SOVIET IN CONTENT - PEOPLE’S IN FORM:
THE BUILDING OF FARMING COOPERATIVE CENTRES
AND THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE, 1948-1950

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It was not until 1948, when the Cominform conflict escalated, that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia began a thorough implementation of the Soviet model in Yugoslav agriculture – due to the Soviet criticism, the CPY made immediate legislative changes and started a class struggle in Yugoslav villages. Simultaneously, and just a few months before the Fifth Congress, Josip Broz Tito initiated a competition for building 4,000 Farming Cooperative Centres throughout Yugoslavia - they were built in accordance with the social-realist “national in form – socialist in content” slogan. Once the building started, in his Congress speech, Radovan Zogović, a leader of the Serbian Agitprop department, offered the first official proclamation of Socialist Realism in the post-war period by a political authority. This article analyses the process of planning, designing and building of the Farming Cooperative Centres; discusses their political, ideological and formal implications; and inquires into the specific role of architecture, joined with the theory of Socialist Realism, in building Yugoslav socialism.

Key words: the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute; the Five-year plan; Farming Cooperative Centres; Socialist Realism; national in form.

THE POLITICS: THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE

In March 1947, after an unsuccessful Belgrade meeting with Soviet representatives, Edvard Kardelj left for Moscow to meet with Josif Stalin personally. Forming joint stock companies was a way of post-war bonding between Yugoslavia and the USSR; however, as the bonds were strengthening, the disagreements were rising. In the context of the emerging Eastern Bloc, the USSR initiated a process of cultural and economic exchange with the countries of people’s democracies, adjusting their economies to its own five-year economic development plan. By the beginning of 1947, the Soviet share in their import-export structure had increased, the trade agreements were signed, new joint stock companies were being created and the first economic plans were being prepared. The Yugoslav government was a leader in this process. The One Year Plan was already declared in 1946. While the other Eastern European countries were setting up their short-term plans, the proclamation of the first Yugoslav Five Year Plan was already in order.1 In the course of the process, in February 1947, the first Soviet-Yugoslav joint stock companies were created, concerning the river float and civilian airlines (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.113-118). By March, the Soviets had resumed a monopoly over the firms and were already looking to establish more. This time, they were demanding the founding of joint production companies in the field of metallurgy and oil extraction, that is, in the field of heavy industry, which was to be the base of The Plan. In Kardelj’s later words, this presented a problem “for both political and economic reasons” (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, p. 120).2 By 1947, the CPY had already gained full political power in the country and the state had a monopoly over all the major production companies. However, the monopoly itself did not enable the organizing and controlling of the entire process of economic accumulation and reproduction from one centre (Obradović, 1995, p.83). This was the task of The Plan, and in the words of Andrija Hebrang, the chairperson of the Economy Council at the time: “It is known that the one who holds the economy in hand, also holds the power” (Obradović, 1995, p.64). However, the enforcing of The Plan implied another level of centralisation. By demanding to establish joint companies in the industrial field specifically, the USSR was asking for direct involvement in leading the Yugoslav economic plan, that is, its

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2 The other countries of people’s democracies did not proclaim their Five Year Plans until The Council for Mutual Economic Aid was found in January 1949 in Moscow. In 1947, when the Five Year Plan was declared in Yugoslavia, a Three Year Plan was proclaimed in Hungary, Two Year Plans in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and One Year Plan in Albania. After the founding of The Council to which Yugoslavia was not invited, Five Year Plans were declared in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (1949-1953), Hungary and Poland (1950-1954), Romania and Eastern Germany (1951-1955), and were based on the same premises as the Yugoslav (1947-1952) and the first Soviet Five Year Plan (1928-1933) (See Obradović, 1995, pp.103-104).

3 According to Dedijer, forming join companies in the field of industry was one of the reasons of the Soviet conflict with China, and later with the other Eastern European countries as well (see ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.117-118; and Feltô, 1971, pp.154, 369-371).
share in holding the power. The Soviet terms were unacceptable, yet, in an agricultural country such as Yugoslavia, Soviet aid was necessary for the building of industry. The CPY was obviously looking for some other form of cooperation, and in that regard, Kardelj’s March meeting with Stalin was an unexpected success. Halfway through debating the joint companies’ issue, Stalin suddenly stopped insisting on his previous requests. His new standpoint was:

“What would it be like not to form new joint companies at all, but for us to help you, to give you one aluminium factory, one metal factory, and to help you in drilling for and refining oil? It is clear that joint-venture companies are not an adequate form of cooperation with an allied and friendly country such as Yugoslavia. There would always be disputes, in a way, the independence of the country would suffer and friendly relations would become corrupted. Those kinds of firms are convenient for satellite countries (…). We will give you all that on credit, help you with the workforce, specialists, and some of it you will pay in money, or however you can (…) We still have to get something from you too”. (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.120-1)

Both sides agreed that Soviet aid in building Yugoslav industry was to be given in credit loans. In the following month, the Law of the Five Year Plan was declared and publicly celebrated on 1 May 1947. Simultaneously, the Yugoslav government had declined the Marshall Plan, as did the other Eastern European countries. After that, the credit loans with the USSR were signed and foreign trade was predominantly directed toward the Eastern Bloc. The Cominform was created in September 1947 in Poland, establishing its future base in Belgrade, offering the official post-war political partnering between communist parties, and proclaiming that the world was divided in two opposing blocks: the democratic and the imperialistic (see ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol. 1, pp.161-165). By the end of the year, the mutual contracts of friendship and cooperation were signed among the Eastern Bloc countries, implying their military cooperation in case of war. Yet at the same time, it remained uncertain whether the Yugoslav economy would develop in the way the CPY had planned, because it became unclear if the funds Stalin had promised were going to be invested.

At the beginning of December 1947, the Secretary of the Yugoslav Foreign Trade Ministry Bogdan Crnobrnja left for Moscow to renew the trade agreements that were due to expire by April 1948. He was left there waiting for nearly two months (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.188-9). On 20 January 1948, he was finally received, only to find that the contract promised was merely verbal. Two weeks later, Kardelj left for Moscow again. This time, Stalin issued him with two ultimatums in two days: on 10 February, the foundation of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation; and on 12 February, the signing of a contract for obligatory consultations on foreign political issues (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.168-75, 185-7). Stalin was dissatisfied with Kardelj’s indecisiveness. On 26 February, the Soviet Ministry of Trade declared the trade agreements would be delayed until December 1948. From that moment on, Soviet economic pressure was turning into a full-blown Yugoslav economic crisis. In March, Soviet military and civilian experts were withdrawn from Yugoslavia and the facts of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict were exposed internationally. By mid-1948 when the first Cominform Resolution was declared, Yugoslavia found itself in a situation of total political and economic isolation from the Eastern and the Western Blocs simultaneously.

The framework of the Soviet criticism was that “the class struggle cannot be felt”, as there was “a substantial growth of capitalist elements in Yugoslav villages” (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.204-5). The CPY was also held responsible for “a non-programmatic approach to Party leadership”. Apparently, its last congress had been held in 1928. By 1948, the CPY had already introduced a series of economic and cultural measures in accordance with Soviet practice, yet Yugoslav and Soviet systems still differed a great deal. Along with the state-owned (državni) and the co-operative (za drugim), the 1946 FPRY Constitution still allowed the private (privatni) economic sector. As for the cultural field, Socialist Realism was encouraged by Yugoslav art critics; however, the standpoints of Yugoslav cultural field officials, architects in particular, were ambiguous. In 1947, there were several competitions for designing Yugoslav government buildings, but the formal characteristics of submitted projects still fell into two distinct categories: some resembled Modernism, others, Socialist Realism. In fact, both were equally accepted and discussed by juries (Blagojević, 2007, pp.56-188). However, in a matter of weeks after the Soviet criticism, a new Party line was established. In a plenary meeting held on the 12th and 13th of April, the CPY abandoned the path of a people’s democracy and posed the concepts of class struggle and of the socialist character of the Yugoslav revolution. The changes in the legislative and the public economic field were immediate. On 28 April 1948, the Nationalization Law was revised, abolishing all industrial companies that were still privately owned. On 20 May, the Party decided not to take part in the second Cominform meeting scheduled for June, thereby avoiding a public confession of guilt and instead announced the holding of the Fifth Congress on 21 July. The CPY also did not abandon the idea of the Plan, yet because of the economic sanctions, its further implementation would have to be based on domestic resources only, that is, on the private sector. As “a complete liquidation of capitalist assets in the industrial production field” had already been conducted (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, p.58), in accordance with the Soviet criticism, the class struggle and internal enemy issues related to the peasants. Simultaneously, the building of the Cooperative Centres (Zadružni domovi) began, giving architecture a new, crucial role in building socialism.

THE PRACTICE: THE BUILDING OF FARMING COOPERATIVE CENTRES

Josip Broz Tito gave the initiative for building Cooperative Centres in December 1947 (Bačić, 1948; ed. Krunic, 1948). At the same time, Crnobrnja had left for Moscow and Soviet economic pressure was starting to take place. This investment was not provided for – the Plan presented detailed building funds and in certain domains even the exact number of buildings was specified. Yet the document contained no data about building the Centres either by numbers or by the scope of the investment. The building started on April, and after the Congress was announced in May, it continued in the form of a so-called “pre-congress competition”. To this day, let alone 1948, this was one of the largest mass building actions in Yugoslavia: the task was to build 4,000 units.

The social significance of the Centres was constantly stressed at the time and it was closely linked to their architectural programme. The buildings consisted of two integrated parts: the agricultural-administrative (Zadruga – Farming Cooperative Office) and the cultural-educational section (Dom kulture – Cultural Centre). The presumptions behind the given partition were the following. Firstly, by building such architectural works, the material base for future development of the farming cooperative sector and Yugoslav agriculture would be created. New facilities would accommodate the exchange of industrial and agricultural products and, therefore, provide the newest technical advancements for agricultural production (Govor potpredsednika Savezne vlade Edvarda Kardelja, 1948). Secondly, the
cultural and ideological development of the masses would be improved. By building new theatres and libraries, peasants would find “knowledge, art, scientific and cultural entertainment, as well as necessary resting places” (Brajović, 1948, pp.28-29). The claim that providing technical equipment would improve agricultural development is indisputable; however, in the present economic conditions, there was nearly nothing to exchange (see Pavlović, 1997, pp.48-50). The purpose of the Plan itself was to improve industrial development, that is, to produce more machines. Accomplishing this goal by foreign trade was not possible at this point. Therefore, what was really implied in the above theses was that the mere building of the Centres would increase the use of mechanization, improve agricultural production and initiate cultural development. Clearly, this is hardly sustainable anywhere, not to mention Yugoslavia in 1948, and equalizing architectural works to a “material base” was a rather literal interpretation of Marx’s thought, particularly in times when there were no funds to cover the expense of building that material base itself.

As has been said, the federal government made the decision about the number of buildings “after considering the material and financial possibilities” (Bajalica, 1948, p.6). However, those central funds were unlikely to cover any of the necessary material requirements for this mass enterprise, the general recommendation was to collect local resources first (Borba, March 29, 1948). The State provided certain amounts of steel, glass, cement, and timber, but the rest of the construction material, namely, sand, stone, lime and bricks had to be manufactured and sourced locally due to the shortage of gas near construction sites. Having to build 4,000 units simultaneously in a matter of months also implied having a great number of trained construction workers that post-war Yugoslavia did not have. Considering the fact that they had to be found immediately, some were trained on crash-courses and others had to learn the trade while on-the-job. In many cases, there was no time to wait for federal funds at all and the building started without any external help. The work was expected to be done exclusively by peasants anyway as the moving power of the masses and their initiative was broadly counted upon.

Cooperative Centres were designed according to a specific typology. The villages were first divided into eight categories by number of inhabitants, and based on that, eight types of projects were made. Such partition was supposed to bring new edifices into accord with each village’s economic strength. The assumption was, in contrast to urban areas, rural settlements’ economic power could be directly linked to the number of inhabitants. That is, the more fertile the land, the more people would live there (Kojić, 1973, p.134). However, in 1946, all agricultural fields larger than 30 hectares (medium sized) had already been collectivized and joined to state-held farming cooperatives - the majority of villages were small and, by the given criteria, undeveloped (Petrica, 1980, p.512; Kojić, 1973, p.151). The mass building of the Centres and their eight group sub-division was meant to be undertaken in those areas specifically. For regions known to be fertile, such as the fields of Vojvodina, there were ninth and tenth so-called “Super Types” of Centres of a larger capacity and with specific programmes (ed. Krunić, 1948). Consequently, the flaws of the given typology were transferred to the Centres’ architectural programme and were most noticeable when relating to their cultural section.

Depending on a village’s size, the architects were supposed to design eight types of buildings. The given programmatic elements were the same for all types, differing only in the number of rooms and capacity. The administrative part consisted of one to two stores and service warehouses, one to four offices and one warehouse for storing agricultural products. As for the cultural section, the dominant programmatic element was a so-called multipurpose hall intended for theatrical plays, films and larger gatherings. The first typological inadequacy could be found in the case of the halls. They were supposed to have 200 seats for type I to 550 seats for type VII. Considering a fifty-seat difference was too small for halls to be classified into different typological categories, the attempts to do so were abortive. They were designed schematically, with the number of seats only approximate to those required by the programme or not even drawn on the blueprints. The other cultural features were of a secondary character. For the first six types only a reading room was required, and only for the last two types a library, both 30m². The last four types also had one or two “rooms for cultural needs” of 20m². As for service facilities, all types had a projectionist’s cabin and a coatroom for the audience, named “a small coatroom” for the first four types. The circulation areas were not defined and the programme contained no data about any other spaces necessary, thus, in most projects, even the sanitary facilities were not drawn in, or they were added to the buildings’ exterior later.

According to the statements of the architects at the time, the cultural section of the Centres was supposed to be “the focus of the cultural revolution of our peasantry” (Macura, 1948, p.28). Yet, the programme was given only in general terms and, consequently, their projects were of the same character. The task of preparing the whole enterprise in a matter of months also left no time for gathering the elementary, economic or technical data. The cadastral registers were not used in the design process (Pivac, 1951, p.111), and even if they had been, they would have been useless, again, due to the typology. Likewise, the final, detailed designs were never made. The construction started by functionally unfinished and technically unmarked first drafts on a 1:200 scale, and although the members of the Engineers and Technicians Society of Yugoslavia (ETSY) had “made the decision to make detailed projects, along with the first drafts” (Macura, 1948, p.27), the rush of a pre-congress competition made those detailed projects remain only a single proposal.

In total, seventy-five projects of different types were accepted, forty-seven of which were for mass construction, and the rest belonged to the “specific” category. As has been said, the tradesmen and engineers had given their best in building Cooperative Centres. Trade Union members worked on construction sites “instead of taking their vacations” and the architects designed the projects for free, taking on the obligation of surveying the construction process by working overtime (Krunić, 1949, p.99). However, the participation of experts was not decisive in any way, because once the building started, the typology according to which the projects were initially made, as well as those projects themselves, was completely neglected. Choosing if and where they were going to be built was neither a typology matter nor the architects’ concern.

The key role of preparing and organizing the building process was given to Party Committees of the Districts (Srez), who were the guardians of Party politics and Plan implementation at the regional level. Along with Cooperative Committees and “the support of the People’s Government and Popular Front”, the District representatives organized the supply and production of construction material, and had the power to decide in which villages and sites the construction would take place (Bajalica, 1948, pp.7-8). Those forty-seven designs the architects had made were mere catalogues for them to choose from. As a result, the only connection the Centres still had to the word “typology”, if any, was that some of them were chosen to be built more than once.
Dragomir Simić’s Project

In the words of Jovan Krunić, the criteria for choosing a project were the following: the need for more buildings of a smaller capacity; the inexpensiveness (a smaller quantity of material required); a good organization of the ground plan; and “one important factor was also architectural treatment of the building, that is, its attractiveness” (Krunić, 1949, p.107). The first claim, however, only partially factual – in Serbia, two thirds of villages were small, and types I, IV and VIII were built the most (Table 1). Apparently, large units were more expensive to build, but seemingly, they were quite attractive as well. The average number of sites per project was thirty, however, not all designs were equally popular. An unknown architect, Dragomir Simić, was the absolute winner of the Serbian pre-congress competition, although he later only received an honorary mention. His design was chosen to be built 132 times, while three other projects never saw the light of day; Rajko Tatić, an eminent pre-war Serbian-national style architect, designed one of them (Table 2).

Table 1. The number of construction sites per type

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<thead>
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<th>Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>916</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>636</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>570</td>
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<td>II</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>118</td>
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<td>VII</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>VI</td>
<td>31</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 2. The number of construction sites per author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Architect</th>
<th>Sites</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Dragomir Simić</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dimitrije Marinković</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Sima Papkov</td>
<td>118</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Nikola Gavrilović</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Miodrag Miljević</td>
<td>79</td>
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<td>VI</td>
<td>Sima Papkov</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>Nedeljko Pešić</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>Nikola Gavrilović</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Jovan Krunić</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Dobroslav Pavlović</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>Petar Petešević</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Branislav Marinković</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
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<td>I</td>
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<td>VIII</td>
<td>Nikola Lalić</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Aleksandar Šegvić</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Tehn. Sergije Vihrov</td>
<td>31</td>
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Simić’s project belonged to the type IV of Centres, and in it there were certain differences to the given programme. The hall had 255 out of 350 seats required along with the reading room; there was a library, which was not required for this type. The architect apparently neglected the typology and found an average programmatic solution that contained all the features Cooperative Centres could have had. This was the first and the last programme revision he made.

If Simić’s design is compared to the other projects of the type IV, the application of the second and third (economic and functional) principle Krunić mentioned becomes clearer. In other designs, ground plans were more developed; therefore, the circulation areas occupied much space, but considering the number of seats required for type IV halls, this was functionally justified (Figure 1). Yet in Simić’s project, the audience areas were kept to an absolute minimum, in fact, one could almost claim there were not any (Figure 2).

Although a foyer for at least 200 people was necessary, it was not included in the design. The visitors were supposed to enter the hall through a porch and a vestibule of 12m² all together. The stage area was under-developed, with no coatrooms, and in the case of a theatrical play, the actors would have to enter the stage directly from outside. The situation in the administrative part was similar. The users were supposed to enter the office directly from...
the porch and go through it to enter the other one. However, given the programme did not define facilities and circulation areas, although they are required for any architectural design, the architect did not feel any obligation to provide them, and in that regard he made no revision of the programme whatsoever. Thus, if the intention behind the project had been to provide adequate spaces for the administrative and cultural needs of users, its plan would have been graded as unsuccessful. Yet, if the goal had been to build the largest number of units in the shortest period of time, with the minimum quantity of material available, comfortable audience spaces could have been sacrificed. Simić designed the most economical and, therefore, the best plan by which the architectural programme was more than fulfilled. It had literally all the programmatic elements of type IV with a library included; thus the requirements were complied with more than a 100%. The project was perhaps atypical for a certain group of villages, but it was made typical by its success. It was the average, most acceptable solution at the time, and in the circumstances, was of a new, high quality. As for the fourth aspect, the buildings’ “attractiveness”, that was realized too. The architect achieved a maximum representational quality by the minimal use of formal elements and again, with minimal material requirements. Its prominent side was formed by a second storey balcony exit, placed above the porch framed by arches (Figure 3a, b). At the time, the arched porch was found to be consistent with Yugoslav vernacular architecture and the Socialist-Realist “national in form” concept (Figure 4a, b, c).

Yet, if the architectural treatment of Cooperative Centres is considered, there is a segment that was typical for all the projects, although it was not required by the programme. Krunić (1949, p.99) mentioned that porches were first supposed to be built in wood in order to mimic vernacular architecture, but due to the shortage of timber, this aspect was also given up on. However, there was no giving up on building porches, they were constructed in brick and concrete that was insufficient for constructing the buildings alone. Evidently, the use of vernacular elements was silently understood among architects, as well as in the building process, although all the economic and organizational conditions for building details like these were extremely unfavourable. Far more important functional aspects were willingly neglected repeatedly, and the porches were not necessary either for construction purposes or by functional requirements, this last is evident from Simić’s project. Building these elements surely required more time, money and material, especially when an unqualified workforce was employed (Figure 5). Seemingly, in the case of the porch, whose role was exclusively representational and in accordance with a “national in form, socialist in content” slogan, the economic aspect had suddenly lost key significance. The task was, apparently, to build the largest number of units, with the minimum of means available,
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THE THEORY: NATIONAL IN FORM,
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Speaking of Cooperative Centres, Kručić (1949,
p.99) claimed the architects were using vernacular forms in order to achieve two goals: they "tried to adjust to people’s [narodna] architecture by form and to local conditions by material". Masura (1946, p.29) explained the two aspects more thoroughly. Firstly, the Centres were supposed to "gain a suitable character and appearance", since their number "imposed a danger of their resembling standardized, monotonous elements", and therefore "a danger for their architectural value to be below the value which the significance and the role of Cooperative economy presupposes". Secondly, the architects tried to adjust the buildings in appearance as well as by material, to local, namely, geographic and climatic conditions, as well as "certain specificities of people’s architecture of certain areas".

Both architects separate the two aspects: “form” and “people’s architecture” on the one hand, and “material” and “the local conditions” on the other. The second attempt, adjusting to local conditions by material was inevitable, because the locally available materials had to be used for construction in any case. However, adjusting to aspects of local architecture was not possible, again, due to the given typology. The criterion of the number of inhabitants said nothing of a villages’ location or its architecture; hence, the architects could not have known where their projects were going to be built. Therefore, adjusting to local architecture is one matter, but adjusting to "people’s architecture by form" in order to express “a suitable character", is something else. Quite another thing was to give those buildings a national form.

According to Bratislav Stojanović (1947-1948, p.14), national forms were coming from the people, therefore, they were the easiest way to bring architecture nearer to the masses and to develop the people’s creative forces simultaneously. As Ivan Čolović (1993, p.83) noted, the political vocabulary in which the key word is “the people”, combined with invoking folklore, has a familiar intent in mind. In the eyes of the majority, folklore subjects and forms legitimize political and military actions. They “suggest (connote) the idea that the messages and emotions transmitted by that speech are inevitably the echo of the voice, of the expression, of people’s will”, moreover, “that the sender of the political message is the people itself”. Quite similarly, in 1948 Branko Maksimović (1948, p. 75) wrote:

“By creating works of architecture we will learn that they belong to the people and that masses of people rightfully expect of our new architecture to fully express their wishes and aspirations toward a better and more joyful life, to sketch out our path to socialism as clearly as possible.”

The intent behind invoking folklore, however, is of a dualistic character. It is used not only to legitimize political projects in the eyes of the people, but also to a foreign audience. By stressing the differences between local tradition and a neighbours’ culture it claims political independence; by looking for similarities, it claims the right to a political conjuction into one common state (Čolović, 1993, pp.88-9).

The Soviet case was, as ever, contradictory. The differences of local traditions were not stressed because there was a claim for political separation; on the contrary, they were supposed to create conditions for their merging into one culture. As Greg Castillo noticed (1997, pp.91-6), this was not a mere political proclamation, but Stalin’s consciously constructed dialectical logic. It was the expressing of non-Russian peoples’ national identity that contrasted and, consequently, propagated Russia’s development and progress - its mission civilatrice was supposed to encourage them back to join Russia. Stalin’s logic was later transferred to the theory of Socialist Realism, and in the mid 1930s, the architects were called to apply the idiom “national in form, socialist in content”. However, how this aphorism was to be translated into built form was by no means obvious, and the main reason for the confusion lay in the theoretical bases of Socialist Realism itself.

As with all the other Soviet arts, the architecture of Socialist Realism was supposed to be concurrent with Gorky’s definition given for literature, by which writers were expected to offer “the truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development” (quoted after Tertz, 1965, p.148). The Statute of The Union of Soviet Architects (1937) stated: "Soviet architecture must aspire to create the edifices that are technically perfect, economical and beautiful, that reflect the joy of socialist life and the greatness of the ideas and goals of our epoch" (quoted after Ostrogović, 1947-1948, p.3). In addition, Andrei Zhdanov explained the way of achieving these goals. The artists were supposed to use “various means” in choosing “the best of what all the previous epochs have ever created” (Zhdanov, 1934, p.181). According to the upper broad definitions, no strict guidelines had been bestowed upon Soviet artists, yet, in the spirit of Stalin’s dialectical logic, this did not imply they had enjoyed absolute freedom. Clearly given instructions could have been easily followed, but the fact there were not any opened up broad possibilities for finding artists’ “mistakes” whenever there was a new Party line to be implemented. Seemingly, that vast openness gave rise for the absolute freedom of the Party on the one hand, and for total repression for the artists on the other.

However, in literature and the fine arts it was at least known that the motives of building socialism were to be portrayed in realistic form. In architecture, it was by no means clear how to reflect “the joy of socialist life” in formal terms, nor was this ever cleared up in its theory. In fact, the theorists were primarily dedicated to erase any stable grounds for architectural production. Soviet architecture was supposed to use “its shapes, its compositional means of expression, its picturesque language” (Ostrogović, 1947-1948, p.4), but those compositional means were never actually defined. In the early 1930s, during the First Five Year Plan, there was a task of finding the Soviet style; so Ivan Fomin

Figure 5. The porch, Veřko Dupci, Rasina District, 2007. Author’s photographic archive.

4 "Učiće se da stvaraju arhitektonska dela mislimo na to da one pripadaju narodu i da narodne mase s pravom osećaju da naša nova arhitektura što punije izrazava njihove želje i stremljenja ka boljem i radosnijem životu, da što jasnije očituje naš put u socijalizam".

44 spatium
laboured to invent a “Red Doric order”, while others opted for historical revivals of Egypt, Pompeii and Renaissance Florence (Castillo, 1997, pp.100-1). Yet at the same time, the theorists claimed Socialist Realism was “not a style but a method” (Kuk, 2000, p.513), and the features of Soviet architecture were not to be pursued in some “formalistic compositional principles”, that is, in the styles alone (Ostrogović, 1947-1948, p.5). The finding of the Soviet style was guaranteed for the future, because it was taken as a scientific fact that the same thing had happened before in all great epochs of architecture. This also meant the style could not have been created instantly, it was supposed to grow “organically” and to be in accordance with the epoch of socialism. Like socialism, which was said to be a transitional period toward communism, architecture was in “a difficult period of searching for the new forms” (Ostrogović, 1947-1948, p.5). In the meantime, the basic principle that was supposed to guide the architects was “the critical assimilation of heritage” (Kuk, 2000, p.513), with the key word here being the “critical”. The Party’s criticism was enabling the architects to catch up with the ever-changing Soviet economic and political measures for their work to remain in accordance with socialist reality in its revolutionary development. Therefore, the Soviet style was never determined, but the architecture of Socialist Realism remained open for further interpretations.

In the second half of the 1930s, after the huge wave of collectivisation, there was a change of ideas. After the delegates of The Second All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers were said to have lobbied for a showplace for collective agriculture, in February 1935 Stalin duly approved the preparations for The All-Union Agricultural Exhibition (Castillo, 1997, pp.100-1). In the course of that action, there was “a determined approach towards national heritage” among architects, who were not looking for a unified (national) style anymore, but for an architecture unified with “the traditions of the vernacular building and the national forms of the peoples of the USSR” (Mac, 1946, p.120). Thereby, the theoretical base of Soviet architecture was redefined, as it was now a part of “a multinational social organism: unified and socialist in content, and various and national in form” (Mac, 1946, p.120). Yet again, the confusion about what constituted a national heritage was well founded, because, if for no other reason, Azerbaijani architects were being exhorted to learn from the treasure of native tradition, while their millenial shrine of Bibi Eyat outside Baku was dynamited as a part of a road construction project (Castillo, 1997, pp.100-1). Nevertheless, this time, the call for national forms was answered persuasively, because the process of their creation was no longer depending on architects themselves, nor was architecture left to develop “organically”. For the purposes of the Exhibition, “national forms” were systematically constructed by bringing hundreds of craftsmen from all Soviet republics to Moscow to work with architects. There the vernacular material was cleansed of all nationalistic and religious content until the only thing left was a picturesque residue, which was joined with Soviet symbols and shipped back to the countries of origin in a form of national architecture (Castillo, 1997, pp.107-8). The same thing had happened with the Soviet concept of nationality which, in the words of Laura Olson (2000, pp.3-4), had nothing in common with the one from pre-socialist days. It was allowed to remain because it represented only “form”.

The case of post-war Yugoslavia was, again, somewhat different. The vagueness of theoretical claims of Socialist Realism was used by Yugoslav architects in the same manner of giving the interpretations that were currently needed. Although the “national in form” slogan was often stressed, there were no formal distinctions in the Centres across different republics, and although this was mostly because of their building processes, that cannot be interpreted as its sole consequence. Critical discussions and political speeches of the time were typically confusing or equating the terms narodno (people’s) and nacionalno (national) – as Mira Krajgher (1948, p.128) wrote: “Between people’s artefacts and our contemporary architecture, the culture, socialist in content and national in form, is also subjected to the law of development”. When writing about Cooperative Centres, the architects were stressing the attempt to “adjust to people’s architecture by form” in order to express their character and significance, but there is not a single article in which it was claimed that their national character should have been expressed. The fact that the problem of nationality was not verbalized clearly does not imply national issues did not exist in post-war Yugoslavia; quite the contrary. Yet, in theory, as well as in practice, these differences were not made. Unlike in the USSR where the national identity problem was systematically solved, in Yugoslavia the problem was, at least in 1948, systematically overlooked.

In the short period allocated to the design process, Yugoslav architects were supposed to find a formula by which the “national in form” slogan was to be quickly applied to built form. The number of units demanded for typical designs, and the way the projects were planned, chosen and built annulled any of their previous character. After all the adjustments made on sites, of the seventy-five initial designs there were literally 4,000 units with every single one of them different from the other. The only one element still typical was “the form” of the porch. The process of cleansing the ideological content was a systemic consequence, while the Soviet result was achieved by constructing, the Yugoslav case was the Soviet version in reverse – dismantling. In Soviet architecture, Russia was an “unrepresented” nation, and expressing the differences of the other republics was merely declaratory; in Yugoslavia there were different nationalities that were unrepresented, while the formal architectural type remained, it was narodni because it was common for the entire country. The one thing that was not produced in practice was the “national in form” concept, it was stressed “formally”, as a mere declaration. Still, the whole enterprise was led by a consciously constructed dialectical logic, which had little to do with the problem of nationality because, in a given political moment, this issue was not a major significance.

**A Dialectical Logic of Propaganda**

On November 1978, Tito spoke of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute and mentioned that “the USSR was supposed to play a role (…) particularly in using its success for propaganda purposes” (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, p.249). Tito’s remark concerned the fact that, starting from 1945, the popularising of the USSR was the corner stone of CPY propaganda (Manojojvíc Pintar, 2005). Still, the reasons for insisting on the same political demeanour once the conflict had escalated, and in times of economic sanctions, can be interpreted from different standpoints. Firstly, by explaining to whom the propaganda was intended. Hannah Arendt (1998, pp.350-1) wrote that totalitarian movements exist in a world that is not totalitarian by itself, so they are forced to appeal to propaganda. This activity is always directed to the exterior sphere, either to non-totalitarian layers of the population or to non-totalitarian countries, and whenever a totalitarian doctrine is in conflict with propaganda intended for abroad, it is explained as a “temporary tactical manoeuvre” to those inside. The thesis can be compared to Tito’s quote; supposedly, the intention of the CPY was to use the authority of the USSR inside the country, when it is more likely that, after 1948 at least, it was directed to the outside, back to
the Soviet Union. All the changes made in Yugoslav law and economy were a declaration of consistency to Soviet principles; likewise, by using vernacular elements in Cooperative Centres their Soviet character was intended. On the other hand, the constant invoking of “the people” and “people’s forms” speaks enough about to whom the internal aspect of propaganda was intended. However, propaganda purposes do not explain the fact that there were 4,000 Centres in the building process in 1948. It is questionable whether “the language” of architecture, namely, referencing Soviet or folklore forms, could be reason enough for the Party to impose the difficult task of building thousands of buildings on itself, even in political and economic conditions already unfavourable for its staying in power. It appears the presumable role of the architecture of Socialist Realism does not end completely if taken solely in the post-modern sense Mikhail Epstein (1998) wrote about, respectively.

According to Arendt (1998, p. 369, 371), the real goal of totalitarian propaganda is not persuading, but organizing, the accumulation of power (Machtbildung). The masses are not conquered by a momentary success of demagogy, but by “a visible reality” and “the power of living organization”. The ideology cannot be either “transferred” or “taught”, but only “exercised” and “practised”. As Kardelj argued at the Fifth Congress, the important feature of the Yugoslav public economy’s socialist transformation was “creating an organizational form and a material technical base which would change the small-self soul of a peasant day-to-day” (V kongres KPJ i zadružne organizacije, 1948). The significance of new farming cooperative economies in achieving that goal was stressed by Aleksandar Ranković, Interior Affairs Minister, who claimed they presented “a very convenient form through which the Party (…) practically helps the masses (…) to mobilize against capitalist elements in the villages” (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, p.383). After that, Dimitrije Bajalica (1948, p.8), the Secretary of the Farming Cooperative Economy Committee, said the Centres themselves were “a material technical base” for achieving socialism in the countryside, a base which “with proper organizational-propaganda work (…) will help the masses to persuade themselves by their own experience of the need and the necessity of that road for a better and happier life”. That was also the long-term significance of those buildings: “Mere building of Centres (…) creates new organizers and managers of public economy, raises the faith in the power of association and enforces the consciousness of Cooperative members”.

As it happens, these were not merely political proclamations. If it had been propaganda only, in all probability there would have been no need for building 4,000 units in the given economic conditions. However, the lack of funds was not the failing point of the whole process, but a prerequisite, its driving power, enforced by the task of building thousands of units simultaneously. By not providing the material and the funds required, the Party was mobilising all the material and human resources available. The engineers were designing (although their projects were not followed); the tradesmen were sent to villages (although their help was of minor significance); but most importantly, the peasants were gathering, producing material and building the units. The action had mobilized all the levels of society to mass labour, and they were doing it pro bono, out of their own resources - after all, they were said to be building for themselves anyway. Contrary to other arts, the one feature architecture could provide in the whole process was a “living organization”, with its key focus shifted from “the buildings” to “the people”, and through it, the Party was practicing the same dialectical Soviet model it was criticized for not being consistent with. On the one hand, this showed people’s support to the outside. As Bajalica (1948, p.8) stressed just before the Congress: “Millions of work hours given [by masses of people] in this pre-congress competition speak of (…) their love for the Party”. Yet more importantly, the Soviet criticism left the Party unsure of the people’s responses. It was in a position of preserving power and, as Yugoslav representatives argued themselves, while the CPY was organizing, the people were practicing and learning. Their involvement in the act of building gave the Centres a character no architect or form could ever manage to express - a didactic one. To paraphrase Slavoj Žižek’s (1999, p.28) insight, the most elementary definition of ideology was given by Marx: they did not know it, they were doing it (Figure 6).

The Building of Socialist Realism

A small number of Centres were finished before the Congress. For example, in the Nisus district thirty-eight were under construction, but by July 1948 only three of them were roofed, and the walls were almost finished on two (Bajalica, 1948, p.7). Yet, the mere fact construction had started was more than enough for the Party to make a number of consecutive assumptions. The material base was set; therefore, the building of the new socialist society had already begun. In Bajalica’s words before the Congress (1948, p. 8):

“By building the Cooperative Centres with their libraries and reading rooms, the conditions of the kolkhoz villages of the great country of socialism have are being created in our countryside too. The Centres are going to become lighthouses which will constantly light up our villages with rays of socialism, and on the base of science of Marxism-Leninism, and using the 30-year-experience of the Soviet Union, in our conditions help create a new, socialist countryside.”

By the same principle, the Centres’ strongpoint in practice, or rather, in reality, along with their formal side, was used for declaring that Socialist Realism is dominant in Yugoslav architecture. In his Congress speech, Radovan Zogović (1948, p.56), a leader of the Serbian agitprop department, condemned “decadence and formalism” of Modern architecture and claimed Socialist Realism is more appropriate for building a new, socialist society. This was the first official proclamation of Socialist Realism in the post-war period by a political authority. As Maksimović (1947-1948, pp.15-16) wrote, the same happened in the USSR in the 1930s, it was those “gigantic tasks of planned building” that posed new conditions “for building architecture on solid, healthy bases”, and for rejecting tendencies which were “rooted in capitalism, in the deterioration of architecture, and turning it into a bare technicism”.

The Party’s proclamations were then followed by an institutional reply: the October Resolution of the Second Congress of ETSY stated that the architects accept the Central Committee’s directives and concluded:

“To discard notions of architecture brought down to a mere solving of the utilitarian, narrow-technical components as in capitalist countries, and to demand the correct fulfilment of functional component and artistic-ideological component of an architectural work at the same instance. (…)”

To devote all the attention necessary to
acquainting, studying, evidencing, conserving and publicizing research results of the architectural heritage of our past.\(^5\) (Rezolucija sekcije arhitekata na II. Kongresu inženjera i tehničara Jugoslavije, 1948)\(^5\)

After that, while speaking of the Centres in April 1949, Krunić (1949, p.99) made the following rationalization: 

“If someone would think that the projects of our Cooperative Centres are not “contemporary”, because they do not have any windows and flat roofs, then we would respond that the measure of contemporaneity and quality of their form is not the use of elements of Western-European grasping of things, but the use of elements that are a real expression of our possibilities and needs, which are in their scope, and which are in the service of the broadest strata of the working masses. Such architecture is a document and an expression of its time and, therefore, is quality architecture. And not only that, the enormity and the broadest significance of this action, which cannot even be imagined in a bourgeois society should be emphasized as well, its breadth and general usefulness for people implies the socialist content of our architecture. From the standpoint of form, it is a contribution to the process of creating the expression of Socialist Realism which has begun.”\(^6\)

Before they were even built, the Centres were proof that the reality was “accurately shown” by which, as Karel Teige (1977, pp.305-6) wrote in his definitions of Socialist Realism, they immediately drew “a positive assessment of the formal side”, and showed “evidence of perfection in its realization”. Moreover, that same formal side was proof that they are Socialist Realism, without mentioning, of course, the detail of “national in form”.

Paradoxically, the architectural practice itself provided a material base for political propaganda, but it managed to establish new theoretical claims about and upon itself only through it. In addition, the politics-practice-theory concept of building Socialist Realism in Yugoslav architecture was just a starting point for the other arts. The pre-congress competition was referring to photographers, artists and art students as well, as they were all sent to construction sites throughout Yugoslavia. Consequently, there was a thematic change in Yugoslav painting also, the motifs of People’s Liberation War were swiftly set aside by motifs of building the new socialist society (Figure 7a, b, c, d). The most distinguished case of that process was the sudden star-status of previously unknown painter Boža Ilić (Merenik, 2001, pp. 21-47). At the end of 1948, his Probing the Terrain of New Belgrade was a huge success, and is considered a canonical example of Socialist Realism in Yugoslav fine arts to this day.

The Year 1949

In Arendt’s words (1998, p.370), totalitarian leaders choose elements from reality to isolate and generalize them until they construct a world that can be on equal terms with the real one. However, they constantly add the power of organization to the weak and unreliable voice of their arguments, and the more their power is resisted by the outside, the stronger is the terror on the inside.

In December 1948, the Soviets declared the trade agreements were not going to be renewed at all and it became clear that political and economic relations with the USSR were not going to be improved no matter what the CPY did (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.2, pp. 4-6, 20-21, 673). In 1949, for the first time after the war, the media image relating to the USSR started to change. The number of favourable articles was decreasing as border incidents with the eastern neighbours were increasing; and along with their first culmination in March, the first critical articles were published (Dobrivojević and Milić, 2004). Yet, even though the popularising of the USSR was stopped, the implementation of Soviet methods did not; in fact, it was enforced even more. In January, after the Second Plenum of the CPY, the Yugoslav economy was reoriented again (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.2, pp.13-16), but contrary to the previous impulsive manner of handling things, the mobilization of the workforce and the liquidation of kulaks as a class acquired a planned approach. The

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\(^5\) Odbaciti shvatanja o arhitekturi koja se svode na puko

\(^6\) Ako bi se nekome činilo da projekt naših zadružnih

\(^7\) Zvanično, u okviru socijalističkih sekcija arhitekata, Mješalica (The Cement Mixer), 1948. Jugoslavija SSSR (1948), No. 30, second unnumbered page.

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![Figure 7a. The building of the New Belgrade, 1948.](image)

![Figure 7b. Frano Bado, Škice sa omladinske pruge (Sketches of the Youth Railroad), 1947. Utovar umjetnosti iz NRI na omladinskoj pruzi (1947-1948) Arhitekta, No. 4-6, p. 53.](image)

![Figure 7c. Ismet Musažinović, Mješalica (The Cement Mixer), 1948. Jugoslavija SSSR (1948), No. 30, second unnumbered page.](image)

![Figure 7d. Boža Ilić, Sondiranje terena na Novom Beogradu (Probing the Terrain of New Belgrade), 1948.](image)
number of Farming Cooperatives started to rise right after Kardelj (1948, p.7) quoted Stalin’s “successes achieved should not make us dizzy nor put us to sleep” at the Fifth Congress; however, after the Plenum their number increased by 600% in 1949 (Table 3, Graph 1).

Table 3. The number of Farming Cooperatives in Yugoslavia, 1945-1949.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cooperatives at the end of the year</th>
<th>Cooperatives found</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>6,625</td>
<td>5,307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Graph 1. The number of Farming Cooperatives in Yugoslavia, 1945-1949.](image)

With a reality base now set and left behind, no material sources left and no obligation to respond to anyone, mobilization per se was the goal. In 1949, the system was organizing the only thing it had left - the people.

THE U-TURN: TAKING ON A NEW FORM OF SOCIALISM

By November 1949, Stalin was still persisting in his accusations; only this time, he was aiming at the intensifying negotiations between the CPY and the West (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.2, pp.535-9). In December, the first trade and loan agreements were signed with Great Britain and the USA, and simultaneously, Kardelj (Govor druga Edvada Kardelja na svečanom zasedanju slovenske Akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, 1949) declared “from now on (…) science is free”. From then on, there was an economic and cultural reorganization perhaps even more revolutionary than the one in 1945. In June 1950, the Party decentralized itself, and in July, it proclaimed the first self-management act. This led to a u-turn in all public fields. The First Conference of Architects and Urban Planners of the FPRY was held in November. The architects confessed their errors from the previous period, stating, among other things, that the Centres were an expensive and luxurious way of building, not suitable for the given land and climatic conditions or their functional requirements. As for Socialist Realism, it was not mentioned even once, its abandonment was silently understood behind Krunic’s words (1950, p. 170, 175) such as that “our architectural expression is specific in form”, and “we think that it is unworthy, illogical and utterly absurd to literally copy ready-made architectural expressions or urban planning formulas”.

Socialist Realism became a pejorative term in the subsequent years marked by residential architecture and Modernism, while previously unfinished government buildings were being dressed in the new, Western fashion (Kulić, 2007). The systematic dismantling was happening once again, and as all recent “results” were being erased, a new form of socialism was adopted. Those legacies were followed until Tito’s death in 1980 when the whole process started again, only in a post-modern epoch that transmitted a new “language” for expressing national tendencies (Lujak, 2010; Živančević, 2008). However, those were only formal adjustments; the urban planning methods were still exactly the same (Bajić Brković, 2002), and the political circumstances have remained an important factor in architectural practice to this day (Počić and Nikezić, 2007). It is reasonable to ask if it were the events of 1948 that posed a material base for the socialist-realist approach of always finding out different forms, while an underlying method of doing so remained essentially soviet.

As for the Centres, after 1950 they were not built anymore - many were left unfinished or their “socialist content” was changed (Ilić, 1969; Nikolić and Ivančević, 1970). Some were used as cinemas and village schools; numerous others became warehouses, or they were simply left abandoned, becoming monuments of the ever changing socialist society. Because of that, the question remains: was “the third way” of Yugoslav architecture, namely Socialist Modernism or Socialist Aestheticism, simply a part of the official political construction that hid the fact it was still Soviet in content and modernist only in form?

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