the social order (also see Barbalet 1998: 3).
fluential position among the (continental) founders of sociology, such as Auguste Comte, who were themselves interested in the phenomena of establishing social order and stability in the post-revolutionary society.

However, for the true “defence” of human emotionality from “narrow-mindedness” of reason, it was necessary to wait for contemporary philosophies of anti-rationalism and existentialism. Yet, by contrasting the Apollonian and Dionysian cult, Nietzsche opposed rationality and instincts and passions (i.e. emotions), favouring the latter (Nietzsche 1872/1999). For him, the Cartesian tradition was a problem, and the solution was seen in the claim that people were biological creatures with “built-in” need for expression of their will. On the other hand, Nietzsche also advocated a kind of control over emotions, since he saw them as products of the (inappropriate) culture, experience and upbringing, and not as instincts (Solomon 2003: 83). Finally, Sartre explicitly dealt with the phenomenon of emotions (Sartre 1939/1993) in his study *Outline of a Theory of Emotions*, attributing them a central place in the context of human existence (Solomon 2008: 9). Emotions, as spontaneous and conscious acts of cognition, were in fact means of understanding the essential nature of a man, which was the consequence (and not the cause) of his existence (Sartre 1939/1993: 10).

**Emotions and Contemporary Philosophy: Towards the Histor(icit)y of Emotions?**

Today, it could be said that emotions are a significant topic in the contemporary philosophy, which is evident in a series of studies and proceedings dedicated to the philosophy of emotions (for example, Hatzimoysis 2003; Solomon 2004; Ebbersmeyer 2012). The explicit renewal of the interest in emotions in the contemporary philosophy occurred after World War II, and the work of Errol Bedford was among the first ventures of this kind. He emphasized the importance of contextual factors when it came to the nature of emotional experience (Bedford 1957). Then, the philosopher Anthony Kenny dealt with desire and pleasure in a separate study, seeing them as bridges between the phenomena of action and emotions (Kenny 1963/2003). For Kenny, emotions were not feelings separated from the influence of the will and reason, and he observed them as motives for human action, in the spirit of classical philosophical tradition. The latter philosophies of emotion were often in close communication with the scientific research of emotions, primarily in biology and psychology.

The work of the philosopher of emotions Robert Solomon stands out among the first comprehensive contemporary conceptualizations of emotions in philosophy (Solomon 1976/1993, see also Solomon 2008). He strongly criticizes the

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15 For a summary of contemporary philosophical issues and research related to emotions, such as the dilemma between essentialism and existentialism, the interrelation between the subjective and the objective during the emotional experience, concerning phenomenology, intentionality, cognition, (i)rationality, expression, biological and cultural backgrounds, and functions of emotions see (Solomon 2008: 10-14). For a summary of basic or “initial” issues within the framework of contemporary cognitive philosophy of emotions, see (Power and Dalgleish 2008: 17–18).
rationalistic assumption that “passions” pose a threat to objectivity and the philosophical knowledge of reality, and tries to “regain central and defining a role of passions in our lives, which has been persistently and so long denied to them” (Solomon 1976/1993: xiv). For him, emotions dominate human lives and represent the basic source of meaning, as well as sense in that life. He rejects reason as an alleged antithesis to emotions and calls the traditional conceptualization of the relationship among these domains as the philosophical “myth of passions” (related to the myth of the passivity of emotions) (Solomon 1976/1993: 67).

Equally important is the contribution of the philosopher William Lyons, who provides the causal-evaluation theory of emotions (Lyons 1980). For him, it is not possible to differentiate emotions in a behavioural, physiological or motivational way, emphasising the cognitive nature of the emotional experience. According to Lyons, emotions are the states of “occurrence” or “events”, not of a disposition. The individual is “eventfully” sad, angry, happy, vain, and the like (Lyons 1980: 53–54). Human beliefs about the current situation, usually caused by perception, are the basis for the evaluation of a given situation, which create desires that cause behaviour, psychological changes, and subjective feelings, accordingly (Lyons 1980: 57).

Finally, in his philosophical research of emotions, Peter Goldie provided both scientific and literary conceptualizations of emotions, trying to deepen the daily discourse on the phenomenon of emotional experiences, as well as the connection between emotions and consciousness, thoughts, feelings, imagination and action (Goldie 2000). Goldie insisted on the importance of taking a personal perspective or the point of view of a conscious person, with a new critique of the normative nature of the conventionally understood rationality in the study of emotions and similar topics. He also questioned the idea that only rationality could adequately explain emotional phenomena, with a critique of over-intellectualized discourse about emotions (Goldie 2000: 3). He especially dealt with the connection between emotions and evolution, as well as between emotions and cultures (Goldie 2000: 84–121). According to Goldie, humans might be a special species of animals, but the study of emotions in the evolutionary, as well as in the cultural context, could reveal many primitively intelligible emotional desires, and their causes in the human past and present (Goldie 2000: 122).

In this regard, understanding the place of emotions in the history of philosophy must be supplemented with the history of emotions. Philosophizing about emotions has simultaneously reflected and produced the historical context of the Western sentiment. For example, the practical dualism between the Apollonian and the Dionysian cult reflected the sharp dualism between reason and sensitivity in Classical Antiquity and ancient philosophy. In the Middle Ages, since the only emotional dedication approved by the church was the love for Christ, emotions were reinterpreted as fiery, harsh, abrupt, and overwhelming passions, which was related to the Christ’s suffering (Barbalet 2007). Emotions that were not related to the Christian devotion were presented as subversive for the Christian faith, and therefore condemned as irrational (Barbalet 2007: 1375). In the late Middle Ages, emotions were followed by a rigid system of conventional forms and strict rules, since the passions produced by difficult living circumstances would probably make social order impossible (Huizinga 1924/1987: 48). That was why the medieval scholastics
were so concerned about how emotions interfered with purely logical thinking, just as they were interested in their rational control (Mandler 2001).

In the 16th and the 17th centuries there was more interest in emotions without theological prejudices, and with the emphasis on the expressive and rhetorical significance of emotional dynamics. The reason for this was probably an increased significance of market exchanges and diplomacy, i.e. the importance of forming an attitude on the intentions of others (Barbalet 2007). This trend continued in the 18th century in the mentioned discussions on moral feelings (Smith 1759/2007), whereby “moral” no longer implied only ethical analysis, but also social and cultural analysis, while “feelings” implied cognitive and even the intellectual content of emotions (Barbalet 2007: 1375). Finally, the increased commercialization produced a growing interest in the family emotionality in the modern period, while the separation of professional and private life (i.e. a job from home) caused new emotional re-evaluations in the 19th century (Stearns 2008: 27).

At the end of the 19th and early 20th century, due to the development of anatomical and physiological sciences, there was an increased interest in physical (not just ideational) basics of emotionality. The first scientific (biological) theories of emotions followed afterwards (Darwin 1872/1989), as well as psychological experiments that were limited only to the emotional experience which could be explored in a laboratory context (James 1890). Finally, in the second half of the 20th century, there was almost an explosive interest in emotions in almost all natural and social sciences, as well as in the popular imagination and reflexive interest of the public for their emotional life (TenHouten 2007: xi).16

The historical analysis allows a deeper investigation of causality that works within the social context of emotions. Namely, the historical research deals with the factors that lead to new emotional formulations, initiating a causal analysis that is more extensive than simple cross-cultural comparisons of the relevant variables (Stearns 2008: 27). The research of the histor(icity) of emotions generates important new data, evaluation tools, and theoretical perspectives for the study of emotions. These researches also offer examples of emotional dynamics and an explicitly

16 Accordingly, historical researches indicate fundamental transformations of emotional standards in the centuries of the early modernity, i.e. in the centuries after 1500, and especially in the 17th and 18th century (Stearns 2008: 23). Inaugural addressing of Caroline Bynum, one of the leading historians of the Middle Ages, specifically referred to the significance of changes in the forms of emotionality between medieval and modern Europe, on the occasion of the election for the president of the American Historical Association in 1997 (Bynum 1997). For her, the Middle Ages were characterized by the prevalence of feelings of wonder and awe (before various miracles, ghosts, monsters, fantastic exploits, descriptions of other worlds in travel books, etc.) as a source of information, which was not the case in the modern age. Also, the study of emotions in Western Europe at the dawn of the Protestant Reformation emphasized the omnipresence of the atmosphere of melancholy and repentance (for example, in works of art, personal diaries, etc.). The situation changed again in the 18th century, in the form of the return of significance to the emotions of happiness and joy, which, in a certain sense, last even today (Stearns 2008: 17). Some theoreticians call certain manuals or instructions for actors in the 18th century as “protosociologies of emotions”, primarily due to detailed discussions of the meaning (and body expression) of specific emotions, as well as the character of the (appropriate) emotional experience in these publications (Cassidy and Brunström 2002).
historical starting point for the evaluation of the current directions of changing the emotional experience.

Then, the history of emotions rooted in the broader aspect of the social history becomes a part of important interdisciplinary and integrative efforts in terms of studying the role of emotions in social life (Kišjuhas 2015). For these reasons, the historians of emotions argue that sociological discoveries about the emotional trends “cry for synthesis” within a comprehensive historical framework (Stearns 1989: 593). In addition, the historical perspective offers an extremely important factor of change as the central variable of the analysis of the way in which emotions develop and function (Stearns 2008: 28). The social scientists have gradually understood the role of variable emotional standards for their own research, and the history (of emotions) can help them to better understand the socio-historical context of these intellectual, philosophical and social changes.

With bright exceptions such as Spinoza, Hume, or Sartre, emotions in the history of the Western philosophy imply an ambivalent and uncomfortable history of the contrasts and conflicts between reason and emotions, which is a relationship that does not suit contemporary (neuro)scientific knowledge (see e.g. Damasio 1994; LeDoux 2000; Pessoa 2008). Although philosophers have been interested in the nature of emotions since the time of the Presocratics and Socrates, the philosophy has largely evolved as a quest for reason without emotions, or senses without the sensibility. Yet, emotions have always “lurked from the background”, although usually as an unusual threat to reason, philosophy and philosophers (Solomon 2008). In this sense, one of the typical and most persistent metaphors on reason and emotions in philosophy is the metaphor of a master and a slave. The “wisdom” of reason has had a dominant role and a firm control, while the “dangerous impulses” of emotions have been safely suppressed or in harmony with reason.

This metaphor also takes place in philosophical, as well as in everyday discourses on emotions even today, in a form of an attitude that the emotions are “more primitive, less intelligent, more brutal, more unreliable, and more dangerous than reason”, and in the context of creating the very distinction between the reason and emotions, as it applies to two different, opposed and antagonistic aspects of the soul (Solomon 2008: 3). Even those philosophers who have been trying to integrate these two aspects, usually by reducing emotions into an inferior element of reason that distorts perception, have kept this distinction and insisted on the unambiguous superiority of Reason.

However, in spite of such attitudes, the philosophers of the West in their works and their intellectual networks (see Collins 1998) have never completely neglected the emotions, even when they characteristically deny their central significance (Solomon 2008: 4). Philosophers like Aristotle, Thomas, Descartes, Kant, have succeeded in creative ways to integrate rational and emotional elements in their philosophies (of emotions), in a way that represents a kind of avant-garde of the (scientific) understanding of this complex interrelation.\(^1\) In this sense, the relationship

\(^{17}\) Alluding to the problematic absence of the philosophy (of emotions) from the contemporary scientific debates on emotions, a philosopher William Lyons illustratively noted the following: “Very recently I acquired a shiny new textbook on the psychology of the emotions. In the chapter entitled ‘What is an emotion?’; I was astonished, in the way that
between reason and emotions in the history of the Western philosophy remains largely the relationship that is filled with ambivalence, i.e. contradictory contrasts, but also an overwhelming attraction between these spheres of human experience and human existence.

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one might be astonished to be served mackerel described as salmon, to find that the definition of an emotion, which began with the words, ‘An emotion is usually caused by a person consciously or unconsciously evaluating an event as relevant to a concern (a goal) that is important...’, was held to be a recent major breakthrough in the psychology of emotion and given a reassuringly recent date of 1986 ... However, the causal-evaluative theories of emotion are arguably as old as Aristotle and the Stoics, and in our own time have been much discussed by philosophers and psychologists well before 1986.” (Lyons 1999: 21).
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REASON WITHOUT FEELINGS?

Aleksej Kišjuhas

Razum bez osećanja? Emocije kroz istoriju zapadne filozofije

Apstrakt

U ovom radu se kritički analizira uzajamni odnos razuma i emocija kroz istoriju zapadne filozofije, kao neprimereno ambivalentni međuodnos kontrasta, kontrole i konflikta. Nakon analiziranja filozofija emocija i strasti među najuticajnijim filozofima i filozofskim delima antike i srednjeg veka, u radu se izlažu ideje o ovom međuodnosu u okvirima moderne filozofije, tj. tokom takozvanog Doba razuma. Na kraju, u radu se analizira karakter emocija u savremenoj filozofiji i ispituju se mogućnosti za istoriju (filozofiju) emocija i osećanja, ali i mogućnosti za prevazilaženje neumerenog suprotstavljanja razuma i emocija, koje je prisutno u dominantnoj zapadnoj filozofskoj tradiciji.

Ključne reči: emocije, razum, osećanja, strasti, istorija filozofije, istorija emocija
